Journal of Civil Law Studies
Volume 9
Number 1 Conference Papers
The Louisiana Civil Code Translation Project:
Enhancing Visibility and Promoting the Civil
Law in English
Baton Rouge, April 10 and 11, 2014
Part 1. Translation Theory and Louisiana
Perspectives

Article 16

10-27-2016

Complete V.9 No.1

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/jcls
Part of the Civil Law Commons

Repository Citation
Complete V.9 No.1, 9 J. Civ. L. Stud. (2016)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/jcls/vol9/iss1/16

This Complete Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Civil Law Studies by an authorized editor of LSU
Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

Volume 9
Number 1
2016
___________________________________________________________________________

ARTICLES


The Constitution as Code (with a Postcript by Nicholas Kasirer) ................................ Paul R. Baier



The Duty of Good Faith Taken to a New Level:
An Analysis of Disloyal Behavior ..................................................................... Thiago Luis Sombra



International Trade v. Intellectual Property Lawyers:
Globalization and the Brazilian Legal Profession............................................... Vitor Martins Dias

CONFERENCE PAPERS
The Louisiana Civil Code Translation Project:
Enhancing Visibility and Promoting the Civil Law in English
Le projet de traduction du Code civil louisianais :
Améliorer la visibilité et la promotion du droit civil en anglais
Louisiana State University, Paul M. Hébert Law Center, April 10–11, 2014


Papers by Vivian Grosswald Curran, Jean-Claude Gémar, François-Xavier Licari, Sylvie
Monjean-Decaudin, Olivier Moréteau, Alexandru-Daniel On, Agustín Parise, and Anne Wagner
CIVIL LAW IN THE WORLD



Québec, Canada..................................................................................... Caroline Le Breton-Prévost

BOOK REVIEW


The Struggle for European Private Law: A Critique of Codification ......................... Agustín Parise

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES
Editor-in-Chief
Olivier Moréteau
Louisiana State University Paul M. Hebert Law Center, USA
Executive Editor
Agustín Parise
Faculty of Law, Maastricht University, The Netherlands
Managing Editors
Christabelle Lefebvre
Louisiana State University Paul M. Hebert Law Center, USA
Jason Maison-Marcheux
Louisiana State University Paul M. Hebert Law Center, USA
Matthew Boles
Louisiana State University Paul M. Hebert Law Center, USA
Book-Review Editor
Susan Gualtier
Louisiana State University Paul M. Hebert Law Center, USA
Honorary Members of the Advisory Board
Robert A. Pascal
Louisiana State University Paul M. Hebert Law Center, USA
Rodolfo Sacco
Faculty of Law, University of Turin, Italy
Advisory Board
Stathis Banakas
Norwich Law School, University of East Anglia, United Kingdom
Paul R. Baier
Louisiana State University Paul M. Hebert Law Center, USA
Andrea Beauchamp Carroll
Louisiana State University Paul M. Hebert Law Center, USA
Elizabeth R. Carter
Louisiana State University Paul M. Hebert Law Center, USA
Seán P. Donlan
University of Limerick, Ireland
Muriel Fabre-Magnan
Faculty of Law, University Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris 1, France
Frédérique Ferrand
Faculty of Law, University Jean Moulin, Lyon 3, France
Silvia Ferreri
Faculty of Law, University of Turin, Italy
James R. Gordley
Tulane University Law School, USA
Michele Graziadei
Faculty of Law, University of Turin, Italy
David W. Gruning
College of Law, Loyola University New Orleans, USA
Attila Harmathy
Faculty of Law, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary

Rosalie Jukier
McGill University Faculty of Law, Canada
Nicholas Kasirer
Justice, Court of Appeal of Quebec, Canada
Pnina Lahav
Boston University School of Law, USA
Alain A. Levasseur
Louisiana State University Paul M. Hebert Law Center, USA
Melissa T. Lonegrass
Louisiana State University Paul M. Hebert Law Center, USA
Hector MacQueen
University of Edinburg School of Law, United Kingdom
Ulrich Magnus
Faculty of Law, University of Hamburg, Germany
Blandine Mallet-Bricout
Faculty of Law, University Jean Moulin, Lyon 3, France
Juana Marco Molina
Faculty of Law, University of Barcelona, Spain
Michael McAuley
Trusts Counsel, Trott & Duncan, Hamilton, Bermuda
Barbara Pozzo
Faculty of Law, University of Insubria, Como, Italy
Christa Rautenbach
Faculty of Law, North-West University, South Africa
Francisco Reyes Villamizar
Faculty of Law, University of the Andes, Colombia
Lionel Smith
McGill University Faculty of Law, Canada
Jan M. Smits
Faculty of Law, Maastricht University, The Netherlands
Fernando Toller
Faculty of Law, Austral University, Argentina
John Randall Trahan
Louisiana State University Paul M. Hebert Law Center, USA
Jacques P. Vanderlinden
Faculty of Law, Free University of Brussels, Belgium
Faculty of Law, University of Moncton, Canada
Stefan Vogenauer
Faculty of Law, University of Oxford, United Kingdom
Michael L. Wells
University of Georgia School of Law, USA
Pierre Widmer
Swiss Institute of Comparative Law, Lausanne-Dorigny, Switzerland

Special Advising Editor
Alexandru-Daniel On
Faculty of Law, Maastricht University, The Netherlands
Graduate Editors
Jumoke Dara
Nate Friedman
Christopher Ortte
Katherine Stephens

Bryan Duprée
Houston Barlow Holley
Josie Serigne
Sara Vono

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES (ISSN 1944-3749)

Published by the Center of Civil Law Studies, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State
University.

© October 2016, Center of Civil Law Studies

The JCLS welcomes submissions for Articles, Notes, Comments, Essays, Book Reviews, and
General Information. Unless otherwise agreed, contributions should have been neither published nor
submitted for publication elsewhere. All contributions will be subject to a critical review by the
Editors, and will be subjected to peer-review.

Editorial comunication and books for review should be addressed to the editor-in-chief, and sent to
our editorial offices.

Editorial offices:
Paul M. Hebert Law Center
Center of Civil Law Studies
W326 Law Center
Baton Rouge, LA 70803-1000

jcls@law.lsu.edu
www.law.lsu.edu/jcls

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES
_________________________________________________________________________________

VOLUME 9
NUMBER 1
2016
_________________________________________________________________________________
ARTICLES
The Constitution as Code: Teaching Justinian’s Corpus,
Scalia’s Constitution, and François Gény, Louisiana and
Beyond—Par la constitution, mais au-delà de la constitution
Paul R. Baier

1

Postscript to The Constitution as Code by Paul R. Baier
Nicholas Kasirer

23

The Duty of Good Faith Taken to a New Level:
An Analysis of Disloyal Behavior
Thiago Luís Sombra

27

International Trade v. Intellectual Property Lawyers:
Globalization and the Brazilian Legal Profession
Vitor Martins Dias

57

CONFERENCE PAPERS
The Louisiana Civil Code Translation Project:
Enhancing Visibility and Promoting the Civil Law in English
(Baton Rouge, April 10 and 11, 2014)
Traduction ou trahison
Vivian Grosswald Curran

127

Langages du droit et styles en traduction :
Common Law vs. Droit civil : An Odd Couple ?
Jean-Claude Gémar

135

A Space in-Between—Legal Translation as a ‘Third Space’
Anne Wagner

167

Pourquoi traduire un code, hier et aujourd’hui ?
Sylvie Monjean-Decaudin

191

The Louisiana Civil Code Translation Project:
A Libertarian View on the Possible Destiny
of a Trilingual “Footnote”
François-Xavier Licari

205

The Louisiana Civil Code in French:
Translation and Retranslation
Olivier Moréteau

223

Revision and Translation: The Louisiana Experience
Alexandru-Daniel On

259

The Concordancias of Saint-Joseph: A Nineteenth-Century
Spanish Translation of the Louisiana Civil Code
Agustín Parise

287

CIVIL LAW IN THE WORLD
Québec, Canada
Loyalty in Québec Private Law
Caroline Le Breton-Prévost

329

BOOK REVIEW
The Struggle for European Private Law:
A Critique of Codification
Agustín Parise

379

THE CONSTITUTION AS CODE:
TEACHING JUSTINIAN’S CORPUS, SCALIA’S
CONSTITUTION, AND FRANÇOIS GÉNY, LOUISIANA AND
BEYOND—PAR LA CONSTITUTION, MAIS AU-DELÀ DE LA
CONSTITUTION

Paul R. Baier ∗
I. Einleitung..................................................................................... 2
II. Aix-en-Provence......................................................................... 4
III. Beweise ..................................................................................... 8
IV. Siena. ...................................................................................... 16
V. Una spina nel piede .................................................................. 19
VI. La théorie de Sienne ............................................................... 20
VII. Justinian’s Zweck im Recht .................................................. 21
VIII. Ottawa .................................................................................. 21
IX. Fertig; fini ............................................................................... 22

∗ George M. Armstrong, Jr., Judge Henry A. Politz Professor of Law, Paul
M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA, USA. email: Paul.Baier@law.lsu.edu This paper was read at the Fourth Worldwide Congress of Mixed Jurisdiction Jurists, 24-26 June, 2015, Montreal, Canada. I have
borrowed heavily from my earlier canvasses of Justice Harry A. Blackmun and
Justice Antonin Scalia in works cited herein. Montreal is an ideal civitas from
which to sound my ideas anew—in search of lost time. I give my thanks to Mr.
Justice Nicholas Kasirer, Cour d’appel du Québec, to Olivier Moréteau, Director
of the Center of Civil Law Studies at LSU Law Center, to A. N. Yiannopoulos,
Eason-Weinmann Chair Emeritus, Tulane University School of Law, and to Tarkan Orhon, of Göttingen, meinem wissenschaftlichen Mitarbeiter, for help with
the books and for tightening up my German. This text was first published under
the title THE CONSTITUTION AS CODE (Vandeplas Publ’g 2015) and is republished
with the authorization of the publisher.

2

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 9

To the memory of John Henry Wigmore, Editorial Chair of the
Association of American Law School’s Modern Legal Philosophy
Series (1917). This treasure of continental legal philosophy translated into English guided Benjamin Nathan Cardozo in composing
his Storrs Lectures at Yale, viz., THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS (1921), and opened my eyes to the epistemology of the Constitution as Code. I read volume IX of this series, THE SCIENCE OF
LEGAL METHOD, when I arrived at Louisiana State University, Paul
M. Hebert Law Center, ca. 1972. A generation of teaching and
scholarship in the field of constitutional interpretation has confirmed to my mind the link between Code and Constitution that Wigmore first brought to my attention by way of the great gift of Rudolph
von Jhering and François Gény in English translation.
I. EINLEITUNG
Justinian ermahnte seine Professoren der Rechtswissenschaften,
die Wahrheit des Corpus Juris zu lehren. Es war ihnen verboten,
über den Text hinaus zu gehen.
My German is a tribute to Rudolph von Jhering of Göttingen,
one of my Mount Royal Muses of Mount Helicon. 1 I had better start
over in English:—
Justinian admonished his professors of law, Justinian ermahnte
seine Professoren der Rechtswissenschaften, to teach the truth of the
Corpus Juris, die Wahrheit des Corpus Juris zu lehren. They are
forbidden to reach beyond it, Es war ihnen verboten, über den Text
hinaus zu gehen. Here are Justinian’s words in English. I translate
from the Latin:
We say this because we have heard that even in the most
splendid civitas of Alexandria and in that of Caesarea are
unqualified men who take an unauthorized course and impart
1. I invite the reader to trek to the top of Mt. Helicon with a great civilian
scholar, jurist, and professor, A. N. Yiannopoulos, “Megas Yiannopoulos,” Emeritus of Tulane University School of Law (New Orleans), who as my colleague at
LSU in my early years of teaching nursed me on the milk of Max Reinstein (Chicago), Albert Erensweig (Berkeley), and Gerhart Kegel (Cologne). I sat wideeyed in his Civil Law System course at LSU Law School, ca. 1972. After forty
years’ friendship, I paid homage to him at a Louisiana Law Review banquet, viz.,
The Muses of Mount Helicon (March 21, 2014), in Paul R. Baier, SPEECHES 258
(Louisiana Bar Foundation 2014).
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a spurious erudition to their pupils; we warn them off these
endeavors, under the threat that they are to be punished by a
fine of ten pounds of gold and be driven from the civitas in
which they commit a crime against the law instead of teaching it. 2
Justice Antonin Scalia is a contemporary Justinian insisting that
his colleagues on the Supreme Court of the United States have committed crimes against the Constitution by going beyond its text as
originally understood by its Framers of 1787, by those who added
the Bill of Rights of 1791, and by the citizens of the several states
who ratified both.
In other words, Mr. Justice Scalia has made a fortress out of the
dictionary. 3
My task (meine Aufgabe) in the civitas of Montreal on the stage
of the Fourth Worldwide Congress of Mixed Jurisdiction Jurists is
to invoke the letter and spirit of Rudolph von Jhering and François
Gény against the spurious erudition of Antonin Scalia, the first Roman on the Supreme Court of the United States.
In a phrase: “The Constitution as Code.”
First, the letter and spirit of von Jhering, from his Unsere Aufgabe (1857): “Durch das römische Recht, über das römische Recht
hinaus.” 4 “Through the Roman law, but beyond the Roman law.”
This, at a time when Germany was without a code. The jurist’s task,
von Jhering realized, was to reshape the old Roman law to fit the
actuality of his times.

2. S. P. Scott’s translation THE CIVIL LAW, infra, note 68, is my standby
pony.
3. Contra, Judge Learned Hand, Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739
(1945): “But it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes
always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning.” Another New York jurist,
Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, has said the same thing about constitutional interpretation in his immortal classic The Nature of the Judicial Process. See Part 3f.,
infra.
4. Rudolph von Jhering, Unsere Aufgabe in I JAHRBÜCHER FÜR DIE
DOGMATIK DES HEUTIGEN RÖMISCHEN UND DEUTSCHEN PRIVATRECHTS 52 (F. E.
von Gerber, Rudolph von Jhering eds., Mauke, 1857).
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Next, François Gény. One hundred years after the Code Civil,
Gény’s Méthode d’Interprétation trumpets “life after text” 5:
One has tried to replace the syllogistic and dogmatic method,
which deduced from the codes a completely fictitious and
unreal “life” incapable of development and fixed definitely
at the moment the logical construction was completed, by a
method which is external rather than only internal as the first
was, and the characteristic of which is the constant revival
of codes, not by their own substance, but through the introduction of all the elements of dynamic life itself. 6
This, from Raymond Salleilles’s Preface to Gény’s great book. 7
Salleilles concludes his Preface by saying, “I could not end with
better words than those inspired by an analogous phrase of Jhering,
which is the focal point of the whole book of Mr. Gény: “Through
the Civil Code; but beyond the Civil Code.” 8
II. AIX-EN-PROVENCE
Next, via Air France, we sojourn from Montreal to Aix-en-Provence, France, an ancient Roman outpost for the troops. I taught
classes there with Justice Harry A. Blackmun of the Supreme Court
of the United States.
We were together at Aix-Marseille-III, its Faculté de droit, the
school of Portalis, progenitor of the Code Civil:—“The Codes of

5. “Of course, it pains Justice Scalia to see the Court surpassing its bounds.
But, truth to tell, the Court has never bound itself to text or original meaning. Life
after text frees the judge. La vie après le texte libère le juge.” Paul R. Baier, The
Supreme Court, Justinian, and Antonin Scalia: Twenty Years in Retrospect, 67
LA. L. REV. 489, 514 (2007).
6. Raymond Saleilles, Preface to FRANÇOIS GÉNY, MÉTHODE
D’INTERPRÉTATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVÉ POSITIF (1899 ; 2d ed. 1919, Jaro
Mayda trans. Louisiana State Law Institute 1963), p. LXXXI.
7. Professor Marie-Claire Belleau, of the Université Laval, Québec, renders
both Salleilles and Gény as “juristes inquiets” in her vibrant reconstruction of
their views, viz., The “Juristes Inquiets”: Legal Classicism and Criticism in Early
Twentieth-Century France, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 379. Thanks to Nicholas Kasirer
for bringing this article to my attention.
8. Salleilles, supra note 6, Preface, at LXXXVI.
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nations are the fruit of the passage of time; but properly speaking,
we do not make them.” 9
Portalis’s foresight, I trust, is familiar to all of you. I owe my
first reading of him to my French colleague, friend, and mixed-jurisdiction jurist Professor Alain Levasseur—his enduring Code Napoleon or Code Portalis?
The constitution is a code, is it not?
Levasseur’s article sparked my teaching of the United States
Constitution as Code. Liberty is open-ended; the judge must give it
life. Par la constitution, mais au-delà de la constitution.
At Aix, Justice Blackmun voiced the same insight: “No body of
men 200 years ago could determine what our problems are today.
That is, I suppose, what we have courts for”—“to construe the Constitution in the light of current problems.” 10 We talked anew of the
timeless problem of judicial interpretation of written texts, from Napoleon’s Code to America’s Constitution, aside the aged fountains
of Aix where Portalis, le père du code civil, played as a little boy.
This was the summer of 1986, the year of Bowers v. Hardwick. 11
You remember Bowers v. Hardwick: The Supreme Court sustained
the constitutionality of Georgia’s sodomy law as applied to two
adult homosexual males caught in flagrante dilicto in the privacy of
their own bedroom by a wandering policeman. Mr. Justice
Blackmun dissented.
“We cannot live with original intent,” 12 he told our Cours Mirabeau students.

9. The Preliminary Discourse of Portalis (M. Shael Herman, trans.), quoted
in Alain Levasseur, Code Napoleon or Code Portalis?, 43 TUL. L. REV. 762, 773
(1969).
10. Hearing Before Comm. on the Judiciary, United States Senate on the
Nomination of Harry A. Blackmun, of Minnesota, to be Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. 35 (1970).
11. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
12. The quotation is taken from the transcript of the sound recordings of our
Aix 1992 classes (hereinafter cited as Aix ’92 Transcripts) (recorded with Justice
Blackmun’s permission; tapes and transcript on file with the author).
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The Justice and I returned to Aix in 1992, the year of Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 13 which saved
Roe v. Wade 14 by a hair. More on Roe v.Wade and François Gény a
little later in meine Aufgabe nach von Jhering.
Justice Antonin Scalia,“Il Giudice Justinianus,” 15 roars in his
dissent in Casey: “We should get out of this area, where we have no
right to be, and where we do neither ourselves nor the country any
good by remaining.” 16
By way of going through Salleilles but beyond him, let me quote
the preface to our teaching materials at Aix, bound in France’s tricolor red, white, and blue, entitled Constitutional Interpretation:
Les procédés d’élaboration (1986):
The American Constitution, like the French Civil Code, consists of words on paper. Constitutional interpretation begins
with words but almost always travels beyond text to the
realm of ideas. Whether we shall have more or less liberty,
more or less privacy, more or less equality, depends on the
work ways of the judge. 17
Our materials paid special attention to the development of the
right of privacy, from Griswold v. Connecticut to Roe v. Wade, to
Bowers v. Hardwick, and beyond.
We promised our students a few continental comparisons in
class. We advised them that our materials were aimed at exploring
the role of the judge and the place of intellectual personality and
process in giving shape to the law of the Constitution.

13. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
14. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
15. My characterization, in Paul R. Baier, The Supreme Court, Justinian, and
Antonin Scalia, supra note 5, at 521.
16. Planned Parenthood, supra note 13, at 1002 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
17. Harry A. Blackmun & Paul R. Baier, Preface to CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION: PROCÉDÉS D’ÉLABORATION vi (June/July 1992) (teaching materials for a summer course on American Constitutional Law at Aix-en-Provence,
France) (on file Law Library, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Baton Rouge, La.,
USA).
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We borrowed the subtitle of our Aix teaching materials from
Gény’s Les procédés d’élaboration du droit civil, 18 a lecture delivered at Nancy in 1910.
At the end of his little book Gény emphasizes the role, which he
suggests was neglected by theoreticians of his time, des procédés
intellectuels et de la terminologie dans l’élaboration juridique, 19 the
role of the intellectual process and of the terminology in juridical
elaboration.
Gény of course was talking about the French Civil Code. His
greatest work was his study of the methods of interpretation and the
sources of private positive law, Méthode d’interprétation et sources
en droit privé positif, which was published in 1899 and translated
into English by Jaro Mayda under the auspices of the Louisiana
State Law Institute in 1963. Only because I teach law in Louisiana,
did I receive the gift of Gény.
Imagine my joy when an esteemed scholar among worldwide
jurists, Nicholas Kasirer, quondam doyen of McGill University Law
School, Montreal, now Mr. Justice Kasirer of the Cour d’appel du
Québec, mentioned my name in trumpeting to the world that:
Recently one scholar linked U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Harry A. Blackmun’s thinking on the Bill of Rights to
Gény’s libre recherche scientifique, citing Jaro Mayda as the
linguistic go-between. 20
True, my place was only in a Kasirer footnote. But I thank Justice Kasirer for his encouragement as I continue to plead the case for
seeing Gény’s Méthode at work in constitutional interpretation in
the United States, or, indeed, at Ottawa.

18. François Gény, Les procédés d’élaboration du droit civil (1910), in LES
MÉTHODES JURIDIQUES : LEÇONS FAITES AU COLLÈGE LIBRE DES SCIENCES
SOCIALES en 1910, pp. 174, 196 (Henry Barthélemy ed., 1911).
19. Id., at 196.
20. Nicholas Kasirer, François Gény’s libre recherche scientifique as a
Guide for Legal Translation, 61 LA. L. REV. 331, 350 n.74 (2001).
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There is a universality in going beyond text to shape the living
law—either of France’s code civil, America’s bill of rights, or Canada’s charter of rights and freedoms.
Following Gény and Kasirer, I offer my own Montreal sound 21:
Par la constitution, mais au-delà de la constitution.
III. BEWEISE
Now to the proofs. My itemization lacks elaboration. This is on
purpose. “Nous faisons une théorie et non un spicilège.” 22 This from
Holmes’s preface to his great book, The Common Law (1881).
I haven’t written a great book. Perhaps my Montreal composition à la Gény is a start. Here is my list of scholarly notes. Jaro
Mayda’s are breathtaking. 23 I only offer a few.
a. Madison’s ninth amendment to the bill of rights authorizes
going beyond the enumeration of rights to vouchsafe others retained
by the people.

21. Cf. Nicholas Kasirer, That Montreal Sound: The Influence of French Legal Ideas and the French Language on the Civil Law Expressed in English (37th
John H. Tucker, jr., Lecture in Civil Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana
State University, 4/10/14, forthcoming in 9 J. CIVIL L. STUD. (2016).
22. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881), Preface, p.
iv, quoting Lehuërou.
23. Mayda’s introduction to his translation of Gény’s Méthode includes 267
footnotes, a display of staggering erudition. See “Gény’s Méthode after 60 Years:
A Critical Introduction,” in FRANÇOIS GÉNY, MÉTHODE D’INTERPRÉTATION ET
SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVÉ POSITIF (1899; 2d ed. 1919) (Jaro Mayda trans., Louisiana State Law Institute 1963), Introduction, pp. V-LXXVI. Thereafter, in progression, MAYDA publishes FRANÇOIS GÉNY AND MODERN JURISPRUDENCE (Louisiana State University Press 1978), with endnotes I-XCIV, pp. 103-228, and with a
sympathetic Introduction by Justice Albert Tate, Jr., of the Louisiana Supreme
Court. Justice Tate was duly impressed:
For me, the important perceptions included new insights into viewing the
law-in-being as involving a sharing rather than a separation of law-creating powers between the legislature and the judiciary, at least in the development of private-law precepts, and also, by reason of explicit and
reasoned formulation, into the judge’s duty to do justice without a specific text as being an integral (although exceptional) part of the life of
the law.
Id., p. xix. The present author’s théorie de Gény goes beyond private to public law
precepts—par la constitution, mais au-delà de la constitution—with thanks to
Judge Tate for his encouragement and friendship over the years.
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A deep thinker before me in Louisiana, Tulane University Law
School’s Mitchell Franklin, 24 linked the ninth amendment to civilian
methodology in going beyond the text to secure the fundamental
rights of the citizen. 25 Griswold v. Connecticut 26 is his exemplar.
The right of privacy is fundamental; it is not textual. The court
gives it life. Franklin is right. To read him is to be astounded. 27
Thomas I. Emerson, a Yale Law Professor and common law
lawyer, who won Griswold v. Connecticut in the Supreme Court of
the United States, is more down to earth:
The precise source of the right of privacy is not as important
as the fact that six Justices found such a right to exist, and
thereby established it for the first time as an independent
constitutional right. It was a bold innovation. 28
Here, whether he knows it or not, Emerson is echoing von
24. “Mitchell Franklin came to Tulane University School of Law in 1930 as
a young New York lawyer with impeccable credentials and no teaching experience. He retired from Tulane in 1967 with an enviable reputation as a teacher,
lawyer, philosopher, historian, political scientist, essayist, photographer, and colorful personality.” The Board of Editors, Mitchell Franklin: A Tribute, 54 Tulane
L. Rev. 809 (1980). “He postulates that, under the ninth amendment, novel constitutional problems must be solved by the analogical development of constitutional texts in the civilian tradition, and not by arbitrary, subjective judicial determination.” Id., at 809-10.
25. Mitchell Franklin, The Ninth Amendment as Civil Law Method and Its
Implications for Republican Form of Government: Griswold v. Connecticut;
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 40 TUL. L. REV. 487 (1966).
26. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
27. See, e.g., Mitchell Franklin, Concerning the Influence of Roman Law on
the Formation of the Constitution of the United States, 38 TUL. L. REV. 621
(1964). For real power in a young scholar, see Franklin’s contribution to RECUEIL
D’ÉTUDES sur LES SOURCES DU DROIT EN L’HONNEUR DE FRANÇOIS GÉNY (1977),
TOME II, TITRE 1, Ch. III, M. Gény and Juristic Ideals and Method in the United
States, pp. 30-45. Franklin says of the allocation of legislative and judicial authority, and the problem of juridical method involved, “The point of departure will
have to be M. Geny’s Méthode d’interpretation, which is the flower of 2,000 years
of Romanist thinking upon the problem of juridical method, a problem hardly yet
perceived in America, a problem calling for the régime of the university law
school.” Id., at 45. See also Philip Moran, Mitchell Franklin and the United States
Constitution, 70 TELOS 26, 36, 37 (Winter 1986-87): “Franklin considers the ninth
amendment a use of the method of analogy in Roman law”; “as a dialectical solution to the problem of how to negate or extend the Constitution while preserving
existing rights.”
28. Thomas I. Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MICH. L.
REV. 219 (1965).

10

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 9

Jhering and Gény.
b. Recall Chief Justice John Marshall’s aperçu, “[i]n considering this question, we must never forget it is a constitution we are
expounding.” 29 The question at hand was whether Congress may
charter a national bank. Marshall held yes, relying on the necessary
and proper clause. I am sure Gény would agree. France has its
banque nationale.
But for purposes of my composition de Montréal, F. Gény would
focus on John Marshall’s italics, “a constitution we are expounding.” Even in the absence of a necessary and proper clause, Gény
would sustain going beyond the text of enumerated powers so as to
sustain a national bank. Banque nationale; banque des États-unis.
c. Enter Mr. Justice Holmes, what he said about reading the Constitution of the United States in Missouri v. Holland. 30 You remember the case dealt with migratory birds on the wing over the sovereign state of Missouri. The State claimed that Congress had no
power to protect such migratory birds flying sky high over its sovereign soil.
Holmes, perched on Mt. Olympus, sided with the U.S. game
warden under Congress’s Migratory Bird Treaty Act, viz.: “[I]t is
not lightly to be assumed that in matters requiring national action,
‘a power which must belong to and somewhere reside in every civilized government’ is not to be found.” 31 Holmes goes beyond text:
[W]hen we are dealing with words that are a constituent act,
like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize
that they have called into life a being the development of
which could not have been foreseen completely by the most
gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to realize or
hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their successors much sweat and blood to
prove that they created a nation. The case before us must be
considered in the light of our whole experience and not
29. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 407 (1819) (Chief Justice John
Marshall’s italics, “a constitution”).
30. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
31. Id., at 433.
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merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago. 32
d. The same year François Gény delivered his lecture at Nancy,
Les procédés d’élaboration du droit civil (1910), Justice Joseph
McKenna at Washington, D.C., elaborated the meaning of the eighth
amendment of the United States Constitution, which prohibits “cruel
and unusual punishment.” This is a contemporaneous instance of the
constitution as code. I mean Weems v. United States. 33
The Court rescued Weems from a punishment of “cardena temporal” with harsh ancillary penalties for stealing 416 pesos—a pittance—from the public till. The punishments, said the Court “excite
wonder in minds accustomed to a more considerate adaptation of
punishment to the degree of the crime.” 34
You can read the details of the punishment in the report (217
U.S. 349). The important point here is that the majority went beyond
the text of the amendment, or found within its spirit, 35 a precept of
justice given voice for the first time:
Such penalties for such offenses amaze those who have
formed their conception of the relation of a state to even its
offending citizens from the practice of the American commonwealths, and believe that it is a precept of justice that
punishment for crime should be graduated and proportional
to the offense. 36

32. Id.
33. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (per McKenna, J.).
34. Id., at 365.
35. “Spirit” is purpose, von Jhering’s Zweck im Recht (Göttingen 1877). Or,
if you will, “penumbras,” “emanations” of Justice Douglas’s méthode et technique
in Griswold v. Connecticut. Spirit guides the judge in reading text and in going
beyond it in order to adapt the law to current social mores, to current reality. Cf.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (per Kennedy, J.); Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5 (Feb. 6, 2015); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1
(1992) (extending the eighth amendment to cover prison conditions in Louisiana’s
state penitentiary. Justice Thomas’s dissent (joined by Justice Scalia) makes the
point of this paper: “The Eighth Amendment is not, and should not be turned into,
a National Code of Prison Regulation.” 503 U.S., at 28. But it has been. Durch
das römische Recht, über das römische Recht hinaus.
36. 217 U.S., at 366-367.
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Beyond the eighth amendment, the proportionality principle is a
fundamental measuring rod of the constitutionality of laws that impinge on individual rights. This is true of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, of the Bundesverfassungsgericht,
of the “fundamental principles of justice” that give life to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, La Charte canadienne des
droits et libertés.
I am sorry to report to you that Louisiana’s Justice Edward
Douglass White, who succeeded Melville Fuller as Chief Justice of
the United States in 1910, dissented in Weems. A jurist of wide
learning and large girth, E. D. White’s dissent in Weems is Justinian
come to life:
Turning aside, therefore, from mere emotional tendencies
and guiding my judgment alone by the aid of the reason at
my command, I am unable to agree with the ruling of the
court. As, in my opinion, that ruling rests upon an interpretation of the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the
Eighth Amendment, never before announced, which is repugnant to the natural import of the language employed in
the clause, and which interpretation curtails the legislative
power of Congress to define and punish crime by asserting a
right of judicial supervision over the exertion of that power,
in disregard of the distinction between the legislative and judicial departments of the Government, I deem it my duty to
dissent and state my reasons. 37
In other words, Joseph McKenna should be fined ten pounds of
gold and driven from the civitas of Washington, D.C.
Twenty-eight pages of E. D. White’s magisterial reasoning in
Weems follow, at the heart of which is White’s rejection of the conception “that by judicial construction constitutional limitations may
be made to progress so as to ultimately include that which they were
not intended to embrace . . . .” 38
Mr. Justice Holmes joined White’s dissent. This is positivism
writ large in denial of the constitution as code.
37. 217 U.S., at 385 (White, J., dissenting).
38. Id., at 411.
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The jurisprudence of the eighth amendment since 1910, I am
happy to report, is convincing proof that Gény’s technique is alive
and functioning in the constitutional jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court of the United States—whether the justices realize it or not. 39
When I composed our teaching materials for Aix I asked Justice
Blackmun in chambers whether he had ever heard of François Gény.
His answer? “No.”
e. As I teach it, Justice Harry A. Blackmun’s opinion for the
Court in Roe v. Wade is an exemplar of von Jhering’s Zweck im
Recht (1877) and Gény’s libre recherche scientifique (1899). His
lonely search at the Mayo Clinic on abortion and his cardigan reading of “liberty” represent a classical instance of Jhering’s purpose in
law and quasi legislation in the style of Gény.
You are free to question my assertion, of course. But first you
must read the 71 pages of Professor Jaro Mayda’s critical introduction to his English translation of Gény’s Méthode, the 460 pages of
its translated text, and the 109 pages of an epilog added by Gény to
his second edition—640 pages in all. More conveniently, at this
Worldwide Congress of Mixed Jurisdiction Jurists, I proffer Jaro
Mayda himself as expert witness. He would be delighted, I assure
you, to appear on the Montreal stage of World Society of Mixed
Jurisdiction Jurists.
In the presence of serious social problems (e.g., the cost to
society of unwanted and uncared-for children, the high
health and life risks resulting from surreptitious abortion
practices, the disproportionate burden carried in both instances by the underprivileged socioeconomic groups), the
39. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002):“[I]n light of the dramatic shift in the legislative landscape that has occurred it the past 13 years” [since
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)], held: the execution of mentally retarded
criminals is “cruel and unusual punishment”; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551
(2005), abandoning Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), and exercising
“our own independent judgment,” held: execution of juvenile offenders younger
than 18 who have committed capital offences is “cruel and unusual punishment”
in violation of the eighth amendment; Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010),
held: “The Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence
on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide.”
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Court finds a teleological gap (created partly by existing legislation). It fills it with reference to the best available medical information about the viability of the fetus as an independent unit of life. And it rules according to the mother’s
right of decision. 40
Mayda’s critique à la Gény of Justice Harry Blackmun’s opinion
of the Court in Roe v. Wade was rendered in 1978. Justice
Blackmun’s teaching of the abortion decision at Aix-en-Provence in
1986, and again in 1992, as I have described it elsewhere, 41 affirms
Professor Mayda’s assessment.
f. The fourteenth amendment guarantees liberty, equality, due
process of law. These are words that do not define themselves.
Judges fill in these linguistic gaps. One of our greatest judges, Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, taught the connection between code and
constitution in his Storrs lectures at Yale. They have come down to
us as Cardozo’s immortal classic The Nature of the Judicial Process
(1921).
Hear him anew: “Today a great school of continental jurists is
pleading for a still wider freedom of adaptation and construction.”42
The judge as the interpreter for the community of its sense
of law and order must supply omissions, correct uncertainties, and harmonize results with justice through a method of
free decision—“libre recherche scientifique.” That is the
view of Gény and Ehrlich and Gmelin and others. Courts are
to “search for light among the social elements of every kind
that are the living force behind the facts they deal with.” 43
Cardozo adds, quoting Ehrlich’s Freie Rechtsfindung und freie
Rechtswissenschaft (1903), “[t]here is no guarantee of justice except
the personality of the judge.” 44 Harry A. Blackmun comes to mind.

40. JARO MAYDA, FRANÇOIS GENY AND MODERN JURISPRUDENCE 86 (1978).
41. Paul R. Baier, Mr. Justice Blackmun, Reflections from the Cours Mirabeau, 43 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 707 (1994).
42. BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
42 (Yale Univ. Press 1921).
43. Id., at 16.
44. Id., at 16-17.
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And what of the Constitution as Code? Here is what Cardozo
thinks of going through the constitution but beyond it: “The same
problems of method, the same contrasts between the letter and the
spirit, are living problems in our own land and law.” 45 Then comes
this: “[a]bove all in the field of constitutional law, the method of free
decision has become, I think, the dominant one today. The great
generalities of the constitution have a content and a significance
that vary from age to age.” 46
“No one shall be deprived of liberty without due process. Here
is a concept of the greatest generality,” 47 says Cardozo. “Yet it is put
before the courts en bloc. Liberty is not defined. Its limits are not
mapped and charted. How shall they be known.” 48
Cardozo’s answer is to see the ideal of liberty as a “fluid and
dynamic conception,” which “must also underlie the cognate notion
of equality.” 49
“From all of this, it results that the content of constitutional immunities is not constant but varies from age to age.” 50
At this point, I can hear Justice Scalia roaring at me: “Sed truffa
est.” “But this is nonsense.”
No it isn’t. Cardozo—Scalia’s New York predecessor on the
Court—borrowing directly from Gény, tells us:
The method of free decision sees through the transitory particulars and reaches what is permanent behind them. Interpretation, thus enlarged, becomes more than the ascertainment of the meaning and intent of the lawmakers whose collective will has been declared. It supplements the declarations, and fills the vacant spaces, by the same processes and
methods that have built up the customary law. 51

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id., at 16.
Id., at 17 (emphasis added).
Id., at 76.
Id.
Id., at 81-82.
Id., at 82-813.
Id., at 17.
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Constitutional law has been built up the same way: “The Constitution as Code.” Or, à la Gény:—“The Civil Law of the Constitution.”
g. Justice Harry A. Blackmun’s dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick
(1986) was seventeen years ahead of its time. Bowers has been overruled by Lawrence v. Texas (2003).
Liberty evolves 52:—judicial interpretation in “le sens évolutif.” 53
Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opinion for the Court is another item
of proof. His peroration in Lawrence v. Texas is an echo of Portalis,
of von Jhering, of Gény:
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of
the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known
of the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities,
they might have been more specific. They did not presume
to have this insight. They knew times can blind us to certain
truths and later generations can see that laws once thought
necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the
Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom. 54
Enough of proofs, enough of spicilège. What of théorie?
IV. SIENA.
Here it is necessary that we board the TGV, depart from Aix-enProvence, and travel to Siena, Italy, by way of the Uffizi Museum
in Florence. Justice Scalia is waiting for us at the University of Siena.
Good teaching requires a clash of views. At Siena Justice Scalia
held court on the subject of separation of powers and the rule of law

52. “Nothing is stable. Nothing absolute. All is fluid and changeable. There
is an endless ‘becoming.’” Id., at 28.
53. “The President of the highest French Court, M. Ballot-Beaupré, explained, a few years ago, that the provisions of the Napoleonic legislation had
been adapted to modern conditions by a judicial interpretation in ‘le sens évolutif.’” Id., at 84.
54. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003) (per Kennedy, J.).
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for Tulane University School of Law. This was July 1991. I tagged
along, prepared our teaching materials, and joined him in class.
Chief Judge Stephen Breyer (as he then was) by happenstance was
in Europe. He joined us. He sat on the backbench.
These two jurists voice competing theories of constitutional interpretation. 55
Scalia, J., and Breyer, J., are foils. They have captivated scholars
of the Supreme Court for two decades. In our Siena classroom they
reminded me of the competing schools of thought in the early Roman Principate. 56 The Sabinians, founded by Capito, were firm adherents of the empire inclined to follow tradition and to rest upon
authority. The Proculians, on the other hand, founded by Labeo,
were republicans of independent mind and prone to innovation. 57 To
me, Justice Scalia is a good Sabinian, Justice Blackmun a soft-spoken Proculian.
Il Giudice Justinianus, Justice Antonin Scalia, would scoff at the
idea that François Gény has any role to play in elaborating the U.S.
Constitution.
Mr. Justice Scalia would reject out of hand, and bluntly, his
friend Herr Baier’s théorie de Montréal—“par la constitution, mais

55. Compare ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW 44-45 (Amy Gutterman ed., 1997) (“Perhaps the most glaring defect of Living Constitutionalism, next to its incompatibility with the whole
antievoluntionary purpose of a constitution, is that there is no agreement, and no
chance of agreement, upon what is to be the guiding principle of the evolution.”),
with STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 5-6 (2005) (“My thesis . . . finds in the Constitution’s democratic
objective not simply restraint on judicial power or an ancient counterpart of more
modern protection, but also a source of judicial authority and an interpretative aid
to more effective protection of ancient and modern liberty alike.”)
56. Peter Stein, The Two Schools of Jurists in the Early Roman Principate,
31 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 8 (1972).
57. H.F. JOLOWICZ & BARRY NICHOLAS, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE
STUDY OF ROMAN LAW 384 (3d ed. 1972), details the two “schools” of jurists—
the Proculians and the Sabinians: “Pomponius says that Labeo and Capito (in the
time of Augustus) ‘first created what may be called two sects,’ and that whereas
Labeo was a very able man, learned in many branches of knowledge and an innovator in law, Capito held fast by traditional doctines.” Id. at 378.
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au-delà de la constitution.” This is foreign nonsense to the Scalianistae.
In one of his more sarcastic opinions, Justice Scalia’s razor mimics Chief Justice John Marshall: “We must never forget that it is a
Constitution for the United States that we are expounding.” 58 Expounding the United States Constitution, Justice Scalia exclaims in
his Lawrence v. Texas dissent:
What Texas has chosen to do is well within the range of democratic action, and its hand should not be stayed through the
invention of a brand-new “constitutional right” by a Court
impatient of democratic change. 59
You will remember Justinian’s warning to his professors of law,
Theophilus, Dorotheus, Isodorus, Anatolius, and Salaminius, to
mention a majority of five, at the outset of the Digest. They are to
teach the truth of the Corpus Juris. They are forbidden to reach beyond it.
Let me recall to your minds the proportionality principle of the
eighth amendment. In Roper v. Simmons, 60 the Supreme Court held
that the eighth amendment forbids the death penalty for a seventeenyear-old who bound and gagged a woman with duct tape, tied her
hands and feet together with electrical wire, and threw her from a
bridge above the Meramec River, drowning her in the water below.
Roars our lion-hearted friend Justice Scalia, jaws wide open:
Bound down, indeed. What a mockery today’s opinion
makes of Hamilton’s expectation, announcing the Court’s
conclusion that the meaning of our Constitution has changed
over the past 15 years—not, mind you, that this Court’s decision of 15 years ago was wrong, but that the Constitution
has changed. 61

58. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 869 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). A plurality of the Court, per Stevens, J., citing the law
of foreign nations, held that the eighth amendment prohibits the execution of persons under the age of fifteen at the time of the offense.
59. 539 U.S., at 603 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
60. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
61. Id., at 608 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Justice Kennedy’s opinion of the Court relies on the views of
foreign jurisdictions in outlawing the death penalty for minors. Antonin Scalia is not impressed: “I do not believe that the meaning of
our Eighth Amendment, any more than the meaning of other provisions of our Constitution, should be determined by the subjective
views of five Members of this Court and like-minded foreigners. I
dissent.” 62
V. UNA SPINA NEL PIEDE
It fell to me to write our Siena examination questions. Seeing an
exquisite sculpture in the Uffizi Museum of a little boy pulling a
spine out of his foot gave me an idea. I told our students about the
sculpture, “Una spina nel piede.”
Question No.1 asked the students to write an essay demonstrating how Justice Antonin Scalia has proved himself a spine in the
foot of the Court. Scalia thought this a clever question. He has von
Jhering’s quick wit. 63 When we first met our Siena students, anticipating the examination, I told them about my visit to the Uffizi Museum, about the little boy bending over to remove the thorn in his
foot, about . . . —Scalia butted in, loudly: “Oh, that’s going to on
the examination!” It was.
The students paid no attention to his Honor’s premonition: a
mangiare la pizza.

62. Id.
63. “Jhering had a strong sense of humor and satire.” Johann George Gmelin,
Dialecticism and Technicality: The Need of a Sociological Method, in THE
SCIENCE OF LEGAL METHOD (1917), PART I, THE PROBLEM OF THE JUDGE, ch. III,
pp. 85, 108 n.45. What else about our Mount Royal Muse Rudolph von Jhering?
I like this: “He possessed a joyous nature such as is not found often among those
of conspicuous learning.” Adolph Merkel, Rudolph von Ihering, in ZWECK IM
RECHT (Isaac Husik trans. Boston, 1913), Appendix I.
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VI. LA THÉORIE DE SIENNE
One more observation of la théorie de Sienne. I played the role
of provocateur. Justice Scalia declined to witness the chaos of Siena’s famous palio horse race after a false start the day before. Instead, we took a walk to see the Catedrale di Santa Maria (Siena’s
famous “Duomo”). “Religion statt Pferdefleisch” (“religion over
horsemeat”) von Jhering would say.
On our walk I mentioned Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes’s
interpretation for the Court in Home Building and Loan v. Blaisdell
(1934) 64 apropos the Contracts Clause. Hughes, of course, was the
Supreme Court’s great chief justice of the twentieth century, as John
Marshall was of the nineteenth.
I paraphrased Hughes in Siena. I quote him exactly in Montreal:
If by the statement that what the Constitution meant at the
time of its adoption it means today, it is intended to say that
the great clauses of the Constitution must be confined to the
interpretation of the framers with the conditions and outlook
of their time, would have place upon them, the statement carries its own refutation. It was to guard against such a narrow
conception that Chief Justice Marshall uttered the memorable warning: “We must never forget it is a constitution we
are expounding (McCulloch v. Maryland); “a constitution
intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently to be
adapted to the various crises of human affairs.” 65
Justice Scalia took me and Hughes to task. Those who imply
from Marshall’s utterance that the Constitution must change from
age to age are mistaken. “But that is a canard.” 66
Justice Scalia of Siena reminds me of Bartolus of Sassoferrato.
Bartolus frequently expressed scorn for opinions he considered foolish. “Sed truffa est.” “But this is nonsense.” Justice Scalia, I am sure,
would condemn my idée au-delà de Montréal as:— “Absurd.” He
has said the same thing of his colleagues’ rulings:
64. Home Building and Loan v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
65. Id., at 442-43 (citation omitted).
66. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849,
853 (1989).
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The notion that the Constitution of the United States, designed, among other things, “to establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, . . . and secure the Blessings of Liberty
to ourselves and our Posterity,” prohibits the States from
simply banning this visibly brutal means of eliminating our
half-born posterity is quite simply absurd. 67
VII. JUSTINIAN’S ZWECK IM RECHT
Justinian’s purpose in collecting the extracts of jurists that compose the Digest is to prevent judicial caprice, to avoid in his own
words, “cases [being] disposed of rather according to the will of the
judge than by the authority of law.” 68 Here is the birthright of Justice
Antonin Scalia from the lips of Justinian himself.
But Justice Scalia’s textualism, his insistence on abiding the letter of the law as originally understood by the citizenry at the time of
adoption of the Constitution, is not the sole measure of judicial duty
as conceived in the Digest.
Ulpianus tells us: “[t]he law obtains its name from justice; . . .
law is the art of knowing what is good and just.” 69 A second birthright makes judges “priests of this art, for we cultivate justice aiming
(if I am not mistaken) at a true, and not a pretended philosophy.” 70
Justice Harry A. Blackmun told us at Aix, “I think we should
pursue justice. Some of us anyway, on the Supreme Court, ought to
keep justice in mind, if not constantly every once in a while at
least.” 71
VIII. OTTAWA
Last stop on our voyage Gény is Ottawa, Ontario, home of the
Supreme Court of Canada. What do we find there?
67. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 953 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
68. Second Preface to the Digest, in THE CIVIL LAW, INCLUDING THE
TWELVE TABLES, THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS, THE OPINIONS OF PAULUS, THE
ENACTMENTS OF JUSTINIAN, AND THE CONSTITUTION OF LEO 189, 195 (S. P. Scott
trans., Central Trust Co., Cincinnati, 1932).
69. Id., at 209.
70. Id.
71. Aix ’92 Transcripts, supra note 12.

22

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 9

A late decision of the Supreme Court of Canada holds that life
includes death. In other words, Section 7 of the Charter of Rights
and Freedoms protects the right to “die with dignity.” This is Carter
v. Canada. 72 The facts of life and death—libre recherche scientifique—are in the trial record.
“The legislative landscape on the issue of physician-assisted
death has changed in the two decades since Rodriguez,” says the
Court. Canadian society requires a new rule, a new freedom. The
ruling is unanimous. The judgment is delivered by the Court:
The prohibition on physician-assisted dying infringes the
right to life, liberty and security of the person in a manner
not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
It’s all there, a bold innovation. Read it for yourself.
“Through the charter, but beyond the charter.”
And just the other day the Supreme Court of Canada advised the
World that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms imposes a
duty of religious neutrality on the state. “This duty results from an
evolving interpretation of freedom of conscience and religion.” Par
la constitution, mais au-delà de la constitution. 73
IX. FERTIG; FINI
Meine lieben Kollegen in Montreal, unserer Voyage von Jhering
und Gény is finished, am Ende.
Rudolf von Jhering et François Gény und ich selbst grüssen herzlich The Right Honorable Beverley McLachlin, Chief Justice, and
her side justices, of the Supreme Court of Canada.
Aufwiedersehen Montreal. Vielen Dank. Merci beaucoup. Au revoir.

72. 2015 SCC 5 (2/6/15).
73. Mouvement laïque Québécois v. Saguenay (City), 2015 SCC 16
(04/15/15).

POSTSCRIPT TO
THE CONSTITUTION AS CODE BY PAUL R. BAIER
Others have written of the “code as constitution,” 1 but the metaphorical leap in the other direction is more rarely undertaken. It is
not surprising that the jump to the “constitution as code” is made in
Louisiana, where the Civil Code and the civil law play a special role
in shaping the legal imagination, and by scholars such as Paul Baier
and Mitchell Franklin whose research linking civilian ideas and constitutional principles have earned them a readership inside and outside the mixed jurisdiction.
The figures of François Gény and his scholarly friend Raymond
Saleilles are key to understanding Professor Baier’s thesis. 2 The
place of these two legendary—and occasionally subversive—scholars in legal letters may, oddly enough, be more secure in Louisiana
than elsewhere where their work has been, at least for the study of
positive law, largely eclipsed. 3 As Professor Baier remarked in this
engaging paper first presented before a rapt audience at the Fourth
Worldwide Congress of Mixed Jurisdictions in Montreal in 2015,
“Only because I teach in Louisiana, did I receive the gift of Gény.” 4

1. The notion that in France the Civil Code establishes a “sociological constitution,” through its enunciation of the fundamental principles for organizing
civil society, its timeless style, its enduring wisdom, and its self-consciously symbolic function, was made famous by Jean Carbonnier, Le Code civil in LES LIEUX
DE MÉMOIRE, II, LA NATION : LE TERRITOIRE, L’ÉTAT, LE PATRIMOINE 293 (Pierre
Nora ed., Gallimard 1986).
2. French legal historians have taken an increasing interest in the intellectual friendship between these two early 20th century scholars. For a rich source
of insight into this collaboration through their recently published personal correspondence, see LETTRES DE FRANÇOIS GÉNY À RAYMOND SALEILLES—UNE
TRAJECTOIRE INTELLECTUELLE 1892-1912 (Christophe Jamin, Frédéric Audren &
Sylvain Bloquet eds, L.G.D.J. 2015)
3. In a sense, Gény has been “found in translation” in Louisiana, where the
rarity of translated works provides him with enduring influence among the sources
of Louisiana civil law in English. See FRANÇOIS GÉNY, MÉTHODE
D’INTERPRÉTATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVÉ POSITIF (1899, 2nd ed. 1919, Jaro
Mayda trans., Louisiana Law Institute 1963).
4. During his lecture of the Congress on June 25, 2015, Professor Baier
alerted the audience to the fact that the United States Supreme Court had just rendered judgment in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. (2015), in which the majority
decided that the right to marry is guaranteed to same-sex couples by the United
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The famous interpretative ideal associated with Saleilles, Gény’s
préfacier, “through the Civil Code, but beyond the Civil Code” may
indeed echo more loudly today in this corner of the United States 5
than in France. 6 The two authors may well not have agreed on all
things, but they shared an intellectual curiosity and an interest in
comparative law that makes them fellow travelers with Professor
Baier. 7 All three are adepts of libre recherche scientifique, to be sure.
And all three of them could wear Jean Carbonnier’s description of
the search for meaning in law on their sleeve: “[i]nterpretation is the
intellectual form of disobedience.” 8
The questions raised in Professor Baier’s paper concerning the
evolving meaning to be attributed to legal texts find refreshing answers when considered in light of the principles associated with the
interpretation of a Civil Code. And as Professor Baier suggests, the
issues pointed to in this essay on the connections between the methods for reading each document are deserving of further study, in particular matters relating to the sources of the law of interpretation.
And who better than legal experts working in a mixed jurisdiction—

States Constitution. The majority view was, Professor Baier explained, a fortuitous but telling confirmation, coming on the day of his talk, that Gény’s approach
to constitutional interpretation was thriving in modern-day jurisprudence.
5. Professor Saleilles’ aphorism is considered, for example, by a renowned
Louisiana civilian in John H. Tucker, Jr., Au-delà du Code civil, Mais par le Code
civil, 34 LA. L. REV. 957 (1974).
6. French scholars have recently lamented that both figures have fallen
from view, prompting major studies endeavouring to revive interest in their work:
see, e.g., LA PENSÉE DE FRANÇOIS GÉNY (Olivier Cachard, François-Xavier Licari
& François Lormant eds, L.G.D.J. 2013) and, RAYMOND SALEILLES ET AU-DELÀ
(Frédéric Audren, Charles Chêne, Nicolas Mathey & Armand Vergne eds.,
L.G.D.J. 2013).
7. For a conspectus of their common and divergent ideas on matters relating
to this paper, as well as an interest the two shared in German law with Professor
Baier, see Eugène Gaudemet, L’œuvre de Saleilles et l’œuvre de Gény en méthodologie juridique en en philosophie du droit in RECUEIL D’ÉTUDES SUR LES
SOURCES DU DROIT EN L’HONNEUR DE FRANÇOIS GÉNY, t. II., 5 (Sirey 1934).
8. JEAN CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL. INTRODUCTION para. 158 (P.U.F.
2004) (my translation).
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be they scholars of public law, 9 private law, 10 comparative law 11 or
legal history12—to link, as François Gény did over one hundred
years ago, interpretative method and sources of law? In thanking
Professor Baier for the invitation to write this short postscript to his
stimulating paper given at McGill University, I allow myself to express the hope that scholars in Quebec and Louisiana will continue
to find fresh opportunities to exchange on matters, like this one, of
shared interest and insight.
Nicholas Kasirer
of the Board of Editors
Journal of Civil Law Studies

9. This work has begun in earnest for Quebec by PIERRE-ANDRÉ CÔTÉ,
INTERPRÉTATION DES LOIS, especially pp. 32 and following on the sources of the
law of interpretation of statute law and of the Civil Code. (4th ed., with the collaboration of Stéphane Beaulac and Mathieu Devinat, Thémis 2009).
10. The leading work in Quebec private law remains FREDERICK P.
WALTON, THE SCOPE AND INTERPRETATION OF THE CIVIL CODE OF LOWER
CANADA (Montreal 1907), especially Part II.
11. For a fine example, see Shael Herman, Quot Judices Tot Sententiae: A
Study of the English Reaction to Continental Interpretative Techniques, 1 LEGAL
STUDIES 165 (1981).
12. In this Journal, for example: Derek Warden, Secundum Civilis: The Constitution as an Enlightenment Code 8 J. CIV. L. STUD. 585 (2015).
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ABSTRACT
By focusing on improving the role of certain mechanisms for
controlling private autonomy under a crisis of liberal values, contract law has reached an objective and straight dimension. The prohibition of disloyal or inconsistent behavior, also known as venire
contra factum proprium in Roman Law, constitutes one of the concepts that is renowned for protecting the trust relationship. The prohibition of disloyal behavior lies in avoiding contradictory behaviors regarding previous manifestations of will that are based on
good faith and that can cause damages. This article aims to challenge the main reason why disloyal behavior should be limited by
good faith in order to promote the legitimate expectations of contractual relationships. This paper first seeks to explain the concepts
related to the limits of disloyal behavior in relation to the grounded
theory of contracts. It then develops a model in which the theory
might be invoked to rectify contradictory conduct. Finally, some
cases heard before the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court and Superior Court of Justice are analyzed to demonstrate how good faith
can also improve contractual due performance in comparative law.
Keywords: Disloyal Behavior, Trust, Good Faith, Contract Law,
Contradicting One’s Own Act, Due Performance, Damages, Loyalty.
I. INTRODUCTION
Given the decline of the political model of liberalism and its values, 1 the basis of contract law has developed an objective dimension, resulting in the reemergence of a number of mechanisms for
controlling private autonomy and will. 2 Among these mechanisms
are duties that are based on Roman Law, the high ethical value of
which underscores the control of contractual rights.
1. Moreover, the idea of freedom of contract has been used as a political
argument in favor of individualism in a laissez faire economy. The case Lochner
v. New York is the main example of that concept, as highlighted by Steven J. Burton in STEVEN J. BURTON, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 207–208 (2d ed. 2001).
2. Thiago Luís Santos Sombra, Representation and Deliberation: Does
Every Vote Have the Same Influence in the Voting Process of Civil Associations?,
41 T. MARSHALL L. REV. (2015).
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The prohibition on contradicting one’s own behavior, conceived
in the expression venire contra factum proprium, or estoppel in
common law countries, 3 constitutes one of the concepts from Roman Law that is renowned for protecting a commitment to loyalty.
The core of the prohibition of contradicting one’s own behavior,
therefore, lies in avoiding behaviors that conflict with previous manifestations of will. 4
The Roman Law concept of venire contra factum proprium and
estoppel, 5 as mechanisms aimed at protecting trust relationships, are
triggered by two distinct behaviors of the same person: an original
conduct of this person (factum proprium), and a subsequent contradictory behavior, with a difference of timing: so that the interest of
another party relying in good faith on the first conduct may be
harmed by the subsequent conduct. 6 It is, therefore, a mechanism
that was created to discourage disloyalty and promote any other duties attached to good faith.
3. The principle venire contra factum proprium is cited in some cases in the
International Court of Justice; see North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J.
3, at 120–21 (Feb. 1969) (separate opinion of Judge Fouad Ammoun). See also
Thiago Luís Santos Sombra, The Interpretation of the Parties’ Conduct, the Uses
and Customs in the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods in COMMENTARIES ON THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON
CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG), 20 (Silvo de Salvo
Venosa & Rafael Gagliardi eds., 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2623247
(last visited Oct 23, 2015).
4. Martijn. W. Hesselink, The Concept of Good Faith in TOWARDS A
EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 619-620 (3rd ed., Arthur S. Hartkamp, Ewoud H. Hondius
& Martinjn W. Hesselink eds, 2004) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1098856; HANS-BERND SCHÄFER & CLAUS OTT, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
CIVIL LAW 384 (Matthew Braham trans., 2004).
5. BASIL MARKESINIS, HANNES UNBERATH & ANGUS JOHNSTON, THE
GERMAN LAW OF CONTRACT: A COMPARATIVE TREATISE 123 (2d ed. 2006).
6. Zimmermann highlights that:
going against one’s own previous conduct (venire contra factum proprium) is frowned upon, and so is relying on a right which has been dishonestly acquired (nemo auditur turpitudinem suam allegans), demanding something which has to be given back immediately (dolo agit qui
petit quod statim redditurus est), proceeding ruthlessly and without due
consideration to the reasonable interests of the other party (inciviliter agere), or reacting in a way which must be considered as excessive when
compared with the event occasioning the reaction (Übermaβverbot).
REINHARD ZIMMERMANN & SIMON WHITTAKER, GOOD FAITH IN EUROPEAN
CONTRACT LAW 24–25 (2000).
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Notably, the prohibition of inconsistent behavior is not an abstract prohibition on contradictory behaviors; rather, it provides only
a barrier to behaviors that reflect inconsistent positions under good
faith. Because contradiction is an inherent human characteristic and
is also inherent in the dynamics of modern social relations, only inconsistencies that affect another party’s patrimonial sphere through
the inobservance of objective good faith (as will be explained next 7)
can be prohibited.
Nevertheless, venire contra factum proprium should not be
viewed from the perspective of an unlimited incentive for consistency in human behavior because, in principle, incipient behaviors have no legal consequences. 8 Strictly speaking, something has
a legal effect only with the emergence of a contradictory position
subsequent to the first act that is based on good faith.
The prohibition of disloyal behavior, 9 therefore, should not be
inferred as an expression of caprice for excessive coherence or strict
reason. In fact, the typical dynamic nature of mass societies demonstrates the invariable concept that wellbeing lies in the freedom to
change one’s positions when facing the new and unknown. Faced
with this reality, the comprehension of a modern and suitable venire
contra factum proprium pervades any attempt to curb the excessive
manifestation of inconsistent behaviors that harm others, however,
without implying a disproportional limitation on the exercise of individual rights. Thus, both estoppel and venire contra factum proprium reinforce the idea that legal relationships are centered on reliance, loyalty, and the fulfillment of one’s expectations.

7. The concept and distinction between objective and subjective good faith
in civil law systems will be explained in the next section.
8. See YUVAL NOAH HARARI, SAPIENS: A BRIEF HISTORY OF HUMANKIND
173 (2014) (explaining that this feature is called cognitive dissonance, which refers to the human ability to hold contradictory beliefs and values).
9. It is important to highlight that the term disloyal behavior is used with the
same meaning as contradictory behavior in this context. Indeed, disloyalty
represents the origin of contradictory behavior.
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II. PREMISE FOR UNDERSTANDING THE THEORY OF DISLOYAL
BEHAVIOR
A. Definitions
The prohibition of disloyal behavior, or venire contra factum
proprium, constitutes a legal premise that is derived from the idea
of trust and, therefore, from the perspective of good faith, 10 which
considers any objectively contradictory intention in relation to previously manifested conduct to be unacceptable. 11 Strictly speaking,
the prohibition of disloyal behavior comprises not only the annulment of performed acts but also the rejection of their predictable and
desired consequences. 12 It is, therefore, a reasonable mechanism to
limit the exercise of individual rights. 13
The prohibition of disloyal behavior, or venire contra factum
proprium, 14 is justified as the protection of legitimate expectations,
which is used as the element that accords this legal premise axiological content in order to only prevent inconsistent behaviors that
breach an assumption of trust. 15 Nevertheless, it is not an inconsistency or a contradiction that the prohibition of disloyal behavior
aims to prevent, but behavior that would result in an unreasonable
interference with a legitimately created trust relationship, that allowed the other party to reasonably rely on the original conduct. 16
10. ANTÓNIO M.R. MENEZES CORDEIRO, DA BOA-FÉ NO DIREITO CIVIL 753
(2001).
11. ALEJANDRO BORDA, LA TEORÍA DE LOS ACTOS PROPIOS 53 (3d ed. 2000).
12. For Antônio Junqueira de Azevedo, “the expression venire contra factum
proprium underpins the exercise of a legal position in contradiction with a previously adopted behavior; there is a violation of good faith as it violates the expectations created—to all parties, but especially to the party at odds.” ANTONIO
JUNQUEIRA DE AZEVEDO, ESTUDOS E PARECERES DE DIREITO PRIVADO 167
(2004).
13. LUIS DÍEZ-PICAZO, LA DOCTRINA DE LOS PROPIOS ACTOS 186 (1963). Individual rights are understood as a category of protected interests that were received from the law the instruments to repeal any attempt of violation as stated in
MARKESINIS, UNBERATH, AND JOHNSTON, supra note 5 at 124–125.
14. BORDA, supra note 11 at 53.
15. Paulo Mota Pinto, Sobre a Proibição do Comportamento Contraditório
(Venire Contra Factum Proprium) no Direito Civil, VOLUME COMEMORATIVO
BOLETIM FACULDADE DIREITO UNIVERSIDADE COIMBRA 269–322 (2003).
16. CORDEIRO, supra note 10, at 750.
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The valuable restructuring of venire contra factum proprium lies
exactly in the attempt to solidify good faith. The prohibition of disloyal behavior is reinvigorated by the endeavor to improve it as a
paradigm for concreteness when faced with behaviors that contradict good faith. The provision of venire contra factum proprium
should, however, receive an accurate, systematic study to avoid its
substantial deterioration by overuse and abuse by claimants, which
would result in the trivialization of the mechanism and the exhaustion of the normative content of good faith. Thus, it should be used
to corroborate the path of the adopted argumentation. 17
In this way, venire contra factum proprium, as a category of contradictory acts, will be apt to be functionally invoked both actively
and defensively. For example, it can be invoked as an action to affirm the existence of a right, including but not limited to, the right
to damages, as a substantial exception of illegality, or as a means of
defense of a legal position or situation that is presented as undeniable. 18
As the basis for venire contra factum proprium, the protection
of legitimate expectations should be the dispositive factor in identifying the disloyal behaviors that are relevant 19—that is, the requirement of trust does not refer to a simple and strict obligation of coherence or truth. 20 Moreover, venire contra factum proprium is a
mechanism that focuses on the protection of legitimate expectations,
not a mechanism for the mere prohibition of bad faith or deceit. 21
17. ANDERSON SCHREIBER, A PROIBIÇÃO DE COMPORTAMENTO
CONTRADITÓRIO: TUTELA DA CONFIANÇA E VENIRE CONTRA FACTUM PROPIUM
121–122 (2012).
18. Judith H. Martins-Costa, A Ilicitude Derivada do Exercício Contraditório
de um Direito: o Renascer do Venire Contra Factum Proprium, 97 REVISTA DA
AJURIS 143, 145 (2005).
19. MARKESINIS, UNBERATH, & JOHNSTON, supra note 5, at 123.
20. Menezes Cordeiro stated that when the idea of venire contra factum proprium is taken to its ultimate consequences: “the normative permissions would be
extinguished in the first exercise and the whole social relationship would be converted into a rigid structure of undeniable obligations.” CORDEIRO, supra note 10,
at 751.
21. RUY ROSADO DE AGUIAR JÚNIOR, EXTINÇÃO DOS CONTRATOS POR
INCUMPRIMENTO DO DEVEDOR 254 (1991).
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The identification of trust and good faith as normative bases for
venire contra factum proprium represents a highly favorable measure for the consolidation of the prohibition of disloyal behavior. It
implies the inclusion of dogmatic and axiological aspects that are
already aggregated by good faith. 22 One of the most significant characteristics of good faith expressed by the conception of venire contra factum proprium is its use as a general principle. 23
The general principle of good faith comprises of both objective
and subjective good faith. 24 Objective good faith (for civil law systems) or just fair dealings (for common law systems) comprises of
the belief and trust in the loyalty, in which a given subject will satisfy the legitimate expectations created in someone else. 25 As the
prohibition of disloyal behavior bars any objectively considered inconsistent conduct, it is irrefutable that such conduct should specifically affect good faith. 26 The prohibition of disloyal behavior follows pari passu the axiological content attributed to good faith. For

22. In fact, “bringing venire contra factum proprium to the doctrine of trust
reveals a higher status of ascending duties, of systematization of the casuistry
around contradictory behaviors, and of descending with the concretization of good
faith.” CORDEIRO, supra note 10, at 755.
23. Hesselink, supra note 4, at 621.
24. Martijn Hesselink outlines that the English common law does not accept
the concept of objective good faith as the European continental system and civil
law countries do. Hesselink, supra note 4, at 619. Nonetheless, Teubner notes the
“legal transplant” of good faith to the British by the Unfair Terms in Consumer
Contracts Regulation 1994 (EC Council Directive 93/13/EEC) caused a great deal
of irritation. Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How
Unifying Law Ends up in New Divergencies, 61 MOD. LAW REV. 11, 11–12
(1998). Zimmerman quotes the case Chapman v. Honig [1963] 2 QB 502 (Eng.)
to confirm the premise that English law does not recognize the effect of good faith
in contract law. According to him, “the relationship between English law’s exclusion of any general requirement of good faith in the performance of contract and
its more general denial of a theory of the abuse of rights perhaps reflects its traditionally wide, liberal approach to the concept of a right itself.” ZIMMERMANN &
WHITTAKER, supra note 6, at 41. Steven J. Burton has also mentioned the difficulties of understanding good faith in the Uniform Commercial Code. Steven J.
Burton, Good Faith Performance of a Contract within Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 67 IOWA L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1981).
25. STEFANO RODOTÀ, LE FONTI DI INTEGRAZIONE DEL CONTRATTO 149
(2004). For an economic approach related to the costs of protecting trust and good
faith, see SCHÄFER AND OTT, supra note 4 at 375.
26. BORDA, supra note 11, at 60.
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example, the connection between both is interrelated to the point
where one finds its ontological foundations in the other. 27
On the other hand, subjective good faith consists of a belief arising from an excusable mistake that certain conduct does not contradict a given right. 28 It is a concept that is not very familiar in common law countries and that encompasses a two-pronged analysis: a
belief or ignorance about not causing harm to another person’s interests that are protected by the law and the mistake of an agent in a
given factual situation to that person’s benefit. 29
Notwithstanding these aspects, it is important to note the remarks of Menezes Cordeiro in the sense that this is not only the invocation of a certain mechanism over others, but rather it is also an
effective relation of its relevant elements. 30 In other words, we
should aim to raise good faith to the condition of a general principle
that is autonomous, abstract, and subject to being invoked for a variety of legal relations, but with consideration of the peculiar aspects
of each case. 31
Conversely, the prohibition of disloyal behavior, on the other
side of the dichotomy of the principle of good faith, illustrates and
embodies some conditions of the normative coverage attributed to
this general duty; 32 however, venire contra factum proprium has its
limitations.33 The discussion would be of lesser importance if the
application of the general duty of good faith was something pacific,
27. JUDITH H. MARTINS-COSTA, A BOA FÉ NO DIREITO PRIVADO: SISTEMA E
TÓPICA NO PROCESSO OBRIGACIONAL 471 (1999); ZIMMERMANN & WHITTAKER,
supra note 6, at 30.
28. PETER A. ALCES, A THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW: EMPIRICAL INSIGHTS
AND MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 77 (2011).
29. DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 13, at 136.
30. CORDEIRO, supra note 10, at 756.
31. MARKESINIS, UNBERATH, & JOHNSTON, supra note 12, at 120–121 (explaining how codes stay up to date).
32. See FRANZ WIECKER, HISTÓRIA DO DIREITO PRIVADO MODERNO 545–
546 (2d ed., António M. Botelho Hespanha trans. 1967).
33. ANDERSON SCHREIBER, A PROIBIÇÃO DE COMPORTAMENTO
CONTRADITÓRIO: TUTELA DA CONFIANÇA E VENIRE CONTRA FACTUM PROPIUM
99 (2012) (highlighting the evolution of good faith as an open clause in the German Civil Code).
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technical, and straightforward within Brazilian doctrine and jurisprudence and in other countries. 34 We should note, for example, that
the applicability of the general duty of good faith in public law is
still subject to some controversy, as is the framing of its essential
core in extra-contractual, pre-contractual, and even post-contractual
relations. 35
B. Distinction Between the Prohibition of Disloyal Behavior and
Other Similar Categories that Stem from Good Faith
With these considerations noted in relation to the concept, legal
nature, and foundations of venire contra factum proprium, it is imperative to analyze some of the norms that bear similarities to the
prohibition of disloyal behavior. The following distinctions will aim
to anchor the theoretical limits of venire contra factum proprium,
without, however, implying an absence of complementarity or even
an imagined casuistic overlap of the norms.
The real intention here is to highlight the necessity of a full comprehension of the applicable criteria of each norm in order to contemplate, in concreto, the best conditions for resolving a controversy
under the perspective of the legal order.
1. Implied Waiver in Civil Law Systems
Given the influence of liberalism, venire contra factum proprium is commonly confused with the norm of implied waiver. 36 To
the followers of voluntarism, it is more convenient to associate initially-adopted conduct with an implied declaration of will through

34. Hesselink, supra note 4, at 621; ZIMMERMANN & WHITTAKER, supra note
6, at 8. According to Zimmermann, “[p]rivate law in Europe is in the process of
reacquiring a genuinely European character.”
35. Article 422 of the 2002 Civil Code considerably eased the alleged controversies around the time frame of the observance of good faith. Furthermore,
the thesis of Menezes Cordeiro on guilt post factum finitum should also be considered. CORDEIRO, supra note 10, at 626; THIAGO LUÍS SANTOS SOMBRA,
ADIMPLEMENTO CONTRATUAL E COOPERAÇÃO DO CREDOR 89 (2011).
36. DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 13, at 149–150.
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which one renounces the exercise of the rights to be obtained in contradiction of that will, rather than finding non-voluntarist grounds to
restrict individual freedom. 37
The fallacy of the syllogism constructed by voluntarists lies in
always considering the facta proprium of an implied declaration of
will when, in fact, this is not the rule. 38 Furthermore, venire contra
factum proprium is marked by its objective character that does not
restrict the scope of legal acts. 39 In refuting this argument, the prohibition on disloyal behavior is independent from the will of whoever practices the inconsistent act. In fact, a contradiction in violation of the expectations rightfully derived from the initial conduct is
sufficient for its existence. 40
Given this explanation, it is worth noting that part of the hypotheses regarding the application of the prohibition of disloyal behavior
is not subject to characterization as an implied waiver or an implied
declaration of will because the factum proprium does not require an
intention, even if presumed, to achieve specific legal effects. 41 It is
not always possible to understand initial conduct and the implied
waiver to exercise a given right, or even as trying to restrict legitimate expectations to implied declarations of will.
Unless the intuitive analysis of Brazilian jurisprudence leads to
the understanding that venire contra factum proprium has been invoked to resolve controversies where implied waiver does not provide clear answers, each mechanism must be conceived according
to its own peculiarities. 42
2. Self-Declared Turpitude
The prohibition of self-declared turpitude derives from the
maxim nemo auditur propriam turpitudinem allegans and presents
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

SCHREIBER, supra note 17, at 162.
DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 13, at 159.
MARKESINIS, UNBERATH, & JOHNSTON, supra note 5, at 125.
SCHREIBER, supra note 17, at 163.
BORDA, supra note 11, at 133–134.
Hesselink, supra note 4, at 623.
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elements that are very similar to those of venire contra factum proprium. 43
Under the influence of liberalism, article 104 of the 1916 Brazilian Civil Code states that “[w]here there is intent to harm a third
party or violate a legal provision, the contracting parties are forbidden to make pleas or allegations before the court related to misrepresentation [though it seems the article is addressing simulation,
misrepresentation seems to be a good translation here] in actions between the parties or before third parties.” Strictly speaking, whoever
has benefited from their own turpitude cannot plead it with the intention of causing damage to others, as the guilt inherent in this conduct has completely extinguished the conflicting intention. The discovery of fraudulent conduct prevails over any other analysis of the
inconsistent nature of the posterior act because, in fact, the fraudulent conduct has occurred only because of the initial malicious intent.
The resemblance between the legal mechanisms is seen in the
attempt to prevent the practice of a posterior act in contradiction to
a previous one. The difference, however, lies in the circumstances
in which, in the case of self-declared turpitude, the initial conduct is
marked by malice, whereas in venire contra factum proprium, it is
independent of the subjective elements. The application of the prohibition of disloyal behavior only requires the characterization of an
objective contradictory situation. For example, the underlying willful element is in conflict with the actual facts supporting it.
3. Mental Reservation
What is commonly known as mental reservation (article 110 of
the 2002 Brazilian Civil Code) occurs when one party hides their

43. See REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN
FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVILIAN TRADITION 667–668 (1996) (explaining the different meanings of dolo and self-declared turpitude).
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real intention when manifesting their will with the objective of causing damage to someone. 44 It is a type of simulation. The difference
between them in the Brazilian Civil Code is that mental reservation
depends on the bad faith of only one person, whereas simulation requires the bad faith of at least two people. Therefore, the previously
declared manifestation of will persists even if the author has made a
mental reservation of not wanting what he or she has actually manifested, unless the other party was aware of that fact. 45
In fact, mental reservation contains aspects that are very similar
to those of self-declared turpitude, such that the arguments used to
distinguish it from the prohibition of disloyal behavior are also valid
here.
4. Tu Quoque
The expression tu quoque originated from the dialogue between
Emperor Julius Caesar and Marcus Junius Brutus when the latter
stabbed the former: “tu quoque, Brutus, tu quoque, mi fili?” 46 In its
literal translation, tu quoque means “even you” and denotes a feeling
of surprise mixed with disappointment for inconsistent behavior. 47
Thus, how is it possible that even you (tu quoque), who engaged in
acts that created a well-grounded and legitimate expectation in
someone else, now come to dishonor what you had previously committed to do? Tu quoque is a term that is invoked to express that no

44. SCHREIBER, supra note 17, at 163; MARTINS-COSTA, supra note 27, at 66;
AGUIAR JÚNIOR, supra note 21, at 35.
45. MÁRIO JÚLIO DE ALMEIDA COSTA, DIREITO DAS OBRIGAÇÕES 320
(2000); LUÍS M. T. MENEZES LEITÃO, II DIREITO DAS OBRIGAÇÕES 76 (2003);
MANUALE DI DIRITTO CIVILE at 110 (6th ed., Pietro Perlingieiri org. 2007).
46. See GUNTHER TEUBNER, GEGENSEITIGE VERTRAGSUNTREUE:
RECHTSPRECHUNG U. DOGMATIK Z. AUSSCHLUSS VON RECHTEN NACH EIGENEM
VERTRAGSBRUCH 10–25 (1975). In Portugal, Germany, and Brazil, the expression
tu quoque is well known and is employed to refer to behaviors that represent an
undesirable surprise for the other party.
47. CORDEIRO, supra note 10, at 837; EGON LORENZ, DER TU-QUOQUEEINWAND BEIM RÜCKTRITT DER SELBST VERTRAGSUNTREUEN PARTEI WEGEN
VERTRAGSVERLETZUNG DES GEGNERS 312 (1972).
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one who violates a norm can obtain benefits that stem from one’s
own disloyal behavior. 48
Although the expression tu quoque is employed in philosophy
and rhetoric as an argument of a fallacious nature or of an inconsistent thesis, from a legal perspective, the term consolidates different evaluative criteria for substantially identical situations. 49
When comparing tu quoque and venire contra factum proprium,
one can notice a markedly similar factor identified by a contradiction observed in a given conduct. However, the difference between
tu quoque and venire contra factum proprium, is associated with
preventing the coexistence of different valuation criteria for objectively similar situations. In other words, the repulsion of disloyalty
and malice seems to stand out more incisively in tu quoque than in
venire contra factum proprium.
5. Suppressio and Surrectio
The mechanism of suppressio, which is most known for its similarity to Verwirkung, can be understood as the inertia of the party
entitled to a right to exert it after a given time lapse, making it impossible to claim it again later under penalty of a violation of the
principle of good faith. 50 Thus, while prescription protects an intention only for the passage of time, for suppressio to be recognized,
one is required to demonstrate that such behavior is unacceptable
under the principle of good faith. 51
Notably, suppressio is not the deprivation of the ability to exert
a right simply as a result of the passage of time. In fact, the controversy involves the non-observance of good faith by someone who
has instilled in another person the legitimate expectation that a right
that had been neglected until then would no longer be exercised. 52
48. Id. at 840.; ANTÓNIO MENEZES CORDEIRO,
PORTUGUÊS (2d ed. 2007).
49. SCHREIBER, supra note 17, at 175.
50. CORDEIRO, supra note 10, at 798–800.
51. AGUIAR JÚNIOR, supra note 21, at 254.
52. CORDEIRO, supra note 10, at 812.
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Therefore, in cases of contracts of successive performance or installments, when the creditor has failed to act in a timely manner on a
certain requirement as a result of a lack of initiative, he is prevented
from taking another position on that issue “if the debtor had reason
to believe that the obligation had been extinguished and has planned
their life under that perspective.” 53
Surrectio represents the other side of suppressio—that is, the
emergence of a right due to the repeated practice of certain acts. As
an illustration, Ruy Rosado de Aguiar Junior evokes the hypothesis
of the distribution of profits in a commercial association, in clear
violation of statutes, which would engender the right to continue to
receive such distributions. 54
6. Estoppel in Common Law
Etymologically, the term estoppel means barrier, obstacle, or
impediment. Originally a procedural common law mechanism, it developed into a rule of substance that maintains significant proximity
to the prohibition of disloyal behavior in Roman Law. 55
The reason why the alluded resemblance between the two is
commonly evoked is because estoppel appeared during the Middle
Ages at a time when Roman Canon Law exerted a considerable degree of influence on the English lawmakers. In addition, the use of
estoppel is frequently associated with the expression own act.
Although both mechanisms are applied with the objective of preventing contradictory behaviors, it is imperative to note that they
developed with the idiosyncrasies of their respective legal order. 56

53. AGUIAR JÚNIOR, supra note 21, at 254.
54. Id. at 255.
55. Borda affirms that some authors restrict the application of estoppel to the
procedural scope as a means of defense against a party who has practiced or failed
to practice a procedural act. BORDA, supra note 11, at 28. We thus verify a relative
resemblance between this line of thought and the concept of logical preclusion as
established in the Brazilian legal order. DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 13, at 180.
56. SCHREIBER, supra note 17, at 72.
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The concept of estoppel is related to the protection of the practice of an initial behavior that results from a legitimate expectation
that such practice conforms with good faith. 57 The main peculiarity
of estoppel in common law is related to the creation of a presumption jure et de jure, an irrebuttable presumption that prevents a person from affirming or denying the existence of a given right for having engaged in a certain act or having made a positive or negative
statement in the opposite sense. 58 Consequently, it is possible to
conclude that estoppel is aimed at objectively protecting the practice
because it safeguards the good faith and trust generated by an unequivocal conduct.
Estoppel is traditionally applied as a defense rather than a cause
of action, though there are exceptions, particularly in the United
States (promissory estoppel). It cannot be applied ex officio by a
judge. The prohibition of disloyal behavior, in contrast, can be applied as both a defensive protection and a cause of action, as well as
in a way that can be enforced ex officio or if provoked. 59
7. Verwirkung in German Law
Verwirkung can be understood as a significantly similar mechanism to venire contra factum proprium and is mainly based on the
analysis of historical events marked by the assimilation of Roman
Law by the Germanic peoples. Note that this affirmation implies no
intention to attribute a position of superiority of Verwirkung over
venire contra factum proprium.
Verwirkung strongly connects with the doctrine of abuse of
rights, as it seeks to prevent the delayed exercise of a right. 60 Verwirkung applies when the beneficiary of a right did not exercise it at
the proper time, which provides the other party with the legitimate

57.
58.
59.
60.

MARKESINIS, UNBERATH, & JOHNSTON, supra note 5, at 132.
BORDA, supra note 11, at 25.
DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 13, at 69.
MARKESINIS, UNBERATH, & JOHNSTON, supra note 5, at 124.
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expectation that the right was waived, independently of the existence of a will to do so. 61 Verwirkung, therefore, aims at preventing
conduct that is engaged in unexpectedly, after a considerable period
of inertia, because such a posture would challenge the assumptions
of good faith. 62
Moreover, we should note that Verwirkung can also be applied
to extend certain deadlines so as to allow the exercise of a prescribed
or expired interest.
8. Duty to Mitigate Loss
The duty to mitigate loss imposed on the creditor of damages
originates in the common law. Like venire contra factum proprium,
the duty to mitigate loss has been subject to a significantly unsystematic normative approach, especially when we observe its development in Germany, Switzerland, and France.
Strictly speaking, the duty of a creditor to mitigate the loss
caused by the debtor finds broad acceptance in international conventions such as Article 77 of the 1980 Vienna Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods; the Hague Convention of July
1st, 1964, relating to a Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods (Corporeal Movables); the
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, published in Rome in 1994; the Principles of European Contract Law;
and the lex mercatoria.
The duty to mitigate loss is not an obligation in the strict sense,
and this is the reason why it must be called a duty. There is no liability in case of non-performance. German law gives the duty to mitigate loss the legal nature of Obliegenheit, 63 which is a less im-

61. BORDA, supra note 11, at 103.
62. DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 13, at 180.
63. Clóvis V. do Couto e Silva, A Obrigação como Processo 112–113 (1976).
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portant duty that only results in the loss of a favorable legal position. 64 By contrast, in Switzerland, the legal nature of the mechanism is equated to an incombance. 65 As such, the creditor’s duty is
more clearly noted as a claimable obligation.
As it has been suggested, French jurisprudence may link the duty
to mitigate loss with the requirement of good faith and the doctrine
of abuse of rights, coming very close to venire contra factum proprium. 66
As stated by Vera Maria Jacob de Fradera, 67 French jurisprudence uses venire contra factum proprium as a justification to impute to the creditor a sanction derived from l’obligation de mitigation. To illustrate this, it is worth mentioning Bailleux v Jaretty. 68 In
this case, a landlord did not charge a full-year rent for eleven years
and when he invoked a termination clause, he was prevented from
exerting his right based on the requirement of good faith. This may
be described as an application of venire contra factum proprium.
After the promulgation of the 2002 Civil Code, which expressed
for the first time the principle of good faith, the duty to mitigate loss
could be identified within the Brazilian legal order as a duty that
attaches to the general duty of good faith. 69 Notwithstanding this
relevant foundation of validity for the application of the duty to mitigate loss, we could also consider it as an abuse of rights, which is
acknowledged as a type of unlawful act. 70
Having established the premises for an accurate understanding
of the duty to mitigate loss, it is important to remember that with the
example of defaulting on a payment obligation, creditors must accept their responsibility and proceed with the required measures to

64. Christoph Fabian, O Dever de Informar no Direito Civil 53 (2002).
65. Silva, supra note 63 at 112–113.
66. AGUIAR JÚNIOR, supra note 21, at 174.
67. Id.
68. Cass. Com., January 7, 1963, Bull. III, no. 16, p. 14.
69. MARKESINIS, UNBERATH, & JOHNSTON, supra note 5, at 121.
70. In Germany, the abuse of rights was viewed as some sort of violation of
the principle of good faith. See ZIMMERMANN & WHITTAKER, supra note 6.
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attempt to minimize their loss, or as it is premised in res perit domino, the creditors must bear the economic consequences of their inertia.
Hence, by failing to mitigate his or her own loss, “the creditor
may be subject to sanctions, either based on the prohibition of venire
contra factum proprium, or for incurring an abuse of right.” 71 This
is caused by the non-observance of a duty attached to the requirement of good faith.
III. BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE ENFORCEMENT OF LOYALTY BASED
ON GOOD FAITH
Because the fundamental scope of venire contra factum proprium is related to the protection of legitimate expectations, all of
the criteria for its application should reflect this objective. 72 Although the prohibition of disloyal behavior has essentially been associated with protecting consistent behaviors or their consideration
per se, such an understanding should not prevail over the new perspective of protecting legitimate expectations.
A. One’s Own Act as the Starting Point
The first criterion for invoking the prohibition of disloyal behavior is the existence of two legal behaviors by the same person at
different points in time. The first of these behaviors can be identified
as the factum proprium. 73 However, the factum proprium cannot be
classified from the beginning as a legal act 74 because, in principle,
the initial behavior does not have any legal meaning, i.e., it is not
legally binding in nature. 75 Moreover, this aspect arises from the

71. AGUIAR JÚNIOR, supra note 21, at 177.
72. DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 13, at 193.
73. Id. at 194.
74. This is an opportune time to invoke the lessons of Menezes Cordeiro, who
states that “the broad scope in which venire contra factum proprium may be encompassed requires prior delimitation, even if empirical and provisional, of the
figurative reach of the mechanism.” CORDEIRO, supra note 10, at 746.
75. SCHREIBER, supra note 17, at 126.
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reasonable conclusion that if a behavior is already binding under the
terms of a positive right—because the law so declares or because the
legal requisites are fulfilled to qualify it as a legal act—it is not necessary to invoke trust or reliance to impose the duty of maintaining
that behavior’s objective meaning. 76
Moreover, if a norm that gives effect to the act exists within the
legal order to make it binding, any breach of the alleged provision
will be subject to rules of civil accountability (contractual or extracontractual). 77 The consistency embodied by the protection of legitimate expectations in the alleged hypothesis is an irrelevant factor,
considering the legal effects arising from the act taken in contradiction to the initial position. 78
Thus, we should not forget that the factum proprium is generally
a non-binding act that becomes binding because it creates legitimate
reliance 79 in someone else and, therefore, subjects the previous behavior to venire contra factum proprium. 80
Invoking the rule of the prohibition of disloyal behavior is unnecessary whenever the non-fulfillment of obligations deriving from
a legal relationship receives due sanction from other legal orders,
such as in cases involving mandatory responsibility. 81
Therefore, venire contra factum proprium can be identified in
two general hypotheses: i) when a person manifests an intention to
not engage in a certain act and then engages in the act; and ii) when
a person declares their intention to engage in a certain act and then
refuses to do so. 82

76. Id. at 126–127.
77. Pinto, supra note 15, at 166.
78. For Schreiber, the law exempts the requirement of trust in coherent conduct, “as the inconsistent behavior will have violated a conduct that positive law
itself already determines as binding.” SCHREIBER, supra note 17, at 126.
79. BORDA, supra note 11, at 69.
80. DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 13, at 195–196.
81. CORDEIRO, supra note 10, at 746.
82. Id. at 747.
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Thus, the factum proprium should be considered neither legally
relevant nor effective 83 unless it generates some effects regarding
the incoherence of the previous conduct in contradiction to good
faith, as defined earlier. 84
It is very important to clarify that not all factum proprium should
be identified as binding conduct 85 because the development of the
prohibition of disloyal behavior does not have the objective of causing excessive legal security; rather, it only protects the legitimate
expectations arising from social relations, independent of the existence of legal norms between the parties. 86
B. General Principles for Protecting Legitimate Expectations
The prohibition of disloyal behavior is a rule derived from the
general principle of good faith. 87 It is a principle that advocates the
duty of loyalty, 88 liability, cooperation, and satisfaction of others’
expectations 89 in the fulfillment of their obligations. 90 This led

83. DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 13, at 201.
84. SCHREIBER, supra note 17, at 129–130.
85. “The person manifesting the intention of practicing a certain act but who
is not committed to doing so normally creates the expectation of a nonexistent or
invalid deal.” CORDEIRO, supra note 10, at 745.
86. ZIMMERMANN, supra note 43, at 636–637.
87. See SOMBRA, supra note 35 at 20; ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION
OF COOPERATION 6 (1984). For Stefano Rodotà, good faith acts as a functional
tool to improve cooperation in contract performance. RODOTÀ, supra note25, at
150.
88. See C. MASSIMO BIANCA, 3 DIRITTO CIVILE: IL CONTRATTO 422–423 (2d
ed. 2000) (underlining that the duty of liability imposes an obligation to not cause
unreasonable surprise).
89. TERESA NEGREIROS, FUNDAMENTOS PARA UMA INTERPRETAÇÃO
CONSTITUCIONAL DO PRINCÍPIO DA BOA-FÉ 238 (1998). Moreover, it is worth noting the reference made by the author on the judgment of the tomato sauce industry,
which distributed seeds to several farmers and, after the harvest, failed to acquire
the harvested crops. For more, see MARTINS-COSTA, supra note 27, at 473–474.
90. For Judith Martins-Costa:
if there is no protection of fair expectations, it is because legal acts are
social acts, and as such, they commonly affect, either directly or indirectly, the lives of our partners and third parties. This is the reason why
a serious and well-grounded evaluation of the trust we arouse in others
is imperative.
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Clóvis do Couto e Silva to affirm that “the duties derived from good
faith are, thus, arranged in degrees of intensity, depending on the
category of the legal acts attached to them.” 91 As reported by Reinhard Zimmermann and Judith Martins-Costa, for a long time, the
instruments controlling the exercise of subjective rights were restricted to exceptio doli and to the abuse of rights. 92
The principle of good faith, which was expressly adopted in the
2002 Brazilian Civil Code, limits the exercise of subjective rights. 93
However, the presence of elements of subjective good faith in venire
contra factum proprium cannot be ignored, especially when the belief is considered to arise from the initial behavior. 94 The initial expectation is maintained only if the personal perspective of the receiving agent is favorable.
Despite the considerations established regarding subjective
good faith, note that good faith constitutes the primordial foundation
for invoking the prohibition of disloyal behavior because of two factors 95: i) the conduct that is objectively considered inconsistent; and

Judith Martins-Costa, A Ilicitude Derivada do Exercício Contraditório de um
Direito: O Renascer do Venire Contra Factum Proprium, 32 REVISTA DA AJURIS
168 (2005).
91. Silva, supra note 63, at 31.
92. Martins-Costa, supra note 18, at 455. Zimmermann draws an insightful
comparison when explaining that:
comparative studies normally focus on specific subject matters, problem
areas and real life situations, or on relatively well-defined legal institutions like mistake, agency or stipulation alteri. Good faith fits into neither
of these categories. At the same time, however, it is as least in some legal
systems regarded as a vitally important ingredient for a modern general
law of contract.
ZIMMERMANN & WHITTAKER, supra note 6, at 12–13, 16.
93. DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 13, at 141.
94. Id. at 209.
95. Hesselink explains that:
the process of concretization has not been totally identical in all countries. Whereas in Germany and in the Netherlands legal doctrine rather
reacts to court decisions and tries to regroup them, and thus they build
up a system (a rather more inductive approach), French and Italian legal
doctrine seem to follow the more deductive approach of asking themselves what, in theory, the content of the duty of good faith, or the good
faith standard could be, and thus they build up a system of sub-duties et
cetera, in which the legal decisions are given their place at a later stage,
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ii) the assumption of good faith by the person adversely affected by
the disloyal behavior. 96
C. Unraveling the Contradiction from One’s Own Act
In order for the prohibition of inconsistent behavior to be correctly invoked, first, the presence of a posterior conduct to the factum proprium, which encompasses the exercise of an intention
grounded in a subjective right 97 that will consequently generate a
conflict of interests, must be identified.
The inconsistent conduct required for the application of venire
contra factum proprium is comprised of two different distinctions.
First, it requires the performance of a new act, and this act must then
embody the pretention of exercising a subjective right. 98 In the absence of the first act, the second one would obviously be legally
valid and effective. It only becomes illegitimate when faced with the
previously manifested conduct. 99
The second act, considered isolatedly, does not have any legal
relevance for the prohibition of inconsistency. It only becomes relevant when contrasted with the previous behavior that generated the
reliance of the other party. 100 Actually, the first act becomes binding
only after the posterior contradictory intention is manifested.
The contradictory posterior intention evokes the exercise of a
completely acceptable right if it were in another context, and it only
becomes inadmissible after a timespan associated with the objective
violation of the duty of coherence and loyalty. The exercise of a
subjective right, therefore, appears as an element of fundamental importance to verify whether the posterior conduct is acceptable.

the Italian authors thereby relying heavily on the achievements of German courts and legal doctrine.
Hesselink, supra note 4, at 625.
96. BORDA, supra note 11, at 61.
97. DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 13, at 217.
98. Id. at 228–229.
99. CORDEIRO, supra note 10, at 747–748.
100. DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 13, at 142.
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The party who was favored by the initial act must obviously be
in good faith. 101 The claimant can invoke the prohibition of disloyal
behavior as a means to protect him or herself from posterior contradictory conduct only if the relationship of trust was also initiated in
conformity with good faith. 102 Thus, it is undeniable that venire contra factum proprium cannot be used as a mechanism to protect a
relationship of trust arising out of bad faith.
The prohibition of disloyal behavior, therefore, arises as an ethical assessment 103 of the initial conduct that legitimately engenders
a relationship of trust guided by good faith. 104
IV. THE PROHIBITION ON DISLOYAL BEHAVIOR IN THE BRAZILIAN
CIVIL CODE
Due to the unquestionable influence of liberalism, the 1916 Civil
Code did not unequivocally contemplate the prohibition of disloyal
behavior. Moreover, as stated above, such a posture highlights an
alignment with the principles of private autonomy that allowed acts
that were purely guided by the unusual manifestations of the will of
the agent, even if that would result in a contradiction with previous
behavior.
The 2002 Civil Code 105 was marked by the adoption of principles of ethics, solidarity, and the objective analysis of legal acts. As
a consequence, legislators were more inclined to prohibit disloyal
behavior and to protect legitimate expectations. The requirement for
coherent behavior being recognized per se in line with the protection
of good faith, venire contra factum proprium began to occupy a
101. Hesselink, supra note 4, at 625.
102. BORDA, supra note 11, at 78.
103. As well argued by Menezes Cordeiro:
venire contra factum proprium, because it is invested with negative ethical, psychological and sociological values, should be mandatorily contrasted with good faith, a concept that bears positive cultural representation and that is, furthermore, contained in the Roman tradition of Corpus
Iuris Civilis in such a state of dilution that makes it omnipresent.
CORDEIRO, supra note 10, at 753. See also RODOTÀ, supra note 25, at 131.
104. DÍEZ-PICAZO, supra note 13, at 143.
105. For instance, see articles 187 and 421 of the Brazilian Civil Code.
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prominent position in the resolution of conflicts of interest. 106 What
one must bear in mind in considering the application of the provisions of venire contra factum proprium is that whenever coherence
is protected, such protection is based on reasons that go beyond a
requirement of consistency.
A. The Federal Supreme Court’s Understanding
The leading case in Brazil regarding the adoption of the prohibition of disloyal behavior or venire contra factum proprium is Extraordinary Appeal No. 86.787, registered by Justice Rapporteur
Leitão de Abreu. The dispute centered on the divorce of a Brazilian
couple who had been married in Uruguay, in full compliance with
Uruguayan law, under a separation of property regime.
Because the separation of property regime was the legal regime
in Uruguay and was also accepted in Brazil, it could not be impugned by the appellant two years after the marriage and after having represented that he was married under a separation of property
regime in several notarial acts, as clarified by Justice Leitão de
Abreu. 107
After an in-depth analysis of the opinion of Justice Leitão de
Abreu, it is possible to identify two specific factors, namely, the previous conduct of the appellant in conformity with good faith and his
attempt to break a relationship of trust that he had consciously
agreed to and then later tried to deny. Venire contra factum proprium appears, in this case, to be an impediment to the appellant’s
behavior, who, after living under the separation of property regime
for two years, then attempted to adopt another regime.

106. José Gustavo Souza Miranda, A Proteção da Confiança nas Relações
Obrigacionais, 153 REVISTA INFORMAÇÃO LEGISLATIVA 131, 141 (2002).
107. S.T.F.J., RE 86.787/RS, Justice Rapp.: Leitão de Abreu, 20.10.1978 90
R.T.J. 968 (Brazil).

2016]

GOOD FAITH AND DISLOYAL BEHAVIOR

51

B. The Development of the Superior Court of Justice’s Interpretation
At the Superior Court of Justice level, the first judgment to expressly adopt the prohibition of disloyal behavior was articulated by
Justice Ruy Rosado de Aguiar. In this case, a married couple who
had agreed to sell property failed to sign a purchase and sale agreement. The buyers were in possession of the property, the sellers acknowledging the validity of the contract. However, after seventeen
years, they refused to provide the property’s final deed. 108
Previously, when deciding Special Appeal No. 37.859, Justice
Ruy Rosado de Aguiar reaffirmed arguments regarding the prohibition of disloyal behavior. He asserted that it was inadmissible for a
party, who requested the issuance of a charter to alienate an encumbered property with an inalienability clause and then refuse to actualize its subrogation:
The party that requests the charter and alienates the encumbered property, having received the price, has the duty to
provide its subrogation, which is still possible, as foreseen
by the law and established in the judgment. It is inadmissible
for the party who benefitted in the process filed under their
request and who breached their duty to actualize the subrogation to obtain, in violation of the prohibition on disloyal
behavior and at the detriment of the party acquiring the property in good faith, the annulment of the alienation simply because, as years have passed, they regret closing the deal. 109
Another important Superior Court of Justice decision on the prohibition of disloyal behavior was rendered by Justice Adhemar
Maciel, who affirmed that “if the alleged mistake in the property
deed was caused by the Administration itself, through a high-ranking official, there is no reason to plead the existence of a vice, at the
risk of causing damage to the party who, in good faith, has paid the

108. S.T.J., REsp 95.539/SP, Justice Rapp.: Ruy Rosado Aguiar 3.9.1996
(Brazil).
109. S.T.J., REsp. 37.859/PR, Justice Rapp.: Ruy Rosado Aguiar, 28.04.1997
(Brazil).
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price established for the acquisition,” 110 without violating the principles nemo potest venire contra factum proprium and memo creditor turpitudinem suam allegans.
In another case related to the signing of a purchase and sale
agreement by a municipality, Justice Ruy Rosado de Aguiar once
again applied the criteria of venire contra factum proprium. He
noted that because the municipality had signed the purchase and sale
agreement for a lot located on its property, the request for annulment
of the act was denied. He also opined that the municipality should
proceed, if possible, with the regularization of the allotment. According to Justice Ruy Rosado, “the prohibition on disloyal behavior
prevents the Public Administration from not following its own procedures, to the detriment of others who have trusted in the consistency of its procedures.”
In another case in which the reporting judge was Justice Antônio
de Pádua Ribeiro, venire contra factum proprium was strongly supported, as stated in the judgment:
[t]he mere circumstance that the Federal Government,
through the Ministry of Health, has bestowed on the defendant laboratory a license for the commercialization of a harmful and disastrous medicine does not create, by itself, a right
of recourse against the National Treasury to the extravagant
claim of the so-called objective responsibility. 111
Therefore, for the reporting Justice, in such cases, the license of
fabrication and commercialization is conferred based on the research data provided by the laboratory itself, and therefore, the right
of recourse would correspond to a case of venire contra factum proprium. 112
The prohibition of disloyal behavior received another endorsement by the Second Chamber of the Superior Court of Justice. The
110. S.T.J., REsp. 47.015/SP, Justice Rapp.: Adhemar Ferreira Maciel,
9.12.1997 (Brazil).
111. S.T.J., REsp. 60.129/SP, Justice Rapp.: Antônio Pádua Ribeiro,
20.09.2004, 185 R.S.T.J. 352 (Brazil).
112. S.T.J., REsp. 60.129/SP, Justice Rapp.: Antônio Pádua Ribeiro,
20.09.2004, 185 R.S.T.J. 352 (Brazil).
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case, headed by Justice Eliana Calmon, referred to the bidding process for a use and exploration license for areas for the new and former passenger terminals of the Pinto Martins – Fortaleza International Airport.
A car park service provider was awarded the bid for the former
passenger terminal. However, after having signed the concession
agreement, the Brazilian Company of Airport Infrastructure
(INFRAERO) discovered that the winning bidder had participated
in the process using false documentation. Consequently,
INFRAERO terminated the contract and invited the second-place
winner to determine whether it was still interested in signing a contract for a period of eight months and nineteen days, which could
eventually be extended for another three years. After the contract
was signed, INFRAERO finished the construction of the new international passenger terminal, which was located far away from the
parking area used by the new winner of the bidding process.
Actually, INFRAERO had forwarded correspondence to the second-place winner of the bidding process with the objective of encouraging it to sign the concession agreement for the remaining period of eight months and nineteen days, when the initial proposal
was for three years. In such correspondence, INFRAERO assured
the second-place winner that the concession agreement would be extended for another three years and that the company would be favored in the bidding process for the new parking area of the international arrivals terminal. After a review request, following Justice
Eliana Calmon, Justice Franciulli Neto delivered his opinion and,
invoked venire contra factum proprium to help solve the controversy. In addition, he noted important considerations regarding the
aspects of said mechanism. 113
Hence, since the first case that was decided by Justice Ruy Rosado, the Superior Court of Justice has provided significant steps

113. S.T.J., REsp 524.811/CE, Justice Rapp.: Eliana Calmon, 14.14.2004
(Brazil).
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toward the construction of a paradigm of venire contra factum proprium in private law. 114
V. CONCLUSION
The theory of disloyal behavior, or venire contra factum proprium, as a mechanism aimed at protecting reliance relationships,
stemmed from good faith and to become an important tool for controlling private autonomy in comparative private law. In general, it
occurs in two distinct behaviors by the same person—one’s own act
(factum proprium) and a contradictory behavior, with a difference
of timing such that the latter represents an incoherence with the good
faith that governs the former. It is, therefore, an expressive tool to
discourage disloyalty and promote any other duties attached to good
faith.
Notably, the prohibition of disloyal behavior does not at all consist of an abstract prohibition on contradictory behaviors; rather, it
only applies to behaviors that reflect inconsistent positions under
good faith. Because contradiction is an inherent human characteristic and is inherent in the dynamics of modern social relations, only
inconsistencies that have a harmful effect on another party’s patrimonial sphere, through the non-observance of good faith, can be
avoided.
Nevertheless, venire contra factum proprium should not be
viewed from the perspective of an unlimited incentive to consistency in human behavior because, in general, many types of be-

114. See Hesselink, supra note 4, at 624 (explaining that “in Germany, scholars both in private law and in jurisprudence have developed methods for rationalizing and objectivating the decisions of the court. The purpose of these Methodenlehren is to render the application of the law in general, and of general clauses like
good faith in particular, as rational and objective (and thereby predictable) as possible, instead of leaving it to the subjective judgment of the individual judge. The
generally agreed method for rationalizing is that of distinguishing functions and
developing groups of cases in which good faith has previously been applied
(Fallgruppen). In doing so, legal doctrine has developed an ‘inner system’ of good
faith, which is regarded as the content of that norm.”).
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haviors have no legal consequences. Strictly speaking, in accordance with the disloyal behavior doctrine, it is feasible to underline
legal effects only when someone faces a contradictory position subsequent to the first act. Nonetheless, what can be observed is that
good faith has been an engine of change in contract law and the law
of obligations in both civil law and common law systems based on
values such as cooperation.
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ABSTRACT
In the context of globalization, this work analyzes a distinctive
characteristic of the Brazilian legal profession. Namely, intellectual
property (IP) lawyers, who played important roles in opening the
Brazilian economy and who were key players in cross-border transactions, are now losing ground to their peers with respect to expertise in international trade. The thesis of this article is that the manner in which Brazilian lawyers are being educated is problematic.
Generally, Brazilian legal education has become degraded and provincial. Yet, Brazilian international trade lawyers, unlike Brazilian
IP lawyers, have overcome their deficient legal training by seeking
legal education abroad. By traveling overseas, especially to the
United States, international trade lawyers are exposed to an education and a set of best practices that stress not just domestic law from
one or another country, but laws from different jurisdictions. International trade lawyers in Brazil are now “global lawyers,” which
enables them to deal more effectively with their country’s expanding
economy, and it supports the argument that globalization matters
for both today’s law students and the legal profession.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The year 2014 marked the fortieth anniversary of the seminal
article “Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the
Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States,” 1 authored by David Trubek and Marc Galanter. This work has been
lauded and cited worldwide as a remarkable piece for those interested in law and development. It has also been praised for discussing
the impact of legal education and reforms on the promotion of economic and social development. 2 Trubek and Galanter discussed the
relationship between law and development (how it was supposed to
work, and how it really worked). 3 In sum, they observed that there
was a gap between the expectations and the outcomes of developmental reforms that occurred in developing countries during the
1960s. 4
Trubek and Galanter examined how scholars (including themselves) were at the forefront of the “moderniz[ation]” of legal systems 5 in “third world” 6 countries. Their objectives should have been
accomplished by the implementation of legal reforms and changes
in legal education in those countries. With respect to the latter, curriculum updates and innovative teaching techniques introduced by

1. See David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement:
Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United
States, 4 WIS. L. REV. 1062 (1974).
2. See David M. Trubek, Law and Development: 40 Years after Scholars in
Self Estrangement—A Preliminary Review, UNIV. WIS. LEGAL STUDIES
RESEARCH PAPER No. 1255 (2014).
3. See Trubek & Galanter, supra note 1. See also Jayanth K. Krishnan, Professor Kingsfield Goes to Delhi: American Academics, the Ford Foundation, and
the Development of Legal Education in India, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 447 (2004)
[hereinafter Krishnan, Professor Kingsfield] (describing several legal education
changes in India since the middle of the twentieth century); Jayanth K. Krishnan,
Academic SAILERS: The Ford Foundation and the Efforts to Shape Legal Education in Africa, 1957-1977, 52 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 261 (2012) [hereinafter Krishnan, Academic SAILERS] (discussing the development and outcomes of legal education reforms in several African countries).
4. See Trubek & Galanter, supra note 1.
5. Id. at 1067.
6. Id. at 1068.
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foreign scholars helped train the “third world” 7 countries’ legal
elites. As such, these elites carried out measures to ensure an efficient legal system for businesses and an accessible judicial system
for the needy. 8
The initiatives mentioned above relied on substantial funding
from development agencies, mainly the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) and the Ford Foundation. 9
These organizations provided the necessary resources that made
these projects possible. 10 Such reforms, however, were short-lived.
Economic and political instability emerged in countries such as Brazil and India for different reasons, albeit with one common root: the
legal reforms did not achieve the expected results. 11 Consequently,
human and financial capital became scarce, and scholars who engaged in such projects lost their interest in researching law and development as well as in working on related policymaking initiatives. 12
The lack of studies on law and development persisted until a few
years ago, when academics started to devote their efforts to this field
once again. 13 Financial systems, capital markets, legal education, judicial reforms, and globalization have been part of the agenda of

7. Id. at 1083-1088.
8. Id. See also David M. Trubek, Reforming Legal Education in Brazil:
From the Ceped Experiment to the Law Schools at the Getulio Vargas Foundation, UNIV. WIS. LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER No. 1180 (2011) (describing
the classroom environment in Brazil and how legal education should educate lawyers concerned with economic and social issues, for example, by emulating clinical and pro bono activities that were common to the American legal system).
9. See generally, Trubek, supra note 8; Krishnan, Professor Kingsfield goes
to Delhi, supra note 3; and Krishnan, Academic SAILERS, supra note 3.
10. See generally, Trubek & Galanter, supra note 1; Trubek, supra note 8;
Krishnan, Professor Kingsfield goes to Delhi, supra note 3; and Krishnan, Academic SAILERS, supra note 3.
11. See Trubek & Galanter, supra note 1. See generally THE NEW LAW AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) [hereinafter THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT] (explaining the rise of a
new moment of law and development studies).
12. See generally THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note
11.
13. Id.
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those interested in this new “moment” 14 of law and development.
Brazil is one of the countries that have garnered the attention of several scholars—including David Trubek and some collaborators of
his most recent works. 15 Nevertheless, intellectual property (IP) in
Brazil and its relevance to law schools have not stimulated researchers to the same degree. 16 Although some scholars have looked at IP
through a law and development perspective, by highlighting the importance of IP law to a country’s developmental path, 17 they have
not analyzed issues relating to the legal education of IP lawyers in a
country like Brazil. Other studies, have thoroughly assessed the extensive training of Brazilian international trade lawyers. 18 This in-

14. See David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos, The Third Moment in Law and
Development Theory and the Emergence of a New Critical Paradigm in THE NEW
LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 11 at 1, 2-3 (explaining the three
different moments in law and development [L&D] theory and what has changed
since the L&D movement started in the 1950s and 1960s).
15. See generally THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note
11; LAW AND THE NEW DEVELOPMENTAL STATE: THE BRAZILIAN EXPERIENCE IN
LATIN AMERICAN CONTEXT (David M. Trubek et al. eds., 2013) [hereinafter LAW
AND THE NEW DEVELOPMENTAL STATE]; and DIREITO E DESENVOLVIMENTO: UM
DIÁLOGO ENTRE OS BRICS (David M. Trubek & Mario G. Schapiro eds., 2012)
[hereinafter DIREITO E DESENVOLVIMENTO].
16. It is important to mention that the scholarship on law and development
has analyzed IP in Brazil in several ways—for example, its relevance to innovation and finance for R&D—but not with special attention to legal education in IP.
See infra note 17.
17. See Alvaro Santos, Carving Out Policy Autonomy for Developing Countries in the World Trade Organization: The Experience of Brazil & Mexico, 52
VA. J. INT'L L. 551 (2012) (highlighting the distinctions between the Brazilian and
Mexican experiences in using the WTO as a means of promoting developmental
trade policies); Monica Steffen Guise Rosina, Fabrício Polido & P. Guimarães,
Propriedade Intelectual: Potencialidades e Fragilidades do Ambiente Jurídicoinstitucional Brasileiro para a Inovação in DIREITO E DESENVOLVIMENTO, supra
note 15, at 135 (discussing the problems of Brazil’s institutional arrangements that
hinder R&D in the country within a comparative perspective); and Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin, Developmental Responses to the International Trade Legal
Game in LAW AND THE NEW DEVELOPMENTAL STATE, supra note 15, at 246 (analyzing that the civil society alongside some legal professionals in Brazil have
been able to find alternatives to enhance intellectual property development in the
country).
18. See generally Gregory Shaffer, Michelle Ratton Sanchez & Barbara Rosenberg, The Trials of Winning at the WTO: What Lies behind Brazil's Success, 41
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 383 (2008) (analyzing how Brazil’s lawyers have been trained
to become litigators at the WTO and why they have succeeded in that arena);
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vestigation, therefore, aims to fill that gap in this literature by bringing legal education and legal training in IP to the center of this debate and by discussing the differences between the legal practice in
international trade and IP in Brazil.
This comparison between IP and international trade is relevant
because IP norms are important to any country’s cross-border transactions as well as its developmental path. 19 Patent, trademark, and
copyright laws serve as important tools to attract foreign investment
and develop a country’s domestic industry and its network of services. 20 Furthermore, globalization has been part of IP’s trajectory,
and international treaties have historically regulated transnational
commerce of rights over inventions and works of authorship. 21 Accordingly, international trade and IP have worked hand in hand for
centuries. In Brazil however, this relationship has been recently
marked by an interesting characteristic: international trade lawyers
have aptly handled and succeeded in IP trade disputes derived from

Rubens E. Glezer et al., Transforming Legal Capacity in Brazil: International
Trade and the Myth of a Booming Practice at http://papers
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2683561 (revealing the perception of international trade lawyers about their training and also of the market in this field).
19. See generally PAUL GOLDSTEIN & MARKETA TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS (3rd ed., Foundation
Press 2012); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Fostering Dynamic Innovation, Development and Trade: Intellectual Property as a Case Study in Global Administrative Law, ACTA JURIDICA 237, 282 (2009); Diepiriye A. Anga, Intellectual Property Without Borders? The Effect of Copyright Exhaustion on Global Commerce,
10 BYU INT'L L. & MGMT. R. 53 (2014); CARLOS ALBERTO PRIMO BRAGA ET
AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, parts 63412 (World Bank Pubs. 2000); David M. Gould & William C. Gruben, The Role
of Intellectual Property Rights in Economic Growth, 48 J. DEV. ECON. 323
(1996); Ha-Joon Chang, Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development: Historical Lessons and Emerging Issues, 2 J. HUM. DEV. 287 (2001);
Francesco Laforgia et al., IPRs and Technological Development in
Pharmaceuticals in THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA: GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 307, 307 (Neil W. Netanel ed., 2009)
(providing broad lenses to the analysis of IP in the developing world); Bruno
Salama & Daniel Benoliel, Pharmaceutical Patent Bargains: The Brazilian Experience, 18 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 633, 686 (2010); Daniel Benoliel &
Bruno Salama, Towards an Intellectual Property Bargaining Theory: The PostWTO Era, 32 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 265, 368 (2010).
20. See GOLDSTEIN & TRIMBLE, supra note 19.
21. Id.
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the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS), whereas Brazil’s domestic regulation of IP rights
that has resulted from this treaty has failed to foster Brazil’s development. 22
Indeed, there are two groups of scholars who have analyzed this
situation. Some authors focus on international trade and the positive
ramifications of Brazil’s trade policies and lawyering in transnational disputes over IP rights. 23 In parallel, other academics specifically concerned with IP have discussed how Brazil has wrongly harmonized its domestic IP laws with international treaties. Some legal
scholars have also questioned whether Brazil needs to strengthen its
national research agenda in order to better prepare IP professionals. 24
The present study argues that the victorious strategy of international trade of IP rights stems from the legal training that lawyers
who work in this field have received, which has not happened to IP
lawyers. Namely, investigations on the capacity building of Brazilian trade lawyers have showed that these professionals have received both legal education and practical training at elite organizations outside of Brazil.25 Also, a recent research study highlighted
that this capacity building has successfully worked for Brazilian legal professionals. 26 While these inquiries on international trade and
the legal profession in Brazil exist, similar studies on international
IP and IP lawyers are still missing.
22. See Badin, supra note 17; Salama & Benoliel, supra note 19, at 676; and
Esteban Donoso, Application of a Mechanism of Proportional Rewards towards
Global Innovation, 4 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 105, 112 n.23 (2014).
23. See Santos, supra note 17; and Badin, supra note 17.
24. See Salama & Benoliel, supra note 19; and Donoso, supra note 22. See
also Julia Paranhos & Lia Hasenclever, A Proteção Patentária e a Interação Empresa-Ict no Sistema Farmacêutico de Inovação Brasileiro, 29 RADAR TECNOLOGIA, PRODUÇÃO E COMÉRCIO EXTERIOR 39 (2013); and Paula Wardi
Drumond Gouvea Lana, Interaç ão entre Direito da Propriedade Intelectual e
Direito da Concorrência: o Instituto de Patentes Pipeline e seu Impacto na Concorrência do Mercado de Antiretrovirais no Brasil, 3 RDC 181 (2015).
25. See Glezer et al., supra note 18; and Shaffer, Sanchez & Rosenberg, supra note 18.
26. See Glezer et al., supra note 18.
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With that said, although legal professionals have been aware of
the international component of IP practice, distinctive characteristics of Brazilian lawyers who work in these complementary fields—
IP and international trade—have been noted and thus need special
attention. 27 Hence, this study will analyze this “boundary-blurring” 28 aspect of international IP and will explore its impact on the
Brazilian legal profession.
The legal profession is known for its liberal values. 29 Lawyers
have been active players in advocating for economic liberalization
and the rule of law in several countries. 30 Law schools, by their turn,
have provided the environment for those ideals to be discussed. Accordingly, the initial step to understand the practice of IP law in Brazil is by analyzing Brazilian law schools. Since this work is concerned with globalization and a small portion of the Brazilian legal
profession is internationalized, it will look at legal education in IP
at elite Brazilian law schools. In sum, whether Brazilian IP lawyers
have been properly educated in IP is a question that needs scrutiny.
That claim is relevant to Brazil’s development because Brazil
has been politically engaged in IP matters, both domestically and

27. See Jayanth K. Krishnan, Vitor M. Dias & John E. Pence, Legal Elites
and The Shaping of Corporate Law Practice in Brazil: A Historical Study, LAW
& SOC. INQUIRY (forthcoming) (describing the process of globalization of the legal profession and how an important IP lawyer and his partners were instrumental
in opening the Brazilian economy).
28. See Sida Liu, The Legal Profession as a Social Process: A Theory on
Lawyers and Globalization, 38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 670, 676 (conceptualizing
boundary-blurring within the legal profession).
29. See LAWYERS AND THE RISE OF WESTERN POLITICAL LIBERALISM:
EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA FROM THE EIGHTEENTH TO TWENTIETH CENTURIES
(Terence C. Halliday & Lucien Karpik eds., 1997) [hereinafter LAWYERS AND THE
RISE OF WESTERN POLITICAL LIBERALISM]; and FIGHTING FOR POLITICAL
FREEDOM: COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF THE LEGAL COMPLEX AND POLITICAL
LIBERALISM (Terence C. Halliday, Lucien Karpik & Malcolm Feeley eds., 2007)
[hereinafter FIGHTING FOR POLITICAL FREEDOM].
30. See LAWYERS AND THE RISE OF WESTERN POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra
note 29; FIGHTING FOR POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 29; and Krishnan, Dias
& Pence, supra note 27.
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globally. 31 The Brazilian government has historically signed international treaties, 32 attempted to modernize the Instituto Nacional da
Propriedade Industrial (INPI), which is Brazil’s patents and trademarks office, 33 and reformed its domestic norms to foster research
and development (R&D) and innovation within the country. 34 Moreover, with respect to IP disputes, Brazil has litigated and has also
been a defendant in international forums, such as the World Trade
Organization (WTO). 35After all, both IP and international trade are
deemed to be complex practices that need specialized legal professionals. 36
Indeed, globalization has increased the complexity of those related fields, and Brazilian lawyers have become experts in both IP
and international trade, albeit with a particular characteristic. 37 On
the one hand, after the TRIPS Agreement and the strengthening of
WTO’s dispute settlement body, Brazilian international trade lawyers have thrived. 38 Brazil has been championed for its success in
handling transnational disputes over IP rights and the TRIPS Agreement. 39 On the other hand, the harmonization of domestic norms
with the TRIPS Agreement has not been seen so positively, and this
work argues that this situation may stem from the legal training that
IP lawyers receive in Brazil.40 Inasmuch as there exists a market for
international legal services in IP, Brazilian lawyers should be prepared to provide these services accordingly. However, it is unclear
31. See Badin, supra note 17; Krishnan, Dias & Pence, supra note 27.
32. See Krishnan, Dias & Pence, supra note 27, at 7.
33. See LEANDRO MALAVOTA, A CONSTRUÇÃO DO SISTEMA DE PATENTES
NO BRASIL: UM OLHAR HISTÓRICO (2011) (making a historical assessment of patent protection in Brazil).
34. Id.
35. See Badin, supra note 17.
36. See Fabiana Luci de Oliveira & Luciana de Oliveira Ramos, General (InHouse) Counsels in Brazil: Career, Professional Profile and a New Role, FGV
Direito SP Research Paper Series No. 119 (2015) (explaining the structure of inhouse counsel in Brazil); and Shaffer, Sanchez & Rosenberg, supra note 18.
37. See Badin, supra note 17.
38. See Shaffer, Sanchez & Rosenberg, supra note 18.
39. See Badin, supra note 17; Santos, supra note 17.
40. See Paranhos & Hasenclever, supra note 24; Lana, supra note 24; Salama
& Benoliel, supra note 19; and Donoso, supra note 22.
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whether Brazilian law schools have been properly educating their
students, and whether IP lawyers have found other ways of obtaining legal capacity in IP, as it has happened with international trade
lawyers.
Regarding the capacity building that Brazilian international
trade lawyers have received, they have been extensively trained after
they graduated in Brazil. 41 Namely, the vast majority of Brazil’s international trade legal professionals have pursued advanced law degrees outside of Brazil. 42 Also, they have worked at respected multilateral organizations and global law firms abroad. 43 These legal
practitioners have stated that Brazil’s strategy of capacity building
has been effective and that it has been instrumental to Brazil’s triumph in international trade disputes. 44 This work will assess
whether or not similar initiatives that have targeted Brazilian IP lawyers exist and what conclusions can be drawn from the legal training
in international IP in Brazil.
Bearing that in mind, the present work intends to make a descriptive analysis of how IP has been taught at select elite Brazilian
law schools. The existing literature on legal education states that
very little has changed in the manner by which law is taught in Brazil, in spite of the effects of globalization on the Brazilian legal market. 45 Initiatives outside the law schools’ boundaries will thus be
similarly assessed. Therefore, this study will examine whether
global forces that have guided Brazil’s new development “moment” 46 have also demanded more legal knowledge and hence a better legal education on international IP in Brazil, and whether law
schools have followed this process.

41. See Shaffer, Sanchez & Rosenberg, supra note 18; Glezer et al., supra
note 18.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See Trubek, supra note 8; see generally AVENTURA E LEGADO NO ENSINO
JURÍDICO (Gabriel Lacerda, Joaquim Falcão & Tânia Rangel eds., FGV 2012).
46. See Trubek & Santos, supra note 14.
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It is important to note that the practice of IP law in Brazil, as
well as in other countries, is deemed to be highly specialized. 47 Few
law firms repeatedly appear in legal profession rankings. Further,
the firms receive work from in-house general counsels who have
only limited experience in IP matters. 48 Thus, in order to succeed in
this market, IP lawyers need to become experts in a variety of aspects of patents, copyrights, and trademarks, which are regulated by
domestic norms and international treaties. 49 Consequently, in addition to being well educated at elite law schools, IP lawyers also need
to be global lawyers. 50
The body of this work is divided into five sections. The first section will discuss the structure of legal education and the situation of
IP within the law school curriculum in Brazil. Secondly, an analysis
of Brazil’s copyrights, trademarks, and patent laws will be conducted. After having described the pertinent IP laws in Brazil that
have been affected the most by globalization, the third and fourth
sections will assess the effects of globalization on Brazil’s IP market, with special attention to the TRIPS Agreement and Brazil’s international trade strategies derived from this treaty.
The fourth section will focus on the education of the elite of Brazil’s IP lawyers, also discussing the consequences of education related problems on Brazil’s development. What international IP lawyers can learn from the experience of international trade lawyers will
be featured in this section, explaining how international trade lawyers complete their international training outside of Brazilian law
schools. Thus, capacity building programs that have been created to

47. See Oliveira & Ramos, supra note 36 at 10; Glezer et al., supra note 18;
Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and the Future: Toward a Better Model for Educating Leaders in Intellectual Property Law, 64
S.M.U. L. REV. 1161 (2011); Stephen C. Hicks, Global Alternatives in Legal Education for a Global Legal Profession, 3 PARALLAX: J. INT’L. PERSPECTIVES 47
(2006).
48. See Oliveira & Ramos, supra note 36 at 10.
49. See Gomulkiewicz, supra note 47; and Hicks, supra note 47.
50. Id.
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enhance Brazilian international trade lawyers’ skills will be summarized, and a comparison with IP lawyers will be made. For further
details on the methodology, please refer to Appendix A.
Finally, the conclusion will discuss how further research can
benefit from this study. Furthermore, it will call for the establishment of an agenda to provide better training to IP lawyers in Brazil,
which can draw upon what has been found regarding international
trade lawyers.
II. LEGAL EDUCATION IN BRAZIL: AN OVERVIEW
Access to education at all levels has been a longstanding problem in Brazil. 51 The complications begin before admissions to college. Namely, the needy struggle to register their children in public
schools. 52 Even when they succeed in doing this, these educational
organizations do not provide an appropriate preparation for students
to pursue a university degree—mainly because of the lack of resources and qualified teachers, which leads many poor students to
leave the regular educational track. 53 Those who persist in spite of
all the hurdles need to compete for a place in a university with those
who have had the opportunity to attend a private school, which usually offers better support and training than the public schools.
The competition among students of public and private schools
becomes particularly difficult when poor students seek admissions
into a public university, because public higher education is the main
(and sometimes the only) option for those who come from public
schools. Therefore, the access to higher education for poor people

51. See THOMAS E. SKIDMORE, BRAZIL: FIVE CENTURIES OF CHANGE (Oxford Univ. Press 1999).
52. See FGV/IBRE Centro de Politicas Sociais, Tempo de Permanência na
Escola, Marcelo Cortês Neri coord. (2009); FGV/IBRE Centro de Politicas Sociais, O Tempo de Permanência na Escola e as Motivações dos Sem-Escola, Marcelo Cortês Neri coord. (2009). Although these works have similar findings, they
shed light on different reasons for dropout.
53. Id.
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in Brazil is extremely challenging, which is worsened when one
seeks elite degrees such as law.
Law schools have been considered the elite of higher education
in Brazil since the Portuguese empire (1500-1822). 54 Due to the inheritance of Portugal’s social norms, Brazilian society was extremely unequal, and only members of the highest social strata had
access to legal education. 55 In addition, higher education was not a
priority for the crown, and the education of the elites living in Brazil
was concentrated in Europe for several years. 56 In fact, the first Brazilian law schools were founded only in 1827, when Brazil was already an independent country. 57 Two schools were established in
that year, one in São Paulo and another one in Recife (on the Brazilian Southeast and Northeast, respectively). 58
Since then, there has been an increase in the number of law
schools in the country, 59 yet not changing the fact that a law degree
remains a status symbol and those who earn it are usually in the upper social classes. 60 The growth in the number of law schools generated a stratification of the legal careers, a phenomenon that worsened due to the fact that the majority of law schools in Brazil are of
low-quality. 61
Drawing upon the government’s Census on Higher Education, a
recent study authored by a prestigious Brazilian university—São
Paulo Law School of Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV Direito SP)—
reveals the quantitative aspects of law schools and law professors in
54. See Joaquim Falcão, Lawyers in Brazil in LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: THE
CIVIL LAW WORLD 400 (Richard L. Abel & Phillip S. C. Lewis eds., 1988) (describing the growth of law schools and the characteristics of legal careers in Brazil).
55. Id.
56. See Frederico de Almeida, A Nobreza Togada: As Elites Jurídicas e a
Política da Justiça no Brasil (2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation) (on file with
the author) (discussing political aspects of having lawyers as members of the Brazilian elite).
57. Id at 97.
58. Id.
59. Id at 90-91. See also Falcão, supra note 54.
60. See Falcão, supra note 54; and Almeida, supra note 54.
61. See Falcão, supra note 54.
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Brazil: there were 1,157 law schools and 40,828 law faculty in Brazil in 2012. 62 Although Brazil has traditionally promoted its public
universities, this has not been the case for legal education. Looking
at the 1,157 law schools that were operating in 2012, 84% were private and only 16% were public. 63 Those numbers denote that private
universities have been the main players in expanding the number of
law schools in Brazil.
Even though there are more private than public law schools in
Brazil, governmental universities still hold the tradition of being, in
general, more respected than private schools. 64 Two reasons explain
this perception by the public opinion. First, the Ministry of Education (MEC) evaluates the performance of each university in Brazil
with a grade. This evaluation depends upon the performance attained by the universities’ students in a national examination named
Exame Nacional de Desempenho de Estudantes [National Exam on
Students Performance] 65 (ENADE). Secondly, Brazilians consider
the bar exam pass rates of all law schools. 66 In the end, public universities have usually fared better in both assessments. 67

62. See JOSÉ GARCEZ GHIRARDI ET AL., OBSERVATORIO DO ENSINO DE
DIREITO at 18, 28 (2013). However, one professor may teach in more than one
law school and be counted twice for census purposes. In addition, a law school
may have two campuses in different cities and they will be considered two law
schools for the census. See Jayanth K. Krishnan & Vitor M. Dias, The Aspiring
and Globalizing Graduate Law Student: A Comment on a Lazarus-Black and Globokar LL.M. Study, 22 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 81, 90 (2015).
63. Id. at 18.
64. See Falcão, supra note 54. See also Alunos de Públicas Têm Melhores
Notas no Exame da OAB, CONSULTOR JURÍDICO, Apr. 2013, http://www.conjur.com.br/2013-abr-26/universidades-publicas-melhor-indice-aprovacao-exame-oab (last visited Aug. 1, 2015) [hereinafter Alunos de Públicas Têm Melhores
Notas].
65. Translated by the author.
66. Although the passing rate in the bar exam is an important aspect to the
reputation of a Brazilian law school, it is not an official measure of quality considered by the government when it decides whether a law school shall exist or not.
67. See Alunos de Públicas Têm Melhores Notas, supra note 64; and Fundaçao Getulio Vargas, Exame De Ordem Em Numeros (2014), http://fgvprojetos.fgv.br/sites/fgvprojetos.fgv.br/files/relatorio_2_edicao_final.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2015).
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Most recently, the MEC and the Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil (OAB) [Brazilian Bar Association] have heatedly debated the
quality of legal education. These two organizations do not always
agree on the meaning of a good legal education. However, it is undeniable that Brazilian students who intend on attending law school
care about what both the MEC and the OAB have to say about a
university. For this reason, it is important to describe how the law
curriculum is organized in Brazil. It is also essential to clarify the
role that organizations like the MEC and the OAB play in Brazilian
legal education in order to assess elite law schools. 68
A. Shedding Light on the Law School Curriculum
In Brazil, education is a constitutional right to be provided by
public and private organizations. 69 The Lei de Diretrizes e Bases da
Educação (LDB) [Guidelines for Education Act], enacted in 1996,
establishes the parameters that universities shall follow. 70 The main
objectives of higher education in Brazil are: stimulating culture and
the development of science; educating professionals of several fields
to engage in the development of the Brazilian society; encouraging
research and development (R&D); strengthening of traditional
knowledge; establishing a permanent agenda of cultural development; concreting knowledge into development of the society; and
promoting R&D beyond the university boundaries. 71 In addition to
the LDB, there are other rules that regulate specific requirements for
universities’ degrees, including curriculum.
Historically, Acts 4,024/1961 and 5,540/1968 were the norms
that regulated the higher education curriculum. 72 According to these
68. See generally Adriana Ancona de Faria, Exame de Ordem Não Serve para
Comparar as Escolas, CONSULTOR JURÍDICO, Jul. 14, 2011, http://www.conjur
.com.falta-indice-consistente-exame-ordem (last visited Mar 14, 2016).
69. See Brazilian Constitution, 1988, arts. 204-205.
70. See Brazilian Lei de Diretrizes e Bases da Educação, Act No. 9,394/1996.
71. Id. at art. 43, I-VII.
72. See Carolina Ramazzina Van Moorsel, O Ensino do Direito e o curso de
Direito no Brasil: um panorama literário e regulatório 44 (completion of course
paper) (on file with the author).
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norms, universities and their law schools were expected to follow a
strict curriculum model. These standards required that particular
courses were taught by law schools. Also, the number of credithours assigned to each courses depended upon regulatory permission. Under this model, the law school curriculum was “frozen,” 73
because law schools did not have the freedom to put emphasis on
particular courses, programs, and research agendas. 74 Thus, with respect to curriculum, there was virtually no difference between Brazilian law schools. Yet, students who attended prestigious universities were more likely to improve their social networks beyond the
classroom. This educational policy resulted in professional opportunities that related much more to personal influence than merits. 75
After the Constitution of 1988 and the LDB establishing the general framework under which universities should be organized, specific regulation of law schools has been implemented. Since 1996
with the LDB, there has been a movement to make the law school
curriculum more flexible. The intent is for universities to start adjusting their courses to regional and international aspects. For example, law schools located in the Brazilian Amazon region would be
permitted to focus on issues related to environmental law and traditional knowledge, while universities in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro
would be allowed to emphasize international business transactions,
securities regulation, foreign investment, and vice-versa. The law
school curriculum would start to be organized under a less strict
framework, needing to follow guidelines, as opposed to mandatory
courses imposed by the government. 76
The debate on the flexibility of the law school curriculum has
garnered the attention of different players, particularly the MEC and

73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id.
See Falcão, supra note 54; and Trubek, supra note 8.
See Van Moorsel, supra note 72.
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the OAB. 77 Whether law schools shall have more or less freedom to
organize their curriculum has been the main point of contention between interest groups and policy makers. 78 On the one hand, some
advocates believe that law school curriculums should be exhaustively defined by the regulators, 79 which would establish required
courses and give less discretion for law schools on what disciplines
should be offered. 80 On the other hand, there were those who urged
for more innovation in the curriculum and teaching methods in order
to update the Brazilian legal education to regional and international
changes. 81 After persisting for a long time, the regulatory framework
in favor of more flexibility to the law school curriculum won, and it
is important to understand the changes that have been introduced
since then.
Although the debate on the changes to universities’ curricula
dates back to the 1990s, it was only in 2004 that law schools were
specifically regulated, when the MEC passed the Resolução MEC
9/2004 [resolution]. This Resolução confirmed the government’s intent to empower law schools by permitting them to innovate in their
curriculum by introducing courses and methodologies that they understood more suitable for their pedagogical project. This change
counted on the support of the Bar, albeit different points of views
existed. 82
The aim was to bring a greater degree of flexibility to the law
school curriculum. Unlike under the “frozen” 83 program of study,
law schools now must inform the regulators of the courses that they
offer by specifying if they are elective or mandatory classes. As a
result, “it does not exist a mandatory curriculum [anymore], but law
77. Id. See also Luciana Gross Cunha et al., Who is the Law Professor in
Brazil, and What Does It Tell About the Brazilian Legal Education, in Third East
Asian Law & Society Conference (2013).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See Van Moorsel, supra note 72.
83. Id. at 44
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schools shall justify and detail which program of study will be offered [to the students].” 84
According to Brazil’s current regulatory framework, law schools
shall educate law students under a three-tier system, consisting in a
“core program,” a “professional axis,” and a “traineeship.” The core
program aims to prepare students to have a reflexive thought about
law and its relationship with other sciences such as political science,
sociology, economics, and anthropology, just to name a few. The
professional axis follows the Brazilian civil law tradition, with
courses such as civil law, civil procedure, criminal law, criminal
procedure, tax law, constitutional law, among others. Lastly, the
“traineeship” focuses on preparing students for the real world. Those
interested in practicing law participate in internship activities. Those
aiming for an academic career focus on scholarly work and advanced research. This three-tier model being a guideline, law
schools may choose the tier on which they want to place more emphasis to be able to imprint their mark on educating future lawyers,
law professors, or judges. 85
Although reforms have been pursued, some scholars have debated remaining problems. 86 One might ask whether law schools
have taken advantage of having more flexibility to implement their
own programs of study and provide a better legal education to their
students. The overall opinion to date is that little progress has been
achieved. 87 Most Brazilian law schools continue to educate students
as they have always done, regardless of the improvements to the

84. Id. at 50 (translated by the author).
85. Id.
86. See generally DIREITOS HUMANOS, DIREITOS SOCIAIS E JUSTIÇA (José
Eduardo Faria ed., Malheiros Editores 2000); Trubek, supra note 8; AVENTURA E
LEGADO NO ENSINO JURÍDICO, supra note 45.
87. Id. See also Krishnan & Dias, supra note 62; JOSÉ GARCEZ GHIRARDI, O
INSTANTE DO ENCONTRO QUESTÕES FUNDAMENTAIS PARA O ENSINO JURÍDICO
(2012); Trubek, supra note 8; AVENTURA E LEGADO NO ENSINO JURÍDICO, supra
note 45.
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curriculum from which they could be benefiting. 88 Since law professors are responsible for teaching the curriculum in the classroom,
it is equally important to understand their situation within this context.
B. Understanding Some Problems of Legal Education in Brazil
As noted above, Brazil has 40,828 law faculty and the vast majority of law schools were private in 2012. 89 Despite recent developments in the law school curriculum, little attention has been given
to law professors, who are instrumental to the success of this educational policy. Likewise, there are no empirical analyses of the methods used to teach law in Brazil, even though scholars have discussed
the problems of the Brazilian legal education and how traditional
methods have been outdated for a long time. 90
Drawing upon the data organized by FGV Direito SP, it is possible to analyze the general profile of a law professor in Brazil and
draw some conclusions, focusing on three aspects: the type of faculty appointment, the educational level, and whether professors
work in a public or private university. From there, one may have a
general understanding of what type of education a law professor in
Brazil has, how engaged she is in her teaching activities, and how
the profile of law professors varies whether working in public or
private universities.
Because law is an undergraduate degree in Brazil, those intending to pursue an academic career typically move on to graduate
school, to gain needed research and teaching skills. It also gives
them a substantial background in a specific field of law that one
would be interested in teaching. And it is not uncommon for law

88. See DIREITOS HUMANOS, DIREITOS SOCIAIS E JUSTIÇA, supra note 86;
Krishnan & Dias, supra note 62; and GHIRARDI, supra note 87.
89. See GHIRARDI ET AL., supra note 62, at 28.
90. See generally Krishnan & Dias, supra note 62; Trubek, supra note 8; and
DIREITOS HUMANOS, DIREITOS SOCIAIS E JUSTIÇA, supra note 86.
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professors to hold advanced degrees in either law or in another field,
such as economics, sociology, and political science.
Few universities offer Master and Doctoral degrees in law. 91 As
of 2012, there were, respectively, 58 Master’s and 24 Ph.D. programs in law available in Brazil. 92 Numbers may seem small, but
the cohort of admitted students in each program varies depending
upon the size of the university and the number of faculty available
to teach at the graduate level. Consequently, there is a significant
group of law professors who hold Master and Doctoral degrees in
Brazil. In 2012, 18,489 professors held Master’s degrees and 9,989
held Ph.D. degrees. 93 From the sample of 40,828 law professors, approximately 70% of them attended graduate school, 45% attained
the Master level, and 25% earned a Doctoral degree. 94
These numbers may look good, but what they represent in terms
of who is teaching law in Brazil does not necessarily support that
assumption. Among all the professors teaching in public law
schools, 35% hold a Ph.D., 95 whereas only 22% of the professors
teaching in private schools are doctors. 96 In sum, at both private and
public law schools in Brazil, law students are being educated by faculty that are probably in the process of completing their graduate
studies and have not reached the doctoral level. Accordingly, the
number of highly-educated law professors in Brazil is relatively low,
which may result in deficiencies related to teaching methods and
research skills to prepare their students properly.
There is another characteristic that may worsen this situation:
the types of faculty appointment. Although it is not possible to measure the degree to which a law professor dedicates herself to teach,

91. It is not uncommon for Brazilian lawyers to pursue an executive education degree after finishing law school, but, in Brazil, this is seen as being more
suitable for lawyers seeking to become legal practitioners.
92. See GHIRARDI ET AL., supra note 62, at 26.
93. Id. at 34.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 35.
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some inferences can be made from the data. According to the Brazilian Census on Higher Education, 97 there are four different types
of faculty appointment in Brazil: full professor with an exclusive
appointment; full professor without an exclusive appointment; adjunct professor; and hourly-paid professor. Similar to the higher education system in the United States, full professors affiliated with
one specific department (or school) tend to be more engaged than
professors who have multiple appointments within and outside academia.
Although some improvement in the quality of life for academics
has been achieved, the overall situation of university professors remains difficult in Brazil. 98 The salaries paid to tenured, full professors, are not as high as compared to other professions. Also, adjunct
professors and hourly-hired professors are paid even less. 99 The infrastructure for research is poor and faculty lack the funding to attend conferences and do fieldwork. 100 For these reasons, the academic career is not as attractive as it is in other countries, especially
in the developed world.
With that said, adjunct professors and hourly-paid professors are
the most common types of faculty appointment that exist in Brazil. 101 Namely, 66% of all law professors are hired as adjunct and
hourly-paid faculty, 102 and no more than 6% are full professors with
appointment at only one university. 28% of the faculty who are full
professors have appointments at other universities. 103 This data supports the argument that the majority of law professors have a primary occupation in addition to teaching law, and this may undermine their academic career in a significant manner. As a result, law
97. Id.
98. See Rogério Rissato, Baixa Remuneração de Professor Prejudica Ensino,
CONSULTOR JURÍDICO, Apr. 2011, http://www.conjur.com.br/2011-abr-02/baixosalario-professor-contribui-decadencia-curso-direito (last visited Jul. 25, 2015).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See GHIRARDI ET AL., supra note 62 at 79-90.
102. Id. at 79.
103. Id.
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professors’ commitment to thinking on new methods, updating syllabi, and researching is compromised due to their many obligations
beyond teaching. 104
The situation is even worse regarding private law schools.
Whereas public universities rely on 30% of full professors with exclusive appointments, 105 private law schools count on only 2%. 106
Furthermore, adjunct and hourly-paid professors represent 71% of
all law professors working for private universities, 107 whereas they
are 38% of all scholars working at public law schools. 108 There is an
important caveat, however, regarding these numbers. There is a
small group of elite law schools that differ from these patterns substantially, and they have been important players in hiring faculty
with strong research backgrounds, such as it has been noted by David Trubek when he analyzes the FGV law schools. 109 There is, thus,
a difference between the hiring parameters of private and public law
schools in Brazil, where the majority of universities seem to prioritize teaching over research.
At last, a quick assessment of where law professors work is also
relevant to understand where Brazilian elite lawyers are being educated. Because the majority of law schools are private, it is expected
that they have more positions available for legal scholars. 110 Indeed,
83% of legal academic positions are in private universities. 111 This
percentage raises some concerns regarding what these professors
need to face while teaching at private universities. These schools
hold the bargaining power when hiring and retaining law professors.
This leaves law faculty without options to negotiate their salaries

104. See generally DIREITOS HUMANOS, DIREITOS SOCIAIS E JUSTIÇA, supra
note 86.
105. See GHIRARDI ET AL., supra note 62, at 79.
106. Id. at 80.
107. Id. at 80.
108. Id. at 79.
109. Trubek, supra note 8.
110. See GHIRARDI ET AL., supra note 62, at 24.
111. Id.
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and conditions for research. Consequently, universities tend to recruit adjunct and hourly-paid professors that have not completed
their graduate studies. 112
If some progress has been achieved regarding curriculum, this
does not seem to be the case with respect to law faculty’s working
conditions. These issues likely influence the performance of both
students and universities, as discussed below.
C. Legal Education Reforms, the Role of Law Professors, and the
Performance of Private and Public Law Schools
Some scholars and lawyers argue that the increase in the number
of law schools and their faculty has exacerbated the problem of legal
education in Brazil. 113 Considering quantitative parameters, some
characteristics are weighted in the assessment of law schools. In
2004, a federal law established the criteria under which universities
and their courses are assessed and graded: 114 teaching; research;
agreements between universities; students’ performance (in national
exams); infrastructure and management; and faculty. 115 All these
criteria shall be observed holistically. 116 Besides the official rules of
evaluation established by the government, social norms also account
for the reputation of law schools. For example, the passing rates for
the bar exam has an impact on the status of a law school.
Indeed, in Brazil, the MEC and the OAB are relevant in determining whether a law school is reputable or not. Moreover, conventional wisdom and perception toward which schools are considered
elite or not also plays an important role in the public perception of
Brazilian law schools. 117 Passing rates for the bar exam are relevant
in shaping people’s opinion. Bearing this in mind, in spite of the big
112. See Rissato, supra note 98.
113. See generally Falcão, supra note 54; and DIREITOS HUMANOS, DIREITOS
SOCIAIS E JUSTIÇA, supra note 86.
114. See Brazilian Lei do Sistema Nacional de Avaliação da Educação
Superior, Act No. 10,861/2004.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See Ancona de Faria, supra note 68.
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debate that exists in Brazil that only the MEC is responsible for
grading and regulating higher education, there are practical issues
related to how the OAB grades a law school. 118 This evaluation is
even more important when students who attend private law schools
usually attain lower grades on the government’s national exam
(ENADE) and when they fail the bar exam. 119
Currently, the passing rate for the bar exam is below 20%. 120
The existing debate is focused on whether there are problems in the
way the exam is prepared and whether law graduates are duly trained
to become legal practitioners. This work focuses on the latter question, specifically regarding the education of IP lawyers. Thus, one
particular type of assessment of law schools will be used to refine
this study’s focus on elite law schools: the Selo OAB Recomenda,
which is a seal granted by the Bar to the law schools that meet specific requirements set forth by the MEC and the OAB.
The OAB Recomenda has existed since 2001. However, it was
only since 2010 that its methodology was adapted to follow MEC’s
standards of evaluation of higher education. In 2010, the OAB’s
Federal Council passed Portaria no. 52/2010, which is a regulation
that aims to complement the ENADE in the evaluation of law
schools. 121 According to the Bar, the OAB Recomenda “is a symbolic program …, and works as a diagnosis, not a ranking, … that
entrusts credibility to law schools.” 122 Thus, as it has been argued
118. It is not uncommon for the legal media in Brazil to report statements issued by the Brazilian Bar with respect to its views on legal education in general
and law schools in particular. These online publications include Consultor Jurídico, Migalhas, and Última Instância, and they have several publications regarding these matters.
119. See Alunos de Públicas Têm Melhores Notas, supra note 64.
120. See Giselle Souza, Pesquisa da FGV Mostra Perfil dos Candidatos do
Exame de Ordem, CONSULTOR JURÍDICO, May 2015, http://www.conjur
.com.br/2015-mai-29/pesquisa-fgv-mostra-perfil-candidatos-exame-ordem (last
visited Aug. 1 2015).
121. See Brazilian Bar Association, Portaria No. 52/2010-CFOAB).
122. See RECOMENDA: INDICADOR DE EDUCAÇÃO JURÍDICA DE QUALIDADE
(4th ed., OAB 2012), at 11 [hereinafter OAB Recomenda]. The Author translated
this excerpt from: “O Selo OAB Recomenda configura-se como um programa
simbólico … que, longe de ser um ranking ao exercer mais um diagnóstico …,
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above about people’s perception of Brazilian law schools, the OAB
attempted to add an empirical component upon which one can rely
on and decide the reputation of a law school.
With respect to the OAB Recomenda’s methodology, it is a triennial report that is built upon statistical analysis of two main variables: the law schools’ grades attained in ENADE and the passing
rate in the bar exam. Its sample includes the most recent ENADE
exam(s) results and the three most recent bar exam results available.
Regarding the bar exam variable, the OAB only includes law
schools that had at least twenty students who sat for each of the three
most recent bar exams. By using this methodology, the OAB assessed 790 law schools in the last edition of the OAB Recomenda
report. 123 From 790 observations, only 89 received the Selo OAB
Recomenda, which represents 7.4% of the OAB’s sample. 124 According to the Bar, these are the elite of legal education in Brazil.
Because this work is focused on elite law schools and education
in IP, this study will now analyze the curriculum of the 89 law
schools recommended by the OAB. This data is relevant to understand where IP lawyers are being educated in Brazil. Although quantitative data for all law schools in Brazil is absent, it can be presumed
that, if elite law schools are not properly training lawyers in IP, other
universities with less human and financial resources are in an equivalent or an even worse situation.
D. Intellectual Property at Elite Brazilian Law Schools
Law schools have been granted authorization to organize their
curriculum. Moreover, they have found little restriction to hiring
professors without advanced degrees. After having analyzed the
overall situation of law schools and law professors in Brazil, it is
expected that law schools have maintained old teaching techniques
incorpora a concepção de … confiança no Direito transitam obrigatoriamente pela
credibilidade e qualidade dos cursos jurı́dicos.”
123. See OAB Recomenda, supra note 122, at 36.
124. Id. at 20.
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and outdated curriculum, leaving outside their scope disciplines unrelated to everyday legal practice. This seems to be the case with IP.
By focusing on elite law schools, the Selo OAB Recomenda reveals an interesting situation regarding the law schools that are reputable as having law students that are faring well in both the ENADE
and bar exam. These schools should be at the forefront of the Brazilian legal education. For this reason, the 89 law schools that received the seal should be fostering innovation in legal education and
preparing Brazilian lawyers to become global legal practitioners in
some fields. However, this has not been the case with IP.
Different works have highlighted the relevance of IP for a country’s socioeconomic development. 125 Experienced lawyers have declared intellectual property as being an extremely complex field;
thus, highly-skilled lawyers would be necessary to work in this
area. 126 Indeed, the general counsel offices of multinational companies in Brazil have reinforced this perception. 127 Researchers have
noted that: “[i]n general, legal departments outsource … specific
and specialized matters (criminal and intellectual property).” 128
Therefore, since IP is considered a complex field, elite lawyers
should be receiving an appropriate education while attending law
school so that they could be more competitive on the legal market.

125. See generally GLAUCO ARBIX, INOVAR OU INOVAR A INDUSTRIA
BRASILEIRA ENTRE O PASSADO E O FUTURO (2007); and GOLDSTEIN & TRIMBLE,
supra note 19; see generally Dreyfuss, supra note 19; Anga, supra note 19; PRIMO
BRAGA ET AL., supra note 19; Gould & Gruben, supra note 19; Chang, supra note
19.
126. See Oliveira & Ramos, supra note 36.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 31.
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In order to understand if lawyers have been trained in IP by the
elite law schools in Brazil, the curricula of all 89 organizations listed
in the last OAB Recomenda report were researched. Fourteen of
them do not provide information about their curriculum. The curriculum of the remaining 75 was thoroughly researched to find out
whether IP was offered. When law schools have IP in their curriculum, the survey verifies whether IP is a mandatory or an elective
course. The results are summarized in the chart below.
Chart 1. Schools Listed by the OAB Recomenda
that Offer IP Courses
60
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that Offer
IP Courses
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Source: Prepared by the author based upon the website of each of
the 89 law schools listed in the OAB Recomenda.
The findings are impressive. Forty-eight schools out of eightynine do not have IP courses, not even specific IP related matters such
as copyrights, trademarks, patents, just to name a few. Fifty-four
percent of these elite schools are not preparing lawyers to work with
IP in their future life. As a result, if law graduates want to seek a
career as IP lawyers upon graduation, it is most likely that they will
need to be prepared elsewhere than at a law school in Brazil.
With respect to IP being an elective or a mandatory course, it is
interesting to note that the numbers of the two categories are similar.
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Since IP is not part of everyday lawyering in Brazil and is considered a complex field, it is expected that law schools let the students
free to decide whether studying IP or not. The legal market in IP is
relatively small, and issues related to IP are usually decided in regions that have been impacted more strongly by globalization.129
Law schools, in a large part of the Brazilian territory, may or may
not have IP as a concern or as a demand from the incoming students.
However, it is problematic to see that IP has been neglected by
slightly more than 50% of a sample of elite schools in an emerging
economy as Brazil. In addition to domestic constraints that may affect Brazil’s innovation, which stem from the lack of training, this
may also leave Brazilian lawyers less competitive on the global market, 130 once there is a global demand of IP services by companies
arriving in Brazil or Brazilian companies seeking to go abroad.
In sum, law schools that should be benefiting from the impact of
globalization in Brazil and have the flexibility to structure their curriculum seem to neglect IP, at a time when they should be interested
in it. Brazilian lawyers may as a consequence have to receive training in IP outside law school in Brazil.
Despite these shortcomings in legal education, relevant reforms
have been addressed to Brazil’s IP laws during the 1990s and 2000s,
and Brazilian lawyers have fared relatively well on the global IP
market. Furthermore, Brazil has been active in litigating IP claims
in the international arena, as it will be analyzed in the following sections.
III. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A SURVEY OF THE BRAZILIAN
LEGISLATION
Brazil has long held the tradition of being an active country in
protecting IP rights from imitation or infringement, domestically
129. See Santos, supra note 17; Badin, supra note 17; Salama & Benoliel, supra note 19, at 664-665.
130. On the Brazilian case with respect to competitiveness, see Salama & Benoliel, supra note 19; Benoliel & Salama, supra note 19, at 311.
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and globally. IP started to be secured as early as 1809, when D. João
VI, king of Portugal, enacted a patent legislation valid for the crown
and its colonies—this rule was “the fourth of its type in the world at
that time.” 131 As an independent country, Brazil has maintained this
custom. Domestically, especially after the enactment of the Constitution of 1988, significant changes have been made to protect IP
rights in Brazil. Internationally, Brazil has signed international treaties on these matters and engaged in transnational disputes at the
WTO. 132
For the reasons mentioned above, this section will focus on a
contemporary analysis of Brazil’s IP norms. Specifically, the Constitution of 1988 and the rules enacted after its promulgation will be
assessed. In addition, although historical international treaties will
be briefly described, the analytical emphasis will be put on the
TRIPS Agreement, the WTO, and the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) regimes and their effects on Brazil’s IP practice.

131. See Krishnan, Dias & Pence, supra note 27, at 14. See also DENIS BORGES
BARBOSA, UMA INTRODUÇÃO À PROPRIEDADE INTELECTUAL (2010) [hereinafter
BARBOSA, INTRODUÇÃO].
132. Several authors have discussed how international treaties concerning IP
rights have been unfair with emerging economies. After the establishment of the
WTO, which is responsible for the enforcement of the TRIPS Agreement, Brazil
and other developing countries organized different strategies to resist and fight
for fairer terms of international trade of IP. Besides this introductory note, this
situation will be thoroughly discussed below. See generally GOLDSTREIN &
TRIMBLE, supra note 19; Benoliel & Salama, supra note 19; Salama & Benoliel,
supra note 19; Donoso, supra note 22; Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Role of India,
China, Brazil and Other Emerging Economies in Establishing Access Norms for
Intellectual Property and Intellectual Property Lawmaking (New York Law
School, Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper No. 09-53, 2009); Robert
Weissman, A Long, Strange TRIPS: The Pharmaceutical Industry Drive to Harmonize Global Intellectual Property Rules, and the Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives Available to Third World Countries, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1079,
(1996); CARLOS CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS (2000).
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Similar to what exists in the United States, 133 intellectual property rights are described in the Brazilian Constitution. Copyrights,134
patents, and trademarks are expressly written in the Constitution. To
be sure, authors and their heirs are granted the rights of ownership
of their work, which can be publicized and reproduced in accordance with specific legislation. 135 Furthermore, inventors and trademark owners hold similar rights over their inventions and marks,
respectively. 136 The 1988 Constitution, therefore, reinforced Brazil’s tradition of having IP rights among the country’s most-valued
rules, and it also provided the legal framework under which legal
reforms occurred over the following years in Brazil.
International and domestic political and economic environments, along with the 1988 Constitution, facilitated the changes to
IP protection in Brazil. 137 Namely, the establishment of the WTO in
1995 and the signing of the TRIPS Agreement in 1994 strengthened
the movement toward legal reforms in Brazil, which resulted in legal
changes to its main IP norms. 138 Issues like duration, rights of ownership, and transfer of immaterial rights, among others, have been

133. See Sean M. O'Connor, The Overlooked French Influence on the Intellectual Property Clause, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 733, 830 (2015) (reflecting on the “IP
clause” of the U.S. Constitution, specifically, its article I, § 8, cl. 8).
134. This work will use the word copyrights when referring to author’s rights,
even though differences exist between these two concepts. After considering the
American readership of this work, this choice seems more appropriate. On the
historical aspects of the distinctions between the French oriented author’s rights
vis-à-vis the U.S. oriented copyrights, see generally Jane C. Ginsburg, Tale of
Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary France and America, 64
TUL. L. REV. 991, 1032 (1989).
135. See Brazilian Constitution, art. 5, XVII and XVIII, a, b.
136. See. Brazilian Constitution, art. 5, XXIX.
137. See generally BARBOSA, INTRODUÇÃO, supra note 131; Denis Borges
Barbosa, A Legislação De Propriedade Intelectual em Vigor (2002),
http://egov.ufsc.br/portal/sites/default/files/anexos/27580-27590-1-PB.pdf/ (last
visited Aug. 1 2015) [hereinafter Barbosa, Legislação] (commenting on Brazil’s
IP legislation); Salama & Benoliel, supra note 19, at 642-43.
138. See BARBOSA, INTRODUÇÃO, supra note 131; Barbosa, Legislação, supra
note 137, at 3-6; Salama & Benoliel, supra note 19, at 642-45.
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changed as a means to fostering Brazil’s technological, socioeconomic, and cultural development. 139 Brazil, which had once been a
closed market for foreign investment, companies, and goods, is now
an open economy. 140 Reforming IP rights is, consequently, instrumental in ensuring the functioning of a free market economy in Brazil. 141
With respect to specific norms that regulate IP practice in Brazil
today, there are copyrights, patents and trademarks, industrial secret,
and software acts. There are several different manners to assess
these legal mechanisms. Bearing this in mind, this section will follow the analytical organization used by Paul Goldstein and Marketa
Trimble in their famous textbook, “International Intellectual Property Law: Cases and Materials.” Specifically, Brazilian IP law requirements for protection, duration, remedies and prosecution, and
rights of ownership will be summarized. These characteristics will
provide important background for the understanding of Brazil’s engagement in international IP issues.
A. Patents
In Brazil, Act 9,279/96 regulates inventions and utility models
that shall be patented and the respective rights that inventors shall
be granted. In order to be patented, an invention shall “satisf[y] the
requirements of novelty, inventive step, and industrial application.” 142 Furthermore, that same norm establishes the first-to-file
system as the valid registration proceeding in Brazil. 143 That is,
starting from the date of the filing with the INPI [the Brazilian patent
139. See BARBOSA, INTRODUÇÃO, supra note 131; Barbosa, Legislação, supra
note 137, at 3-6; Salama & Benoliel, supra note 19, at 642-45.
140. See BARBOSA, INTRODUÇÃO, supra note 131; Barbosa, Legislação, supra
note 137; Krishnan, Dias & Pence, supra note 27; Salama & Benoliel, supra note
19; Santos, supra note 17; and HELOISA CONCEIÇÃO MACHADO DA SILVA, DA
SUBSTITUIÇÃO DE IMPORTAÇÕES À SUBSTITUIÇÃO DE EXPORTAÇÕES (2004).
141. See Santos, supra note 17; Badin, supra note 17; Salama & Benoliel,
supra note 19, at 642.
142. See Lei de Propriedade Intelectual, Act No. 9,279/1996), art. 8.
143. Id. at arts. 16 and 17.

88

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 9

and trademark office], patents are valid for twenty years and utility
models for fifteen years. The inventor must register the invention
either in Brazil or in any other country that has treaties with Brazil
to receive patent protection. 144
Brazil’s legislation describes what cannot be patented. Specifically, Act 9,279/96 states that the following items will not receive
patent protection: discoveries; theories and methods (surgical, mathematical, accountants, etc.); abstract works; literary, architectural,
and aesthetic works; “computer programs per se;” information;
gaming rules; and living beings and biological substance found in
the nature. 145 In addition, an innovation cannot be part of the state
of the art of ongoing scientific or industrial processes related to an
invention that is in the process to being patented. Under Brazilian
law, in sum, to be eligible to receive a patent, it must be an invention
that is innovative or is an improvement.
Once a patent has been granted, a patent holder can license the
right to use for a third party interested in “producing, using, offering
for sale, selling or importing” 146 a product or a process derived from
the patent. There are two types of licenses under Act 9,279/96: the
voluntary and the compulsory licenses, and they differ from each
other significantly.
When a patent holder (licensee) and a third party (licensor) enter
into an agreement on the terms of the license, this is the voluntary
license. According to Act 9,279/96, the parties may spontaneously
seek the INPI with the license contract ready for registration, or the
licensee may request that the INPI offer the patent publically as a
means of finding a potential licensor interested in utilizing the patented product or process. 147 In both cases, the license contract must
be registered with the INPI to become lawful. 148

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
Id. at art. 10, I et seq.
Id. at art. 42, I, II.
Id. at arts. 61-67.
Id. at art. 62 and art. 62, I.
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According to the TRIPS Agreement, a compulsory license is a
mechanism by which Brazilian laws limit the rights of ownership of
a patent holder. When this occurs, the patent holder is required by
the INPI to license the product or process. The INPI is entitled to
grant a compulsory license in specific cases, which must comply
with the TRIPS Agreement. Namely, a compulsory license shall be
enforced when: a patent holder uses the monopoly over the product
or process in an abusive manner; there is abuse of economic power;
there is a dependency of one patent upon another, and when there is
a significant improvement of the dependent patent with respect to
the earlier patent; situations of public interest or national emergency
occur; and when the employee is a co-holder of the patent with her
employer. 149 Furthermore, the request for a compulsory license
should describe the license fees and payment methods, as well as its
duration. And, most importantly, the petitioner must prove why the
compulsory license should be granted. 150
Bearing that in mind, a patent that does not meet the requirements of Act 9,279/96, or that violates any international IP treaty
signed by the Brazilian government will be declared null. 151 In addition, one who claims that a patent is illegal can commence an administrative proceeding with the INPI, which will conduct the investigation and declare whether or not the patent is null. 152
Moreover, the Brazilian judicial system permits unsatisfied
claimants to challenge decisions issued by administrative and regulatory agencies, such as the INPI, in courts. Specifically, the plaintiff
will need to argue that the administrative proceeding has failed to
comply with the due process of law, thus not issuing a fair decision.
Ultimately, Brazilian courts may determine the commencement of a
149. Id. at art. 68 et seq.
150. For all the aspects discussed in this paragraph, see Benoliel & Salama,
supra note 19, at section 2.2.2.1.; and Salama & Benoliel, supra note 19, at section
II, b (discussing the Brazilian government’s efforts to bargain the terms of the
usage and enforcement of compulsory license in Brazil, in compliance with Brazilian law and the TRIPS agreement).
151. See Act No. 9,279/96, supra note 142, at art. 46.
152. Id. at arts. 50-54.
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new administrative proceeding on the same matter for further proceedings. 153
Regarding the territorial aspects of IP enforcement, both the
INPI and the Brazilian courts need to apply IP rights from abroad
within the Brazilian territory. These rights are granted whenever the
patent holder, or the licensor, invokes the patent rights in Brazil,
provided that the country of origin of the patented product or process
has signed a treaty of which Brazil is also a party. 154
With that said, in numbers, the number of patent and utility
model applications registered with the INPI has increased over the
past years. However, it is undeniable that there is a gap between applications submitted by resident and non-resident applicants in Brazil.155 According to the existing literature, the lack of research in IP
in Brazil is one factor that leads to this situation.156
Table 1 summarizes the WIPO’s data on the directory of patents
and utility models in Brazil since 2000. This data reveals how the
percentage of applications filed by Brazilian residents has decreased
in comparison with the same applications that non-residents have
registered. Therefore, although the number of patent applications
has increased overall, this has not necessarily resulted in the improvement of research conditions in Brazil.157 Rather, foreign applicants seem to have capitalized on the weakness of R&D in Brazil,
as well as on the economic growth that the country has experienced

153. Id. at art. 49.
154. See Barbosa, Legislação, supra note 137.
155. According to the WIPO, the difference between resident and non-resident
is the following: “A resident filing refers to an application filed in the country by
its own resident; whereas a non-resident filing refers to the one filed by a foreign
applicant.” See WIPO, Statistical Country Profile: Brazil, http://www.wipo
.int/ipstats/en/statistics/country_profile/profile.jsp?code=BR (last visited Aug. 1
2015).
156. See Eduardo da Motta e Albuquerque & Paulo Brígido Rocha Macedo,
Concessão de Patentes a Residentes no Brasil: 1990/95, 26(3) PESQUISA E
PLANEJAMENTO ECONÔMICO 483, 496 (1996); Salama & Benoliel, supra note 19,
at 644; Laforgia et al., supra note 19, at 309.
157. See Salama & Benoliel, supra note 19, at 644; Laforgia et al., supra note
19, at 309.
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over the last years. As of 2013, Brazil ranked 13th in number of patent applications by residents, while it ranked 9th in the number of
applications by non-residents.
Table 1. Patent Applications in Brazil (2000-2013)
Year
Resident
Non-resident
Proportion of
Applications
Applications
Resident/Non-Resident
Applications (in %)
2000
3,179
14,104
18%
2001
3,439
14,410
19%
2002
3,481
13,204
21%
2003
3,866
12,545
24%
2004
4,044
12,669
24%
2005
4,054
14,444
22%
2006
3,956
15,886
20%
2007
4,194
17,469
19%
2008
4,280
18,890
18%
2009
4,271
18,135
19%
2010
4,228
20,771
17%
2011
4,695
23,954
16%
2012
4,798
25,637
16%
2013
4,959
25,925
16%
Source: Adapted from WIPO statistics database. Prepared by the
author.

Conversely, when the number of applications of utility models
is considered, the pattern mentioned above changes. That is, Brazilian residents register more utility models than non-residents, as it is
outlined in Table 2 (below). The fragility of the research environment in Brazil explains why the number of utility models registered
by residents in Brazil is greater than the number of registers filed by
non-residents. Namely, transfer of technology by advanced inventors to developers as well as improvements to patented inventions
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occur in places where the conditions for innovation are weak, such
as it happens in Brazil. 158
Table 2. Utility Model Applications in Brazil (2000-2013)
Year
Resident
Non-Resident
Proportion of
Applications Applications
Resident/Non-Resident
Applications (in %)
2000
3,184
94
97%
2001
3,439
95
97%
2002
3,470
59
98%
2003
3,578
55
98%
2004
3,539
56
98%
2005
3,173
57
98%
2006
3,126
56
98%
2007
3,001
37
99%
2008
3,320
62
98%
2009
3,337
41
99%
2010
2,902
87
97%
2011
2,956
124
96%
2012
2,880
117
96%
2013
2,891
141
95%
Source: Adapted from WIPO statistics database. Prepared by the
author.

Finally, it has been possible to visualize how the improvements
of Brazil’s patents laws that arose from globalization have not led to
the strengthening of patent practice in Brazil, in particular, in terms
of new patent applications by Brazilian residents. 159 Brazilian patent
attorneys who should be qualified to advise and litigate on these
matters, in accordance with Brazilian and international laws, lack

158. See Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights and Economic
Development, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 471, 479 (2000); Rod Falvey & Neil
Foster, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Technology Transfer and
Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence at 42 (United Nations Industrial
Development Organization 2006).
159. See Albuquerque & Macedo, supra note 156.
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the proper preparation while in law school. 160 Moreover, the environment for research that should prepare engineers, physicians, and
other types of inventors is similarly deficient. 161 Therefore, although
Brazil has been politically active in liberalizing the country’s economy and adapting its local laws to global changes, this has not been
followed by the improvement of conditions to flourish patent lawyering in particular and to the development of inventions in general. 162 Indeed, trademarks, which do not need extensive research
conditions as patents, have thrived in Brazil while the country experienced significant growth during the 2000s.
B. Trademarks
Act 9,279/96 also regulates the protection of marks in Brazil.
Similar to the American model of trademarks protection, 163 the
rights of ownership of marks shall be acquired by its use. However,
marks’ owners are required to register a mark with the trademarks
authority—the INPI in Brazil—as a means of having the presumption of ownership. That is, unless otherwise proved by concrete and
historical evidence that one mark has been historically used without
registration, a trademark owner that registered a mark is presumed
to and will have priority over the rights of ownership. 164
With respect to what shall be registered as a mark, Act 9,279/96
adopts a comparable standard that is used for patents. Specifically,
the law broadly defines what shall be registered as a mark: “Any
distinctive visually perceivable signs that are not included in legal
prohibitions shall be eligible for registration as a mark.” 165 Further-

160. See generally supra section II of this article.
161. See Salama & Benoliel, supra note 19, at 665-66, 668-69.
162. Id.
163. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law
through Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1669, 1702 (2007) (discussing new
approaches to the issue of “trademark use” given new problems that arise from
the current economic context).
164. See BARBOSA, INTRODUÇÃO, supra note 131, at 705-09, 725-28.
165. See Act No. 9,279/1996, supra note 142, art. 122.
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more, Act 9,279/96 states that there are services and products, certification, collective, well-known, and famous marks. The INPI is entitled to declare whether a mark is well-known, famous, or shall be
entitled to protection under Act 9,279/96.
Regarding international aspects, important differences exist between well-known and famous marks. The regulation of Brazilian
and international marks that seek protection under well-known and
famous marks standards shall comply with the Paris Convention.
The difference between these two types of marks is, in sum: famous
marks that shall be protected under the Paris Convention, art. 6bis
(I), shall be registered in any country that has signed the treaty,
whereas well-known marks shall be registered in Brazil. 166
Due to the lack of details on what is a mark that shall be registered with the INPI, Act 9,279/96 extensively describes what shall
not be registered as a mark. In sum, a mark shall not be entitled protection in cases that a mark: is already owned by a third party; is
considered immoral and unethical; is misleading to the consumer;
or has features that are already protected under Brazilian law. 167
Upon registration, a trademark owner has the rights of ownership, which shall protect the mark from imitation and any striking
similarity of other marks owned by third parties. 168 Consequently,
the distinctive signals of the registered mark shall not be copied.169
Furthermore, the duration of the protection lasts for ten years and
can be renewed while the mark is being used—there is no maximum
term of protection for marks in Brazil. 170 While a mark is protected,
its owner shall use her rights to use the mark or license it for third
party use. 171 These are, therefore, the main rights of ownership derived from the registration.

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

See BARBOSA, INTRODUÇÃO, supra note 131, at 759, 768-70.
See Act No. 9,279/1996, supra note 142, at art. 124, I et seq.
Id. at arts. 129 and 130.
Id.
Id. at art. 133.
Id. at arts. 134, 135, and 139.
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Invalid registration and the infringement of rights of ownership
may be challenged in either the INPI or in court. 172 Petitioners who
intend to commence administrative proceedings that claim for the
nullity of a trademark registration are required to file the request
within 180 days from the registration date. 173 As for lawsuits, they
must be brought to courts within five years of the date of the registration. 174 Once a court reaches a decision on whether the mark is
valid or null, the INPI shall be notified to enforce the legal proceedings with respect to voiding the registration, ceasing the rights of
ownership, or transferring the title to whomever is entrusted the
ownership in accordance with what the court decided. 175
Regarding the development of trademarks in Brazil after the reforms of 1996 and the recent economic booming in the country,
trademark applications have increased significantly. To be sure,
Brazil was ranked the third country with the highest number of
trademarks applications by residents in 2007, according to the
WIPO’s data. Different from patents, however, economic performance has had more of an impact on the development of trademarks
than on the environment of adequate legal services and R&D. 176
Thus, although Brazilian residents have been the key players in the
growth of trademarks applications in Brazil, non-residents have also
benefited from the economic boom in Brazil and intensified the
number of trademarks applications as well. In sum, the number of
trademarks applications can be noted in the Table below.

172. Id. at Chapter XI, §§ I and II.
173. Id. at art. 169.
174. Id. at art. 174.
175. See BARBOSA, INTRODUÇÃO, supra note 131, at 775-79.
176. See William O. Hennessey, The Role of Trademarks in Economic Development and Competitiveness at 1, University of New Hampshire, The IP Mall—
Intellectual Property Collection, http://www.ipmall.info/sites/default/files
/hosted_resources/Hennessey_Content/RoleofTrademarksinEconomicDevelopmentandCompetitiveness.pdf (last visited Aug. 3 2015); TRADEMARKS, BRANDS,
AND COMPETITIVENESS (Teresa Da Silva Lopes & Paul Duguid eds., Routledge
2010).
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Table 3. Trademark Applications in Brazil (2000-2013)
Year
Resident
Non-Resident
Proportion of
Applications
Applications
Resident/Non-Resident
Applications (in %)
2000
12,999
5,413
71%
2001
15,042
5,814
72%
2002
12,485
5,196
71%
2003
7,726
3,131
71%
2004
9,291
3,201
74%
2005
12,539
5,493
70%
2006
24,459
8,342
75%
2007
102,005
26,540
79%
2008
43,774
16,531
73%
2009
50,778
13,408
79%
2010
52,568
11,969
81%
2011
45,844
14,641
76%
2012
41,670
13,560
75%
2013
27,714
9,197
75%
Source: Adapted from the WIPO statistics database. Prepared by the
author.

Similarly to what has happened to patents and utility models,
economic liberalization and growth, along with legal reforms that
resulted in the Act 9,279/96 have fostered the development of trademarks in Brazil. This environment has attracted foreigners (individuals and corporate entities) interested in protecting their marks in
Brazil and Brazilians aspiring to secure their marks from imitation
both within the country and abroad. 177 Thus, this context has led to
a significant increase in the number of trademark applications in
Brazil, and Brazilian nationals have been responsible for 74% of the
total applications on average.

177. Michele Copetti, Registro de Marcas—Propulsor para o
Desenvolvimento? in PROPRIEDADE INTELECTUAL E DESENVOLVIMENTO (Welber
Barral & Luiz Otávio Pimentel orgs., 2007).
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Therefore, Act 9,279/96 has succeeded in ensuring protection
for inventors and trademarks owners. Yet, the research environment
and the capacity of providing legal services necessary to the development of patents in Brazil has fared differently from what has been
observed in trademarks. According to the data collected for this
study, it is possible to conclude that the difference between these
two IP rights regulated under the same norm is likely a result of the
poor conditions of R&D in Brazil. On the one hand, legal advice and
litigation involving trademarks overlap with antitrust and competition matters and can be handled by attorneys with training in other
fields. 178 On the other hand, patent lawyering demands skillful professionals alongside patent experts who understand specific characteristics of an invention. 179 Thus, under the same rule, the development of patent related applications and services in Brazil lacks conditions to flourish, even though trademarks experience a different
outcome.
In conclusion, the Paris Convention is the main source upon
which Brazilian authorities look to for the enforcement of trademarks protection. Thus, Brazilian lawyers shall not be aware of only
the domestic aspects of the legislation only, but also of how to protect Brazilian marks abroad and international marks in Brazil. Likewise, this has happened to copyrights laws in Brazil.
C. Copyrights
Although trademarks, patents, and industrial designs are regulated by the same norm—Act 9,279/96—copyrights find safeguard
under a specific law: Act 9,610/98. Namely, Act 9,610/98 describes
the international scope of protection in Brazil. The first articles of
this norm state that copyrights registered in countries with which
178. For an assessment of the co-evolutionary aspects of antitrust and trademark laws, see Deven R. Desai, The Chicago School Trap in Trademark: The CoEvolution of Corporate, Antitrust, and Trademark Law, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 551,
620 (2015).
179. See Badin, supra note 17.
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Brazil has signed treaties in IP matter shall experience protection in
Brazil and vice versa. As a result of the international influence on
Brazilian IP laws, copyrights also follow the requirements to register and secure copyrighted works that have been set forth by international treaties. 180
Indeed, the definition of works under the Brazilian copyright
legislation is comparable to what is found in the United States181:
“The intellectual works that are protected are creations of the mind,
whatever their mode of expression or the medium, tangible or intangible, known or susceptible of invention in the future, in which they
are fixed . . . .” 182 As for the roll of works that shall receive copyright
protection under Act 9,610/98, it includes: texts resulted from literary, artistic, or scientific expression; lectures and addresses; dramatic, audiovisual, cinematographic, photographic, drawings, paintings, sculptures, musical, choreographic, and mimed works; drafts
and three-dimensional creations related to engineering, architectural, gardening, and geographical works; adaptations, translations,
and transformations of original creations that result in new forms of
intellectual work; computer programs; and collections or compilations and other forms of collective works. 183
If a creation falls within one of the categories mentioned above,
an author has the right to register her work. 184 However, similarly to
what happens with trademarks, the register is not required as a
means to protecting a work of authorship. 185 Registration is usually
recommended to prove anteriority when a conflict over ownership

180. See Pedro Mizukami et al., Exceptions and Limitations to Copyright in
Brazil: Call for Reform, in ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN BRAZIL: NEW RESEARCH
ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, INNOVATION AND DEVELOPMENT (Lea Shaver ed.,
2008).
181. For an American perspective of copyright law, see CRAIG JOYCE ET
AL., COPYRIGHT LAW, 20-28 (2007).
182. See Lei de Direitos Autorais , Act No. 9,610/1998), art. 7.
183. For a complete list of works described in Act No. 9,610/1998, see Id. art.
7, I et seq.
184. Id. at art. 18.
185. Id. at art. 19.
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emerges. 186 Finally, authors have several options as to where they
shall register their works, which vary according to the nature of the
work. 187
With respect to the rights of ownership, they shall be exercised
by the author solely, by a corporate entity duly entitled for that, or
in the case of collective works, by more than one author. 188 Authors
have moral 189 and economic rights 190 over their works. In terms of
the former, they are inalienable and irrevocable, and they refer to the
protection of the integrity of the original work and the possibility for
the author to claim her rights of ownership at any time. Regarding
the latter, they apply to the author’s right to benefit from her work
by expressly authorizing a third party to use the original work or
modify it in order to make it available for public audience—the
changes to any work shall comply with the terms agreed with the
author and respect her moral rights. And last, if moral and economic
rights are violated, or if disputes emerge about the ownership of a
certain work, this can be settled administratively or judicially. 191
Namely, the copyright infringement’s proceedings are described
in Act 9,610/98. The types of infringement are usually related to
conflict of ownership and unlawful reproduction and alteration of
the original work without prior consent by the author. 192 Because
there are a variety of administrative agencies that are competent to
register and analyze copyrighted works, the specific proceedings
also vary. Yet, Act 9,610/98 is the main norm that a petitioner shall
base upon her claim in order to be successful in the dispute. These
are, therefore, the main aspects related to copyright laws that are
186. See Jane Resina Fernandes de Oliveira, Educação a Distância e Ciência
da Informação: Uma Reflexão sobre os Direitos do Autor (2006) (unpublished
Master’s thesis, Universidad de Brasília) (on file with the author) (describing the
advantages of registering a work of authorship).
187. Id. (outlining some of the organizations with which authors can register
their work).
188. See Act No. 9,610/98, supra note 182, at arts. 22-23.
189. Id. at arts. 24-27.
190. Id. at arts. 28-45.
191. Id. at arts. 101-110.
192. Id. at art. 107, I et seq.; art. 108, I et seq.
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discussed in disputes over copyright protection that reach the Brazilian courts. Unfortunately, a comparable set of data, such as the
one used to assess patents and trademarks, have not been found for
copyrights.
Finally, Brazil has made some progress in adapting its domestic
legislation to international parameters of IP regulation, but there are
also some flaws. 193 Yet, the flaws are some of the steps needed to
secure IP protection for Brazilian companies and multinational corporations based in Brazil. Another relevant aspect is how Brazil has
used the international norms and global forums to resolve IP disputes.
IV. WHEN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND IP OVERLAP: BRAZIL AS AN
INTERNATIONAL IP RIGHTS DISPUTANT
Brazil has been at the forefront of international protection of IP
rights, in particular, because it has signed several international treaties 194 and settled disputes using bodies like the WTO. 195 This tradition dates back to the Berne Convention, which regulates copyrights of artistic and literary works—Brazil is one of the original
signatory countries of this treaty. 196 Similarly, Brazil has also signed
the Paris and Rome Conventions, on patents and trademarks, respectively. 197 Finally and most recently, Brazil agreed to the terms of the
TRIPS Agreement, which governs the international trade of IP related products and services. 198
Moreover, Brazil has worked closely with international IP organizations, mainly the WIPO and the WTO. Namely, Brazil joined

193. See Pedro Mizukami et al., supra note 180.
194. See Krishnan, Dias & Pence, supra note 27.
195. See Badin, supra note 17; Santos, supra note 17; and Shaffer, Sanchez &
Rosenberg, supra note 18.
196. See WIPO, WIPO-Administered Treaties: Brazil, http://www.wipo.int
/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?country_id=23C (last visited Aug. 4 2015).
197. Id.
198. Id.
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the WIPO in 1975, 199 has been a WTO member since 1995 (the year
of its foundation), 200 and had been a party to the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) since 1948. 201 As a member of the
most relevant international IP bodies, as an original signatory to important international IP treaties, and as an active reformer of its national IP laws to adhere to international agreements, Brazil has been
a key global player with respect to the development of international
IP and has used international litigation to fight for a fair global governance of IP rights. 202
Yet, most of the data on the disputes involving private entities
are not disclosed such as, for example, international arbitration.
Nevertheless, the WTO makes available all cases that impact directly Brazil’s trade policies, Brazilian companies, and global conglomerates that operate in Brazil. Since the TRIPS Agreement regulates international trade involving IP and is governed by the WTO,
governmental disputes have usually been brought to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. 203
The disputes brought to the WTO provide relevant information
to understand what has been demanded of global legal professionals
with respect to the TRIPS Agreement. Furthermore, whether Brazilian IP lawyers have been able to meet the expectations of such a
qualified legal market is another important question to this analysis,
which will be discussed next.
The establishment of the TRIPS Agreement and the WTO regime with its new dispute settlement system posed several chal-

199. See WIPO, Member States: Brazil, http://www.wipo.int/members/en
/details.jsp?country_id=23 (last visited Aug. 4 2015).
200. See WTO, Understanding the WTO: Members and Observers,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited
Aug. 4 2015).
201. Id.
202. See Badin, supra note 17; Salama & Benoliel, supra note 19; Santos, supra note 17.
203. See Shaffer, Sanchez & Rosenberg, supra note 18.
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lenges for countries and lawyers, especially those from the developing world. 204 In terms of the former, the TRIPS Agreement deepened the longstanding gap between developed and developing nations concerning fair terms of international trade of IP protected
products and services. As for the latter, when conflicts regarding IP
issues emerged in international forums, legal professionals in developing countries had to handle these cases while competing with extremely well-prepared lawyers from the developed world. As a result, the asymmetry of powers between developed and developing
states became even more evident in this context. 205
Notwithstanding this unequal relationship between countries
and professionals in having fair IP trade regime at the global level,
some lawyers from developing countries have been successful in
challenging the status quo imposed by wealthy economies. 206 That
is, while using international forums of dispute settlement, namely
the WTO, lawyers based in developing countries have designed interesting litigation strategies and achieved effective results for their
countries. 207 For example, Brazil and India gained access to medicine for HIV by using a compulsory license mechanism. 208
Regarding the Brazilian experience, scholars have analyzed the
litigation strategies that have led to the country’s favorable outcomes when using the WTO dispute settlement system, 209 including
some comprehensive case studies of IP rights cases brought to the
204. See generally Shaffer, Sanchez & Rosenberg, supra note 18; and JOSEPH
CONTI, BETWEEN LAW AND DIPLOMACY: THE SOCIAL CONTEXTS OF DISPUTING
AT THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (Stan. Univ. Press 2010).
205. For the argument built in this paragraph, see generally Dreyfuss, supra
note 132; CORREA, supra note 132; Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Designing a Global Intellectual Property System Responsive to Change: The
WTO, WIPO, and beyond, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1187 (2009); TRIPS AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: TOWARDS A NEW IP WORLD ORDER? (Gustavo
Ghidini, Rudolph J. R. Peritz & Marco Ricolfi eds., Edward Elgar Publ’g 2014);
Carlos Alberto Primo Braga, The Developing Country Case for and against Intellectual Property Protection, 112 WORLD BANK DISCUSSION PAPERS 69 (1990).
206. See Shaffer, Sanchez & Rosenberg, supra note 18.
207. See Badin, supra note 17; Santos, supra note 17.
208. Id. See also Dreyfuss, supra note 132.
209. See Shaffer, Sanchez & Rosenberg, supra note 18; CONTI, supra note
204.
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WTO. 210 Brazilian international trade lawyers have been noted as
skilled professionals who have won many disputes against other
countries where legal education is significantly better and proper
training on WTO disputes is provided. 211
Yet, academics who have observed the aforementioned situation
have focused most of their attention on international trade lawyers,
leaving international IP lawyers outside of their scope. It seems, in
fact, that the latter group has not assumed the leadership of this process. To be sure, the scant references to IP lawyers in Michelle Badin’s work appear when she describes that such professionals
“greatly supported those [very restrictive] changes in the country’s
regulation [of IP rights].” 212
Although the WTO legal proceedings are extremely complex
and need specialized litigators to handle the cases, IP has been the
central issue that has been discussed in some relevant cases in which
Brazil has been a party213—specifically, a country can litigate before
the WTO in three different ways: being a complainant, a respondent,
or a third party. 214 Accordingly, in addition to the legal procedure of
the WTO regime, which falls within the scope of “WTO matters”
for the literature, 215 the substantive matters of the cases is equally or
even more important to build a strong legal argument. Hence, substantial knowledge of IP is an important aspect that lawyers need to
be aware of.
Scholars have already noted that international trade lawyers in
Brazil have succeeded in using the WTO dispute settlement system. 216 However, this market seems to be occupied by international
trade lawyers only. If international IP lawyers had any participation
210. See Badin, supra note 17.
211. See Glezer et al., supra note 18; Shaffer, Sanchez & Rosenberg, supra
note 18.
212. See Badin, supra note 17, at 261.
213. See Badin, supra note 17; and Santos, supra note 17.
214. See Shaffer, Sanchez & Rosenberg, supra note 18.
215. Id. at 433.
216. Id. See also Badin, supra note 17; CONTI, supra note 204; Glezer et al.,
supra note 18.
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in these cases, they were not highlighted in comprehensive studies
on these disputes. Such assessment finds basis, for example, when
examining Shaffer, Badin, and Rosenberg’s work. 217 They analyzed
all the cases (until 2008) brought to the WTO by Brazil as well as
the cases in which Brazil was a respondent or a third party. They
organized their analysis by listing the parties, the file date and stage
of the proceeding, the matter in dispute, and the private consultants
that were hired.
Indeed, drawing upon Shaffer, Badin, and Rosenberg’s work,
and using the WTO’s database of disputes, the search for IP cases
has been refined here. Only disputes over IP rights and the TRIPS
Agreement have been analyzed. After having researched all 135
cases that Brazil has participated at the WTO, it was possible to select a sample of thirteen disputes in which the TRIPS Agreement
and IP have been mentioned as the point of contention between the
disputants. Namely, Brazil filed two cases as a complainant, 218 was
the respondent in one case, 219 and participated as a third party in ten
cases. 220
Likewise, similar research on cases that Brazilian claimants
have brought to the WIPO Mediation and Arbitration Center has
been attempted. Surprisingly, according to the WIPO, a case involving a party (complainant or defendant) from Brazil has never been
filed with this WIPO’s Center. 221 In order to promote alternative
217. See Shaffer, Sanchez & Rosenberg, supra note 18.
218. See Brazil v. United States, DS No. 224 (WTO, Jan. 31 2001); and
Brazil v. European Union and the Netherlands, DS No. 409 (WTO, May 12 2010).
219. See United States v. Brazil, DS No. 199 (WTO, May 30 2000).
220. See European Communities v. Canada, DS No. 114 (WTO, Dec. 19
1997); European Communities v. United States, DS No. 160 (WTO, Jan. 26
1999); United States v. European Communities, DS No. 174 (WTO, Jun. 1 1999);
Australia v. European Communities, DS No. 290 (WTO, Apr. 17 2003); United
States v. China, DS No. 362 (WTO, Apr. 10 2007); Ukraine v. Australia, DS No.
434 (WTO, Mar. 13 2012); Honduras v. Australia, DS No. 435 (WTO, Apr. 4
2012); Dominican Republic v. Australia, DS No. 441 (WTO, Jul. 18 2012); Cuba
v. Australia, DS No. 458 (WTO, May 3 2013); Indonesia v. Australia, DS No.
467 (WTO, Sept. 20 2013).
221. The information described here has been provided by the WIPO’s and the
INPI’s officials, which is on file with the author.
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dispute resolution (ADR) on IP matters in Brazil, a Memorandum
of Understanding between the WIPO and the INPI was signed in
2012 and became effective in 2013. 222 The movement toward establishing a culture of ADR in IP in Brazil is relevant, because it complies with and draws upon the WIPO’s guidelines and the successful
experience in solving disputes outside of the courts. 223 In Brazil,
where conflicts commonly reach the courts, it is important to think
about and work on practices to reduce the amount of litigation. With
respect to IP, the internationalization of this field in Brazil, thus, has
led to this initiative.
Regarding the thirteen disputes within the WTO’s dispute settlement body, the legal issues vary. Namely, five cases are about patent
rights and IP enforcement. There are seven disputes on trademarks
and geographical indication and there is one case about music licensing. Although trademarks represent the majority of cases
brought to the WTO, there is one caveat concerning this number: the
disputes are related. That is, two conflicts emerged on agricultural
products and five on aspects related to the international trade of tobacco. Even though each case has its relevance to Brazil’s international trade agenda, in terms of IP, strong emphasis has been put on
patent disputes. 224
Prominent academics such as Alvaro Santos, 225 Bruno Salama
and Daniel Benoliel, 226 Michelle Badin, 227 and Rochelle Dreyfuss 228
have noted how Brazil has successfully used international IP norms,
especially patent law, to protect its national interests globally and
enhance IP protection domestically. The aforementioned authors describe how, for example, the pharmaceutical industry has attempted
222. See WIPO, WIPO Mediation for Proceedings Instituted in the Brazilian
National Institute of Industrial Property (INPI-BR), http://www.wipo.int/amc
/en/center/specific-sectors/inpibr/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2016).
223. Id.
224. See Badin, supra note 17; Salama & Benoliel, supra note 19.
225. See Santos, supra note 17.
226. See Salama & Benoliel, supra note 19.
227. See Badin, supra note 17.
228. See Dreyfuss, supra note 150; Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 205.
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to trump the access to medicines in the Global South after the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement. 229 As a result, “TRIPS has
had much more positive effects in the North[.] . . . In the life sciences, there is concern that patenting has moved too far upstream.
Patents over genes, protein sequences, diagnostic correlations, and
other fundamental knowledge allow patentees to dominate broad
technological opportunities.” 230
In response to this process, which stemmed from the TRIPS
Agreement, Brazil, India, and China resisted. The effective usage of
the compulsory license, international litigation, and new trade agreements in addition to what had been set forth by the TRIPS Agreement were the main forms of opposition. 231 These countries sought
to litigate before international bodies as well as draw up policies to
ameliorate the asymmetric powers between developed and developing countries. 232 According to Rochelle Dreyfuss, in sum, “as
emerging economies move into a leadership position in establishing
new practices and advancing their pro-access views, they are sure to
challenge the preeminent role of the North in setting world norms
for intellectual property protection.” 233
In conclusion, Brazil has been championed as a victorious user
of the international bodies that engage in international IP litigation
and lawmaking. Brazil has also conformed its IP laws to international treaties, albeit this raised some concerns within the country—
as it will be discussed below. Furthermore, Brazil has ably used legal tools and proceedings to resist and respond to developed countries when conflicts have emerged from agreements such as the
TRIPS Agreement. Accordingly, Brazil and its legal professionals
seem to have proved that “a developing nation that can ‘lawyer up’
would be at a real advantage not only in regard to drafting and de-

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

See Badin, supra note 17; Dreyfuss, supra note 132.
See Dreyfuss, supra note 132, at 8.
Id.
See Badin, supra note 17; Salama & Benoliel, supra note 19.
See Dreyfuss, supra note 132, at 3.
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fending legislation, it could also be proactive: it could insist on renegotiating the Agreement to deal with its development problems.” 234
However, previous research indicates that the successful results
mentioned above is most likely the result of the work of skillful international trade lawyers, not legal experts who specialize in IP.235
Moreover, the lack of a strong IP research agenda and leading IP
lawyers has exposed Brazil’s weakness in using patent rights to foster R&D and innovation. Because of the small number of opportunities to receive legal training in IP and international IP in Brazil,
this assessment may not be surprising. International trade lawyers
have received training and education abroad, namely at American
and European law schools, in addition to the training missions at the
Brazilian Embassies in Geneva and Washington, D.C. 236 Therefore,
Brazilian professionals with expertise in international trade have
capitalized on several opportunities they had available to thrive in
this niche, which their peers who work in IP did not follow. 237
Conversely, IP lawyers in Brazil face severe problems in being
properly educated in their field, and their international opportunities
do not seem to be as plentiful as they are for international trade.
Whether IP lawyers have been exposed to and benefited from international opportunities as international trade lawyers have is a question yet to be addressed. Therefore, the next section will thoroughly
analyze the profile of elite IP legal professionals in Brazil in order
to identify where and how they have been educated and trained,
since they do not find this guidance and mentorship at most of the
elite law schools in Brazil.

234. Id. at 8.
235. See Santos, supra note 17; Badin, supra note 17.
236. See Glezer et al., supra note 18; Shaffer, Sanchez & Rosenberg, supra
note 18.
237. Id.
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V. THE GLOBALIZING LEGAL PROFESSION IN BRAZIL: THE
PRACTICE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL IP
As it has been described in the previous section, this work focuses on the elite of IP lawyers in Brazil. Accordingly, a thorough
research of publications that rank lawyers and law firms was done
as means of compiling a group of highly regarded IP law firms in
Brazil. After having selected IP as the area of expertise in the selected references, it was possible to identify thirty law firms that are
based in Brazil and are globally known for their IP practice. 238
An important characteristic of IP firms in Brazil is that they have
been historically seen as global law firms, 239 which have been
founded by “pioneer-globalizer[s].”240 To be sure, previous research
described how some of these firms implemented advanced and democratic management strategies to help them run their legal businesses in Brazil. 241 For example, they established organizational
models based on efficiency and meritocracy. 242 As discussed below,
IP lawyers have not engaged in transnational initiatives as international trade lawyers have traditionally done. Conversely, Brazil’s international trade lawyers have recently succeeded in cross-border
disputes over IP rights, and they have relied upon significant exposure to international legal education to achieve results. Thus, a comparison between these two groups of legal practitioners may explain
the underlying reasons that have led to this situation.
The data reveal that slightly less than 25% of all IP lawyers of
this sample have received legal education abroad, 243 namely graduating from master and doctoral programs at universities outside of
238. Please refer to Appendix A infra for further details on the methodology.
239. See Krishnan, Dias & Pence, supra note 27.
240. Id. at 10. Note also the case of Dannemann, Siemsen, Bigler & Ipanema
Moreira, an IP firm that has foreigners amongst its founding partners.
241. See Krishnan, Dias & Pence, supra note 27.
242. Id.
243. Even though the educational characteristics of the sample analyzed here
had been collected from publicly available repositories, in order to secure the
names of these professionals and where they work, the data is on file with the
author. This information may be provided upon request.
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Brazil. In contrast, a recent study on Brazilian trade professionals
noted that: “[international trade lawyers have found] incentives for
them to study abroad, especially in the U.S. And most of the elite
trade lawyers we interviewed have had international experience in
graduate courses or internships abroad.” 244
Moreover, the data show that the size of the cohort of IP lawyers
working at elite Brazilian firms is not small, especially considering
that IP is seen as a complex area that needs specialized professionals. In a universe of thirty firms, it has been possible to count 517
lawyers who work exclusively in IP. This finding is noteworthy because of the limitations of the data, and, in particular, because the
pattern observed in IP is different from what has been found in international trade, which has a small but well-trained cohort of lawyers. 245
The relatively large number of legal professionals who work in
IP in Brazil may stem from different factors. On the one hand, new
global demands that have been brought by the opening of the Brazilian economy have strengthened the international facet of IP lawyering that have long existed in Brazil.246 On the other hand, the
recent economic development in Brazil has also increased the need
for lawyers to handle domestic IP matters. 247 For example, Brazilian
lawyers have noticed growth in the number of administrative proceedings filed with and conducted by the INPI. 248 To be sure, at least
one important law firm specialized in IP doubled its size during the
1990s. 249 As a result, law firms with focus on IP have expanded in
order to meet an increasing demand. Yet, this advancement has not

244. See Glezer et al., supra note 36, at 9.
245. Id. (describing that there exist eleven Brazilian law firms recommended
for their international trade practice by Chambers and Partners, and the authors of
this study interviewed twenty-one trade professionals working at these firms).
246. See Dreyfuss, supra note 132.
247. See Lilian Matsuura, Especialista em Propriedade Intelectual Brilha na
Advocacia, CONSULTOR JURÍDICO, Oct. 2008, http://www.conjur.com.br/2008out-31/propriedade_intelectual_evidencia_advocacia (last visited Jul. 30 2015).
248. Id.
249. Id.
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been followed by a step toward the internationalization of legal education in IP within Brazilian law schools.
The relevant, though small, percentage of Brazilian IP lawyers
educated abroad may be an alarming signal rather than a positive
one. Since most law schools in Brazil, in particular the elite ones, do
not offer IP courses, when law students start practicing law, their
training needs to be provided by either their hiring firms or law
schools outside of Brazil. The data presented above suggest that
most IP lawyers in Brazil are being prepared within their workplace,
because the number of professionals educated abroad is small. This
lack of training in law schools, either in Brazil or elsewhere, raises
other problems, which will be outlined below.
A. Lessons from International Trade Lawyers to their IP Colleagues
Legal professionals have been noted for their liberal values, their
role in ensuring a country’s rule of law, and their work toward the
promotion of economic liberalization. Furthermore, law schools
have been the environment to discuss these ideals. 250 Accordingly,
legal practitioners specialized in IP should not be any different, especially when they should fight and advocate for a global environment of fair trade of IP rights. However, when lawyers are trained
within the workplace, it is expected that they attend to demands
brought by clients, leaving behind policymaking issues as well as
matters outside of their firms’ and clients’ scopes.
To be sure, “at the local level,” Brazilian IP lawyers used their
political capital with the INPI to further the reforms of domestic IP
laws that were “even more conservative on behalf of the IP owners
in comparison with the WTO rules.” 251 Thus, the TRIPS Agreement
250. See LAWYERS AND THE RISE OF WESTERN POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra
note 29; FIGHTING FOR POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 29; and Krishnan, Dias
& Pence, supra note 27; YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS: LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE
CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES (2002).
251. See Badin, supra note 17, at 261-62.
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and its aftermath in Brazil suggest that international trade lawyers
have aptly brought together private interests and policymaking concerns to the cross-border commerce of IP rights. 252 In contrast, most
of IP lawyers have stood aside from this process and the “contributions from civil society movements based in Brazil on Brazil’s foreign policy regarding IP have been limited.” 253
Specifically, the section above described how the TRIPS Agreement has deepened the asymmetry of powers between developed
and developing nations, but Brazil has achieved a relevant position
with respect to the international lawmaking of IP. 254 Surprisingly,
however, IP lawyers have not taken the lead in this process. 255 If
Brazil has been championed as a victorious player in international
IP, especially in litigating by using the TRIPS Agreement at the
WTO, the successful strategy behind these actions was an international trade plan that was conducted by international trade lawyers,
not IP lawyers. 256
Although previous research on international trade lawyers in
Brazil have discussed the flaws in the legal education that these professionals receive in Brazil,257 specific programs to build legal capacity for trade lawyers have been organized. 258 Namely, prestigious organizations of the Brazilian civil society alongside the government have provided funding and training for international trade
lawyers, under a “three pillar’ structure.” 259 In addition to receiving
incentives to pursuing advanced degrees at respected European and
American universities, these trade professionals have also worked at
252. See Shaffer, Sanchez & Rosenberg, supra note 18.
253. See Badin, supra note 17, at 277.
254. See Dreyfuss, supra note 132.
255. See Badin, supra note 17; Santos, supra note 17; Salama & Benoliel, supra note 19 (discussing the relative success of Brazil’s trade policy, which included IP rights. Yet, both authors analyze this victory in IP disputes under an
international trade perspective, which leads to the conclusion that lawyers with
expertise in international law and international trade have led this process).
256. Id. See also Shaffer, Sanchez & Rosenberg, supra note 18.
257. See Glezer et al., supra note 18.
258. See, Shaffer, Sanchez & Rosenberg, supra note 18.
259. Id. at 423.
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Brazilian embassies in places such as Washington, D.C. and Geneva, which have been considered “unique in the realm of trade diplomacy.” 260 In sum, the “three pillar” worked in accordance with
the following framework:
The structure consists of a specialized WTO dispute settlement division located in the capital, Brasília (the “first pillar”), coordination between this unit and Brazil’s WTO mission in Geneva (the “second pillar”), and coordination between both of these entities and Brazil’s private sector, as
well as law firms and economic consultants funded by the
private sector (the “third pillar”). As part of this “third pillar,” the Geneva mission started an internship program for
trade specialists from government agencies and young attorneys from Brazilian law firms and business associations. 261
Likewise, several trade lawyers have worked at global firms and
other prestigious organizations in the United States and Europe,
apart from the internships at Brazilian embassies. 262 Brazil has, thus,
successfully exposed its legal practitioners to educational opportunities in international trade and practical experience at elite organizations. 263 As a result, “the narrative offered by Brazilian [international trade] attorneys shows that they are strongly connected to foreign professionals and work constantly to find foreign clients, generating demand for legal services and expanding contact networks
in the area.” 264
As the above-mentioned initiatives succeeded, it has been noted
that the vast majority of Brazilian legal professionals working in international trade law have been extensively trained abroad. 265 These
lawyers have exceptional sets of skills in international trade, significant social capital, and they are ready to engage in disputes and

260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id. at 435.
Id.
See Glezer et al., supra note 36.
Id.
Id. at 33.
Id.
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policymaking in this field, which aligns with the TRIPS Agreement. 266 Conversely, IP lawyers have not achieved the same results
as their peers who work in international trade, despite some of the
WIPO’s and the INPI’s agreements to make opportunities available
to Brazil’s IP lawyers. 267
B. Barriers to Having a Global and Effective IP Practice in Brazil
In contrast to what has been found regarding the capacity building for trade lawyers, the tools available to Brazilian IP lawyers are
still limited. 268 Besides the small number of elite law schools that
offer IP courses in Brazil, a similar scenario has been noted beyond
the law schools’ boundaries. 269 That is, in Brazil, civil society organizations and governmental bodies that focus on IP rights are not
as structured to train IP lawyers as those engaged in educating international trade professionals. To be sure, when Michelle Badin analyzes the participation of few IP lawyers who have worked alongside
the civil society in trade related IP matters, 270 she acknowledges that
“[v]ery few groups, such as the Center on Technology and Society
of the Getulio Vargas Foundation, have been able to mobilize human and financial resources to participate directly in international
conferences and meetings.” 271 Such assessment, therefore, reinforces the advantages of the exposure to international influence that
Brazil’s IP lawyers should be benefiting.
Regarding the dichotomy between public and private participation in IP initiatives, scholars argue that, in Brazil, most investments
in IP derive from public funding, and more specifically, from public

266. See Shaffer, Sanchez & Rosenberg, supra note 18.
267. See Maria Beatriz Amorim-Borher et al., Ensino e Pesquisa em
Propriedade Intelectual no Brasil, 6(2) REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE INOVAÇÃO 281
(2007).
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. See Badin, supra note 17, at 278-79 (explaining the situation regarding
drug policy in Brazil in light of the TRIPS Agreement).
271. Id. at 277.
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universities. 272 Namely, R&D is commonly funded by the government, and the money is usually managed by public universities and
foundations. 273 Civil society is still becoming a relevant player in
promoting IP training, which subsequently fosters innovation in
Brazil. 274
In addition, the fact that Brazil’s institutional organizations rely
heavily on public organizations poses (at least) two related problems. First, funding for research is scarce, and the process of accessing these resources is extremely bureaucratic. 275 Specifically, official organizations, including the academic ones, shall follow strict
rules to receive and spend funds, which sometimes do not comprehend the characteristics of innovative R&D projects. 276 Secondly, a
foundation or university that implements institutional bypasses to
spend the money more efficiently may face accusations related to
under-reported consultancy fees to the Brazilian authorities, and
their respective leaders may face criminal charges for mishandling
public money. 277
The obstacles mentioned above, along with the weak infrastructure of Brazilian universities, hinder the formation of a strong research environment. 278 This bottleneck in Brazil’s capacity to stimulate R&D, innovation, and IP protection raises serious questions
about Brazil’s chances of becoming competitive. Given the situa-

272. See generally, Alexandre Pacheco da Silva, Antes de uma Fundação um
Conceito: um Estudo sobre a Disciplina Jurírica das Fundações de Apoio na
Cooperação entre Universidade e Empresa (2011) (unpublished Master’s Thesis,
Fundação Getulio Vargas) (on file with the author). See also Salama & Benoliel,
supra note 19, at 642 (stating that “the development of a generics industry assisted
in government efforts to revamp its network of public laboratories”).
273. See Silva, supra note 272.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. See also Salama & Benoliel, supra note 19, at 637 (suggesting that the
political “framework in Brazil also favors short-sighted policies in connection
with R & D investments in the pharmaceutical industry.”).

2016]

BRAZIL: INT’L TRADE V. IP LAWYERS

115

tion, lawyers have attempted to create legal tools to reduce the bureaucratic steps that universities face in fundraising for research. 279
Namely, legal professionals alongside the academic community
have worked to approve Brazil’s Lei de Inovação [Innovation Act],
and they have also promoted legalizing efficient means of receiving
and spending money for highly-innovative projects. 280 Apart from a
few successful initiatives, however, Brazilian lawyers and scholars
still have a long path ahead of them to build and secure efficient
ways of gathering and using resources for innovation as well as
working toward the strengthening of IP rights in Brazil.
Bearing that in mind, a thorough study analyzed the development of IP training in Brazil. 281 The authors found that few initiatives had been structured, such as the growth of graduate programs
in IP. However, most of the steps that have been created comprehend
seminars, workshops, and conferences. 282 Yet these short-term programs have been a staple in IP in Brazil. To be sure, the National
Conference on Intellectual Property was in its twentieth-six year in
2006, when the aforementioned investigation was conducted. 283
Moreover, scholars have found that the programs mentioned
above had little emphasis on the international component of IP practice. Namely, only one workshop counted on the WIPO’s participation. 284 In 2006, the INPI and the WIPO jointly organized a workshop named “Training of Trainers,” which sought to provide
knowledge to technology and IP managers as well as agents from
public and private organizations that worked with the commercialization of intellectual property. 285 However, it is not clear whether

279.
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281.
282.
283.
284.
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See Amorim-Borher et al., supra note 267.
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Id at 293.
Id. at 295.
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and to what extent legal professionals were targeted by this initiative. 286 Therefore, although some domestic measures have paid attention to the global aspects of IP, and few have counted on the participation of professionals from the WIPO, it is unlikely that such
actions overcame the problems that legal professionals faced when
they aspired to receive training in international IP.
Also, it has not been possible to find any discussion on practical
experiences abroad that have been specifically offered to Brazilian
IP professionals. It is known that the WIPO has organized summer
courses and a professional development program. 287 However,
whether there are incentives for Brazilian professionals to enroll in
such initiatives, and whether these programs provide practical training to Brazilian lawyers is not known from the WIPO’s website.
With that said, although it is not possible to infer from an existing study288 that the attendees of such programs were already working, they did not mention any possibility for lawyers to work temporarily at the WIPO or at foreign law firms. This lack of options
differs from the situation found in international trade, a field in
which legal professionals usually have significant work experience
at multilateral, public, and private organizations outside of Brazil.
As a result, it is expected that IP professionals need to find other
ways to receive training in international IP.
The small cohort of Brazil’s legal professionals educated
abroad, along with the problems in R&D and practical experience in
IP, have serious consequences for Brazil’s competitiveness in the
global economy. To be sure, scholars have noted that, although Brazil has successfully fought for its IP rights at the WTO, Brazil’s domestic “IP strategy” following the TRIPS Agreement has not been
as efficient as other emerging economies. 289 Namely, this is likely
286. Id.
287. See generally WIPO, WIPO Academy, http://www.wipo.int/academy/en/
(last visited March 15 2016).
288. Amorim-Borher, supra note 268.
289. See Salama & Benoliel, supra note 19; Paranhos & Hasenclever, supra
note 24; and Lana, supra note 24.
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because Brazilian IP lawyers have long experienced a lack of education and training at Brazilian and foreign law schools. The domestic outcomes of the TRIPS Agreement in Brazil will be assessed in
order to explain this dichotomy between international and national
IP practices, and why Brazilian trade lawyers have coped where IP
lawyers had problems.
Other emerging markets, such as India, have experienced greater
advantages from the TRIPS Agreement than Brazil. 290 Article 6 of
the TRIPS Agreement was a serious point of contention during the
negotiations, with strong opposition from the United States. 291
Namely, the TRIPS Agreement established that developing and the
least developed countries might wait between five to ten years to
harmonize their domestic norms to the treaty. In the interim, these
countries would be allowed to do “parallel importation” of products
patented abroad, which means that “in this theory [of international
parallel importation] the intellectual property right is consumed as
soon as goods are placed in the market, so that they can freely circulate.” 292
Scholars argue that the underlying reason for that interlude and
the parallel import provision was to provide developing countries
the possibility to prepare their economic and legal environments to
compete with developed nations under equitable, or at least fairer,
terms. 293 These conditions, along with the compulsory license
mechanism, should provide emerging markets tools to build and
strengthen their own patent industries, so that they could capitalize
on the entrance of foreign inventions by emulating and enhancing

290. Id.
291. Jerome H. Reichman, The TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or
Cooperation with the Developing Countries, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 441
(2000).
292. See Vincenzo Di Cataldo, Parallel importations. New perspectives at 1,
WIPO, 2007, http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/sme/en/wipo_smes_rom_09
/wipo_smes_rom_09_workshop12_3.doc.
293. Id. See also Paranhos & Hasenclever, supra note 24; Salama & Benoliel,
supra note 19, at 648; and Lana, supra note 24.
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them, and to enjoy greater chances of becoming more competitive. 294
Yet, the literature on the outcomes of the TRIPS Agreement in
Brazil suggests that other developing countries have used the agreement’s provisions to induce their innovation agenda more efficiently
than Brazil. 295 Indeed, Brazil enacted its Patents and Trademarks
Act in 1996. Thus, it has not benefited from the window of opportunity to import, improve, and innovate upon previous inventions
through parallel importations. 296 Conversely, India introduced its
new patent legislation in 2005, almost ten years after the TRIPS
Agreement was originally signed. 297 Consequently, India has enjoyed the transitional period to do parallel importations and, hence,
boost its patent industry. 298 Therefore, in comparison with Brazil,
India has utilized the legal tools set forth by the TRIPS Agreement
in favor of its domestic growth, going beyond the usage of compulsory licenses and transnational litigation over IP rights at the
WTO. 299
However, as described above, the TRIPS Agreement’s effects
on Brazilian IP practice have not been so favorable. Brazilian residents have always designed and registered utility models, whereas
non-residents have usually registered patents, a situation that could
have been changed following the TRIPS Agreement. These unsatisfactory statistics are likely a result of the problems in IP training at
Brazilian law schools in particular and at universities in general.
Brazilian IP lawyers have not benefited from capacity building programs that their international trade peers have.
Bearing that in mind, consider the literature that has been discussed in this study. There are, at least, two ways of interpreting
what is being said about Brazil’s participation in the international IP
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

Id. See also Paranhos & Hasenclever, supra note 24; Lana, supra note 24.
See Paranhos & Hasenclever, supra note 24; Lana, supra note 24.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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arena. On the one hand, Brazil has been championed as a prominent
player in using international trade tools related to IP rights, particularly the TRIPS Agreement litigation at the WTO. 300 On the other
hand, Brazil has not fostered innovation and has not strengthened IP
rights as other developing countries did after the TRIPS Agreement,
for example, when it enacted its legislation without using the transitional period set forth by the TRIPS Agreement. 301 Therefore, this
work’s argument is that the success in the “trade aspect” of international IP stems from the participation of skilled international trade
lawyers, whereas the legal practice related to the “IP protection aspect” has serious flaws, namely because the legal tools that have
been used by Brazilian universities, law schools, law firms, and the
government have not created a legal and corporate framework capable of enhancing Brazil’s chances to innovate. 302
This “boundary-blurring” 303 aspect of international IP is a relevant characteristic of the globalization of the legal profession in Brazil. That is, as international trade, IP has its nuances. The two areas
of law, however, become connected through the commerce of IP
rights that are regulated by international treaties, such as the TRIPS
Agreement. Globalization is a major factor that causes this “boundary-blurring” process between legal fields, such as it has been noted
here in regard to international IP in Brazil. Namely, “[boundaryblurring is] often observed when a subordinate profession seeks to
. . . break into a new area of work.” 304 The literature on international
trade of IP and domestic regulation of IP rights in Brazil suggests
that this “boundary-blurring” process has taken place in Brazil,
where international trade lawyers have succeeded in the market of
international IP disputes that have arisen from the TRIPS Agreement. 305 Why this has happened is a question yet to be answered by
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

See Santos, supra note 17; Badin, supra note 17.
See Paranhos & Hasenclever, supra note 24; and Lana, supra note 24.
See Salama & Benoliel, supra note 19.
See Liu, supra note 28.
Id. at 676.
See Santos, supra note 17; Badin, supra note 17.
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further research, but the answer may be related to the problems in
the legal training that has been received by Brazilian IP lawyers.
Indeed, both IP lawyers and international trade legal professionals in Brazil are respected for being experts in their respective
fields. 306 International trade is deemed to be a small niche, whereas
IP has several branches that lawyers can specialize in, and upon
which specialized IP firms have expanded. 307 Furthermore, both areas of law share deficiencies with respect to the legal education that
legal professionals receive at Brazilian law schools, where lawyers
do not find proper training. Thus, although there are similarities between IP and international trade law, there are also striking differences, too. To be sure, a number of studies on international trade
lawyers and international trade strategies designed by Brazilian professionals have over time noted that civil society organizations
alongside the Brazilian government have efficiently coordinated
ways to fill the gaps in legal education and, consequently, build legal
capacity for Brazilian trade lawyers. 308 With respect to IP, although
Brazilian IP firms have grown following the implementation of the
TRIPS Agreement and the enactment of new domestic legislations,
this has not resulted in the development of Brazil’s IP agenda.
In conclusion, lawyers and law firms that have been noted as
historical leaders in the globalization of the legal profession in
Brazil 309 have lost their space, which has been dominated by international trade professionals. The lack of creative programs and
strong support from the local civil society and government, as well
as the small percentage of IP lawyers who have been trained abroad,
may be an underlying reason for this conclusion. In Brazil, no specific training program reaches the majority of the legal professionals
working in IP. Conversely, although international trade is a field that

306.
307.
308.
309.

See Glezer et al., supra note 18; Oliveira & Ramos, supra note 31.
See Glezer et al., supra note 18; Matsuura, supra note 247.
See Shaffer, Badin & Rosenberg, supra note 18.
See Krishnan, Dias & Pence, supra note 27.
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relies on a small group of professionals, almost all of them have received training abroad at elite educational, market, multilateral, and
governmental organizations. 310
It is a fact that Brazil has fared relatively well in its recent development process during the 1990s and 2000s, and IP protection
has been crucial to that result. However, when one considers Brazil’s performance from a comparative perspective, this context
changes. The part of IP practice in Brazil that is unrelated to international trade disputes over IP rights demonstrates that Brazil has
lacked efficient IP policies, which may stem from the difficulties in
finding efficient legal advice. 311 Both INPI officials and IP lawyers
are highly regarded for their deep knowledge of IP, 312 and yet Brazil
has not benefited from IP mechanisms derived from the TRIPS
Agreement in the same way as other emerging markets. 313 Where IP
lawyers have lost space, international trade professionals have succeeded. Legal education in Brazil or abroad may be the first, if not
the most important, step that might have affected this competition
for this “boundary-blurring” international IP market between Brazilian legal professionals.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This work has analyzed the relationship between development,
legal education, and the legal profession in Brazil. A specific field
of law has been selected as a case study for this assessment: international intellectual property. Several academics have discussed
how IP is important for a country’s development. 314 Similarly, there

310. See Glezer et al., supra note 18.
311. See Salama & Benoliel, supra note 19.
312. See Badin, supra note 17 (discussing that the role that the INPI plays in
ensuring an efficient IP system is controversial in Brazil. However, the author
acknowledges that, for some observers, those who work at the INPI are deemed
to be well prepared professionals).
313. See Paranhos & Hasenclever, supra note 24; Lana, supra note 24.
314. See generally GOLDSTEIN & TRIMBLE, supra note 19; Dinwoodie &
Dreyfuss, supra note 205.
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are authors who have long studied law and development. 315 After an
interlude in the scholarly works on law and development, several
investigations were done to understand the different “moments”316
of law and development in the developing world. 317 Even with the
few studies on IP that exist, legal education in IP has not been the
central topic of analysis. Thus, this work has attempted to fill this
gap in the literature by proposing an examination of how legal education, international IP, and the legal profession have been working
toward Brazil’s development.
The focus on international IP is important to understand how the
most globalized part of IP practice has recently worked in Brazil.
Accordingly, the first section of this work shed light on Brazil’s elite
law schools, and whether they have been training the highest strata
of Brazil’s IP lawyers. It has been found that the majority of elite
law schools in Brazil do not offer any IP related courses to their
students, namely patent, trademark, and copyright law. Because this
gap exists, Brazilian lawyers have attempted to find training elsewhere by pursuing advanced law degrees abroad or by receiving
training at their law firms.
Bearing that in mind, the second and third sections assessed how
globalization has affected important IP laws and IP lawyering in
Brazil. In fact, Brazil has been a leader in international IP since the
rise of the first international treaties on IP rights. Recently, Brazil
has been a relevant player in international IP disputes, especially
during the negotiations and after the implementation of the TRIPS
Agreement. Patent, trademark, and copyright laws have been updated in order to align with the TRIPS Agreement. Yet, it has been
noted that most of the disputes that have arisen from the TRIPS
Agreement have been brought under international trade law to the
WTO’s dispute settlement body. Therefore, Brazilian international
trade lawyers have been at the forefront of international trade law,
315. See Trubek & Galanter, supra note 1.
316. See THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 11.
317. Id.
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particularly with respect to the TRIPS Agreement. This conclusion
results from two main reasons. The first is because of the nuances
of legal proceedings regarding international trade. And second, because of the extensive training that Brazilian international trade lawyers have received.
With that said, the fourth section examined the situation mentioned above in a more in-depth manner. One way of assessing why
international trade lawyers have occupied a space that might be handled by IP lawyers is the lack of training in the latter area of law.
That is, whether Brazilian IP lawyers were going abroad to receive
education in IP has been analyzed. It has been found that almost
23% of Brazilian IP lawyers have received education abroad. Conversely, previous research on international trade lawyers revealed
that almost all elite legal professionals in the sample researched and
received excellent training at highly-regarded law schools in Europe
and in the United States.
Looking at this study holistically, several conclusions can be
drawn from the primary data and arguments discussed here, which
provide relevant information to guide further research on this topic.
Namely, ethnographies can be made, which will give a voice to Brazil’s IP lawyers and hear their perceptions. Furthermore, globalization has pushed the development of IP to issues related to international trade, which can be seen as a “boundary-blurring” process of
the Brazilian legal profession in this specific area of law. Relying
upon better training than the one of their IP peers, international trade
lawyers have coped with international trade law concerning IP
rights. Regarding the international trade aspects of IP, Brazil and its
legal professionals have been championed as examples of how to
dispute IP rights globally against developed countries. On the domestic characteristics of IP, however, the situation is not as positive.
Indeed, in comparison with other emerging economies, such as
India, Brazil has lost some important window of opportunities to
capitalize on the TRIPS Agreement. Further research may want to
consider analyzing Brazil and India in parallel. Legal education is in
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crisis in both countries. However, domestic strategies following the
TRIPS Agreement have been effective to boost India’s IP industry.
The underlying reason behind India’s domestic success in IP remains to be addressed.
Brazil has enacted new IP legislations shortly after the TRIPS
Agreement was signed. As a result, Brazil did not enjoy the transitional period set forth by the TRIPS Agreement and, consequently,
did not extensively use parallel imports to improve its domestic industry. The successful use of compulsory license to obtain medicines and the litigation strategies that have been used at the WTO
were pursued by international trade lawyers. In contrast, those who
exclusively study IP as well as Brazil’s development and its innovation tools are skeptical about how Brazilian IP lawyers and laws
have worked in favor of Brazil’s development.
The argument is not that international trade lawyers are better
professionals than those who handle IP cases. Instead, it is being
discussed how civil society, alongside the Brazilian government, has
built legal capacity for international trade lawyers that has not been
similarly offered to IP lawyers. This problem in the preparation of
IP lawyers has not been addressed when academics have looked at
the strategies concerning international IP in Brazil. This investigation has added another layer to that discussion, showing the neglect
of IP in the Brazilian law school curriculum. Brazilian legal professionals, in general, have fared well in spite of the deficiencies in the
legal curriculum. Yet, they still have a long way ahead of them to
integrate their knowledge in both IP and international trade, produce
synergies, and enhance Brazil’s developmental path.
APPENDIX A
With respect to the process of gathering data, some problems
have been faced in the fourth section. There were some obstacles in
collecting precise data on elite IP lawyers in Brazil. For that reason,
a methodological caveat regarding this section is necessary.
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There are three well-respected publications that make it possible
to refine the search of law firms per expertise: “Chambers & Partners,” 318 “The Legal 500,” 319 and “Who is Who Legal.” 320 The website of each of the recommended firms by those periodicals was carefully researched. However, the degree of public information on the
educational background of lawyers varied. That is, some firms disclosed only information on partners and, as a result, the total number
of IP lawyers working at these firms as well as where they were
educated is not known for certain. Data was only collected on the
lawyers who had their profiles available.
The barriers to accessing full information shall not change the
conclusions drawn from the available data. In general, the educational background of partners was public and might indicate the general portrayal of legal professionals hierarchically beneath them. To
be sure, the legal profession in countries such as Brazil is deemed to
be stratified. 321 Accordingly, the degree of exposure to foreign education of law firms’ partners tends to be a reliable source to identify
to what extent a firm is open to globalization of legal education.
Therefore, although it is not possible to generalize, in precise terms,
what has been found in this non-random sample to all IP lawyers in
Brazil, it is likely that the general profile of the elite of the profession
in IP is similar to IP lawyers who have been left out of this sample.

318. See Chambers and Partners, Intellectual Property Lawyers & Law Firms
Guide: Brazil, http://www.chambersandpartners.com/41/34/editorial/9/1.
319. See The Legal 500, Intellectual Property: Brazil, http://www.legal500
.com/c/brazil/intellectual-property.
320. See Who’s Who Legal, Special Reports: Brazil, http://whoswholegal
.com/specials/186/brazil/.
321. See Maria da Gloria Bonelli, Lawyers' Associations and the Brazilian
State, 1843-1997, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1045 (2003).

TRADUCTION OU TRAHISON
Vivian Grosswald Curran ∗
This essay was developed from a presentation at LSU Law Center at a conference surrounding its project to translate the Louisiana
Civil Code into French. Since my presentation was on translation, I
thought maybe I ought to give it in two languages, and translate as I
went along, but since that would have meant sacrificing half of my
allotted time, I decided to start in English and continue in French. I
wanted to deliver my presentation in French for a few reasons. First
and foremost, I must admit, because I never pass up the chance to
speak in French when I am allowed to. Barthes spoke of “le plaisir
du texte,” 1 for me it is “le plaisir du verbe,” 2 maybe la dégustation
du verbe. But I have two other reasons. I am a comparativist, as all
of us are and must be who are interested in translation, and the modern era of comparative law began in France and in French. I think
that tribute should be paid to this fact. And finally, as the other essays in this issue make clear, languages are precious parts of the
worlds they come from and that they in turn influence, so the ubiquity of any single language should be resisted.
And with that I will proceed to my topic.
La traduction a beaucoup influé sur mes projets professionnels,
et j’ai eu un véritable eurêka personnel concernant la traduction à
l’âge de huit ans. J’ai grandi dans une famille aux États-Unis où mes
parents tenaient à ce que leurs enfants retiennent les langues de la
famille, en l’occurrence le français et l’allemand. Je lisais donc des
livres pour enfants allemands tels Der Struwwelpeter 3, qui dépeint
le sang coulant du doigt d’un petit garçon dont la punition pour avoir
sucé son pouce fut de le perdre quand on vient le lui découper une
∗ Distinguished Faculty Scholar, Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. Sauf précision contraire, toute traduction est celle de l’auteur.
1. ROLAND BARTHES, LE PLAISIR DU TEXTE (1982).
2. CHARLES BAUDELAIRE, L’ART ROMANTIQUE, 3 ŒUVRES COMPLÈTES 173
(Michel Lévy Frères, 1868) (« Il y a dans le … verbe quelque chose de sacré … »).
3. HEINRICH HOFFMANN, DER STRUWWELPETER (1845).
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nuit. Je lisais tous les livres sur Sissi, l’impératrice Élisabeth d’Autriche pour enfants français, Sissi jeune fille, Sissi impératrice, Adieu
Sissi, etc 4. d’où je connaissais par cœur le protocole de la cour des
Habsbourg, les contes de Daudet et la Petite sœur de Trott 5, un livre
que ma mère avait beaucoup aimé dans son enfance, et qui décrit
l’arrivée d’un nouvel enfant au sein d’une famille quasiment, j’ai
envie de dire, précieuse, sauf que l’histoire se déroule à la fin du
XIXe siècle, au lieu du XVIIe. Par contre, dans le livre du docteur
Seuss pour enfants américains, lorsqu’un jour s’absentent les parents, un chat coquin sort de nulle part pour semer la pagaille, et de
fil en aiguille les murs de la demeure sont recouverts de peinture
rougeâtre où se distinguent les empreintes digitales des enfants 6.
Un jour l’idée m’est venue tout d’un coup et elle ne m’a jamais
quittée depuis, que les langues différentes servent à dire des choses
différentes, que les histoires allemandes et françaises et américaines
dans mes livres ne consistaient pas en mots qui servaient comme
outils pour exprimer les mêmes concepts, mais plutôt que les histoires provenaient de quelque chose de beaucoup plus profond et
qu’elles n’auraient pas pu être rédigées dans une autre langue. Et
ainsi ont commencé toutes les plus belles aventures intellectuelles
de ma vie et celles qui m’ont amenée à cette belle conférence de la
Louisiana State University.
Il y a non seulement les langues, mais aussi bien un bon nombre
de genres de langues. Et à la limite le silence représente une langue
aussi, car le non-dit exprime dans les interstices du langage. Nous
juristes savons certainement combien peut signifier une lacune textuelle. Les langues peuvent aussi être symboliques. Il a été suggéré
par exemple que le fondateur du domaine de la cybernétique s’immisça dans les cultures et les langues des mathématiques pures et

4. ODETTE FERRY, SISSI JEUNE FILLE (1979); SISSI IMPÉRATRICE (1981);
MICHEL MANOLL, ADIEU SISSI (1963).
5. ANDRÉ LICHTENBERGER, LA PETITE SŒUR DE TROTT (1898).
6. DR. SEUSS, THE CAT IN THE HAT (1957).
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appliquées, de l’ingénierie et de la neurophysiologie, et que son génie fut de traduire entre elles. Selon un physicien, la cybernétique
serait « une théorie du cafouillage » 7, « a theory of messiness ».
Qu’est-ce que la traduction alors ? Par-dessus tout, en ce qui
nous concerne, c’est un acte comparatif qui devient primordial pour
un droit en voie de transnationalisation, et elle aspire dans tous les
domaines où elle opère à baliser dans le désordre de l’étrange, du
différent, de l’inexplicable, en le réordonnant dans le langage du familier, du connu, mais sans pour autant en avoir trahi l’original. Sauf
que le mot « trahir » comporte aussi, je vous le rappelle, une connotation positive : celle de laisser percevoir. Aussi peut-on dire que
même une traduction qui risque de perdre l’original en le revêtant
d’un vocabulaire juridique qui provient d’un autre ordre juridique et
donc d’une histoire sociale et politique qui influent sur le sens des
termes, que même dans cette situation-là, le lecteur sensible verra
que le texte trahira avec un peu de chance, peut-être ne serait-ce que
par la présence de contradictions apparentes ou de lacunes inexplicables, le mystère de l’original qui demeure comme un palimpseste
qui se lit en filigrane à travers la traduction, traduction dont la familiarité même constitue un leurre.
Wittgenstein disait : « Les limites de ma langue sont les limites
de mon monde » 8. Et l’auteur d’un livre titré Un autre : chronique
d’une métamorphose, y demande : « Peut-on se faire une idée de la
source d’après ceux qui y boivent ? » c’est-à-dire sans en avoir bu
soi-même.
Jusqu’ici nous voyons que la traduction est bornée par le vécu,
ou en d’autres termes nous avons surtout évoqué le défi de l’irréductible intraduisible. Mais pouvons-nous voir dans la traduction encore plus loin que ses attaches et ses pertes culturelles ? Se peut-il
qu’elle représente un modèle cognitif de l’analyse juridique, de
7. Vivian Grosswald Curran, Comparative Law and Language in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 704, n°116 (Matthias Reimmann &
Reinhard Zimmermann, eds., 2006).
8. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTACUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS,
PROPOSITION 5, 6 (1933).
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l’analyse tout court, et que pour ce qui est du droit, ce soit même le
mécanisme central de réflexion au sein de tout ordre juridique national aussi bien que de celui qui est mise en œuvre dès que les frontières sont franchies et qu’il s’agit de droit transnational ou international ? De même, celui qui ne parle qu’une seule langue entreprendil le mécanisme de la traduction dans l’acte de la compréhension au
sein d’un seul système sémiotique, une seule communauté de
signes ? Effectivement, la traduction, comme l’avise George Steiner, serait :
formellement et pragmatiquement implicite dans chaque
acte de communication, dans l’émission et la réception de
tout mode de signifier … Comprendre c’est déchiffrer. Entendre de la signification c’est traduire. Dès lors, la structure,
les moyens et les problèmes, essentiels dans l’acte de traduire sont présents [aussi] dans l’acte de parler, d’écrire, de
la codification picturale au sein d’une seule langue. La traduction entre langues n’est qu’une application particulière,
[mais elle est] le modèle fondamental de la langue humaine
… [Or, nous pouvons à ce propos remarquer] les innombrables difficultés que peuvent subir les personnes à l’intérieur d’une langue unique qui cherchent à communiquer en
franchissant des barrières d’ères historiques, de classe sociale, de sensibilités sociales ou professionnelles différentes 9.
La traduction peut actuellement revêtir des aspects d’un problème révolu tant l’anglais paraît prendre l’ascendance aujourd’hui.
De même, plus on entend parler de mondialisation et de droit transnational, plus la problématique du droit comparé peut revêtir des aspects d’un domaine révolu. Mais la réalité est toute autre. La langue
du droit est liée à la grammaire interne des systèmes, des cultures,
des mentalités juridiques, ce qui entrave la communication par le
moyen d’un vocabulaire emprunté d’un autre système, culture et
mentalité juridique. La nature comparative complexe de la langue

9. GEORGE STEINER, AFTER BABEL: ASPECTS OF LANGUAGE AND
TRANSLATION XII (2e ed., 1992) (1975).

2016]

TRADUCTION OU TRAHISON

131

caractérise aussi le droit, si bien que le droit comparé est un traducteur de droit, et un processus d’autant plus important que la rencontre des droits ne produit pas identité ou compréhension.
La quête de l’identité pour les langues est une vieille histoire.
Umberto Eco la raconte dans son livre titré La recherche de la
langue parfaite dans la culture européenne. Il s’agit de l’angoisse
née de l’incapacité de chaque langue humaine de réaliser un reflet
parfaitement transparent du monde par le moyen des mots. Le désespoir du fait qu’aucune langue ne puisse établir une correspondance parfaite entre signifiant et signifié proviendrait du message
biblique qu’une telle langue existait avant que Dieu ne créa le désarroi à Babel pour punir l’homme 10. Vers le XXe siècle, l’idéal
d’une langue sans ambiguïté aucune est considéré comme la clef de
voûte pour découvrir la nature et le fonctionnement de la pensée 11.
Selon Umberto Eco, l’obsession de trouver une langue unique, universelle et parfaite, rédemptrice, existe dans toutes les cultures du
monde.
Steiner de son côté voit dans la légende de Babel l’idée que la
valeur de chaque langue est son manque de susceptibilité à la traduction. Il se pose la question de l’origine de la grande multiplicité
de langues mutuellement incompréhensibles qui se trouvent dans
des régions trop proches pour expliquer leur nombre. Une anecdote
intéressante et véridique que raconte le critique Reich-Ranicki à ce
propos est que l’on a reproché au poète Heinrich Heine de son vivant
une trahison envers la langue allemande parce que sa poésie, disaiton, se traduisait trop bien dans d’autres langues 12.

10. UMBERTO ECO, THE SEARCH FOR THE PERFECT LANGUAGE: THE MAKING
OF EUROPE (James Fentress trad., 1995).
11. GOTTLOB FREGE, THE THOUGHT: A LOGICAL INQUIRY IN PHILOSOPHICAL
LOGIC (P. Strawson ed., 1967).
12. MARCEL REICH-RANICKI, DER FALL HEINE 28 (1997).

132

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 9

Un livre paru il y a plusieurs années 13 raconte l’allure foudroyante de la perte de langues sur la terre dans les dernières décennies. Il est pourtant sans doute utile de nous rappeler que, quelles
que soient les pertes de différences, la différence elle-même ne diminue pas. Ce sont plutôt les terrains de la différence qui se déplacent, si bien que certaines différences qui ont le plus compté auparavant revêtiront une importance diminuée à l’avenir.
La dernière forme de traduction que je vais évoquer est celle de
la mémoire, du souvenir, car le droit est un domaine où le passé agit
sur l’avenir. Dans son beau livre, L’irréversible et la nostalgie, Vladimir Jankélévitch dit du souvenir, ce que l’on pourrait aussi bien
dire de la traduction, qu’il est :
comme un plat réchauffé, ou comme le pâle duplicata de
l’instant initial ; la deuxième fois est une première fois, mais
souvent aussi elle est un simple écho atténué de cette première fois … pour le nostalgique [c’est] un leurre délicieux
et une fascinante duperie … Le souvenir ressemble à cette
vérité, mais il n’est pas cette vérité elle-même … Il manque
je ne sais quoi, un Presque-rien qui est tout ; il ne manque
que l’essentiel ! Ce déficit impossible à localiser est le vide
qui attire l’homme nostalgique : car l’homme est tenté de
compléter, d’étoffer à l’infini les ombres de la réminiscence,
et de re-vivre réellement le déjà-vécu. C’est le re de ce revivre qui est la folle chimère. Tout reparaît, rien ne reparaît.
Rien ne disparaît, tout disparaît. Un deuxième voyage à
Taormina ne me donne pas l’éblouissement que le premier
m’avait laissé. J’ai voulu recommencer et n’ai senti en moi
qu’une grande sécheresse : le cœur et la conviction n’y
étaient pas. Comment suppléer à ce charme inexplicable et
rétrospectif de la première fois 14 ?

13. DANIEL NETTLE & SUZANNE ROMAINE, VANISHING VOICES: THE
EXTINCTION OF THE WORLD’S LANGUAGES (2000).
14. VLADIMIR JANKELELVITCH, L’IRRÉVERSIBLE ET LA NOSTALGIE 68-69
(Flammarion 2011).
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Ce défi et déficit du souvenir est aussi bien le challenge de la
traduction : comment suppléer à ce charme inexplicable et rétrospectif du texte original, peut-on respecter son exactitude tout en respectant l’esprit de son énoncé 15 ?

15. Voir à ce propos JOACHIM FEST, PAS MOI ! SOUVENIRS D’UNE JEUNESSE
11 (Raymond Voyat trad., 2007).
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∗ Professeur émérite, Linguistique et traduction, Université de Montréal.
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d'être négligeable. La manière de dire influant sur le sens et sa perception en modifie parfois le cours et pèse sur l’interprétation du
texte qu'en produiront ses interprètes : le juriste, le comparatiste, le
traducteur et le jurilinguiste.
Aussi la traduction d’un code civil, particulièrement dans l’une
des deux grandes langues de communication, de civilisation et de
culture que sont l’anglais et le français est-elle une entreprise aussi
hasardeuse que fascinante. Les deux langages du droit que portent
la Common Law et le Droit civil sont l’illustration évidente des
risques qu'encourent ceux qui s'aventurent à les traduire. Leur confrontation dans l'odyssée linguistique et juridique que représente la
traduction de leurs textes déroule un parcours semé d’embûches
pour le traducteur. Le texte juridique présente en effet des particularités singulières sur le double plan du fond, de la matière, et sur celui
de la forme, du style.
Produire des textes équivalents est la fonction même du traducteur, sa « tâche », et sa noble ambition. Or, la difficulté qui attend le
traducteur est grande et sa responsabilité, double, qui tient non seulement au message juridique que contient le texte à traduire (TD,
texte de départ), mais encore à la forme particulière de son expression. Dans les deux cas, il s'agit de les rendre conformément à la
lettre et à l'esprit du système de droit réexprimé dans le TA (texte
d'arrivée). Cette double fonction que doit assurer le traducteur porte
la complexité de son savoir-faire à son acmé. Les aspects linguistiques, culturels et techniques (le droit) s’entrecroisent, s’entrechoquent même au point qu'il est parfois difficile d'en démêler l'écheveau.
La traduction du Code civil de la Louisiane est un bel exemple
de la confrontation apaisée de deux grandes cultures juridiques, de
deux « esprits des lois » et de leurs langages. Antithétiques et néanmoins complémentaires, ils sont portés au comble de leur expression
par le canal exigeant des codes et en voie d’engendrer un tiers langage inscrit dans une tradition juridique, mais exprimé dans la lettre
et l'esprit de son temps.
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I. LANGUE ET COMMUNICATION
Lorsque, pour communiquer, une société doit passer par la traduction 1 et que cette activité s'étend sur une période de plusieurs
siècles comme au Canada et en Louisiane, la langue n’en ressort pas
indemne. En outre, selon la façon dont les langues de départ (LD) et
d'arrivée (LA) se sont rencontrées, paisiblement – par proximité de
contact ancienne et permanente, en Suisse – ou avec la force et l'impétuosité d'une conquête (normande, en Angleterre – 1066 ; anglaise, en Nouvelle France – 1753), l'effet des langues en contact
affectera la langue la plus fragile.
Au Canada, la fonction que l'activité traduisante a assumée depuis sa fondation (1867), mais surtout depuis le Traité de Paris
(1763), dépasse le simple niveau linguistique pour atteindre une dimension sociétale, voire ontologique. Aussi par son originalité, par
les formes singulières qu'il revêt et par la diversité de ses effets, ce
phénomène est-il véritablement d'ordre ethnologique 2, niveau où les
faits culturels sont pris en compte dans leur globalité, mais sans
éclairage idéologique particulier. Selon l'anthropologue Norbert
Rouland, « pour forger son identité, l’homme produit de la différence » 3. Le droit n’échappe pas à cette loi. La culture du juriste
comporte « une solide dimension historique » 4, celle du pays même
où le droit s’est édifié et que reflète son langage particulier qui, tout
en procédant de la langue générale, « s'est forgé une terminologie et

1. Trois sens principaux définissent ce terme, qui peut être entendu comme
(1) activité, exercice de la profession (de traducteur) en général, (2) action de traduire (le processus) ou (3) produit de l'opération traduisante (TA). Dans cet article, traduction est entendu au sens le plus large, soit le premier.
2. ANDRÉ LEROI-GOURHAN, LE FIL DU TEMPS. ETHNOLOGIE ET PRÉHISTOIRE
244 (Fayard 1983). Dans son sens propre, « l'ethnologie définit la particularité des
groupes humains », par rapport à l'anthropologie, qui « aborde la généralité du
comportement de l'homme ».
3. NORBERT ROULAND, ANTHROPOLOGIE JURIDIQUE 12 (Presses universitaires de France 1991).
4. DENIS ALLAND & STÉPHANE RIALS, Dictionnaire de la culture juridique
xi (Presses universitaires de France, 2003).
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une phraséologie propres »5. Or, agir sur les langues revient à agir
sur « les cultures elles-mêmes » 6.
Aussi, l’une procédant de l’autre et dépendant étroitement l’une
de l’autre, langue et culture sont-elles indissociables. La culture occupe une place éminente dans le champ du droit. Phénomène historiquement local, le droit franchit difficilement les frontières : « Vérité au deçà des Pyrénées, erreur au-delà » 7 nous rappelle Pascal.
Chaque terme du droit est un condensé exprimant la charge historique d’une notion, d’une institution. Le fond du problème porte sur
le sens que recèle le texte et l’interprétation de l’intention de son
auteur. Ce sens et son interprétation dépendent toutefois du facteur
incontournable qu'est la culture, tant celle que véhicule le texte que
celle de son interprète.
La « force » d'une langue réside-t-elle dans sa capacité à « repousser l'étranger »8 ? Ne viendrait-elle pas plutôt, comme le pensait
Gœthe, du fait qu'elle puisse le « dévorer » ? Voir, par exemple, le
français actuel et ses emprunts, aussi nombreux qu’anciens, aux
autres langues (arabe, espagnol, italien, …) au cours de son évolution et la marque du français sur l’anglais contemporain jusque dans
la lettre de ses lois (law French), voire dans l’esprit de ses institutions (Honi soit qui mal y pense) 9. Et vice versa, avec l'habeas corpus, le trust, entre autres institutions juridiques anglaises qui se sont
introduites au fil du temps dans le corpus français. Cela s'est produit
des deux côtés, mais non sans difficulté, car la notion juridique et
l’image mentale associées à un signe linguistique, parce qu’elles
5. Lazar Focsaneanu, Les langues comme moyen d'expression du droit international, 16 ANNUAIRE FRANÇAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 256, 262 (1971).
6. CLAUDE HAGÉGE, L'HOMME DE PAROLES 204 (Fayard 1985).
7. BLAISE PASCAL, PENSÉES 70 No. 294 (Léon Brunschvicg ed., Paris
1897).
8. ANTOINE BERMAN, L’ÉPREUVE DE L’ÉTRANGER. CULTURE ET
TRADUCTION DANS L’ALLEMAGNE ROMANTIQUE. HERDER, GOETHE, SCHLEGEL,
NOVALIS, HUMBOLDT, SCHLEIERMACHER, HÖLDERLIN 26 (Gallimard, 1984).
9. La devise « Honi soit qui mal y pense » symbolise l’Ordre de la Jarretière. Elle est inscrite sur la jarretière qui entoure l’écusson des armoiries royales.
C’est Édouard III qui, en 1348, a fondé cet ordre de chevalerie britannique qui
possède depuis son origine cette devise en langue française (anglo-normand).
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sont consubstantielles à une langue, au terme et à l’usage qui les
porte, passent mal du signe d’une langue à un signe d’une autre
langue. C’est ce que j’entends démontrer lorsque je compare les
trois termes utilisés en français, en anglais et en allemand pour désigner l’État de droit : rule of law, Rechtsstaat 10. Ou encore, ces trois
autres :
EN Good faith

FR

Bonne foi

DE Treu und Glauben

Dans quelle mesure ces termes, que l’on présente comme équivalents dans la plupart des dictionnaires bilingues, s’équivalent-ils
vraiment sur les trois plans du droit, de la langue et de la culture ?
Chacun d’eux repose sur une tradition aussi ancienne qu’elle est nationale et singulière. Ils ne recouvrent pas intégralement le même
champ sémantique. L’État de droit, en France et sous la Ve République (1958), n’est pas identique dans tous les États francophones,
par exemple en Belgique (État monarchique fédéral) ou en Suisse
(confédération). Quant au principe du Rule of law, peut-il être le
même dans deux pays, tels les États-Unis et le Royaume-Uni, dont
les institutions sont aussi différentes (République fédérale / État monarchique) ? Quant aux applications du principe de la « bonne foi »,
par exemple en matière contractuelle, les traditions anglaise, française et germanique diffèrent notablement 11.
Ce constat découle du passé de chaque peuple et des traditions
qu'il s'est données, et cela même lorsque l'histoire mouvementée de
deux peuples, l'anglais et le français, et de leurs langues s'est déroulée de concert, se croisant et se chevauchant sans cesse depuis 1066.
Deux langues en sont issues qui ont davantage en commun qu'on ne
le croirait a priori en ne se fondant que sur une observation superficielle.
10. Voir plus de détails dans Jean-Claude Gémar, Le traducteur juridique et
l’asymétrie culturelle. Langue, droit et culture in ACTES DU VIE FORUM
INTERNATIONAL SUR LA TRADUCTION CERTIFIÉE ET L’INTERPRÉTATION JUDICIAIRE
231 (Elena de la Fuente ed., Fédération internationale des traducteurs 2003).
11. Sur ce terme, voir ALLAND & RIALS, supra note 4, at 143.
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A. L'anglais et le français : une histoire et un passif communs
Cousines germaines, les langues anglaise et française ont beaucoup en commun. Le vocabulaire anglais contient quelque 65 pour
cent de mots d'origine française (anglo-normande, plus précisément), donc latine, d'où ses nombreux gallicismes. Quant au français, il ne cesse d'emprunter à l'anglais depuis toujours. Mais qui
emprunte quoi à qui, finalement ?
Après la bataille de Hastings (1066), « l'anglais cessa d'être la
langue du pays [l'Angleterre] » pour trois siècles 12. Fait peu connu,
la Magna Carta que le roi Jean sans Terre fut amené à signer en
1215 fut aussitôt traduite en... français. Paradoxalement, le rétablissement progressif de l'anglais comme langue officielle, à partir du
Statute of Pleading (1362), accéléra le rythme des emprunts de l'anglais au français, notamment le vocabulaire juridique (law French),
dont toute une série de termes viennent du normand : court, justice,
judge, jury, suit, sue, defendant, accuse « accuser », plea, felony,
crime, assize (de l'ancien français de même sens « assise »), session,
damage. Quant à l'ordre des mots inversé de Attorney General « avocat général », court martial ou letter patent, il « témoigne de l'importance du français dans le domaine du droit » anglais 13. On peut
alors parler de triglossie juridique à propos des juristes anglais, lesquels, selon circonstances, temps et lieu, employaient soit l'anglais,
soit le latin, soit le français. Le poids de la conquête normande sur
l'histoire et l'évolution de la langue anglaise est considérable.
Elle ne le fut pas moins dans l'autre sens. Les trois siècles de
domination anglaise sur le duché d'Aquitaine (1154–1453), entre
Loire et Pyrénées, consécutive au mariage (1152) d'Aliénor d'Aquitaine avec le futur roi d'Angleterre (1154) Henry Plantagenet, « contribuèrent à introduire en Guyenne des mots d'Angleterre, qu'ils
soient moyen anglais, anglo-français ou latins »14. Cette influence
12. ALAIN REY ET AL., MILLE ANS DE LANGUE FRANÇAISE, HISTOIRE D’UNE
PASSION, VOL. I DES ORIGINES AU FRANÇAIS MODERNE 299 (Perrin 2007).
13. Id. at 305–06.
14. Id. at 277.
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s'exerça principalement dans les domaines administratifs et juridiques. Aux trois langues alors en usage en Aquitaine, (latin, occitan
et français), est venu se juxtaposer le français d'Angleterre pendant
trois siècles. Ce brassage des langues a produit un écheveau linguistique des plus difficiles à démêler. Aujourd'hui, chacune des deux
langues continue d'emprunter des mots à l'autre, mais de façon inégale selon les périodes. Si, dans la foulée de la conquête (1066),
l'anglais a massivement emprunté au français, l'inverse s'est produit
au Canada, après 1763, et s'est accéléré en France depuis 1945.
Au Canada, les deux langues étant en contact depuis 1763, il est
compréhensible et normal qu'il y ait des emprunts réciproques. Toutefois, le poids de l'anglais sur le français s'est fait lourdement ressentir. La raison en découle peut-être de l'histoire de ces deux
langues, comme le souligne Alain Rey, « [...] la proximité entre le
vocabulaire anglais, due à l’emprunt massif au latin et au français
au Moyen Âge, et celui des langues romanes a pu donner à l’anglais
une force de pénétration accrue sur le français » 15.
À moins d'être un philologue averti, il n'est jamais évident ni
simple de s'assurer qu'un mot est issu de l'une ou de l'autre langue.
Un exemple permettra de mieux le comprendre, celui du terme verdict, bien établi en français, et depuis longtemps (1669). Or, comme
le signale Littré (1872), il s'agit d'un emprunt à l'anglais verdict
(XVe s.), lui-même emprunté à l'anglo-normand verdit (XIIIe s.), qui
s'écrivait en ancien français voirdit (1276) ou veirdit. Tous deux découlent du latin médiéval verdictum, variation de verumdictum, veredictum « véritablement dit ». Le mot verdictum a été repris et réintroduit en français pendant la Révolution française au sens de verdict – que Littré définit ainsi : « Résultat de la délibération du jury »
– et n'a plus varié depuis que dans ses modalités.
On en déduira que la valeur d'un mot, à un point donné de son
histoire, n'est que le résultat de l'impression fugitive qu'il laissera au

15. ALAIN REY, L'AMOUR DU FRANÇAIS 138 (Denoël 2007).
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lecteur. La question de son origine ou de sa provenance ne sera tranchée, si tant est que cela soit faisable, qu'au terme d'une analyse philologique parfois complexe. En sorte qu'il est difficile d'avancer
avec certitude qu'il s'agit d'un gallicisme, d'un anglicisme ou... d'un
latinisme ! Pourtant, c'est bien le cas de nombre de mots anglais et
français, dont les origines et le cheminement nous sont pour le moins
obscurs.
Ce qui, pour la langue courante, représente un obstacle considérable à franchir, l'est davantage encore lorsque l'on a affaire à une
langue spécialisée comme celle du droit, qu'il s'agisse de Charybde
(l'anglais) ou de Scylla (le français).
B. Langage, tanage : culture, écriture et style
Malgré leur cousinage et tout ce qu'elles ont en commun, les
langues anglaise et française n'en sont pas moins fort différentes. De
l'anglais au français, en effet, « on ne passe pas seulement d'une
langue à l'autre, on passe essentiellement d'une culture à l'autre, d'un
art de vivre à l'autre, d'une manière de penser à l'autre [. . .] »16.
S'agissant de la langue, ces différences sautent aux yeux – et aux
oreilles. Pour un observateur normal, elles portent essentiellement
sur la phonétique et la syntaxe. Elles sont pourtant plus profondes et
subtiles car elles tiennent à l'esprit de la langue, à son âme ou essence. Peut-on comparer Racine et Shakespeare ? L'essayiste, auteur
et académicien anglais Michael Edwards l'a fait, avec brio.
Ces différences viendraient du fait que l’anglais est ancré dans
le réel, alors que le français se place « dans un monde à la fois réel
et cérébral » ; la syntaxe anglaise oblige le rédacteur « à passer d’un
événement à l’autre, alors que la syntaxe française plane un peu audessus de l’événement […] et le dit avec un début, un milieu et une
fin »17. On retrouve ce schéma notamment dans la manière dont sont
16. MICHEL SPARER & WALLACE SCHWAB, RÉDACTION DES LOIS, RENDEZVOUS DU DROIT ET DE LA CULTURE 154 (Conseil de la langue française 1980).
17. MICHAEL EDWARDS, RACINE ET SHAKESPEARE 67 (Presses universitaires
de France 2004).
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rédigés les textes de loi conçus selon la tradition anglaise, si différente du style de rédaction du Code Napoléon. Reconnaissons que
« l’anglais peut facilement se passer de prépositions entre les mots,
voire de conjonctions de coordination entre les propositions alors
que le français, héritier de la syntaxe latine, ne saurait s’en dispenser » 18. S’il fallait les qualifier d’un mot, on pourrait dire, en reprenant l'étonnant raccourci de Michael Edwards, que l’anglais est
« centrifuge », alors que le français serait « centripète ». Ces traits
reflètent l'âme de ces deux peuples, inscrite dans la singularité culturelle de leur langue et de son écriture 19.
Nous avons néanmoins affaire à une langue, l'anglais, dont
« l'ordre de modification régressif [. . .] correspond à une démarche
synthétique, alors que, [en français, langue analytique,] l'ordre de
modification progressif [. . .] correspond à une démarche analytique »20. En anglais, l'adjectif est antéposé ; l'ordre de modification
est alors « régressif » en ce sens qu'il va du déterminant (l'adjectif)
au déterminé (le substantif) : eye witness, last will, United Nations.
Le français, lui, suit un ordre de modification « progressif », qui va
du déterminé au déterminant ; l'adjectif est le plus généralement
postposé : témoin oculaire, Nations unies, un savant émérite, une
mère courageuse 21.
Deux esprits, deux styles. On comprend mieux la difficulté que
pose la reformulation d'un texte d’une langue dans l'autre, obstacle
que tant de traducteurs franchissent pourtant au quotidien, quelle
que soit la longueur et les circonvolutions des phrases et quel que
soit le domaine concerné. Celui du droit est toutefois réputé faire
18. JEAN-FRANÇOIS REVEL, L'OBSESSION ANTIAMÉRICAINE 10–11 (Plon
2002).
19. JACK GOODY, THE LOGIC OF WRITING AND THE ORGANIZATION OF
SOCIETY (Cambridge University Press 1986).
20. Mickael D. Picone, Le français face à l'anglais : aspects linguistiques, 44
CAHIERS DE L'ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONALE DES ÉTUDES FRANÇAISES 9, 11
(1992).
21. Lorsque l'adjectif est antéposé, en français, le sens de l'expression s'en
trouve modifié : par exemple, un grand homme = un homme célèbre, un homme
grand = de grande taille. Cette question, bien plus complexe au demeurant, n'est
que survolée ici.
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partie des plus complexes en raison de la façon dont s'expriment les
gens de loi et dont sont rédigés ses textes, critiqués et brocardés
qu'ils sont dans la plupart des langues aussi loin que l'on remonte.
La façon de rédiger les textes juridiques, leur style, varie d’une
langue à l’autre, parfois de façon considérable, comme c'est le cas
entre l’anglais et le français. Ce style est celui que de grands juristes
ont imprimé au cours de l’histoire du droit d’un pays, qu'ils ont illustré, recommandé ou prescrit dans leurs écrits, doctrinaux comme
jurisprudentiels.
En français, suivant le modèle du Code Napoléon, on pose un
principe général, sous-entendant des choses censément connues. Intelligenti pauca : « À qui sait comprendre, peu de mots suffisent »,
pensait Stendhal, ce grand styliste. Aussi, en français, le verbe, mot
porteur d’une charge sémantique maximale, vient-il souvent en
tête dans les dispositions de ses codes : « Sont immeubles les fonds
de terre, les constructions et ouvrages [. . .] » (art. 900 C.civ. Québec) ; « Font partie intégrante d’un immeuble les meubles qui
[. . .] » (art. 901 C.civ. Québec).
De son côté, l’anglais juxtapose, place souvent les conditions en
tête de phrase, d’article, de disposition ou de clause. Ce style est
celui que les lois du Royaume-Uni ont connu pendant des siècles. Il
a servi de modèle pour rédiger les lois du Canada (dont la Constitution de 1867), et que l'on trouve, par exemple, dans le Partnership
Act de 1890 22. Dans cette loi, où nombre d'articles commencent par
« Where (a partner, a partnership, a member, the business, ...) », le
sort que réserve le législateur à la personne ou l'entité visée se fait
souvent attendre une bonne centaine de mots plus loin. Ce n'est pas
l'usage dans la tradition française, où la longueur moyenne de la
phrase d'une disposition législative se situe entre 15 et 23 mots,
comme dans le Code Napoléon.

22. 1890 c. 39 (53 & 54 Vict.). Entrée en vigueur le 1er janvier 1891, cette
loi a été révisée par la suite.
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Ce sont autant de raisons qui, interférant dans la communication
entre l'anglais et le français, en perturbent le flux et compliquent à
la fois la compréhension du discours oral et la réexpression de l'écrit
dans l'autre langue.
C. Heurs et malheurs du langage du droit
De nombreux obstacles se dressent sur le chemin des langues.
La polysémie, l’ambiguïté, la technicité du vocabulaire, les lourdeurs et les maladresses n’en révèlent qu’une partie. Ce sont autant
de parasites se dressant entre le texte et son lecteur/auditeur susceptibles de perturber, dégrader, voire de bloquer la communication.
Le langage du droit, plus que toute autre langue de spécialité, en
est victime, mais à un degré supérieur en ce sens que les risques
encourus sont liés au caractère obligatoire, potentiellement contraignant, que véhicule la norme juridique et à la compréhension que
les parties tireront du texte les concernant (loi, règlement, contrat,
jugement). Un texte rempli de termes techniques dont la signification échappe au profane, un texte dont la longueur, la lourdeur et le
formalisme de la présentation découragent la lecture ne sont pas de
nature à en faciliter la lisibilité et à battre en brèche l'adage nemo
censetur legem ignorare (Nul n'est censé ignorer la loi).
Le concept de langues de spécialité(s) divise les linguistes. Pour
certains, cette notion ne correspond qu’à une application technique
à tel domaine de mots appartenant à la langue générale. Pour
d’autres, ces langues, dites « langues de spécialité » ou « langues
spécialisées », reposent sur une nomenclature de termes propre à un
domaine. Voir, en droit : ab intestat, chirographaire, mise en examen, synallagmatique, tacite reconduction. Quelle que soit l’opinion
des uns et des autres, nul ne niera que certains domaines se distinguent des autres, de la langue générale et de la structure normale de
ses textes par la manière dont sont rédigés leurs textes. On connaît
ceux du droit, entre autres : loi, jugement, contrat, testament. À cet
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égard, il faudrait plutôt parler des langages du droit, selon que l’auteur du texte sera le législateur, un juge, un avocat ou un notaire,
outre les subdivisions que l’on peut faire dans chacune de ces catégories et ses textes. À chaque grande fonction (exécutif, législatif,
judiciaire) que la langue de Thémis doit assumer correspondent un
style et une manière de dire.
Le message du droit et son langage sont soumis aux aléas du
langage humain, avec tout ce que cela sous-entend de quiproquos,
de lacunes et autres imperfections liées à la nature du langage,
source de tant de malentendus. Comme le pense le philosophe, « les
mots sont bien la dernière chose sur quoi l’on parvient à s’entendre » 23. Cela peut aller jusqu'au point où le législateur (ou le
juge), afin d’éviter toute équivoque, se sent parfois tenu de préciser
ou définir chaque terme employé dans la loi. Dans le Code criminel
du Canada, par exemple, le législateur est allé jusqu'à indiquer les
deux sens possibles que le terme anglais property peut prendre en
français : bien/propriété.
Domaine des plus culturels et singuliers, le droit remonte aux
sources de la civilisation, aux origines de chaque langue, des notions
et des traits culturels qu’elle véhicule. Ce que montrent des termes
comme chattels real, fee simple, habeas corpus, ou l'adjectif omniprésent reasonable (man/person), trust ou consideration des pays de
common law ; quasi-contrat, quasi-délit, délit, droits de l’homme,
en France. Leur traduction dans une autre langue, si tant est qu’elle
soit possible – ou conceptuellement acceptable : droits de l'homme
= human rights ? – rend-elle justice à la richesse de la notion sur
laquelle reposent ces termes ? En témoignent les deux grands systèmes juridiques que sont la famille romano-germanique et celle de
la common law lorsque l’on se penche sur l’histoire de leurs institutions et des termes premiers que comprend leur vocabulaire.

23. Roger-Pol Droit, Éthique : envers les autres ou envers soi ?, LE MONDE
2 mars 2007.

DES LIVRES,
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L'observateur attentif des mots du droit sait bien qu’ils expriment en quelques signes l’histoire, souvent complexe et tortueuse,
d’une notion, d’une institution. Le mot « droit » lui-même évoque
un cadre unique définissant une situation, un état propre à une tradition juridique singulière liée à une nation et à une culture parfois
millénaires.
Le droit, la technique juridique, pour François Gény, se résumeraient à « une question de terminologie »24. Gény n'était pas jurilinguiste. Le traducteur-jurilinguiste sait que traduire ne consiste pas
simplement à traduire les mots d'un texte dans un autre, mais à en
transmettre le sens du message qu'il contient – ce que nous verrons
plus loin (Partie II). Comme toute discipline fondée sur l’usage
d’une langue, le droit présente son lot de difficultés et de problèmes.
Les juristes sont d’ailleurs les premiers à relever et même à dénoncer
ambiguïtés, faiblesses et glissements du langage du droit 25. La difficulté que présente ce langage lorsqu’il s’agit de le traduire ne se
borne pas à son vocabulaire, à ses termes et aux notions qu’ils véhiculent. La façon dont est rédigé le texte juridique n’est pas sans importance ni incidence sur la manière dont son message peut être
compris.
Lorsque ces langues sont soumises à l’épreuve de la traduction,
on constate les effets parfois étonnants auxquels donne lieu l’opération traduisante et les difficultés qu’elle présente pour le traducteur,
dont la principale réside dans la notion juridique que porte le terme.
II. LE LANGAGE DU DROIT EN TRADUCTION
Sans traducteurs, la civilisation, la science et la culture auraientelles atteint leur stade de développement actuel ? Qui souhaiterait
24. FRANÇOIS GÉNY, SCIENCE ET TECHNIQUE EN DROIT PRIVÉ POSITIF 456 (Sirey 1921).
25. Pour faire court sur un aussi vaste sujet, voir particulièrement la collection des ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT et ses nombreux volumes (en particulier les Nos 19 et 35), où les meilleurs esprits juridiques du temps débattent en
toute liberté des questions et problématiques que soulèvent le droit et son langage.
Voir aussi MICHEL VILLEY, PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 222–26 (Dalloz 1975).
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vivre dans le « meilleur des mondes », façon Huxley, ou dans celui
des langues de Babel, ou encore sous la loi unique – e pluribus unum
– qu’invoquait Cicéron ? Tout au contraire, c’est la rencontre, le
croisement des langues et des cultures, dans la mosaïque de leur diversité, qui, en donnant naissance à un tertium quid, est la véritable
source d'enrichissement de chacune d'elles. Cette rencontre passe
obligatoirement par la traduction, carrefour du dialogue des langues
et des cultures, et cela depuis la nuit des temps.
Les traducteurs ont vaincu la malédiction de Babel en permettant
d'établir une communication interlinguistique entre les peuples qui
ne parlaient ni n'écrivaient la même langue. La traduction est le véhicule de l'information, de la connaissance et du savoir, et cela depuis quelque 5 000 ans attestés. Parmi les fonctions que l'on attribue
à la traduction, la communication vient en premier. Ensuite, la traduction est avant tout un savoir-faire qui a évolué en pratique professionnelle. Cette pratique est omniprésente dans toutes les grandes
langues et leurs traditions. Ce n'est que récemment, dans la seconde
moitié du XXe siècle, que devenue objet d'étude de la part des linguistes, puis des traductologues, elle s'est transformée en discipline
à part entière : la traductologie. La fonction « productive » de la traduction est toutefois la plus évidente ; elle s’exerce depuis que l’on
conçoit, compose, rédige, réforme, révise, réécrit, traduit, etc., des
textes, et que ces textes doivent être communiqués, pour x raisons,
à des personnes ne possédant pas la langue de leurs auteurs.
Traduire est cependant difficile, il faut l'admettre. De plus,
comme toute entreprise ou œuvre humaine, toute traduction est critiquable. On se méfie des traductions et des traducteurs : traduttore,
traditore ! Des idées reçues, des rumeurs circulent à son propos, et
ce parmi les plus grands auteurs. Qu'en dit un Montesquieu dans les
Lettres persanes ? Qu'un traducteur ne pense pas puisqu'il ne s'exprime pas par lui-même ! Même si l'on peut mettre cette pensée sur
le compte de la satire, elle porte et n'est pas de nature à rehausser le
statut et le rôle de la traduction. Enfin, dans la dynamique de mondialisation qui secoue les sociétés, le rapport du droit à la langue
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s’en trouve modifié. Désormais, le regard que le droit local, généralement introverti, posait sur sa langue doit composer avec l’extérieur, le « tout-monde » comme l'appelait Glissant.
Aussi la tâche du traducteur est-elle une quête incessante, jamais
satisfaite, de l'équivalence des textes. Tel l’acrobate sur son fil, à la
merci de son équilibre, il chevauche le présent (le texte et sa sémantique) risquant la chute à chaque pas.
A. Traduire ou « l'imparfait du subjectif »26
La traduction est le reflet de l’ambivalence humaine : elle sécrète le meilleur comme le pire. L’image classique du gué à traverser, chère aux traductologues et aux poètes, illustre bien les périls
que doit affronter le traducteur en chemin. Le défi qui lui est posé
est celui de la compréhension du texte, qu’il soit littéraire, commercial, ou technique, puis de sa « recréation » ou « réexpression » dans
un TA. On sait que les manières de traduire varient dans le temps et
dans l’espace d’une même région, d’une langue et d’une culture à
l’autre, selon les modes et les contraintes propres à chaque époque
et situation. Le fleuve de la traduction repose sur un lit de pratiques
remontant aux sources de l’histoire de l’humanité.
1. Traduire : l'art et la manière
La question : « Comment faut-il traduire ? » reste posée même
si nombre de savants esprits (écrivains, philosophes, linguistes, traductologues, . . .) s’y sont essayés, chacun s’efforçant d’apporter une
réponse, des solutions, d’édifier un système cohérent, d’élaborer des
principes et, parfois, des systèmes théoriques censés faciliter la
« tâche » du traducteur. Néanmoins, tout traducteur le moindrement
averti sait que la traduction, art d’exécution, n’est pas une science
exacte et qu’un texte ne se traduit pas avec une grille qu’il suffirait
26. J'emprunte à FRÉDÉRIC MUSSO une partie du titre de son recueil de
poèmes L'IMPARFAIT DU FUGITIF (La Table Ronde 2010), titre qui pourrait aussi
qualifier l'opération traduisante.
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d’appliquer pour obtenir automatiquement la réponse désirée. Traduire requiert un savoir-faire et des connaissances peu ordinaires
pour faire comprendre la diversité des formes que peut prendre
« l’hospitalité langagière » qu'imagine Ricœur 27. Face à son texte,
le traducteur aura à établir une stratégie particulière de traduction en
vue d’atteindre le but visé, laquelle reposera sur des principes, une
ou des méthodes plus ou moins éprouvés et en outre fort divers selon
le domaine concerné. L’alternative idéale préconisée par Ricœur (citant Schleiermacher), soit « amener le lecteur à l’auteur » et « l’auteur au lecteur », ne simplifiera pas le travail du traducteur 28.
On ne peut qu’y reconnaître l’écart (Rilke parle de Abgrund : un
abime) séparant les langues, donc les droits aussi, situant ainsi le
traducteur de la langue étrangère au bord du vide et devant cette réalité : traduire revient à dire les choses autrement et, peut-être, à accepter « l’écart entre l’adéquation et l’équivalence » 29. Est-ce le cas
lorsque le droit passe par le filtre de la traduction ? Le droit est-il un
genre per se, à part, le distinguant des autres domaines, rétif à « l’hospitalité langagière » ?
2. De la traductibilité en général et du droit en particulier
Ces interrogations répondent indirectement à la question de la
traduction du droit, de son existence linguistique « par-delà sa
langue »30. Ces questions ont longtemps été éludées, sinon ignorées,
hors du champ du droit comparé – pourtant impliqué au premier
chef – pour cause d'incompatibilité épistémologique. Tels sont les
enjeux auxquels est exposé le langage du droit au sein même de son
univers, le principal défi étant celui de l’interdisciplinarité, nécessaire en traduction mais peu pratiquée dans le dialogue (un monologue ?) du droit avec sa propre langue et a fortiori avec les autres

27.
28.
29.
30.

PAUL RICŒUR, SUR LA TRADUCTION 20 (Bayard 2004).
Id. at 9.
Id. at 19.
SIMONE GLANERT, DE LA TRADUCTIBILITÉ DU DROIT 9-10 (Dalloz 2011).
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langues. Faute de réponses du droit à la question de sa « traductibilité », il faut alors convoquer d’autres disciplines (linguistique, traductologie, ethnologie, histoire, philosophie) si l’on veut établir ce
qui permettra de distinguer la traduction juridique des autres types
de traduction avant de revenir sur les solutions acquises pour les
soumettre à l’examen critique. Par exemple, la loi peut-elle dire la
même chose dans une autre version linguistique, comme au Canada,
ou dans plusieurs versions linguistiques, comme dans l'Union européenne ? L’enjeu de cette quête est de montrer une éventuelle indétermination linguistique, « peut-être inhérente à toute traduction
d’un texte juridique »31.
La traductibilité d'un texte, quel que soit son domaine, se pose
en de multiples questions dont les réponses sont aussi nombreuses
que diverses. Sans entrer dans le détail des principes théoriques de
la traduction, le simple fait d'évoquer l'apport de la linguistique (de
Saussure à Chomsky) et de la philosophie (Benjamin, Gadamer,
Heidegger, Venuti, etc.) qui imprègne la réflexion traductologique
(Nida, Reiss, Séleskovitch, Wilss) conduit à s'interroger, par
exemple, sur des concepts tels que « l'éthique » et « l'ethnocentrisme » du traducteur, le fonctionnalisme et le skopos, ou encore sur
la place et le rôle du signe dans les fonctions qu'est appelé à prendre
un texte, etc. Ces principes, constructions et notions théoriques, confrontés entre autres à la théorie de la déconstruction et aux « plis »
labyrinthiques dont est constitué un texte (Derrida), en passant par
« l’indétermination de la traduction » chez Quine, conduiraient à en
conclure que, pour le traducteur, la partie est perdue d’avance.
S’il en est ainsi pour la traduction en général, peut-il en être autrement pour la traduction en particulier qu’est la traduction juridique ? La singularité du langage du droit fait obstacle à sa traduction. De plus, les spécificités culturelles – outre les caractéristiques
inhérentes au texte juridique : normativité, performativité, présentation, disposition, typologie, etc. – propres aux systèmes juridiques
31. Id. at 23.
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en font un autre obstacle à la traduction de ses textes. Aussi le traducteur juridique, confronté – entre l'anglais et le français notamment – à des difficultés « infiniment plus grandes » 32 que celles que
présentent les autres domaines, n’en peut mais. On requiert de sa
personne, de surcroît, de tenir aussi le rôle de l'interprète non seulement du texte, mais encore du droit parce que « traduire vers la
langue française une loi écrite en langue anglaise n'est pas seulement
une opération de traduction : c'est une opération d'interprétation par
le traducteur de la loi écrite en anglais » 33. Attaché à son credo de
fidélité au texte, peu au fait « des enseignements de l’herméneutique
– et, a fortiori, de la deconstruction – quant aux limites inhérentes à
l’acte de traduire » 34, le traducteur n'en poursuit pas moins sereinement son œuvre.
Somme toute, la traduction n'est au mieux qu'une approximation, une caresse du texte de départ visant à en interpréter le sens et
les significations 35 afin de les faire passer dans le texte d’arrivée.
« La traduction, art de l'effleurement et de l'approche, est une pratique de la trace » assure Glissant 36. Cette « trace » réside-t-elle dans
la lettre ou dans l'esprit du texte ?
B. Traduire la lettre ou l'esprit du droit ?
Le droit, dans la lettre comme dans l’esprit, n’est pas exprimé de
la même façon d’une langue à une autre ni d’un système juridique à
un autre, malgré la proximité des rapports que les langues et les systèmes entretiennent. Le common lawyer ne s’y prend pas de la même
façon que son homologue civiliste – méthode de Code (1848) et

32. SPARER & SCHWAB, supra note 16, at 154.
33. Id.
34. GLANERT, supra note 30, at 203.
35. JEAN-CLAUDE GÉMAR, TRADUIRE OU L'ART D'INTERPRÉTER (Presses de
l'Université du Québec 1995).
36. Édouard Glissant, Le cri du monde, LE MONDE DES LIVRES 28–29, 5 nov.
1993.
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principes de Montesquieu (1748) obligent 37. Comme Condillac l’a
bien exprimé dans son Discours de réception à l’Académie française (1768), « [l]es tours dont elle [la langue maternelle] nous fait
habitude, sont comme les moules de nos pensées ».
Se fondant dans le creuset de ces pensées, chaque langue forge
ses propres moules. La langue et ses usages se coulent difficilement
dans une pensée conçue et exprimée dans un autre idiome. Pourtant,
depuis Babel et afin d’en contrer les effets, les hommes recourent à
la traduction pour communiquer. Mais à quel prix ? À en croire
George Steiner, si traduire est « un art exact » 38 (an exact art), il
reste que « quatre-vingt-dix pour cent des traductions sont fautives »39. Si dix pour cent seulement des traductions sont acceptables ou réussies, chaque acte de traduction effectué doit confirmer
la difficulté que présente l’opération traduisante. Pour surmonter
cette difficulté, les traducteurs s'interrogent depuis toujours sur la
manière et les moyens d'y parvenir.
Depuis Cicéron au moins, deux écoles de pensée divisent le
monde de la traduction. Selon les tenants de la première, la traduction doit être effectuée en suivant la lettre du TD, de façon littérale,
voire mot à mot, par respect sacré dudit mot ; les partisans de la seconde sont convaincus, au contraire, qu’une traduction doit être faite
dans l’esprit du texte, de façon plus ouverte, voire libre. Telle est
l'alternative qui s'offre au traducteur et que Cicéron – qui était aussi
traducteur et un des précurseurs de la jurilinguistique – présente en
deux mots lourds de sens : traduire comme interpres (traducteur) ou
comme orator (auteur) 40. Depuis, la traduction a évolué en discipline (la traductologie), les écoles et les méthodes se sont multipliées.
37. GEORGE COODE, ON LEGISLATIVE EXPRESSION; OR, THE LANGUAGE OF
THE WRITTEN LAW (T. & J.W. Johnson 1848) ; MONTESQUIEU, DE L'ESPRIT DES
LOIX (Genève, Barillot & fils 1758).
38. GEORGE STEINER, AFTER BABEL 311 (Oxford University Press 1992).
39. Id. at 417.
40. CICÉRON, DE OPTIMO GENERE ORATORUM (V, 14 ) (Mots extraits de la
phrase « nec converti ut interpres, sed ut orator »).
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On retrouve ces principes opposés dans la traduction des textes
canoniques des pays bilingues ou multilingues, tels le Canada, la
Belgique et la Suisse. L’Acte de l’Amérique du Nord Britannique est
la traduction, calquée sur le texte anglais d’origine, du texte fondateur du Canada le British North America Act (1867). En Suisse, la
version française du Code civil (adoptée en 1907) trahit à la fois la
lettre et l’esprit du texte allemand d’origine en offrant aux citoyens
de Romandie un texte conforme à leur langue et à leur culture, qui
reflète le modèle de rédaction et de référence en droit privé de
l’époque : le Code Napoléon. À l’inverse, au Québec, la traduction
anglaise du Code civil de 1866 suit littéralement le texte de départ,
offrant ainsi un texte lourd et peu idiomatique. Ces exemples montrent que le traducteur-jurilinguiste peut parfois s’approprier le
texte, comme pour le code suisse, et le traduire librement. Dans le
cas contraire, comme dans les exemples du Canada et du Québec
évoqués, il agit en service commandé, sous l’autorité politique de
l’État, lequel peut attribuer une fonction socio-juridique particulière
audit texte.
Le lecteur francophone (Suisse) ou anglophone (Québec) n’en
ressent pas moins un malaise devant le caractère peu idiomatique
d’un texte dont la formulation et les termes employés dérangent ses
habitudes. On touche là à l’essence de l’écrit. À l’inverse, lorsque le
texte de départ a été traduit et rédigé en fonction du destinataire
(Suisse) ou conçu (en corédaction) dans l’esprit des deux langues et
des deux systèmes juridiques (Canada), le produit final est mieux
reçu. Au service du texte, le fond et la forme ne font alors plus qu’un.
Auquel cas, chaque communauté linguistique s'y retrouve dans cette
manière de dire (le style de l’auteur, collectif ou unique), qui est
aussi porteuse d’un sens symbolique pour elle.
Peut-on être juste et fidèle dans les deux manières de rendre un
TD, en particulier lorsqu’il s’agit d’un texte juridique, où la précision et la rigueur sont de mise ? Les deux exemples ci-dessous de-
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vraient permettre d'éclairer cette idée. Le premier présente la traduction de l’article 3 de la constitution canadienne, effectuée selon la
lettre 41 :
3. It shall be lawful for the
Queen, by and with the Advice
of Her Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, to declare by Proclamation that, on
and after a Day therein appointed, not being more than
Six Months after the passing
of this Act, the Provinces of
Canada, Nova Scotia, and
New Brunswick shall form and
be One Dominion under the
Name of Canada; and on and
after that Day those Three
Provinces shall form and be
One Dominion under that
Name accordingly.
(82 mots)

3. Il sera loisible à la Reine,
de l'avis du Très-Honorable
Conseil Privé de Sa Majesté,
de déclarer par proclamation
qu'à compter du jour y désigné, mais pas plus tard que six
mois après la passation de la
présente loi, les provinces du
Canada, de la NouvelleÉcosse et du Nouveau-Brunswick ne formeront qu'une
seule et même Puissance sous
le nom de Canada; et dès ce
jour, ces trois provinces ne
formeront, en conséquence,
qu'une seule et même Puissance sous ce nom.
(82 mots)

Conforme à la lettre, la traduction va plus loin encore : au pied
de la lettre, soit au mot près ! Le second exemple présente un texte
conçu – corédigé, en fait – dans l’esprit de la langue et de la culture
d’arrivée 42. Il s’agit de l’article 7 de la Loi d'interprétation 43 :

41. The Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3 (U.K.) ; Loi constitutionnelle de 1867, 30 & 31 Victoria, ch. 3 (R.U.). Noter que le texte d’origine
parlait d’« Acte » de l’Amérique du Nord britannique (AANB).
42. L.C. 1994, ch. 40.
43. L.R.C. 1985, ch. I–21.
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Where an enactment is not in
force and it contains provisions
conferring power to make regulations or do any other thing,
that power may, for the purpose
of making the enactment effective on its commencement, be exercised at any time before its
commencement, but a regulation
so made or a thing so done has
no effect until the commencement of the enactment, except in
so far as may be necessary to
make the enactment effective on
its commencement.
(78 mots)

[Vol. 9

Le pouvoir d’agir, notamment de prendre un règlement, peut s’exercer avant
l’entrée en vigueur du texte
habilitant ; dans l’intervalle,
il n’est toutefois opérant que
dans la mesure nécessaire
pour permettre au texte de
produire ses effets dès l’entrée en vigueur.
(40 mots)

On voit la différence par rapport au texte précédent qui ne réside
pas seulement dans la longueur de la disposition et le nombre de
mots (moitié moindre), mais aussi, surtout, dans la rédaction fluide,
idiomatique, de la phrase.
Les traducteurs, dans la plupart des cas, s'appuient sur les travaux et recherches des traductologues et le corps de « doctrine »
qu'ils ont édifiée. Néanmoins, s'agissant du droit et de la traduction
de ses textes, il importe de s’inspirer aussi des réflexions des juristes
et, particulièrement, des comparatistes. Ces derniers sont en prise
directe sur les problèmes que posent non seulement le langage et les
mots du droit, mais encore les notions et concepts qu’ils véhiculent,
lesquels recèlent quelquefois une subtilité telle que l'on peut douter
qu’une équivalence soit possible quand on passe d’un système à un
autre.
Au Canada, État bilingue, bisystémique et multiculturel, la traduction officielle (lois et règlements) est passée, en trois siècles
(1774–1985), par trois grandes étapes dans son évolution, depuis
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une traduction des plus serviles, dont la Constitution de 1867 est le
meilleur exemple, à la plus ‘libre’, celle de la « corédaction » des
lois. En traduction juridique, c'est le principe de « l’équivalence
fonctionnelle » qui a les faveurs du monde du droit 44 – mais sans
exclusive 45 – pour réaliser l'équivalence des textes, ce que le Canada
a accompli pour ses lois 46.
C. Réaliser l'équivalence, graal du traducteur
Ce principe de « l'équivalence fonctionnelle », on le doit à
Louis-Philippe Pigeon, juge près la Cour suprême du Canada et
grand artisan d'une rédaction française des lois de qualité 47. Toutefois, si l'on s'interroge sur la possibilité de traduire le droit, sur sa
« traductibilité », c'est que la question de l'équivalence des textes juridiques, celui de départ et celui d'arrivée, n'est pas tranchée. Éternel
débat entre traductologues, mais aussi entre juristes, philosophes,
etc.
Le principe de l’équivalence, appliqué au droit, est simple en
théorie : quel que soit le système juridique, on assume que des problèmes identiques se présentent partout qui appellent des solutions
identiques. L’ennui, nous dit le comparatiste « est que l’on ne trouve
pas toujours une institution ou une technique équivalente »48. Aussi,
44. Voir FABRIZIO MEGALE, TEORIE DELLA TRADUZIONE GIURIDICA 99–101
(Editoriale Scientfica, 2008) ; MARTIN WESTON, AN ENGLISH READER'S GUIDE
TO THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 21–23 Berg 1991).
45. Voir plusieurs opinions sur la question : Pierre Legrand, Issues in the
Translatibility of Law in NATION, LANGUAGE AND THE ETHICS OF TRANSLATION
30(S. Berman & M. Wood eds, Princeton University Press, 2005) ; SUSAN
SARCEVIC, NEW APPROACH TO LEGAL TRANSLATION 235–237 (Kluwer 1997) ;
GLANERT supra, note 30.
46. Jean-Claude Gémar, Translating vs Co-Drafting Law in Multilingual
Countries: Beyond the Canadian Odyssey in LEGAL TRANSLATION IN CONTEXT.
PROFESSIONAL ISSUES AND PROSPECTS Vol. 4 at 155 (Anabel Borja Albi & Fernando Prieto Ramos eds., Peter Lang 2012).
47. Louis-Philippe Pigeon, L’équivalence fonctionnelle, in LANGAGE DU
DROIT ET TRADUCTION – ESSAIS DE JURILINGUISTIQUE – THE LANGUAGE OF LAW
AND TRANSLATION. ESSAYS ON JURILINGUISTICS 271 (Jean-Claude Gémar ed.,
Conseil de la langue française 1983).
48. Olivier Moréteau, Premiers pas dans la comparaison des droits in
JURILINGUISTIQUE : ENTRE LANGUES ET DROITS. JURILINGUISTICS: BETWEEN LAW
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pour résoudre ces problèmes, doit-on faire appel à des moyens différents. Il s'ensuit que l’équivalence « fonctionnelle » passe, en droit
comparé, pour la solution privilégiée en présence de systèmes comparables. Même si elle n’est pas la solution idéale qui assurerait la
parfaite correspondance des textes (si tant est que ce soit possible),
même entre systèmes proches, et n'est pas exempte de critiques 49,
elle n’en constitue pas moins un « accommodement raisonnable »
entre langues et systèmes, que suivent les comparatistes depuis des
décennies pour réaliser l'équivalence juridique souhaitable.
1. L'équivalence des textes : fiction juridique ?
Lorsqu'il s'agit de traduire le droit, il est vain de chercher une
équivalence parfaite. Ce qui compte, à vrai dire, ce n'est pas tant
l'équivalence des concepts ou des termes que celle des textes. On
parlera, en l'occurrence et de façon pragmatique, de « degré »
d'équivalence, en distinguant équivalence complète, quasi complète
ou partielle, dont il faudrait arriver à mesurer la perte et avoir l'honnêteté ou l'humilité de l'accepter 50. Une solution pratique consisterait à disposer d'une grille de degrés et de niveaux d'équivalence afin
d'établir avec une certaine précision « l'écart notionnel » séparant
des termes juridiques, les uns contenant plus ou moins d'éléments
que les autres 51.
Ainsi que le dit avec humour Umberto Eco, qui prône la stratégie
de la negoziazione (la négociation) comme méthode de traduction,
s’agit-il d’une souris ou d’un rat, du signifiant (l'apparence) ou du
signifié (le sens) ? Après tout, ces deux animaux appartiennent à la

AND LANGUAGE 419 (J.-C Gémar & N. Kasirer eds., Bruylant-Thémis 2005)
[hereinafter JURILINGUISTIQUE].
49. Megale, supra note 44, at 99-101.
50. Id. at 90-91.
51. Jean-Claude Gémar, Style et sens du texte juridique en traduction in UN
PAYSAGE CHOISI. MÉLANGES DE LINGUISTIQUE FRANÇAISE OFFERTS À LEO
SCHENA – STUDI DI LINGUISTICA FRANCESE IN ONORE DI LEO SCHENA 192, 196
(Giovanna Bellati et al., L’Harmattan Italia 2007).
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même espèce : les rongeurs (Rodentia) 52, et comme tout bon traducteur le sait, « traduire, ce n'est pas coller au texte de départ, mais au
contraire savoir s'en éloigner assez pour exprimer librement le message à rendre »53. C'est ce que le Canada a réalisé par la corédaction
en instituant valeur égale à chaque version des lois canadiennes aux
termes de l'article 18 (1) de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1982 :
18. (1) The statutes, records
and journals of Parliament
shall be printed and published
in English and French and
both language versions are
equally authoritative.

18. (1) Les lois, les archives,
les comptes rendus et les procès-verbaux du Parlement sont
imprimés et publiés en français
et en anglais, les deux versions
des lois ayant également force
de loi et celles des autres documents ayant même valeur.

Fiction juridique autant que linguistique ? Sans doute, mais elle
permet de placer de manière fonctionnelle les deux textes sur un pied
d'égalité sur les plans juridique et linguistique. En traduction juridique, l'équivalence doit être double. Elle concerne les mots (les
termes) et les notions et concepts qu'ils portent, mais surtout le message juridique du texte. Il suffit parfois d'un simple mot pour bloquer
le mécanisme du sens et son interprétation lorsqu'il peut sembler que
l'équivalence n'est pas réalisée.
2. L'équivalence des termes : les mots et les choses
Deux situations, parmi d'autres, peuvent se présenter, l'une relève de la langue, et l'autre du droit. Dans la première, deux termes
ne sont pas jugés équivalents dans les deux textes et la justice est

52. UMBERTO ECO, DIRE PRESQUE LA MÊME CHOSE
TRADUCTION 107 (Grasset 2003).

– EXPERIENCES DE

53. André Labelle, La corédaction des lois fédérales au Canada. Vingt ans
après : quelques réflexions in LA TRADUCTION JURIDIQUE. HISTOIRE, THÉORIE(S)
ET PRATIQUE 269 (Jean-Claude Gémar ed., ETI-ASTTI 2000).
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appelée à se prononcer sur l'interprétation à leur donner. Dans le second cas de figure, un terme d'apparence anodine est calqué sur celui
du TD. Or, très répandu dans l'usage courant, il est critiqué comme
impropriété à la fois linguistique et juridique.
a. L'adéquation linguistique
Le premier exemple est tiré du « Règlement de procédure et de
preuve » de la Cour pénale internationale (CPI/ICC) adopté par
l’Assemblée des États Parties à New York, en septembre 2002. Les
deux langues officielles de la Cour sont l’anglais et le français. La
Règle 144 (Prononcé des décisions de la Chambre de première instance) énonce :
2. Des copies de toutes les décisions susmentionnées sont
fournies le plus rapidement possible : [...]
b) À l’accusé dans une
langue qu’il comprend et
parle parfaitement, pour
satisfaire si besoin est aux
exigences de l’équité conformément au paragraphe 1
f) de l’article 67.

(b) The accused, in a la
guage he or she fully understands or speaks, if
necesary to meet the requirements of fairness under article 67, paragraph
1 (f).

(Je souligne)
L'accusé a fait appel du jugement le condamnant rendu en première instance, alléguant que les deux adverbes employés, fully et
parfaitement, ne sont pas équivalents et qu’en outre, l’exigence de
perfection que fixe l’adverbe du texte français est une condition impossible à satisfaire. L’appelant a été débouté en appel, la traduction
ayant été jugée équivalente. La Cour, en l’espèce, a dit le droit, qui
suit ici la langue et ses singularités socio-culturelles. Deux cultures
socio-linguistiques, deux usages et manières de dire se font face,
fondés sur des formes de pensée et des considérations ancrées au
plus profond de la lettre et de l’esprit de chacune des « deux solitudes », comme le dirait un Canadien.
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b. L'adéquation du droit et de la langue
Le second exemple montre que lorsque l'on ne suit pas avec rigueur les préceptes des méthodes de traduction, que le traducteur
s'en tient à l'apparence des mots, des termes, et non au sens du message, la probabilité est grande que l'équivalence soit peu ou mal réalisée, donc incomplète, en particulier lorsque les notions ne se recoupent pas exactement comme dans le cas de termes tels que « contrat », « crime », ou « propriété ». La tentation est forte, en effet, de
calquer le terme ou l'expression du TD, par exemple le terme contractuel anglais terms and conditions rendu en français par « termes
et conditions ».
Sur le plan linguistique d’abord, outre l’anglicisme que représente « termes et conditions », nous avons affaire à une mauvaise
traduction de terms and conditions. Contrairement à l’anglais, en
français on double rarement un terme d'un synonyme. Ce principe
prévaut en droit particulièrement. Il y a donc un mot de trop dans
« termes et conditions », et ce mot est « termes » car, dans l’expression anglaise, term n’a pas le sens de « mot », « vocable », mais bien
de « condition », même si celle-ci est d’une autre sorte. Or, en français, « terme », qui possède de nombreuses acceptions (17, chez Littré !), n’a pas le sens général ou spécialisé de « condition », et encore moins dans le domaine du droit. Deux raisons pour que cette
‘traduction’ soit irrecevable.
Ensuite, sur le plan juridique, le Canada est doté de deux systèmes de droit qui ne traitent pas les obligations contractuelles de la
même manière. En droit civil des obligations, la notion que porte la
condition n’est pas identique à celle de la common law, où une condition est « a major term of a contract », alors que term désigne
« any provision forming part of a contract », dont l’importance est
moindre, « a term of minor importance » selon l'Oxford Law Dictionary. Le souci de la précision et la quête de l’exhaustivité caractérisant la common law, a porté les common lawyers à jumeler les deux
sortes de « conditions » : terms + conditions, couvrant ainsi le
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champ de l’obligation contractuelle : « [f]orming integral parts of a
contract or agreement » (Black's Law Dict.). L’habitude s’est installée : will and testament, nullify and void, modify and amend,
En droit civil des obligations, la « condition » remplit à elle seule
cette fonction. Il est donc inutile de rajouter « termes » à « condition », ce qui constitue une aberration juridique. On ne trouve nulle
part de référence à « terme » comme synonyme éventuel de « condition » et l’expression « termes et conditions » n’apparaît dans aucun ouvrage de référence 54. Dès lors, on comprend pourquoi les
autorités linguistiques et juridiques canadiennes condamnent cet
emploi, ou l’ignorent, tout simplement. On pourrait multiplier les
exemples, citer le tristement célèbre jointly and solidarily, rendu par
« conjointement et solidairement », qui fait injure à la responsabilité
solidaire des débiteurs et que le Barreau du Québec qualifie de « formule aussi courante que vicieuse [. . .] dénuée de tout sens juridique »55. Arrêtons là, le droit, comme la langue, est trop souvent
bafoué !
Un dernier point, qui a son importance à la fois en droit et en
traduction est l'interprétation que chaque discipline fait de ses textes.
Traductologues et juristes ont en commun des théories, des principes
et des méthodes d’interprétation de leurs textes. Ils partagent même,
en apparence, une alternative fondamentale. D’un côté, le traducteur
peut traduire de manière littérale ou libre. De l’autre, chez les juristes, l’interprétation d’une loi peut être stricte (ou restrictive) ou
large.
3. De l'interprétation du texte : droit et traduction
En pratique, les choses sont plus complexes, d’un côté comme
de l’autre. Pour le traducteur, c’est le sens du « message » que porte
54. Pourtant, cette expression prospère dans Internet. Un chercheur en signale
1 260 000 occurrences dans Google ! Voir: www.l3.ulg.ac.be/colloquetraduction2010/textes/heyden.doc Les doublets en anglais juridique, consulté le 6 mars
2015.
55. Barreau du Québec. Voir : http://www.barreau.qc.ca/pdf/publications/guide-langage-clair.pdf, p. 18, consulté le 6 mars 2015.
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le texte de départ – et non ses mots – qu’il faut « interpreter »56 avant
de le traduire et de le réexprimer dans le TA. Pour le juriste, pour
les juges en particulier, le sens du texte de loi à interpréter passe
généralement par l’intention du législateur (ou du Parlement). Une
fois acquis, le principe de l'égale autorité des deux versions d'une
loi, comme le prévoit la loi canadienne, l'intention du législateur,
qu’il faut établir, est l'obstacle à franchir, qui est une démarche à
haut risque 57. En effet, les deux systèmes de droit ne recourent pas
aux mêmes techniques. Dans la tradition romano-germanique, pour
établir l'intention du législateur, les travaux préparatoires tiennent
une place importante pour éclairer la signification de l'acte 58. Dans
la tradition de common law, en revanche, on se méfie des débats
parlementaires, source peu fiable de l'intention du législateur 59.
Si l’intention législative – cette fiction juridique destinée à pallier les lacunes que constitue, pour H.L.A. Hart, « la texture infiniment variable de la langue » – est la « pierre angulaire »60 de l’interprétation des lois, l’intention de l’auteur est le critère sur lequel
se fonde le traducteur, herméneute du texte, pour « l'interpréter ».
La différence est tout entière dans la règle, impérative, qu'instaure
le législateur. L'interprète de la Loi « dit le droit », l'interprète du
texte « dit le message » véhiculé. Mais c’est surtout l’interprétation
des lois bilingues, davantage que celle des lois unilingues, qui retient
l’attention du traducteur et du jurilinguiste. Or, contrairement à
l'idée reçue, la langue n’est pas toujours en cause ; la version que

56. Au sens qu’Umberto Eco donne à ce mot, soit qu’interpréter est l’opération qui « précède toute traduction », parce que « interpréter n’est pas traduire »
(p. 265 et s.), mais est l’opération qui vise à élucider la signification du texte, sa
« signifiance » (Barthes), en vue de le traduire. Voir supra note 51, at 110.
57. Michel Bastarache, Les difficultés relatives à la détermination de l’intention législative dans le contexte du bijuridisme et du bilinguisme législatif canadien in JURILINGUISTIQUE, supra note 48, at 93, 95.
58. VOCABULAIRE JURIDIQUE 680 (Gérard Cornu ed., Presses universitaires
de France, coll. Quadrige 2003).
59. Bastarache, supra note 57, at 105.
60. Id. at 95.
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retiendra le tribunal est celle qui exprime le plus exactement ce qui
semble correspondre au sens voulu 61.
Le droit canadien accorde à la traduction (des lois) un statut
d’égalité objective que la linguistique ne lui reconnaît que symboliquement par l’équivalence – toute relative – des textes. Ce que confirment la jurisprudence 62 et la doctrine 63, pour qui « juridiquement
la version anglaise d’un texte du Code civil du Québec a la même
valeur que le texte français » (on le souhaite pour le Code civil de
Louisiane !). Pour le traductologue toutefois, et ce dans tous les domaines, le sens porté par le texte de départ reste la référence absolue
pour que le TA concorde avec le TD 64. Or, pour les tribunaux, l'important c'est « l'uniformité d'interprétation et d'application de la
loi », alors que « son intelligibilité ne représente qu'un idéal » 65. On
sent bien tout l'intérêt que présente la situation canadienne. S'il n'y
avait pas deux versions d'une même loi, celle-ci ne bénéficierait pas
de cette interprétation croisée que produit le bijuridisme doublé de
bilinguisme ; son texte, voire son message serait soit incomplet 66,
soit incertain 67.
Il n’est contraire ni à l’esprit ni à la syntaxe du français de dire
une chose de la même manière, ou à peu près, que la langue de départ et quoiqu’il soit « toujours possible de dire la même chose autrement » 68. La recherche d’un langage univoque, dénué d’ambiguïtés, est une préoccupation commune à tous les champs de l’acti-

61. Id. at 107.
62. Doré c. Verdun (Ville de), [1997] 2 R.C.S. 862, 150 D.L.R. (4e) 385.
63. Adrian Popovici, Libres propos sur la culture québécoise dans un monde
qui rétrécit, 54 R.D. MCGILL 223, 229 (2009).
64. Jean-Claude Gémar, Traduire la common law en français : possibilité du
sens ? in 10 LE SENS EN TRADUCTION 153 (Marianne Lederer ed., Lettres Modernes Mignard, Cahiers Champollion 2006).
65. Pierre-André Côté, La tension entre l'intelligibilité et l'uniformité dans
l'interprétation des lois plurilingues, in JURILINGUISTIQUE, supra note 48, at 143.
66. Judith Lavoie, Le bilinguisme législatif et la place de la traduction, 16
TTR : TRADUCTION, TERMINOLOGIE, RÉDACTION 121 (2003).
67. Bastarache, supra note 57, at 116.
68. RICŒUR, supra note 27, at 16.
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vité humaine. Les juristes n’y échappent pas, pour lesquels le principe in claris cessat interpretatio pourrait laisser croire au mythe de
la transparence et de l’univocité du langage que semblent créditer
les divers mouvements de « plain language » et de « lisibilité » des
textes juridiques.
ÉPILOGUE
L'expérience et l'aventure qu'est la traduction d'un ouvrage, aussi
important pour une société que l'est un code, tel le Code civil de
Louisiane, réservent sans doute aux auteurs leur lot de difficultés
mais aussi de bonheurs, ceux que l'on éprouve lorsque la traduction
d'une phrase, d'une disposition qui, tout en sacrifiant à l'impératif de
la lettre, rejoint l'esprit de la langue et du système d'arrivée. Chaque
texte à traduire est un nouveau défi, un cas d’espèce requérant une
stratégie particulière du traducteur, dont le savoir-faire reste encore
la meilleure garantie de succès. Le traducteur d'expérience sait qu’il
est toujours possible de « dire quasi la stessa cosa », dire presque la
même chose 69.
C’est bien ce mot, cet adverbe : presque, qui invite à réfléchir à la possibilité de traduire le droit, à sa traductibilité même. Ce
qui replace le propos dans son contexte réel de relativité et de variabilité de la traduction. Œuvrant entre la langue et le droit, le traducteur est le messager du texte. Responsable de la « pré-interprétation » du sens du texte à traduire, il peut apporter un éclairage complémentaire précieux à même d'aider l'interprète du droit dans sa démarche d'interprétation de la loi pour parvenir à l'équivalence.

69. ECO, supra note 52, at 110.

A SPACE IN-BETWEEN—LEGAL TRANSLATION AS A
‘THIRD SPACE’
Anne Wagner ∗
I. Introduction ............................................................................. 168
II. Conceptual Space of Elaboration ........................................... 171
A. Legal Translation as a ‘Spatio-Temporal Whole’ .............. 171
B. Legal Translation as a Contact Zone .................................. 173
C. The Passage Through Third Space: Between Trauma and
Heritage .............................................................................. 174
III. The Assemblage Phase: From Meaning-Making to MeaningFinding ................................................................................... 176
A. ‘Invariant Concept’ in ‘Third Space’—A Presumably
Transparent Meaning ......................................................... 178
B. Multivariable Translational Analyses in ‘Third Space’ ..... 182
1. The Latin Heritage: Article 53 of the Civil Code ........... 185
2. From Trauma to Repair: Article 11 of the Civil Code .... 187
3. Societal Evolution of Marriage: Article 144 of the Civil
Code .................................................................................... 188
IV. Jurilinguistics as An Evolutionary Discipline ...................... 188

∗ Associate Professor at the Université Lille–Nord de France and Research
Member in the Centre droits et perspectives du droit, équipe René Demogue.

168

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 9

We should remember that it is the “inter”—the cutting edge of
translation and negotiation, the in-between, the space of the entre
that Derrida has opened up in writing itself—that carries the burden
of the meaning of culture… It is in this space that we will find those
words with which we can speak of Ourselves and Others. And by
exploring this hybridity, this ‘Third Space,’ we may elude the politics of polarity and emerge as the others of our selves. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Legal translation is a space of possibilities, an autonomous realm
of “cross-cultural events” 2 within which the “system-bound” 3 of legal concepts and notions deeply rooted in language, history and societal evolution 4 of one country are transformed and integrated into
the language of another, and as a result, stratified over the course of
time 5:
[A]ll legal systems are mixed—derived from imported structures, concepts and ideas but also emanating from different
normative systems which are based on customs, religions
and languages, habitat and natural resources, families, geography and climate, conceptions of morality, and other features. 6

1. Homi Bhabha, Cultural Diversity and Cultural Differences in THE POSTCOLONIAL STUDIES READER 206, 209 (Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths & Helen
Tiffin eds., Routledge 1995) [hereinafter Cultural Diversity].
2. MARY SNELL-HORNBY, TRANSLATION STUDIES: AN INTEGRATED
APPROACH 43 (John Benjamins Publishing Company 1988).
3. DEBORAH CAO, TRANSLATING LAW 23 (Multilingual Matters 2007).
4. SUSAN ŠARČEVIĆ, NEW APPROACH TO LEGAL TRANSLATION (Kluwer
Law International 2000); Anne Wagner & Jean-Claude Gémar eds., The Process
of Translabiliting: Translating and Transferring Law, its Concepts, Notions and
Language, 26 INT’L J. SEMIOT. L. (2013) [hereinafter The Process of Translabiliting]; Anne Wagner & Jean-Claude Gémar eds., Decision-Making in Legal
Translation, Interpretation and Speech Act—Legal Semiotic Cultural Mediation
Techniques, 201 SEMIOTICA (2014) [hereinafter Decision-Making in Legal Translation].
5. Barbara Pozzo, English as a Legal Lingua Franca in the EU Multilingual
Context in THE ROLE OF LEGAL TRANSLATION IN LEGAL HARMONIZATION 186
(C.J.W. Baaij ed., Wolters Kluwer 2012).
6. Nora V. Demleitner, Combating Legal Ethnocentrism: Comparative Law
Sets Boundaries in 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 737, 748-49 (1999).
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Accordingly, the main complexity in legal translation is to
gather terminology of multiple origins 7 and to transfer it into another
linguistic framework. 8 This linguistic framework is originally a binary code that comprises two semantic spaces: the source space and
the target space. The legal translation process would then constitute
the ‘Third Space,’ 9 a space in-between, “which enables other positions to emerge . . . [and where] . . . all forms of cultures are continually in a process of hybridity” 10 of evolution. This Third Space is
undefined, vague, and fluid. It is a precondition for the negotiation,
transformation and translation 11 between two cultures. Bhabha posits:
It is that Third Space, though unrepresentable in itself, which
constitutes the discursive conditions of enunciation that ensure that the meaning and symbols of culture have no primordial unity or fixity; that even the same signs can be appropriated, translated, rehistoricized, and read anew. 12
Indeed, this ‘Third Space’ permits manipulation of the consciousness and unconsciousness of legal discourse when the translation process is underway. It is a “Third Space of enunciation between the poles of cultural identity, a space within which cultural
identities themselves are transformed.” 13 ‘Third Space’ acts as a
multistage dynamics, 14 as an absent structure 15 where mechanisms

7. SIMON SHERRY, GENDER IN TRANSLATION 134 (Routledge 1996).
8. Wagner & Gémar eds., The Process of Translabiliting, supra note 4.
9. “For me the importance of hybridity is not to be able to trace two original
moments from which the third emerges, rather hybridity to me is the ‘Third
Space,’ which enables other positions to emerge.” Infra, note 10.
10. John Rutherford, The Third Space: Interview with Homi Bhabha in
IDENTITY, COMMUNITY, CULTURE, DIFFERENCE 211 (Lawrence & Wishart 1990).
11. COMMUNICATING IN THE THIRD SPACE 120 (Karin Ikas & Gerhard Wagner eds., Routledge 2009) [hereinafter COMMUNICATING IN THE THIRD SPACE].
12. Bhabha, Cultural Diversity, supra note 2, at 208.
13. COMMUNICATING IN THE THIRD SPACE, supra note 11, at 120.
14. Anne Wagner, Semiotic Analysis of the Multistage Dynamics at the core
of Indeterminacy in Legal Language in VAGUENESS IN NORMATIVE TEXTS 173
(Vijay K. Bhatia., Jan Engberg, Maurizio Gotti & Dorothee Heller eds, Peter Lang
2005).
15. UMBERTO ECO, LA STRUCTURE ABSENTE—INTRODUCTION À LA
RECHERCHE SÉMIOTIQUE (Mercure de France 1972).
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of transfer, of importation from one culture to another have to be
fairly analysed. 16 However,
1. The passage brought effects of distortions and appropriation . . . , reformulation and renewals demanded of the
target language. 17
2. This struggle—between possession and dispossession,
or between reinscription and obliteration—is necessary perilous . . . . 18
3. Decision-making needs to elaborate multiple and viable
solutions . . . and so to have “cultural mediation” in the
legal field. 19
‘Cultural mediation’ 20 is an essential pillar within ‘Third Space’
as it opens up a series of promising ways, alternatives, and compromises to create encounters and crossroads 21 between disciplines for
practical possibilities in the legal translation process: “Put differently, the likelihood of identical concepts possesses both an innate
component (our cognitive design) and a cultural one (how culture
structures experience and represents it in that culture’s language).” 22
This paper construes presentations of ‘Third Space,’ orientates
our vision of ‘legal translation’ and finds acceptable and readable
transfers in the legal communicative space—a “protean, moving and
complex process.” 23 The aim of this paper is to offer broader perspectives for understanding the roles of ‘translation’ and ‘Third

16. Wagner & Gémar eds., Decision-Making in Legal Translation, supra
note 4; SANFORD BUDICK & WOLFGANG ISER, THE TRANSLATION OF
CULTURES—FIGURATIONS OF THE SPACE BETWEEN (Stanford University Press
1996).
17. SHERRY, supra note 7, at 11.
18. BUDICK & ISER, supra note 16.
19. Anne Wagner & Jean-Claude Gémar, Communication and Cultural Mediation Techniques in Jurilinguistics in 201 SEMIOTICA 1 (2014) [hereinafter
Communication and Cultural Mediation Techniques in Jurilinguistics].
20. Id.
21. John Sinclair, Trust the text in ADVANCES IN WRITTEN TEXT 12 (Malcolm
Coulthard ed., Routledge 2005).
22. ELINA PAUNIO, LEGAL CERTAINTY IN MULTILINGUAL EU LAW—
LANGUAGE, DISCOURSE AND REASONING AT THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
143 (Law, Language and Communication Series, Ashgate 2013).
23. Anne Wagner & Jean-Claude Gémar, Jurilinguistique et Juritraductologie—A Collective and Societal Dimension: Multiplicity of Meaning between Sciences and Society, 27 INT’L J. SEMIOT. L. (2014).
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Space’ in the debate of legal translation, from both theoretical and
practical angles.
II. CONCEPTUAL SPACE OF ELABORATION
A ‘space of elaboration,’ of interpretation is crucial in the study
of law, language and translation in society. It means that the way
beliefs and values are socially constructed, and the way they reflect
their images and disseminate their views, provides potential and valuable keys for research in the field of legal translation theory. Challenging legal translation theories is an unavoidable aspect of social
and legal interaction within the transfer and exchange of communication in the legal sphere.
‘Third Space’ is not only a space of expansion but also an organised and classified space. It is entwined in the source space and
in the target space, and it can lead to several sets of translation,
where “they are very diverse map-tracing, rhizomeroot assemblages, with variable coefficients of deterritorialisation.” 24
A. Legal Translation as a ‘Spatio-Temporal Whole’
The roles of legal translators, jurilinguists and/or lawyer-linguists are crucial to achieve a comprehensible and readable ‘Third
Space’ in the target language:
. . . of what is immediately presented as a spatio-temporal
whole . . . knowing how to orientate oneself in space and
time, knowing how to construe presentations or appearance
in terms of spatial and temporal ‘reality.’ 25
This ‘spatio-temporal whole’ leads to considerations of the aspects of ‘foreignization’ and/or ‘domestication’ of concepts, terms,
notions in the target language 26: “The translator can either leave the
24. GILLES DELEUZE & FELIX GUATTARI, A THOUSAND PLATEAUS 15 (University of Minnesota Press 1988).
25. JONATHAN HERON, PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS FOR A NEW PARADIGM 87
(Seuil 1989).
26. Wenfen Yang, Brief Study on Domestication and Foreignization in
Translation, 1 JOURNAL OF LANGUAGE, TEACHING AND RESEARCH 77 (2010);
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writer in peace as much as possible and bring the reader to him, or
he can leave the reader in peace as much as possible and bring the
writer to him.” 27
In the translation process, this ‘whole’ cannot be evaluated in a
mechanical way. 28 Tomášek 29 suggests that translators and/or jurilinguists utilize “a procedure based on both linguistic and legal comparative approaches.” This process needs interpretation of the objective legal reality where translators, jurilinguists and/or lawyerlinguists will be educated and trained to deal with the diverse, multilayered, socio-legal aspects in translation:
Translation always falls short of its goal of conveying the
meaning and the style of a text in a new text that reads like
an original composition in the second language. The law is
always subject to interpretation; the idea that it is “carved in
stone” is only an illusion. Nor is the meaning of words ever
fixed: the kind of precision the law demands of language,
and formal semantics attempts to represent, is again based
on an illusion of human linguistic behaviour, which has
evolved very efficiently for a large number of purposes,
though pinning down precise meaning is not among them.
This has implication for translation as well, for if indeterminacy is already the condition within languages, it holds a fortiori between languages. 30
Pierre Legrand drew the fact that “texts are intentional and relational. The meaning of the original is assumed not to reside wholly

JEREMY MUNDAY, INTRODUCING TRANSLATION STUDIES: THEORIES AND
APPLICATIONS (Routledge 2001); LAWRENCE VENUTI, THE TRANSLATOR’S
INVISIBILITY: A HISTORY OF TRANSLATION (Routledge 1995); EUGENE A. NIDA,
TOWARD A SCIENCE OF TRANSLATION (E.J. Brill 1964).
27. WOLFRAM WILSS, THE SCIENCE OF TRANSLATION: PROBLEMS AND
METHODS 33 (Günther Narr 1982).
28. Hans J. Vermeer, Hermeneutik und Übersetzung (swissenschaft), 9
TEXTCONTEXT 163 (1994).
29. Michal Tomášek, On Selected Problems in Translation of the Legal Language in TRANSLATOLOGICA PRAGENSIA IV, ACTA UNIVERSITATIS CAROLINAE
PHILOLOGICA 4/1994, 113,113 (Karolinum 1990).
30. John E. Joseph, Indeterminacy, Translation and the Law in TRANSLATION
AND THE LAW 13, 19 (Marshall Morris ed., Benjamins 1995).
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within the original itself. There are silences to be addressed.” 31 Causality in the legal translation process is primordial and can lead to
multiple explanations.32 As Hermans 33 also points out, there is no
real solution to this issue. Experts in legal translation have to “patiently, repeatedly, laboriously negotiate the other’s terrain, while
trying to conceptualize our own modes of representation and the
commensurability of cultures.” 34
B. Legal Translation as a Contact Zone
As already mentioned ‘Third Space’ is entwined in the source
space and the target space. ‘Inbetweenness’ is crucial as it acts as a
‘contact zone’ between the source language and the target language.
It has a coordinate function between the source culture and the target
culture, where sets of interpretation are available for consideration—like in the game theory in mathematics—with high or low
connectivity in the legal transfer process. Accordingly, whereas high
connectivity leads to a proper transfer without modifying the boundaries of the original meanings, low connectivity results in an increased hybridized discourse with many variants in the target language, leading to intercultural efforts of creations and shifts in
meanings. Sacco introduces the concept of “legal formants which
may or may not be in harmony with each other.” 35 This idea follows
the approach proposed by Deleuze & Guattari where they describe
the rhizome with three main functions, i.e. heterogeneity, connection and multiplicity:
31. Pierre Legrand, Issues in the Translatability of Law in NATION,
LANGUAGE AND THE ETHICS OF TRANSLATION 30, 37 (Sandra Bermann & Michael Wood eds., Princeton University Press 2005) [hereinafter Issues in the
Translatability of Law].
32. See WESLEY SALMON, CAUSALITY AND EXPLANATION 360 (Oxford University Press 1998).
33. Theo Hermans, Translation as Institution in TRANSLATION AS
INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION 3 (Mary Snell-Hornby, Zuzana Jettmarová &
Klaus Kaindl eds., Benjamins 1997).
34. Id. at 19.
35. Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative
Law in 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 30 (1991).
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A rhizome may be broken, shattered at a given spot, but it
will start up again on one of its old lines, or on new lines ….
Every rhizome contains lines of segmentarity according to
which it is stratified, territorialised, signified, attributed, etc.,
as well as lines of deterritorialisation down which it constantly flees. 36
Legal translation has a pivotal role in the re-interpretation and/or
deterritorialisation 37 of identity. It is unavoidable 38 to assume new
and different meanings from the original matrix of the source language, and to accept that this transfer in the target language is never
pure 39 between the signified and the signifier.
Alan Watson refers to legal transplant to describe the “moving
of a rule or a system from one country to another, or from one people
to another,” 40 and Bhabha completes this notion where he postulates
that “the pact of interpretation [could never be] simply an act of
communication between the I41 and the You 42 . . . . The production
of meaning requires that these two places be mobilised in the passage through a Third Space.” 43
C. The Passage Through Third Space: Between Trauma and Heritage
‘Third Space’ in legal translation entails analyzing the roles of
actors involved in the translation process, the actions they take and
the final product they built from their practices. Given the power

36. DELEUZE & GUATTARI, supra note 24, at 9.
37. Id. at 15.
38. See Gayatri Spivak, Translation as Culture in TRANSLATION:
REFLECTIONS, REFRACTIONS, TRANSFORMATIONS 238, 238 (Paul St-Pierre & Prafull C. Kar eds., Pencraft 2005).
39. See JACQUES DERRIDA, SEMIOLOGY AND GRAMMATOLOGY 26 (Chicago
University Press 1981).
40. ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANT: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE
LAW 21 (University of Georgia Press 1993).
41. The ‘I’ refers to the source language.
42. The ‘You’ refers to the target language.
43. HOMI BHABHA, THE LOCATION OF CULTURE 36 (Routledge 1994).
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legal translation could have, there is a clear need to analyse the discursive modus operandi in relation to context, a “cultural turn,” 44
which is necessary for describing, analysing and interpreting social
relations reflected in the text, before delivering the final translation
in the target language. 45 We take ‘cultural turn’ to mean that legal
discourse reflects “the organization of society and its institutions
and the roles and power structures inherent therein.” 46
The reconstruction of the meaning of the source language (SL)
necessarily involves references to a meta-level parameter, as the SL
text cannot be encapsulated within the limits of the source legal system, but has to be ‘colonized’ and/or ‘domesticated’ in the target
language. 47 Talmy states that “language somehow mirrors thought,
and thought in turn, some external reality.” 48 Accordingly, legal language is culturally labelled. 49 However, Nietzsche moderates the
culture-bound system when he expressed his scepticism that “the
various languages, juxtaposed, show that words are never concerned
with truth, never with adequate expression ….” 50
The translation process is the result of legal discourse analyses
in which a wide variety of complex linguistic devices may either
inherit the same legal usages or abuse (the trauma) the original

44. MARY SNELL-HORNBY, THE TURNS OF TRANSLATION STUDIES: NEW
PARADIGMS OR SHIFTING VIEWPOINTS? 50 (Benjamins 2006) [hereinafter THE
TURNS OF TRANSLATION STUDIES].
45. VIJAY K. BHATIA, WORLDS OF WRITTEN DISCOURSE: A GENRE-BASED
VIEW 123 (Continuum 2004).
46. Ruth Wodak, 1968 The Power of Political Jargon—A “Club–2” Discussion in LANGUAGE POWER AND IDEOLOGY: STUDIES IN POLITICAL DISCOURSE
137, 155 (Ruth Wodak ed., Benjamins 1989).
47. King-Kui Sin & Derek Roebuck, Language Engineering for Legal Transplantation: Conceptual Problems in Creating Common Law Chinese, 16
LANGUAGE & COMMUNICATION 235 (1996).
48. Cited in JOANNA JEMIELNIAK, LEGAL INTERPRETATION IN
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 41 (Law, Language and Communication Series, Ashgate 2013).
49. GIDEON TOURY, DESCRIPTIVE TRANSLATION STUDIES AND BEYOND 33
(Benjamins 1995).
50. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON TRUTH AND LIES IN A NONMORAL SENSE 248
(CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform 1873).
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framework by implementing a distinct legal usage in the target language.
Therefore, the challenge is important for accurate legal translations in practice:
- The translator of a legal text aims at introducing foreign legal worldviews into a different legal life-world.
His task is to make the foreign legal text accessible
for recipients with a different (legal) background. 51
- In the area of intercultural communication, requiring
not only language mediation but heightened cultural
expertise, the (human) translator (and interpreter)
plays an increasingly important role, whereby he/she
will take the full responsibility for the “final product.” 52
By revealing the passage through ‘Third Space,’ legal experts
are encouraged to better master translation practices to avoid a language/practice duality and lead to:
[an] assumed translation would be regarded as any targetculture text for which there are reasons to tentatively posit
the existence of another text, in another culture and language, from which it was presumably derived by transfer operations and to which it is now tied by certain relationships
. . . within that culture. 53
III. THE ASSEMBLAGE PHASE: FROM MEANING-MAKING TO
MEANING-FINDING
“An assemblage is precisely this increase in the dimensions of
multiplicity that necessarily changes in nature as it expands its connection . . . There are only lines.” 54 Law is a social phenomenon
having multiple (or comprehensive) philosophical, theoretical and
historical roots. Meanings in law have cultural nuances according to
51. E. Pommer Sieglinde, The Hermeneutic Approach in Legal Translation
in UNTERWEGS ZU EINER HERMENEUTISCHEN ÜBERSETZUNGSWISSENSCHAFT:
RADEGUNDIS STOLZE ZU IHREM 60. GEBURSTAG 274, 283 (Larisa Cercel, John
Stanley eds., Günther Narr 2012).
52. SNELL-HORNBY, THE TURNS OF TRANSLATION STUDIES, supra note 44, at
133.
53. TOURY, supra note 49, at 35.
54. DELEUZE & GUATTARI, supra note 24, at 29.
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the systems of lifestyle, values, traditions and the collective memory
that are being examined. Law conveys testimony of the past but also
demonstrate an ongoing social process that could be adjusted within
space and time. Likewise, law reflects human values, practices, and
aspirations of changes as its boundaries are flexible and in constant
evolution. As expressed by Cao “law and legal language are systembound, that is, they reflect the history, evolution and culture of a
legal system.” 55 The concepts of a particular legal system, however,
are not language-dependent. That is to say, they can be transferred
from one language to another when carried out within a semiotic
framework that facilitates the bridging of conceptual gaps between
concepts in the source language and their counterparts in the target
language. 56
It therefore seems logical to make prospective translators “fit”
for a wide range of technical producing activities, providing them
not only with a solid text-based competence, but also with a solid
social knowledge of both the source and target languages. 57
Concepts are part of the social phenomenon as they are units of
meaning that can vary in their finality. Concepts serve as instruments for thinking and communicating, and allowing the expression
of human thoughts, conclusions and suppositions in the source language. Consequently, the transfer process is not easy and translators
have to distil a reasonable knowledge of the source language in the
target language. Sin King Kui points out:
All large-scale cultural transfers begin in the absence of a
readily usable language. The first, and most natural, response of the native culture is to make an attempt to naturalize the foreign culture. Where it has a close affinity to the
55. CAO, supra note 3, at 23.
56. King-Kui Sin, foreword to English-Chinese Glossary of Civil and Commercial Law Terms v-xi (Hong-Kong: Department of Justice 2002).
57. See Jean-Claude Gémar, Traduction et industries de la langue : nouveau
défi pour le traducteur, 37 META : JOURNAL DES TRADUCTEURS / META:
TRANSLATORS' JOURNAL 374 (1992); see also LANGAGE DU DROIT ET
TRADUCTION, ESSAIS DE JURILINGUISTIQUE (Jean-Claude Gémar ed., Montreal:
Linguatech 1982); Wagner & Gémar, The Process of Translabiliting, supra note
4, at 738-739.
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native culture, naturalization or minor adjustment may be
adequate. But where it is one of great complexity, or radically different, the native culture will find it necessary at
some point to change and adjust its language so as to make
it [suitable for effecting such transfer]. 58
Cultural transfer, migration or translatability is a priority, and
legal translators will have to fill the conceptual gap in the target language. To find a way from meaning-making to meaning-finding:
Translatability aims at comprehension, whereas encounters
between cultures or interactions between levels of culture involve either assimilation or appropriation by making inroads
into one another, trying to get out of a different culture or the
different intra-cultural levels that seem attractive, useful, or
is combated and suppressed for whatever reasons. 59
In other words, legal translators have to fix the semantic source,
adjust it for the target language and—if necessary—build meta-linguistic devices to fill the conceptual gap for the target language:
“translators are aware of the decisive part they have always played,
without leaving the shadows themselves, to enable others to overcome the barriers of language and culture by way of the translators’
skills as writers.” 60
The translatability process is never pure and is always subject to
a “power takeover in the multiplicity by a corresponding subjectification proceeding . . . . Unity always operates in an empty dimension
supplementary to that of the system considered.” 61
A. ‘Invariant Concept’ in ‘Third Space’—A Presumably Transparent Meaning
Marriage is an invariant concept when switching from the
source language to the target language. Its linguistic unit in the
58. Sin King Kui, The Common Law in Uncommon Chinese: Linguistic
Anomalies and Cultural Shock, 2 JOURNAL OF TRANSLATION 136-137 (1998).
59. Wolfgang Iser, On Translability, 4 SURFACES 5, 6 (1994).
60. Renato Correia, Translation of EU Legal Texts in CROSSING BARRIERS
AND BRIDGING CULTURES: THE CHALLENGES OF MULTILINGUAL TRANSLATION
FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION 38, 40 (Arturo Tosi ed., Multilingual Matters Ltd.
2003)
61. DELEUZE & GUATTARI, supra note 24, at 29.
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meaning-finding is fixed in both languages. Only the variables (societal and legal factors) within this concept may differ. However,
Marriage does not create confusion in the translatability process, as
the linguistic unit is transparent. The ‘invariant concept’ under translation leads to the conservation of its original unit, though there is
no absolute cultural equivalence. A process of meaning-finding will
then be implemented to adjust the target language:
Transplanting frequently, perhaps always, involves legal
transformation. Even when the transplanted rule remains unchanged, its impact in a new social setting may be different
. . . . The whole context of the rule or concept has to be studied to understand the extent of the transformation. 62
Marriage is one of the most anchored concepts related to culture, society and religion. It is considered as a Christian heritage. It
is part of the cultural heritage, highlighting a distinction of the criterion for the composition of a couple. The assessment of the novelty
‘marriage’ requires the identification of the concept, a sequential
analysis of its development, and the cultural experience this word
has in civil law and common law systems.
Marriage comes from the verb marry, which meant in the XII
century “to bind women to men, and thus guarantee that a man’s
children were truly his biological heirs. Through marriage, a woman
became a man’s property.” ‘Marry’ derives from the Latin maritus,
which means husband. From a traditional etymology, maritus meant
“male,” but Alain Rey (Editor of the dictionary Petit Robert) traces
this word back to an Indo-European root, in Sanskrit Marya (young
man in love) and from the Greek Meirax. Additionally, Benoit De
Boysson indicated that the term marriage comes not only etymologically from maritare (which means “male”) but also from matrimonium, which means “marriage” and from mater, the mother. 63 Etymologically, De Boysson concludes that “marriage is a legal form
62. WATSON, supra note 40, at 116.
63. BENOIT DE BOYSSON, MARIAGE ET CONJUGALITÉ—ESSAI SUR LA
SINGULARITÉ MATRIMONIALE (Thèse—Université Jean Moulin Lyon 3, LGDJ
2012).

180

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 9

by which a woman is preparing herself to become a mother by marrying a man.” 64
Religion became involved in the institution of marriage when
the sacramental nature of marriage was written into canon law at the
Council of Trent in 1563. However, same-sex couple marriage in
history is rare, but known. The Roman emperor Nero, who ruled
from AD 54 to 68, twice married men in formal wedding ceremonies, and forced the Imperial Court to treat them as his wives. In the
second and third century in Rome, homosexual weddings became
common. 65 Romans outlawed formal homosexual unions in the year
342. But John Boswell in his research found evidence of homosexual unions after that period, including some that were recognized by
Catholic and Greek Orthodox churches. 66
The history of the development of French national law in the
area of conceptualisation of family and marriage has significantly
evolved. Modern cultural evolutions introduced the concept of
“Civil Partnership” both for heterosexual and same-sex couples in
the mid-20th century. With the introduction of civil partnerships,
boundaries were reconsidered in terms of the concept of family,
where significant developments were expected to comply with Human Rights’ frameworks encompassing the notion of family. They
mostly focused on the individual rights of man to participate, to create his own cultural identity, and to have a family irrespective of his
sexual orientation insofar as it did not infringe upon human rights of
other individuals; however, men could not enjoy the same rights as
heterosexual couples in terms of parentage and inheritance.
The most recent evolution of the concept of marriage dates back
from November 2012 where the French government decided to vote
a bill “mariage pour tous,” marriage for everybody irrespective of
their sex. This text relies on the principle of equality before the law
and permits same-sex couples to marry and enjoy the same rights
64. Id.
65. MARILYN YALOM, A HISTORY OF THE WIFE (Harper Collins 2002).
66. JOHN BOSWELL, SAME-SEX UNIONS IN PREMODERN EUROPE 199-217
(Vintage 1995).
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and duties as heterosexual couples. 67 The bill was passed and
changes were made in the French Civil Code to replace the words
“husband and wife” with “spouses,” and “father and mother” with
“parents” (respectively in Art. 75 of the French Civil Code, and in
Art. 34, Art. 371–1). 68
An evolution of the concept of marriage also occurred in Hong
Kong, a common law jurisdiction, when the Court of Final Appeal
decided in 2013 (FACV No. 4 of 2012 on appeal from CACV No.
266 of 2010) that a post-operative male-to-female transsexual person who had undergone sex reassignment surgery (“SRS”) at a hospital is allowed to marry her male partner. Previously, she had been
denied the possibility to do so by the Registrar of Marriages on the
ground that she did not qualify as a “woman” under Hong Kong’s
marriage law, which solely adopted the biological criteria for assessing the sex of a person for the purposes of marriage as “procreative intercourse was an essential constituent of a marriage at common law” (Corbett v Corbett).
Three points are worth noting in the decision of the Court of Final Appeal. First, as the right to marry is protected by the Basic Law
of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong Bill of Rights, it must not be taken
away by any marriage law. Second, the nature of marriage has undergone drastic changes in Hong Kong, so much that procreation is
no longer regarded as an essential constituent of marriage. Third, the
biological status of a person’s sex should not be fixed at birth and
be regarded as immutable. To put it in a nutshell, the decision has
given new meaning to the common law concept of marriage and
modified the conventional concept of sex as something inborn and
immutable. Yet, unlike the latest French concept, marriage under
67. Act No. 2013-404 of May 17, 2013, art. 13, allowing marriage to samesex couples. The preliminary title is completed by article 6-1 as follows: “Art. 61.—Le mariage et la filiation adoptive emportent les mêmes effets, droits et obligations reconnus par les lois, à l’exclusion de ceux prévus au titre VII du livre Ier
du présent code, que les époux ou les parents soient de sexe différent ou de même
sexe.”
68. Id.
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Hong Kong laws remains marriage of opposite sexes. The two concepts, though close, are not equivalent.
Legal language is bound to culture. In terms of translation, that
of the concept ‘marriage,’ and for that matter, the concepts of sex
(male, female, man, woman), might seem straightforward, but in
terms of cultural transfer and in reference to Christianity or to common law history, “there cannot be equivalence of meaning between
the law-in-translation and the original law.” 69 Translators will not
be in the capacity of translatabiliting, transplanting the full load of
the concept into the target language, which can only be achieved
through meta-translational devices. 70 Multiplicities in meaning are
flat and defined by the outside. 71
B. Multivariable Translational Analyses in ‘Third Space’
The choice of equivalence is not merely a linguistic and translational decision but a cultural mediation, 72 corresponding to the ‘passage through Third Space’ and to “the silences to be addressed.” 73
These silences correspond to the background in meaning, making in
the source language where they derive from prior experiences of
law. ‘Third Space’ creates a living notion 74 where:
[C]oncepts are more like chess pieces. They can be manoeuvred to produce certain results but the players have a choice
as to the move. Similarly, lawyers and judges often have a
choice as to how they will move the concepts. 75
Multivariable translational analyses 76 provide both descriptive
and inferential meanings. They presuppose that (1) we examine
69. Legrand, Issues in the Translatability of Law, supra note 31, at 30.
70. King-Kui Sin, Out of the Fly-Bottle: Conceptual Confusions in Multilingual Legislation, 26 INT’L J. SEMIOT. L. 927 (2013).
71. DELEUZE & GUATTARI, supra note 24.
72. Wagner & Gémar eds., The Process of Translabiliting, supra note 4.
73. Legrand, Issues in the Translatability of Law, supra note 31, at 37.
74. FRANÇOIS GÉNY, 1 SCIENCES ET TECHNIQUE EN DROIT PRIVÉ POSITIF, (Recueil Sirey 1922).
75. JOHN HYNES FARRAR & ANTHONY M. DUGDALE, INTRODUCTION TO
LEGAL METHOD 78 (Sweet & Maxell 1990).
76. Only a few samples from our multivariable translation analyses are shown
in this paper.
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some concepts, (2) process their variables and (3) search for the inter-correlations that the variables may possess in both the source and
target spaces. Eventually, from this deciphering process provided by
the inter-correlated variables, we could envisage the most appropriate translation.
The objective of multivariable translational analyses is to gain
thorough understanding and knowledge of concepts, their purposes,
their assumptions, and their limitations in the source space. From
these extractions, we can then emphasize the similarities and/or differences in both the source and target spaces, and so think of the
‘passage through Third Space.’ The essential objective of these analyses is to be meaningful in the target space. As expressed by
Legrand, “to penetrate the ‘legal’ one must appreciate the ‘social’
that underpins it, otherwise the ‘legal’ literally does not make
sense.” 77
Our analyses rely on two matrices. Each of them has extensions,
located in space and time, and leads to the analyses of some extractions so as to decipher their meanings in the source and target spaces,
and to see how the translation was operated. The two matrices with
the units to be investigated (in bold) are as follows:
• Matrix 1:
a. Extracts from Les codes des codes ou les Vingt-un Codes in
1839 (Text 1)
Extracts from The Code Napoleon or, The French Civil Code—literal translation 1827 (Transl. 1)
• Matrix 2:
b. Extracts from the most recent version of the Civil Code of
March 14, 2014 (Text 2)
c. Extracts from the official and current translation available on
Legifrance Portal (Transl. 2)

77. Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems are Not Converging in 45 INT’L
& COMP. L.Q. 52, 58 (1996).
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Matrix 1.
Art. 53
Civil
Code

Text 1.
Le procureur du roi au tribunal de première instance
sera tenu de vérifier l’état
des registres lors du dépôt
qui en sera fait au greffe; il
dressera un procès-verbal
sommaire de la vérification,
dénoncera les contraventions ou délit commis par les
officiers de l’état civil, et requerra contre eux la condamnation aux amendes.

Transl. 1
The commissioner of government at the court of first instance shall be bound to verify
the state of the registers at the
time of their being deposited
among the rolls of the court; he
shall draw up a concise statement of such verification, he
shall certify all offences and
crimes committed by the officers of the civil courts, and shall
demand sentence against them.

Matrix 2.
Art. 53
Civil
Code

Text 2.
Le procureur de la République au tribunal de grande
instance sera tenu de vérifier l'état des registres lors
du dépôt qui en sera fait au
greffe ; il dressera un procès-verbal sommaire de la
vérification, dénoncera les
contraventions ou délits
commis par les officiers de
l'état civil, et requerra
contre eux la condamnation
aux amendes.

Transl. 2.
The Government procurator
at the tribunal de grande instance shall verify the state of
the registers when they are deposited at the court registrar's
office; he shall draw up a memorandum of verification, denounce minor and ordinary offences committed by officers of
civil status and call for their being sentenced to fines.

Matrix 1.
Art. 11

Text 1.
L’étranger jouira en France
des mêmes droits civils que
ceux qui sont ou seront accordés aux Français par les
traités de la nation à laquelle cet étranger appartiendra.
Text 2.
L’étranger jouira en France
des mêmes droits civils que
ceux qui sont ou seront accordés aux Français par les
traités de la nation à laquelle cet étranger appartiendra.

Transl. 1
A foreigner shall enjoy in
France the same civil rights as
are or shall be accorded to
Frenchmen by the treaties of
that nation to which such foreigner shall belong.

Matrix 2.
Art. 11

Transl. 2.
An alien enjoys in France the
same civil rights as those that
are or will be granted to French
persons by the treaties of the nation to which that alien belongs.
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LEGAL TRANSLATION AS A ‘THIRD SPACE’
Text 1.
L’homme avant dix-huit ans
révolus, la femme avant
quinze ans révolus, ne peuvent contracter mariage.
Text 2.
Le mariage ne peut être contracté avant dix-huit ans révolus.

185

Transl. 1
A man before the age of 18, and
a woman before 15 complete,
are incapable of contracting
marriage.
Transl. 2.
A male and a female may not
contract marriage before they
have completed their eighteenth
year.

From completeness, we investigate their meanings in context,
search for the variable factors available for them, and eventually see
if their original significances were preserved (heritage) or radically
modified (trauma).
1. The Latin Heritage: Article 53 of the Civil Code
Under article 53, Latin was privileged in Matrix 2 over an English word translated literally in Matrix 1. Latin is transparent in both
the source language and target language without any loss of authenticity and meaning. Translators seek the etymological root of “procureur du roi,” “procureur de la République,” and select the Latin
concept for that legal purpose. The ‘passage through Third Space’
is then much easily facilitated. As rightly pointed out by Rodolfo
Sacco:
La plus grande partie de l’immense bagage lexical dont bénéficie le continent européen est traduisible en raison de ses
origines liées, d’abord à la traduction du latin au français,
du latin à l’allemand, du latin à l’italien, puis à la traduction
du français et de l’allemand à l’italien, au russe, au hongrois, à l’espagnol, au polonais, etc. 78
Indeed, if we look at the meaning of procurator, several convergent definitions arise from dictionaries of the source and target
spaces in Matrix 2:
78. Cited in HEIKKI E.S. MATTILA, JURILINGUISTIQUE COMPARÉE—
LANGAGES DU DROIT, LATIN ET LANGUES MODERNES 209 (Jean-Claude Gémar
trans., Yvon Blais 2012).
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Ce mot vient du latin procurator (qui prend soin des
intérêts d’un autre). On appela procureurs, des officiers publics, dont la fonction était de comparaître en
jugement pour les parties, d’instruire leurs causes et
servir leurs intérêts. 79
The term procurator is used in those countries whose
codes are based on the Roman civil law for certain officials, having a representative character, in the courts of
law. Thus under the ancien régime in France, the procureurs du roi were the representatives of the Crown in
all causes. 80

If we now investigate Matrix 1 and its translation as “Commissioner,” the meaning is as follows:
- This word is applied to members of a permanently constituted department of the administration, as civil service commissioners. 81
In Matrix 1, the author added “of government.” Even though it
may fit with the original meaning, there is a need to investigate the
source meaning in the source space (French) at the approximate
equivalent time period with the French word “commissaire:”
Commissaires—Nom donné à tous ceux qui recevaient une
mission du roi ou d’une assemblée pour inspecter les provinces, administrer la justice, soutenir une loi devant les assemblées politiques, etc. 82
From this reading, the concept is not adequate and has no equivalence to the context in which it was originally attributed in the Civil
Code drafting of 1839. However, if we follow the “Thousand-Plateaus” principle of Deleuze & Guattari, translators tried to “operate
in an empty dimension supplementary to that of the system considered.” 83 The root (also named ‘line’) of the rhizome is not cut and
its exteriority is then expanded as a “line of deterritorialization”84
79. DICTIONNAIRE HISTORIQUE DES INSTITUTIONS, MŒURS ET COUTUMES DE
LA FRANCE (1874).
80. THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (1911).
81. Id.
82. DICTIONNAIRE HISTORIQUE DES INSTITUTIONS, MŒURS ET COUTUMES DE
LA FRANCE (1874).
83. DELEUZE & GUATTARI, supra note 24, at 48.
84. Id. at 30.
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and permits to restratify its meaning into another sign-system, even
though its conceptual load is not fully transferred.
2. From Trauma to Repair: Article 11 of the Civil Code
In the light of Art. 11, one key concept that arises is “étranger.”
Even though its translation seems unequivocal, two proposals were
given: “Foreigner” in Matrix 1 and “Alien” in Matrix 2.
In Matrix 1, we first notice that the word “foreigner” is not an
entry in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, which comprises 21 volumes.
Only the word “Alien” is found and is referred as follows:
The technical term applied by British constitutional law to
anyone who does not enjoy the character of a British subject;
in general, a foreigner who for the purposes of any state
comes into certain domestic relations with it, other than
those applying to native-born or naturalized citizens, but
owns allegiance to a foreign sovereign. 85
Now, if we compare the target language version to the source
language version, we can see many similarities indeed:
Étrangers—La législation moderne distingue deux classes
d’étrangers, l’étranger domicilié et l’étranger passager. Le
premier, lorsqu’il a obtenu l’autorisation de résider en
France, y jouit de tous les droits civils. Le second n’a que
les droits garantis par les traités à sa nation. Tous peuvent
recevoir des legs et des successions, droit que la loi du 17
juillet 1819 leur a reconnu dans toute sa plénitude. Quant
aux droits politiques, tels que le droit d’être électeur, de siéger comme juré dans les tribunaux, d’exercer des fonctions
publiques, et de représenter la nation dans les assemblées
politiques, les étrangers ne peuvent en jouir que s’ils ont obtenu des lettres de naturalisation.86
So, the proposed translation seems not valid, though the translator uses “foreigner” to avoid the culturally-labelled meaning of
“British subject” inherent to him with the use of the concept “Alien.”

85. THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (1911).
86. DICTIONNAIRE HISTORIQUE DES INSTITUTIONS, MŒURS ET COUTUMES DE
LA FRANCE (1874).
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In Matrix 2, “étrangers” are translated as “aliens.” In Jowitt’s
Dictionary of English law, “aliens” are said to be: “At common law
an alien is a subject of a foreign State who was not born within the
allegiance of the Crown.”
Therefore, this definition validates the translation choice of “aliens” in Matrix 2 and could have also originally been implemented
in Matrix 1.
3. Societal Evolution of Marriage: Article 144 of the Civil
Code
Our last example concerns Art. 144 of the Civil Code about the
qualities and conditions required to contract marriage under the
Civil Code of 1839 (Matrix 1), and the current Civil Code (Matrix
2). If we consider Matrix 1, the translation of the words “homme”
and “femme” is easy and transparent, and does not lead to any difficulties in terms of contracting marriage between people of opposite
sexes.
If we now turn to Matrix 2, Text 2 uses a gender-neutralized
sentence. No mention to man or woman is made at this level. However, the translation operates the opposite direction and again mentions “male” and “female,” which are adjectives if we refer to the
Oxford or Cambridge Dictionaries. “Male” and “female” appear
when you have to fill in a customs declaration for passengers flying
to foreign countries, and check the relevant box corresponding to
their respective sex. The drafter’s original intent to remain neutral is
no longer respected and does not correspond to the current legal reality of “marriage” in France, which can be contracted not only by
heterosexual couples but also by homosexual couples.
IV. JURILINGUISTICS AS AN EVOLUTIONARY DISCIPLINE
Legal translation issues have been extensively addressed over
the last two decades, 87 and transferring concepts and terms into other
87. See Wagner & Gémar eds., Decision-Making in Legal Translation, supra
note 4; Wagner & Gémar, Communication and Cultural Mediation Techniques in
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linguist/legal systems has been a salient characteristic. The paper
shows how language is powerful and active, conveying social experiences and shaping the reality of legal translation both in theory and
in practice. It is noteworthy that practitioners and experts in this field
are sensitive to an “assumed translation.” 88 Theories and practices
are structured to understand this ‘Third Space,’ where legal translation could accommodate both the source and target languages.
For this reason, translators, lawyer-linguists, and jurilinguists
make decisions and choices that reflect common knowledge, 89 but
they still operate within the constraints set by the principle of cultural reality in the target language:
Semiotically speaking, it will be clear that it is the target or
recipient culture, or certain section of it, which serves as the
initiator of the decision to translate and of the translating process . . . . Translators operate first and foremost in the interest
of the culture into which they are translating, and not in the
interest of the source text, let alone the source culture. 90
Finally, ‘Third Space’ in the translation process leads to mitigating solutions, to a map in action with multiple entryways, passageways, strata in meanings. Various strategies in both matrices were
employed, invoking both tradition and ‘emancipation’ from legal
translation theories and practices:
Translation thus is not simply an act of faithful reproduction
but, rather, a deliberate and conscious act of selection, assemblage, structuration, and fabrication . . . . In these ways
Jurilinguistics supra note 19; Wagner & Gémar, Jurilinguistique et Juritraductologie—A Collective and Societal Dimension: Multiplicity of Meaning between
Sciences and Society, 27 INT’L J. SEMIOT. L. (2014); Wagner & Gémar eds., The
Process of Translabiliting, supra note 4; MATTILA, supra note 78;
JURILINGUISTICS: BETWEEN LAW AND LANGUAGE (Jean-Claude Gémar & Nicholas Kasirer eds., Thémis 2005); JEAN-CLAUDE GÉMAR, TRADUIRE OU L’ART
D’INTERPRÉTER (Presses Universitaires du Québec 2000); LANGAGE DU DROIT ET
TRADUCTION, ESSAIS DE JURILINGUISTIQUE (Jean-Claude Gémar ed., Linguatech
1982); Rodolfo Sacco, La traduzione giuridica in IL LINGUAGGIO DEL DIRITTO
(Uberto Scarpelli ed., LED 1992); ŠARČEVIĆ, supra note 4; CAO, supra note 3.
88. TOURY, supra note 49, at 35.
89. See ŠARČEVIĆ, supra note 4.
90. Gideon Toury cited in SNELL-HORNBY, THE TURNS OF TRANSLATION
STUDIES, supra note 44, at 49.
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translators, as much as creative writers and politicians, participate in the powerful acts that create knowledge and shape
culture. 91

91. TRANSLATION AND POWER xxi (Edwin Gentzler & Maria Tymoczko eds.,
University of Massachusetts Press 2002).
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La question de la traduction d’un code constitue par nature une
question « juritraductologique ». La juritraductologie, introduite
sous cette dénomination dans les années 2010 1, représente un nouveau champ d’investigation combinant les savoirs de la science juridique et ceux de la traductologie.
Les questionnements que suscite la traduction juridique ne sont
pas nouveaux. Depuis le développement de la traductologie dans les
années 1970, des chercheurs en linguistique et en traductologie soulèvent les difficultés que pose la traduction spécialisée. Lorsqu’elle
est abordée, la traduction juridique est observée et analysée sous
l’angle uniquement linguistique. À partir des années 2000, la linguistique juridique fait son apparition dans la science juridique au
travers des travaux du professeur Gérard Cornu. Son analyse affinée
∗

Université de Cergy-Pontoise. Directrice du Centre de recherche interdisciplinaire en juritraductologie (Cerije) : http://www.cerije.eu.
1. SYLVIE MONJEAN-DECAUDIN, LA TRADUCTION DU DROIT DANS LA
PROCÉDURE JUDICIAIRE. CONTRIBUTION À L’ÉTUDE DE LA LINGUISTIQUE
JURIDIQUE (Dalloz 2012).
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du vocabulaire juridique et du discours du droit est une source précieuse d’enseignement. Toutefois, l’auteur n’évoque que par
quelques lignes, en introduction de son ouvrage, la traduction du
droit qu’il classe dans la linguistique juridique 2. De ce point de départ épistémologique est venu se fonder en science juridique un nouveau champ d’étude : la juritraductologie ou traductologie juridique.
Afin de lui consacrer un cadre institutionnel spécifique et exclusif,
le Cerije (Centre de Recherche Interdisciplinaire en Juritraductologie) a été créé à Paris en 2012. Il s’agit du premier centre de recherche dédié exclusivement à ce nouveau champ interdisciplinaire
dont la pertinence a été démontrée 3. Le centre s’est donné pour objectif premier de définir son objet d’étude et de développer la recherche fondamentale et la recherche appliquée sur les problématiques que soulève le droit de la traduction et la traduction du droit
tant en science juridique qu’en traductologie 4. L’approche holistique menée concomitamment en droit et en linguistique constitue
en ce sens une innovation.
Le Cerije a le privilège de compter le Professeur Olivier Moréteau parmi ses membres et je le remercie très chaleureusement d’accueillir la présente communication consacrée à l’analyse juritraductologique de la traduction d’un code. Mon analyse consiste à présenter et répertorier, entre hier et aujourd’hui, les diverses raisons
pour lesquelles un code a été ou est traduit. Autrement dit, les questions posées sont les suivantes : pour qui, pourquoi et pour quoi faire
traduire un code ?
Afin de répondre à ces questions et sans toutefois pouvoir prétendre à l’exhaustivité, il convient d’avancer, à titre liminaire,
quelques définitions (I). Mon analyse se fondera uniquement sur les
théories fonctionnelles que j’ai développées en juritraductologique.
2. GÉRARD CORNU, LINGUISTIQUE JURIDIQUE 5 (Paris, Montchrestien, 3e éd.
2005).
3. Le Cerije a organisé son premier colloque international sur La pertinence
d’une juritraductologie : pour les universitaires, les juristes, les traducteurs et les
citoyens, et s’est tenu les 19 et 20 juin 2014 à la Maison de l’UNESCO à Paris.
4. http://www.cerije.eu/axes-de-recherche/.
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Pour ce faire, seront présentées les typologies fonctionnelles du
texte source et de sa traduction (II). Elles permettront une observation du rapport entre texte source et texte cible amenant à constater,
en prenant pour exemple un code, que la traduction soit remplit (III),
soit ne remplit pas (IV) les mêmes fonctions que le texte auquel elle
se rapporte.
I. DÉFINITIONS
À titre liminaire, il s’avère indispensable de rapporter quelques
définitions avant de préciser en quoi consiste la traduction d’un
code. Tout d’abord, qu’est-ce qu’un code ? Formellement, un code
est un :
recueil officiel des dispositions législatives et réglementaires
qui régissent une matière. [Intellectuellement, un code est
un] (…) ensemble cohérent des règles qui gouvernent une
matière, [un] corps de droit résultant, en une matière, du regroupement et de l’ordonnance des règles qui s’y rapportent
(en général selon un plan systématique), mais qui peut être
le fruit soit d’une véritable codification (à droit nouveau) soit
d’une codification administrative purement formelle (à droit
constant) 5.
Puis, que signifie traduire ? La traduction se définit à la fois
comme une action et comme le résultat de cette action 6. Traduire,
consiste à « faire que ce qui était énoncé dans une langue naturelle
le soit dans une autre, en tendant à l'équivalence sémantique et expressive des deux énoncés »7. La traduction comme résultat se définit comme un « texte ou ouvrage donnant dans une autre langue
l'équivalent du texte original qu'on a traduit » 8. Étymologiquement,
5. VOCABULAIRE JURIDIQUE 165 (G. Cornu, dir., Association Henri Capitant, Paris, PUF, 8e éd. 2007).
6. TRÉSOR DE LA LANGUE FRANÇAISE DU XIXe ET DU XXe SIÈCLE (17891960) 447 (P. Imbs & B. Quemada dir., Paris, Éd. du Centre national de la recherche scientifique, Gallimard, 1994).
7. PAUL ROBERT, LE NOUVEAU PETIT ROBERT, DICTIONNAIRE
ALPHABÉTIQUE ET ANALOGIQUE DE LA LANGUE FRANÇAISE 2592 (texte remanié et
amplifié sous la direction de J. Rey-Debove et A. Rey, Paris 2009).
8. Id. p. 2592.
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le mot traducere en latin signifie « faire passer », le préfixe « tra »
a pour sens « au-delà » et le verbe « ducere » veut dire « conduire »9. Souvent considérée par les juristes comme une activité purement linguistique, François Ost n’en constate pas moins que « la
traduction est devenue consubstantielle au droit »10.
L’opération de « traduction d’un code » doit être, elle aussi, précisée : c’est une activité relativement ancienne qui accompagne ou
non une activité de codification. Quoiqu’il en soit, cette activité de
traduction entre dans le champ de la traduction juridique qui est considérée en traductologie comme une traduction spécialisée et pragmatique 11. Une activité qui appartient également au domaine de la
science juridique puisque la majorité des traductions de codes réalisées dans l’histoire ont été menées par des juristes et non par des
traducteurs. Traduire un code est une opération qui s’inscrit dans un
contexte historique, politique, juridique spécifique. Sa vocation téléologique se manifeste par sa fonctionnalité et ma réflexion portera
précisément sur les fonctions de la traduction du droit en général et
d’un code en particulier.
II. LES THÉORIES FONCTIONNELLES EN JURITRADUCTOLOGIE
Les théories fonctionnelles avancées en traductologie générale
présentent un intérêt indéniable pour la juritraductologie 12. Partant

9. Dictionnaire LE LITTRÉ en ligne. Disponible sur http://www.littre.org
/definition/traduire.
10. Ariel Suhamy, Le droit de traduire. Entretien avec François Ost, LA VIE
DES IDÉES, 15 décembre 2009. Disponible sur http://www.laviedesidees.fr/Ledroit-de-traduire.html [consulté le 16/05/2016].
11. NICOLAS FROELIGER, LES NOCES DE L'ANALOGIQUE ET DU NUMÉRIQUE 18
(Paris, Les Belles Lettres, Coll. Traductologiques, 2013) : « la traduction pragmatique n’est ni la traduction littéraire, ni la traduction générale ». L’auteur indique
que le texte en traduction pragmatique est fortement lié à la trilogie : auteur, destinataire et demandeur. Au passage, la fonction de la traduction est servie.
12. La théorie du skopos constitue le point de départ initiée en Allemagne par
Hans Vermeer à la fin des années 1970. Elle a été développée par Christiane Nord
et Katharina Reiss, entre autres, et a conduit à établir une typologie des textes à
traduire fondée sur les fonctions de leur traduction.

2016]

POURQUOI TRADUIRE UN CODE ?

195

de la typologie des textes/discours juridiques 13, introduite en linguistique juridique (A), la juritraductologie propose une typologie
fonctionnelle des traductions juridiques (B).
A. La typologie fonctionnelle des textes/discours juridiques
La multiplicité des situations nécessitant de traduire le droit, révèle la nature composite des textes soumis à la traduction. Se fondant sur les travaux de G. Cornu, C. Bocquet a établi une typologie
des textes/discours juridiques en trois catégories 14 :
- les textes/discours normatifs, qui servent à créer la norme et
relèvent du discours du législateur
- les textes/discours juridictionnels à savoir les textes des décisions qui servent à appliquer la norme et relèvent du discours du juge
- les textes/discours doctrinaux qui servent à exposer et/ou
commenter le contenu de la norme et qui relèvent du discours de la doctrine
Les trois fonctions des textes/discours juridiques sont présentées
dans le tableau suivant :
Figure 1.
À quoi sert le texte/discours juridique ?
1. À créer la norme
2. À appliquer la norme
3. À exposer, commenter la norme

Il convient ici de signaler que le terme « norme » est à prendre
dans son acception la plus large. Le terme se réfère à toute énonciation d’une règle de droit. Ainsi entrent dans la première catégorie,
les textes qui créent du droit à l’issu d’un processus législatif, réglementaire, voire même contractuel 15.
13. Établie par G. Cornu et reprise par C. Bocquet.
14. CLAUDE BOCQUET, LA TRADUCTION JURIDIQUE. FONDEMENT ET
MÉTHODE 10 (Bruxelles, De Boeck, coll. Traducto 2008).
15. CORNU, supra note 2, p. 263.
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L’élaboration d’un code, quelle que soit l’institution qui en est
l’auteur (organe législatif ou exécutif), figure parmi les textes dits
normatifs à savoir ceux qui servent à créer la norme et qui relèvent
de la première catégorie. Entrent dans la deuxième catégorie, entre
autres, les décisions juridictionnelles qui servent à appliquer le droit.
Enfin, la troisième catégorie regroupe les textes qui émanent des travaux scientifiques, à savoir de la doctrine dont le rôle est d’exposer
et de commenter le droit.
Partant de cette typologie, j’ai dégagé une typologie des traductions juridiques, fondée également sur l’approche fonctionnaliste
dans une démarche juritraductologique.
B. La typologie fonctionnelle de la traduction juridique
La typologie fonctionnelle des textes et des discours juridiques
peut-elle s’étendre à la traduction juridique ? Autrement dit, est-il
possible de mettre face à face les fonctions remplies par le texte
source et par le texte cible ?
La traduction, en tant que texte cible du texte source dont elle
est l’émanation, se trouve de facto dans un rapport fonctionnel identique à celui des textes/discours juridique tel que l’illustre le tableau
ci-dessous (Figure 2).
Figure 2.
Typologie fonctionnaliste des textes et des traductions juridiques
À quoi sert le texte juridique À quoi sert la traduction du texte
source ?
juridique (cible) ?
1. À créer la norme
1. À créer la norme
2. À appliquer la norme
2. À appliquer la norme
3. À exposer, commenter la
3. À exposer, commenter la norme
norme

Les contextes internationaux, régionaux ou nationaux dans lesquels, et de plus en plus fréquemment, la traduction est produite démontrent que le texte cible sert également à remplir ces trois fonc-
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tions distinctes. En effet, la traduction accompagne la création, l’application ou l’exposé de la règle de droit, qu’il s’agisse par exemple
d’élaborer un texte normatif dans un contexte bilingue (traduction
des traités, règlements européens, lois suisses, etc.), de prononcer
l’exequatur d’un jugement étranger, de solliciter la coopération judiciaire (application de la norme), ou bien de diffuser des travaux de
droit comparé (exposer ou commenter la norme).
La question, qui se pose ici, consiste à se demander si, dans ces
divers contextes de traduction, la fonction du texte cible est ou non
la même que celle du texte source. Autrement dit, dès lors qu’une
traduction est réalisée, celle-ci présente-t-elle des fonctions équivalentes ou des fonctions divergentes à celles du texte source auquel
elle se rapporte ? Les deux hypothèses seront tour à tour analysées.
III. LA TRADUCTION REMPLIT LES MÊMES FONCTIONS QUE LE TEXTE
SOURCE : L’EXEMPLE DU CODE
Dans cette première hypothèse, il existe une stricte correspondance entre les fonctions du texte source et celles du texte cible, tel
que cela figure dans le tableau suivant.
Figure 3.
À quoi sert le texte juridique
(texte source) ?
1. À créer la norme
2. À appliquer la norme
3. À exposer, commenter la
norme

À quoi sert la traduction juridique
(texte cible) ?
1. À créer la norme
2. À appliquer la norme
3. À exposer, commenter la
norme

Le tableau illustre le rapport de stricte équivalence fonctionnelle
entre texte source et texte cible. Notre analyse portant sur la traduction d’un code, seul le premier cas sera illustré par des exemples.
Si l’élaboration d’un code remplit, par nature, une fonction normative, il s’agit de se demander dans quelles circonstances la traduction de ce même code présenterait une fonction similaire de création de la norme ? Répondre à cette question revient à se demander
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si l’élaboration du code et sa traduction sont concomitantes (A), ou
si, au contraire, elles sont différées (B) ?
A. La traduction du code est concomitante
Une telle situation peut se présenter dans des contextes d’ordre
tant international qu’interne. Même si dans le cadre d’une organisation internationale ou régionale il n’existe pas de code à proprement
parler, certains textes revêtent toutefois la même force créatrice de
droit qu’un code 16. Dès lors qu’une organisation supranationale reconnait plusieurs langues officielles, la traduction de ses textes normatifs s’impose en vue de leur entrée en vigueur au sein des États
membres. L’exemple paradigmatique du multilinguisme est fourni
par l’Union européenne. Les textes de nature normative, à caractère
plus ou moins contraignant, doivent être traduits dans les vingtquatre langues officielles afin de satisfaire à l’exigence de l’élaboration du droit européen. La traduction est non seulement concomitante mais fait, également, partie intégrante du processus législatif
d’élaboration et de l’applicabilité directe des textes.
Une situation similaire se produit au niveau national au sein des
États plurilingues, comme le Canada, la Suisse, la Belgique, etc. qui
doivent énoncer leur législation dans plusieurs langues. Ce fut aussi
le cas en Louisiane après la cession par la France aux États-Unis, le
Digeste de 1808 et le Code civil de 1825 ayant été rédigés en français et traduits en anglais. Dans le cadre de leur politique linguistique, l’adoption de toute loi génère automatiquement une traduction
dans toutes les langues officielles de ces États. La traduction d’un

16. La codification qui consiste à rassembler dans un nouveau texte unique
un acte législatif et toutes ses modifications existe au sein de l’Union européenne.
Un règlement ou une directive peuvent prendre la dénomination de code. Par
exemple, le Règlement (CE) n°562/2006 du Parlement européen et du Conseil du
15 mars 2006 établissant un code communautaire relatif au régime de franchissement des frontières par les personnes (code frontières Schengen). Ou encore, la
Directive 2001/83/CE du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 6 novembre 2001
instituant un code communautaire relatif aux médicaments à usage humain.
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code peut accompagner l’harmonisation normative d’un État plurilingue. Par exemple, le Code civil suisse de 1912 est le fruit d’un
long travail de regroupement des différents codes de droit privé
(cantonaux) existants. Il a été rédigé par Eugène Huber en allemand
puis a été traduit en français par Virgile Rossel et en italien par
Brenno Bertoni, tous deux juristes.
Dès lors que la traduction du code est concomitante à son élaboration, texte source et texte cible, sont indissociables. Les effets juridiques du code sont liés à la réalisation de la traduction et celle-ci
est investie de la même force contraignante que le texte source.
B. La traduction du code est différée
Dans ce cas, il existe un décalage de temps entre l’élaboration
du code et la réalisation de la traduction. L’histoire des traductions
des codes témoignent que, généralement, la traduction sert à implanter un code en territoire étranger.
En cas de conquête territoriale, la traduction d’un code peut
constituer un acte d’implantation forcée d’une législation nationale.
La domination politique et juridique exercée par l’État conquérant,
dont la langue n’est pas celle de l’État conquis, conduit à traduire le
code en vue de le transplanter sur le territoire conquis. Cela nous
ramène à l’œuvre juridique de l’Empire napoléonien. Les victoires
de l’armée napoléonienne ont abouti à introduire le Code Napoléon
dans de nombreux États européens. Les travaux, dont ceux de l’association Henri Capitant, ont démontré l’influence du Code civil napoléonien dans les législations passées et présentes 17. Dans la
grande majorité des cas, sa transplantation s’est accompagnée d’une
traduction 18.

17. Le Code civil français et son influence en Europe 757-765 in 2 REVUE
(1950).
18. André Tunc, Code Napoléon in ENCYCLOPÆDIA UNIVERSALIS [en ligne]:
http://www.universalis.fr/encyclopedie/code-napoleon/ [consulté le 4 janvier
2016]; par ex. Codice di Napoleone il Grande pel regno d'Italia, Volume 1, Milano, Dalla Reale Stamperia, MDCCCVI https://books.google.fr/books
INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ
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Dans d’autres cas, il peut y avoir influence juridique sans traduction c’est-à-dire que l’implantation du code n’est pas liée à une
conquête territoriale mais plutôt à un ralliement idéologique. La volonté politique d’importer le Code Napoléon se matérialise par la
traduction opérée par l’État lui-même. Hors de toute conquête,
l’Amérique latine fournit de nombreux exemples. Dans le but de
s’affranchir du droit espagnol, la Bolivie a adopté le Code Napoléon
pour sa valeur émancipatrice. En 1831, les Boliviens devenus indépendants ont traduit littéralement le Code Napoléon en vue de le
transférer dans leur ordonnancement juridique. Il en a été de même
au Venezuela dont le premier code civil est une réplique fidèle du
Code Napoléon 19.
IV. LA TRADUCTION NE REMPLIT PAS LES MÊMES FONCTIONS QUE LE
TEXTE SOURCE : L’EXEMPLE DU CODE
Diverses situations sont susceptibles de se présenter, tel que cela
apparaît dans le tableau suivant (Figure 4).
Figure 4.
À quoi sert le texte juridique
(texte source) ?
1. À créer la norme
2. À appliquer la norme
3. À exposer, commenter la
norme

À quoi sert la traduction juridique (texte cible) ?
1. À créer la norme
2. À appliquer la norme
3. À exposer, commenter la
norme

À chaque fonction du texte juridique source peut correspondre
une fonction différente de sa traduction et ce quel que soit le type de
textes, de contextes, les situations juridiques de droit international
privé ou public, etc.
La présente analyse se limitera à la seule traduction d’un code et
dans ce cas les fonctions entre texte source et texte cible ne sont pas
?id=Codice di Napoleone il Grande pel regno d'Italia; Pour sa traduction en allemand, https://books.google.fr/books?les traductions du code napoleon.
19. Imre Zajtay, Les destinées du Code civil, 6 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE
DROIT COMPARÉ 792 (1954).

2016]

POURQUOI TRADUIRE UN CODE ?

201

concordantes dès lors que la traduction ne remplit pas de fonction
normative (Figure 5).
Figure 5.
À quoi sert le texte juridique
(texte source) ?
1. À créer la norme
(texte = code)

À quoi sert la traduction juridique (texte cible) ?
1. À créer la norme
2. À appliquer la norme
3. À exposer, commenter
la norme

Sachant qu’elle peut porter soit sur l’intégralité d’un code, soit
seulement sur des parties de celui-ci, la traduction peut servir soit à
appliquer la norme (A) soit à exposer la norme (B).
A. La traduction du code sert à appliquer la norme
Cela concerne les contextes juridiques où la réalisation pratique
du droit passe par la traduction d’un code. En général, la traduction
porte sur des extraits du code et elle a pour destinataire des institutions, des professionnels du droit ou des citoyens. De multiples situations peuvent se présenter et relever du droit international privé
ou du droit international public.
Aujourd’hui, il est de plus en plus fréquent que le juge national
doive appliquer la loi étrangère. Dans le cas où les parties demandent l’application des dispositions d’un code étranger libellées dans
une langue différente de celle de la procédure, elles doivent apporter
au juge national une traduction. Cette traduction servira de fondement à la décision du juge national et donc à l’application du droit
au cas d’espèce soumis à son appréciation.
Un autre exemple peut être cité, en matière d’entraide judiciaire
européenne. Le mandat d’arrêt européen 20 se substitue dans l'Union
européenne aux procédures d'extradition classiques, État par État,
par voie diplomatique, considérées comme lourdes et inefficaces. Il
20. Mis en place par la décision-cadre 2002/584.

202

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 9

consiste en un formulaire à remplir et s’accompagne de la citation
des articles du code pénal sur lesquels se fonde la demande. L’ensemble du dossier doit être traduit dans la langue de l’autorité d’exécution à savoir le juge de l’État membre destinataire. Dans ce cas,
traduire les articles du code pénal vise à permettre l’arrestation ou
la remise par l’État membre d’exécution d’une personne réclamée
dans l’État membre d’émission du mandat en vue de l’exercice de
poursuites judiciaires ou de l’exécution d’une peine. La traduction
portera tant sur le formulaire que sur les dispositions du code pénal
qui l’accompagnent.
B. La traduction du code sert à exposer ou à commenter la norme
Par nature, ce type de traduction est réalisé dans un contexte institutionnel ou scientifique. Son objectif est de donner accès au droit
à titre informatif ou pour sa diffusion, voire dans un but pédagogique
ou d’investigation.
Selon que le code appartient ou non au droit positif, la traduction
sera diachronique ou synchronique. Rappelons que cette distinction
a été opérée par Georges Steiner. Une traduction est dite diachronique dès lors qu’elle adapte le discours de l’époque du texte source
(passé) au discours contemporain (présent). Si la traduction ne procède pas à cette adaptation, elle est dite synchronique.
Par exemple, le code d’Hammurabi est l’un des plus anciens
codes remontant au XVIIIe siècle avant Jésus Christ. Lorsque la stèle
est retrouvée à Suse en 1901, le père Jean-Vincent Scheil 21 procède
à son entière traduction. Cette traduction a apporté des enseignements précieux sur le droit babylonien qui consiste en un énoncé,
sous une forme impersonnelle, des décisions de justice du roi.
Ce Code (et sa traduction) sont exposés au Musée du Louvre, à
Paris et une copie est également exposée au musée archéologique de
Téhéran.
21. Révérend père dominicain Jean-Vincent Scheil était également un archéologue français.
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De même, le Corpus Iuris Civilis de l’empereur Justinien a été
traduit (tardivement) du latin vers le français par les juristes, Henri
Hulot, Jean-François Berthelot, Pascal-Alexandre Tissot et Alphonse Bérenger 22. L’intérêt et les apports de cette traduction, menée par des juristes, sont indéniables pour avoir inspirés les législateurs successifs 23.
La retraduction de l’anglais vers le français du code civil louisianais réalisée par le Centre de droit civil de l’Université d’état de
Louisiane (LSU) constitue également un bel exemple de restitution
d’un code dans son état originel.
Quant au droit positif, un exemple intéressant de traduction du
droit français contemporain peut être cité. Le site de Legifrance présente la traduction d’une dizaine de codes français principalement
en langues anglaise et espagnole 24. Certains textes législatifs sont
également disponibles en arabe, en allemand, en italien et en mandarin. Ces traductions ne sont destinées ni à créer la norme, ni à
l’appliquer, mais servent uniquement à exposer le contenu du droit
français. Elles n’ont qu’une valeur informative et s’inscrivent dans
le cadre d’un programme de diffusion du droit français.
En conclusion de ce bref exposé, il apparaît clairement que toute
traduction d’un texte juridique présente une visée téléologique dans
la mesure où elle est sollicitée dans un contexte particulier et à des
fins spécifiques. Que la traduction d’un code soit concomitante au
22. Une œuvre de traduction qu’avait réalisée prof. Hulot au milieu du 18e
siècle, avant la révolution française mais dont la publication avait été interdite :
http://www.histoiredudroit.fr/corpus_iuris_civilis.html.
23. PASCAL-ALEXANDRE TISSOT, CODE ET NOVELLES DE JUSTINIEN;
NOVELLES DE L’EMPEREUR LÉON, FRAGMENS DE GAÏUS, D’ULPIEN ET DE PAUL 67 (Metz, éd. Behmer et Lamort; Paris, éd. Rondonneau 1803-1811) :
Le Code civil des Français, ouvrage dont la nécessité s'était montrée depuis long-tems, et qui est l'époque la plus mémorable de notre législation,
entièrement fondé sur les lois romaines, est un des plus beaux triomphes
de ces lois. Le législateur, en les prenant pour base, en a recommandé
l'étude la plus spéciale : de sorte qu'à présent l'étude de ces lois et celle
de notre Code ne font qu'une. La traduction du corps des lois romaines
ne pouvait donc paraître dans des circonstances plus favorable : utile et
même nécessaire dans les tems précédens, elle est indispensable dans
celui-ci.
24. La maîtrise d’œuvre de ces traductions est confiée à Juriscope.
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texte source, qu’elle soit différée plusieurs années, voire plusieurs
siècles après la promulgation de celui-ci, qu’elle s’effectue au sein
d’institutions (nationales ou supranationales), d’universités ou
d’agences de traduction, elle répond strictement aux besoins des
donneurs d’ordre (législateur, exécutif, institutions nationales ou supranationales, administration de la justice, professionnels du droit,
universitaires, entreprises, justiciables, etc.) placés dans une situation à haute teneur juridique. Traduire le droit pour le droit c’est
prendre en compte non seulement la finalité de l’opération traduisante mais également le caractère plus ou moins contraignant de la
traduction du texte de droit. Les effets juridiques d’une traduction
varient en fonction des contextes dans lesquels elle est réalisée. Dès
lors qu’elle est créatrice du droit concomitamment au code luimême, la traduction d’un code se voit investie d’une fonction normative maximale c’est à dire qu’elle revêt le degré de juridicité le
plus élevé 25.

25. Sylvie Monjean-Decaudin, Les fonctions de la traduction dans le mandat
d’arrêt européen, LA GAZETTE DU PALAIS 56 (24 déc. 2009, No. 358).

THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE TRANSLATION PROJECT:
A LIBERTARIAN VIEW ON THE POSSIBLE DESTINY OF A
TRILINGUAL “FOOTNOTE”
François-Xavier Licari ∗
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Almost twenty years ago, as I was a doctoral student in Strasbourg, France, I had the privilege to follow a course by Professor
Shael Herman, who taught an Introduction to the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). In passing, he could not resist to evoke his beloved
“footnote.” What he called the “footnote” was Louisiana law: he explained that in American law books one often finds footnotes like
“except in Louisiana;” “as for Louisiana, see …,” and so on. 1 He
painted us a vivid portrait of the Romanesque genesis of Louisiana
civil law; he celebrated its Frenchness and its hybridity, in a word:
its fascinating singularity; he made us love the intellectual jewel that
it is. Since that time, my passion for Louisiana law has never decreased. I am more than delighted to explore today another one of
its facets.
∗ Associate Professor, Institut François Gény, University of Lorraine,
France.
1. Comp. Shael Herman, Apologia for a Footnote, 7 TUL. CIV. L.F. 187
(1992) 187.

206

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 9

I. INTRODUCTION: THREE GOALS
In the course of this lecture, I will address a herculean task undertaken by Prof. Moréteau and the Center of Civil Law Studies of
LSU: “The Louisiana Civil Code Translation Project.” They have
translated the present version of the Louisiana Civil Code (La. C.C.)
in French, so that now the Louisiana Civil Code exists again in its
original language. A Spanish translation is also envisaged. This bilingual, and in the future trilingual, “footnote” is accessible online,
a ubiquity that assures a maximal diffusion.2
One may wonder about the purpose of such an undertaking. Sylvie Monjean-Decaudin has already highlighted the different purposes of code translation in general. 3 To understand the motives of
the translation of the La. C.C. in particular, let’s take a look at the
project description, “The Louisiana Civil Code Translation Project:
An Introduction.” 4 It reveals that the aim of this translation is threefold.
Firstly, “the translation project will make the Civil Code available to Francophone Louisianans” and, consequently, contribute to
the promotion of the linguistic rights of this minority, disdained by
a legislature that “may have forgotten that civil codes are drafted for
citizens ….” 5
Secondly, the Louisiana Civil Code is viewed as an alternative
model that may facilitate law reform in mixed jurisdictions that have
a civil code inspired from the Napoleonic Code.

2. https://www.law.lsu.edu/clo/louisiana-civil-code-online/.
3. See Sylvie Monjean-Decaudin, Pourquoi traduire un code, hier, et
aujourd’hui ?, in this same volume of the J. CIV. L. STUD.; See also Olivier
Cachard, Translating the French Civil Code: Politics, Linguistics and Legislation,
21 CONN. J. INT’L. L. 41 (2005).
4. Olivier Moréteau, The Louisiana Civil Code Translation Project: An Introduction 5 J. CIV. L. STUD. 97 (2012); See also Olivier Moréteau, Le Code civil
de Louisiane en Français : traduction et retraduction, 28 INT J. SEMIOT. LAW 155
(2015).
5. Id. at 98.
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Thirdly, it is suggested that the Civil Code of Louisiana could
serve as a model for civil law countries as well: “Overall, the translated civil code should serve as a guide for law reform, in civil law
countries trying to bridge the divide with common law systems. This
is the case of most Member States of the European Union ….” 6
We would have expected a fourth goal: The Louisiana Civil
Code as chevalier blanc entering the European Civil Code tournament. 7 But Prof. Olivier Moréteau thinks that Europeans do not need
a European Civil Code. He is a partisan of pluralism and diversity. 8
I think the Louisiana Civil Code could have an influence on European law, depending on the point of view we adopt. If we limit
ourselves to the traditional national codification, as a model, the
Louisiana Civil Code has a very limited chance of success. But, if
we adopt a broader view and consider the law as a global market and
the Louisiana Civil Code as a highly marketable product, we have
good reasons to be optimistic.
II. THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE AS THE EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE?
In Louisiana, you are probably not aware of what a British
scholar teaching in France labeled a “game of cat and mouse.” 9 A
rather vicious game, where the leading member states attempt—
with a variable skillfulness—to place their own codification on the

6. Id.
7. In European parlance, the future (?) European Civil Code bears the less
elegant name of “Common Frame of Reference:” Martinj W. Hesselink, The Common Frame of Reference As a Source of European Private Law, 83 TUL. L. REV.
919 (2009); THE POLITICS OF THE COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE (Alessandro
Somma ed. 2009); now, the EU has lowered its ambitions and concentrates on a
unified sales law, the so called “Common European Sales Law” (‘CESL’):
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES ON EUROPEAN SALES LAW (Javier Plaza Penadés & Luz
M. Martínez Velencoso eds. 2015).
8. Olivier Moréteau, A Summary Reflection on the Future of Civil Codes in
Europe in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HELMUT KOZIOL 1449, 1451 (Peter Apathy,
Raimund Bollenberger et al. eds., Sramek, Vienna 2010).
9. Ruth Sefton-Green, The DFCR, the Avant-Projet Catala and French Legal Scholars: A Story of Cat and Mouse?, 12 EDIN. L.R. 351 (2008).
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European exchequer. Not only is there a competition between different national projects and academic circles, but in France there is
also a competition between different projects and persons. The latest
French project is only a few months old, but for the first time it
seems to have a chance to be realized. 10 All of its predecessors are
now sleeping Beauties waiting for a Prince charming who will never
come. If we focus on the French attitude towards a European codification, it is very simple to sum up. In the words of Ralf Michaels:
“Where a European Code threatens to replace the code civil with
something different, it must be opposed. Where, by contrast, the
code civil is allowed to become a European Code …, Europeanization is supported.” 11
The same could be said about almost each European country.
Probably because the majority of scholars, to which I belong, is not
convinced by such an endeavor. First, and very simply, I am not sure
that we really need such a code. The American example amply
demonstrates that the multiplicity of laws is not an impediment to a
dynamic interior market. Why not continue to brew European law
in microbreweries? What Shael Herman writes for American law is
transposable to the European situation:
Like microbreweries producing their distinctive ales and
beers, the various state judiciaries … construe enactments of
their coordinate legislatures and produce case law …. But by

10. PROJET DE RÉFORME DU DROIT DES CONTRATS, DU RÉGIME GÉNÉRAL ET
DE LA PREUVE DES OBLIGATIONS, RENDU PUBLIC LE 25 FÉVRIER 2015, with a commentary from Nicolas Dissaux & Christophe Jamin (Dalloz 2015); Cécile Chabas,
Commentaire de l’avant-projet de réforme du régime général des obligations, 113
REVUE LAMY DROIT CIVIL 105 (2014). In the meanwhile, the much awaited new
law of obligations saw the light : Ordonnance 2016-131 du 10 février 2016 portant
réforme du droit des contrats, du régime général et de la preuve des obligations
[Ordonnance 2016-131 of February 10, 2016 on the Reform of Contract Law, of
Obligations in general and of Proof of Obligations] Journal officiel de la République française [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Feb. 11, 2016; see M.
Mekki, The General Principles of Contract Law in the “Ordonnance” on the Reform of Contract Law, 76 LA. L. REV. 1193 (2016).
11. Ralf Michaels, Code vs. Code: Nationalist and Internationalist Images of
the Code civil in the French Resistance to a European Codification, 8 EUROPEAN
REVIEW OF CONTRACT LAW 277 (2012).
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definition, these different case-products are at best only persuasive for neighboring states who chauvinistically vouch
for their own domestic products. As in beer so in commercial
law. Strength resides in diversity. E pluribus unum. 12
Secondly, I really wonder why we should “bridge the divide”
between common law and civil law in Europe. I cannot agree more
with Mauro Bussani:
Why should any European codification effort pay a timeand energy-consuming tribute to the search for a compromise between continental and common law solutions? Why
should this effort be carried on with a counterparty—the
United Kingdom—that … has always kept it self as a distance from the most significant milestones of the European
Union institutional story …? Why should the continental tradition not rely merely and deliberately on itself to strengthen
its own capacity for dialogue with the non-European world
living on a civilian legacy in the Americas, in Africa and in
Asia? 13
Thirdly, a Code of obligations, or, a fortiori, a European civil
code, doesn’t seem to still be the right way to legislate. Why? Because the post-modern man (or woman) aspires to justified law; he
or she is reluctant towards the apodictic nature of codes, or, more
generally, of statutory law. In our post-modern, multicultural and
12. S. Herman, Competition in the Land of Microbreweries: Managing Multistate Transactions in the United States, 5 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 351, 355
(1997); see, in the same vein, Alain A. Levasseur, “Réponse Louisianaise” in
Réponse de la Fondation pour le droit continental, REVUE DES CONTRATS 1376
(2011): “Les deux cents ans de coexistence du Code civil louisianais, en langue
anglaise, avec la common law de quarante-neuf États sur un même continent ne
semblent pas conduire à la conclusion que l’unification du ‘droit privé’ soit une
nécessité sur ce continent.”
13. Mauro Bussani, A Streetcar Named Desire: The European Civil Code in
the Global Legal Order, 83 TUL. L. REV. 1083, 1091 (2009). Levasseur supra
note 12, expresses the same opinion in a more vigorous way:
Si je transpose le rapport ‘Louisiane contre 49 États de common law’
dans le cadre de l’Union européenne, il devient alors ‘Grande-BretagneIrlande contre 23 (?), 24 (?), 25 (?) États continentaux civilistes’. Il me
semble que ce rapport parle de lui-même ! Des ‘compromis’ avec la
Grande-Bretagne devraient-ils conduire à une ‘harmonisation’ du droit
du contrat (et non des contrats) de la civil law vers la common law ? À
une harmonisation du droit de la vente de la civil law vers la common
law ? Impensable !
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pluralistic society, women and men desire to choose the law that will
govern them. 14 The liberty of choice is already big on the law market
of the 21st century; it could be bigger in a libertarian society. Let’s
begin with a utopia and let’s end with the reality, which is not that
far from utopia.
III. THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE IN THE LAW MARKET: UTOPIA AND
REALITY
A. The Libertarian Utopia
I am not sure that everyone here is familiar to the libertarian
school of thought. As a matter of introduction, I will quote David
Friedman’s “The machinery of Freedom” (1973), one of the canonical books of anarcho-capitalism:
The central idea of libertarianism is that people should be
permitted to run their own lives as they wish. We totally reject the idea that people must be forcibly protected from
themselves .… We also reject the idea that people have an
enforceable claims on others, for anything else than being
left alone. 15
In a chapter dedicated to police, courts and laws, Friedman elaborates further on the dispensability of the state. 16 Police, courts and
laws? On the market! As a way to solve the private law disputes, the
path to a libertarian society would be the unlimited potential to resort to mediation and arbitration. 17 But you may ask, in such an anarchist society, who would make the laws? “The answer is that systems of law would be produced for profit on the open market just as
books and bras are produced today.” 18 There would be many private
14. JAN M. SMITS, PRIVATE LAW 2.0—ON THE ROLE OF PRIVATE ACTORS IN
A POST-NATIONAL SOCIETY (Eleven Int’l Publishing 2011).
15. DAVID FRIEDMAN, THE MACHINERY OF FREEDOM—GUIDE TO A
RADICAL CAPITALISM xiii (3rd ed. 2014) at XIII.
16. In fact, according to the libertarian thought, the State is not only dispensable, it is nefarious. A parasite. See MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, ANATOMY OF THE
SATE (2009).
17. FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 110.
18. Id. at 112.
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courts and a variety of legal systems. Each court would choose the
most efficient law to settle disputes. Would that society be messy? I
don’t think so: even today, there is a lot of uncertainty; the law that
applies to you sometimes depends on the country you live in; and
sometimes, it depends on your nationality. Sometimes, it is purely
accidental; remember the infamous lex loci delicti. 19 Of course,
those who join the myth according to which uniformity is beautiful
will object that Friedman’s model is a dystopic regression. But, if
the plurality of legal systems cohabiting in a territory is really problematic, “courts will have an economic incentive to adopt uniform
law, just as papers companies have an incentive to produce standardized size of paper.” 20 Basically, there would be a “competition
among different brands of law, just as there is competition among
different brands of cars.” 21
What will these “brands” of law be? As it is rather intellectually
challenging to create a brand new legal framework ex nihilo, arbitration agencies will be in search of existing adaptable models.
Whether such rules are efficient, they are familiar to the parties and
they provide answers to most of the relevant questions. They therefore provide a potential point of initial agreement and can conduct
further bargaining. The La. C.C. could be this point of initial agreement for any libertarian society which could get convinced by the
charms of Louisiana civil law. I’ll try to explain later why they
should.

19. The rejection of the lex loci delicti commissi was one of the motives of
the “American Choice-of-law Revolution.” See Symeon. C. Symeonides, The
American Choice-of-Law Revolution in the Courts: Today and Tomorrow 298
RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'ACADÉMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONALE DE LA HAYE 448
(Brill 2002).
20. FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 116.
21. Id. at 112.
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B. The Law Market Hic et Nunc
This utopia may remain nothing else than a utopia. Nevertheless,
the “law market” is already there. 22 By “law market,” I refer:
to ways that governing laws can be chosen by people and
firms rather than mandated by states. This choice is created
by the mobility of at least some people, firms and assets and
the incentives of at least some states to compete for people,
firms and their assets by creating desired laws. 23
One of the main sources of this law market is the possibility that
people have to choose the law of another state. The party autonomy
principle is cardinal in European private international law. 24 Let’s
remind us article 3 [Freedom of choice] of the ‘Rome I Regulation’:
“A contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties ….”
Indeed, it’s almost a universal principle. 25 Thus, the Louisiana rules
regarding the law of obligations could be chosen by parties worldwide to govern a contract. Indeed, it is generally admitted that contract partners can even choose a “neutral law,” a law that has no
particular factual, geographical or legal relationship with the contract. In the same vein, international arbitration law offers a great
freedom for parties to choose the applicable law. 26 Again, the parties
are free to choose the law they wish, and again, they could choose
Louisiana law of obligations. Yet, even though this principle exists

22. ERIN A. O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET (Oxford University Press 2009).
23. Id. Chapter 4, in limine.
24. For a critical approach, see Horatia Muir Watt, “Party autonomy” in international contracts: from the making of a myth to the requirements of global
governance, 6 ERCL 250 (2010).
25. Russell J. Weintraub, Functional Developments in Choice of Law for
Contracts, 187 RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'ACADÉMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONALE
DE LA HAYE 271 (Brill 1984).
26. Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Unbound: Award Detached from the Law of Its
Country of Origin, 30 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 358 (1981); Rachel Engle, Party Autonomy in International Arbitration: Where Uniformity Gives Way to Predictability, 15 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 323 (2002); Charles Chatterjee, The Reality of the Party
Autonomy Rule in International Arbitration, 20 J. INT’L ARB. 539 (2003).
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in international law, libertarian doctrine would suggest an extension
of this rule to national legal relations.
At this stage, we can see that there is a great possible field for
the success of the Louisiana Civil Code. But, what about the practice?
Why should Europe adopt such a model if a European civil code
was to see the light? And why would contract partners choose Louisiana law if they have no special ties with civil law or a mixed jurisdiction?
Now, I will inquire if the La. C.C. is worth being adopted, be it
by a legislature or by parties of a contract.
IV. THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE IS AN ATTRACTIVE GOOD ON THE
LAW MARKET
I believe that, in the competition between legal systems, the Louisiana Civil Code has an eminent role to play. Needless to say, some
institutions of the Louisiana civil law are too culturally impregnated
to be easily exported: family law, matrimonial regimes or succession
law, for example. The two books that appear as very marketable are
Book III and Book IV. Book III is entitled “On the different modes
of acquiring the ownership of things.” At its heart lies the law of
obligations. Book IV deals with “Conflict of laws.” These sets of
rules are very attractive for at least three reasons.
First of all, both France and the E.U. are seeking for reforms and
harmonization of their conflict of laws. Second, the law of obligations and the conflict of laws rules are relatively culturally neutral:
they are largely based on Roman law, logical and guided by the respect of the legitimate expectations of the parties and on economic
rationality. 27 They could then be useful for any arbitration agencies
27. REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS—ROMAN
FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVILIAN TRADITION Preface (Clarendon Press 1996); P.E.
Nygh, The Reasonable Expectations of the Parties as a Guide to the Choice of
Law in Contract and in Tort, 251 RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'ACADÉMIE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONALE DE LA HAYE 279 (Brill 1995).
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or legislature. And thirdly, the books on obligations and on conflicts
of laws enclose many interesting innovations and original provisions, as I will try to illustrate at the end of this speech.
A. Economically Efficient?
In a society where law is a product and where people are free to
choose their law, the good product should be an economically efficient one. This leads us to the haunting question of the efficacy of
the civil law vis-à-vis the common law. In this field, the perspective
is shadowy: legal economists contend that legal institutions stemming from the English common law offer superior institutions for
economic development, as compared to those of the French civil
law. 28 These authors give two main arguments. First, the common
law system supplies more adequate rules for business transactions
and financial markets; second, French private law assumes a too important place for state interventionism, which inhibits its economic
effectiveness. But, what to think about mixed jurisdictions, and, especially, about Louisiana law? If common law is really beneficial to
economic growth, the endurance of hybrid legal systems where private law belongs to the civil law tradition is perplexing. As we well
know, common law neighbors exert a great pressure on the “footnote” (Louisiana law) to put it back in the main text (U.S. common
law). Hence, there may be a good reason—and not solely a fierce
chauvinism—why this footnote does not surrender, despite the discomfort of the bottom of the text. The vitality of the Louisiana Civil
Code did not happen by chance. Darwinism, or at least common
sense, teaches us that generally useless organisms tend to disappear. 29

28. For a critical account of these common places about the non-efficiency of
the civil law, see: Nuno M. Garoupa & Andrew P. Morriss, The Fable of the
Codes: the Efficiency of the Common Law, Legal Origins, and Codification Movements, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV., 1443 (2012).
29. Nuno M. Garoupa & Carlos Gomez Ligüerre, The Efficiency of the Common Law: The Puzzle of Mixed legal families, 29 WIS. INT’L L.J. 671 (2012).
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But let’s not take law and economics too seriously; at least because an important finding of law and economics research in the two
last decades has been that the rationality assumption of the homo
economicus is often overestimated, if not mistaken. In effect, economic agents are plagued with diverse cognitive limitations that
bound their rationality. As an illustration, a recent empirical study
showed that the reason why parties in international contract disputes
preferred English law and Swiss law was far from crystal clear, and
that the attractiveness of two very different contract laws in essence
could be explained by a combination of extrinsic factors and intrinsic qualities of those contract laws. 30 The extrinsic factors are as
various as the seats of the arbitration, the language in which the laws
are available, the so-called “neutrality” of the chosen law, the model
contracts, the influence of the global law firms and the colonial past.
I will comment on two of them, the language and the neutrality.
Firstly: the language. Francophiles and francophones will see a
provocation in my statement, but the main quality of the La. C.C. is
that it is American and written in English. The American civilization
has acquired a de facto leadership: English is a lingua economica
and a lingua academica, if not the lingua franca of Europe and the
world. 31 Most recently, several countries of continental Europe have
admitted, or are discussing to admit, English as an optional court
language. 32 Surprisingly enough, France belongs to these pioneer
countries. Moreover, U.S. law(s) and U.S. law schools are prestigious; everywhere, we can observe a true reception of American

30. G. Cuniberti, The International Market for Contracts: The Most Attractive Contract Laws, 34 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 455 (2014).
31. Robert Phillipson, Lingua franca or lingua frankensteinia? English in European Integration and Globalization, 27 WORLD ENGLISHES 250 (2008).
32. Christoph A. Kern, English as a Court Language in Continental Courts,
5 ERASMUS L. REV. 187 (2012).
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law, 33 even if its exact extent is subject to debate. 34 Willy-nilly,
American English is the vernacular language of the 21st century, especially in the world of trade and international contracts, 35 even if
linguists regularly warn us that legal English is not adapted to such
contracts. 36 On the contrary, the Louisiana Civil Code offers civilian
legal English, which is suited for international contracts between
parties who do not belong to the common law world. It could also
provide a common language for civilians in Europe. 37 But, if English dominates the international commerce, it doesn’t have a monopoly. French is spoken in many of its former colonies and remains the
second language in international diplomacy. As for Spanish, it is
spoken not only in Latin America, but also in the United states.
Thus, our trilingual footnote will be accessible in languages that are
known at least passively by the immense majority of the merchants
and lawyers of the world. It is a great strength.
Second, the Louisiana Civil Code has the quality of neutrality. I
mean that it possesses this dose of universalism that is necessary to
be adapted in different places and cultures. Jurists accustomed to the
French legal culture feel at home when they delve into the Louisiana
civil code, even if its language is English. But this impression of
déjà vu is starkly nuanced by the presence of truly distinctive pieces
that awaken deep interest; all the reforms of the past decades have
borrowed from a variety of legal traditions: German law, Dutch law,
33. Wolfgang Wiegand, The Reception of American Law in Europe, 39 AM.
J. COMP. L. 229 (1991).
34. Wolfgang Wiegand, Americanization of Law: Reception or Convergence? in LEGAL CULTURE AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 137 (Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber eds., Westview Press 1996); see the volume L’américanisation du droit, 45 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT (2001).
35. Nedim Peter Vogt, Anglo-Internationalisation of Law and Language:
English as the Language of Law, 29 INT'L LEGAL PRAC. 112 (2004).
36. Barbara J. Beveridge, Legal English—How it Developed and Why It is
Not Appropriate for International Commercial Contracts in THE DEVELOPMENT
OF LEGAL LANGUAGE 55, 63 (Heikki E. S. Mattila ed., Helsinki: Kauppakaari
2002). Also available online at http://www.tradulex.com/articles/Beveridge.pdf.
37. See Olivier Moréteau, Can English Become the Common Legal Language
in Europe? in COMMON PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 405 (R. Schulze
& G. Ajani eds., 2003).
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common law, etc. The result, which some of you may regret, is that
the Louisiana civil code is less French; but this loss is compensated
by a huge gain: it has evolved into an authentically European code.
As the only genuine European Civil Code, the Louisiana Civil Code
is very suitable for cross-cultural relations. This is why European
jurists should absolutely draw from the experiment from their Louisiana colleagues to build a truly European Code, if they really want
to get one. 38 This is also the reason why partners of a contract could
choose Louisiana law as a “neutral” lex contractus.
Because of my lack of time, I will only give two examples, one
concerning the law of obligations, the other concerning conflict of
laws.
B. Two Examples of Marketable Provisions
Let’s begin with article 1967, which introduced the concept of
promissory estoppel in Louisiana law, 39 without revolutionizing it. 40

38. Mathias Reimann, Towards A European Civil Code: Why Continental Jurists Should Consult Their Transatlantic Colleagues, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1337, 1341
s. (1999).
39. In the case of Ducote v. Oden (221 La. 228, 59 So.2d 130 [1952]), the
Louisiana Supreme Court held that promissory estoppel was unknown to Louisiana law. This remained jurisprudence constante until the enactment of art. 1967.
It seems that there was no need for Louisiana courts to resort to the doctrine of
promissory estoppel. General provisions of the Civil Code relating to contract,
quasi-delict and delict provided solutions to the questions that were solved with
promissory estoppel in common law jurisdictions: Federick H. Sutherland, Promissory Estoppel and Louisiana, 31 LA. L. REV. 84 (1970). For the theoretical foundations and the genesis of the new provision, see Shael Herman, Detrimental Reliance in Louisiana Law—Past, Present, and Future: The Code Drafter's Perspective, 58 TUL. L. REV. 707 (1984); Mohamed Y. Mattar, Promissory Estoppel:
Common Law Wine in Civil Law Bottles, 4 TUL. CIV. L.F. 71 (1988); See also Jon
C. Adock, Detrimental Reliance, 45 LA. L. REV. 753, 762 (1985) (discussing the
nature of “detrimental reliance,” and how it does not harmonize well with the
civilian theory of contracts); David D. Snyder, Comparative Law in Action: Promissory Estoppel, The Civil Law and The Mixed Jurisdiction in LOUISIANA:
MICROCOSM OF A MIXED JURISDICTION, 235, 273 et seq. (Vernon Valentine
Palmer ed., 1999) (analyzing the cases rendered before and after the enactment of
art. 1967 and showing that the majority of the courts adheres to the contractual
theory).
40. In Louisiana, the doctrine of “detrimental reliance” under Civil Code article 1967 raises some concerns, at least in the field of extinctive prescription.
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This article finds itself in a chapter entitled “Cause,” in Title IV
“Conventional Obligations or Contracts,” of Book Three “Modes of

While it is reasonable to consider detrimental reliance as a “personal action” subject to a ten-year prescriptive period, it is also reasonable to consider it a delictual
obligation subject to a one-year prescriptive period. See Simmons v. Sowela Technical Institute, 470 So. 2d 913, 923–24 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1985) (regarding detrimental reliance as both delictual and contractual in nature). Given the nature of
the cause of detrimental reliance, some Louisiana courts have suggested that such
a cause of action is imprescriptible. See generally Babkow v. Morris Bart, P.L.C.,
726 So. 2d 423, 429 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1998) (citing Fontenot v. Houston General
Insurance Co., 467 So. 2d 77 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1985) wherein the court regarded
statements that lull the plaintiff into a “false sense of security” estopped the defendant from pleading prescription). David v. Snyder, Hunting Promissory Estoppel in MIXED JURISDICTIONS COMPARED: PRIVATE LAW IN LOUISIANA AND
SCOTLAND 316–17 (Vernon V. Palmer & Elspeth Reid eds., 2009) (sustaining
that, despite the location of art. 1967, Louisiana promissory estoppel has solid
delictual roots). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a dualist approach:
Turning to the merits of this issue, the answer to this question turns on
whether these two claims are viewed as contractual in nature-and thus
governed by the ten-year period-or delictual in nature-and thus governed
by the one-year period The question seems simple, but the answer is
more complex. We have applied both statutes to claims denominated as
“detrimental reliance” because the nature of the action, rather than its
label, governs which statute applies. Compare Copeland v. Wasserstein,
Perella & Co., 278 F.3d 472, 479 (5th Cir. 2002) (applying one-year
statute), with Stokes v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 894 F.2d 764, 770 (5th
Cir. 1990) (applying ten-year statute). In other words, “[w]hen evaluating which prescriptive period is applicable to a cause of action, courts
first look to the character of the action disclosed in the pleadings.” SS v.
State, 831 So.2d 926, 931 (La. 2002). We conclude that Keenan’s detrimental reliance and promissory estoppel claims derive from a breach of
promise, like Stokes, rather than a breach of duty, like Copeland (footnotes omitted): Keenan v. Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 575 F.3d
483, 487–8 (5th Cir. 2009).
This approach has been confirmed in a recent case:
Detrimental reliance claims based in contract are subject to a ten-year
prescriptive period. First La. Bank v. Morris & Dickson, Co., LLC,
45,668 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/3/10), 55 So.3d 815. Furthermore, a promisor
who lulls the promisee into a false sense of security that an action will
be taken cannot avail itself of claim of prescription. Babkow v. Morris
Bart, P.L.C., 98–256 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/16/98), 726 So.2d 423; Fontenot v. Houston Gen. Ins. Co., 467 So.2d 77 (La. App. 3 Cir.1985). Although we find the ten-year prescriptive period applicable to MCGC's
claims, these circumstances are ones in which estoppel would lie as
DHH's repeated promises to MCGC that it would investigate and enforce
its code induced Cormier into abandoning his original lawsuit. DHH's
multiple failures to do as it promised over many years would justify it
being estopped from claiming that MCGC's action is prescribed (footnote omitted): Murphy Cormier General Contractor, Inc. v. State, Dept.
of Health & Hospitals,114 So.3d 567, 598–99 (La. App. 3 Cir., 2013).
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Acquiring Ownership of things.” This chapter starts with article
1966: “An obligation cannot exist without a lawful cause,” a provision that is in the straight line of the French civil tradition. The following article gives a simple definition of the cause: “Cause is the
reason why a party obligates himself.” 41 Until now, there is nothing
new under the sun. But let’s look at the lengthy second paragraph of
this article: “A party may be obligated by a promise when he knew
or should have known that the promise would induce the other party
to rely on it to his detriment and the other party was reasonable in
so relying.” This article is remarkable: first, it preserves a notion to
which many of my French colleagues are viscerally attached, quasi
enamored: la cause. Second, this paragraph codifies a genuinely
common law concept known as ‘detrimental reliance,’ or ‘equitable
estoppel.’ The La. C.C. clearly illustrates how the concepts are intellectually linked and bridges the divide between the civil law and
the common law. But that is not all; the provision provides a very
flexible solution to sanction the breach of detrimental reliance, adding that: “recovery may be limited to the expenses incurred or the
damages suffered as a result of the promisee’s reliance on the promise.” In other words, “a court may grant damages, rather than specific performance, to the disappointed promise, and may even limit
damages thus granted to the expenses actually incurred ….” 42
This possible choice between specific performance, a typically
civilian remedy, and damages, a remedy generally preferred in common law systems, is another value of this provision. And, as a last
argument, what a wonderful illustration that “codificatory” doesn’t
necessarily rhyme with “rigidity:” With this “civilized” form of detrimental reliance, the judge has a tool that enables him to take every
factual and legal element of the case in consideration, and after having weighed all the relevant interests, to adopt the fairest solution.
The introduction of such a provision in the French Code civil would

41. Art. 1967 La. C. C.
42. Comment (e) under art. 1967.
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put some order in the nascent French case-law on promissory estoppel. 43
Now I would like to evoke a topic highly debated in the U.S. and
in Europe: punitive damages. Louisiana is proudly aligned with
modern Continental European legal systems in excluding punitive
damages as incompatible with the purpose of the law of damages: to
“repair the harm sustained by the victim of a wrong, and not to punish the wrongdoer.” 44 Louisiana lawmakers, courts, and scholars generally regard the rejection of punitive damages as an important point
of contact with the modern civil law world, and as a point of departure
from its common law neighbors. Given that the law of almost every
43. In France, the last decades have seen the emergence of new sources of
obligation of a doubtful nature: letters of intent, gentlemen’s agreements, “quasicontracts of lottery,” and “unilateral promises” without contract (engagement
unilatéral de volonté). These sources of obligation have strong connections with
the concept of detrimental reliance (the long-term distribution relations being one
of the oldest situations where legitimate expectations are protected without resorting to contract). See FRANÇOIS-XAVIER LICARI, LA PROTECTION DU
DISTRIBUTEUR INTÉGRÉ EN DROIT FRANÇAIS ET ALLEMAND 513, 517 et seq.
(2002). The concept of detrimental reliance or promissory estoppel is slowly
growing in French Law from the fertile soil of the duty of good faith: C. CIV. [Fr.]
art. 1134 § 3. But see Christian Larroumet, Detrimental Reliance and Promissory
Estoppel as the Cause of Contracts in Louisiana and Comparative Law, 60 TUL.
L. REV, 1209, 1224 (1986) (asserting the superfluity of promissory estoppel in a
civil law system). The terminology itself lacks firmness (principe de cohérence,
estoppel, interdiction de se contredire au détriment d’autrui, protection de la confiance légitime, etc.). Furthermore, its exact nature and scope need clarification.
See Horatia Muir Watt, Pour l’accueil de l’estoppel en droit privé français in
MÉLANGES EN L’HONNEUR DE YVON LOUSSOUARN 303 (1994); BERTRAND
FAGES, LE COMPORTEMENT DU CONTRACTANT n° 630 (P.U.A.M. 1997); Jean Calais-Auloy, L’attente légitime, une nouvelle source de droit subjectif? in
MÉLANGES EN L’HONNEUR DE YVES GUYON 171 (2003); Sophie Alexane, Le principe de protection de la confiance légitime peut-il se passer d’un préjudice?, 2005
REVUE DE DROIT DES AFFAIRES DE L’UNIVERSITÉ PANTHÉON-ASSAS 249; Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson, L’estoppel, concept étrange et pénétrant, REVUE DES
CONTRATS 1279 (2006); Denis Mazeaud, La confiance légitime et l’estoppel –
Rapport français in LA CONFIANCE LÉGITIME ET L’ESTOPPEL 247 (B. FauvarqueCosson ed., Société de législation comparées 2007); Pierre-Yves Gauthier, Confiance légitime, obligation de loyauté et devoir de cohérence: identité ou lien de
filiation? in VALÉRIE-LAURE BÉNABOU & MURIEL CHAGNY, LA CONFIANCE EN
DROIT PRIVÉ DES CONTRATS 109 (2008).
44. Saúl Litvinoff, § 7.6 in 6 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 205 (2d. ed.
1999); 7 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAITÉ PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS 184 (2d
ed. 1954); John W. deGravelles & J. Neale deGravelles, Louisiana Punitive Damages—A Conflict of Traditions, 70 LA. L. REV. (2000).
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U.S. state as well as a number of U.S. federal laws share a general
acceptance of punitive damages, one might dismiss the Louisiana
exception as yet another example of diversity that uniquely characterizes the U.S. legal landscape, and of the delicate balance of American federalism. But for the same reason that globalization has
forced courts in Continental civil law systems to consider punitive
damages in the context of conflicts of laws, 45 Louisiana courts are
often required to apply and review foreign laws that are repugnant
to its ordre public, or public policy. In this sense, the European experience in a shrinking world, where incompatible legal principles
cause friction, is something with which the small jurisdiction of
Louisiana is historically familiar. And how Louisiana resolves the
conflict of values between the common law world and the civil law
world is worth meditating. Louisiana Civil Code article 3546 is the
relevant provision for conflicts of laws in the field of punitive damages. The creation of Article 3546 was the first known attempt to
draft a conflicts rule specifically tailored to punitive damages:
Article 3546: Punitive Damages
Punitive damages may not be awarded by a court of this state
unless authorized:
(1) By the law of the state where the injurious conduct occurred and by either the law of the state where the resulting
injury occurred or the law of the place where the person
whose conduct caused the injury was domiciled; or
(2) By the law of the state in which the injury occurred and
by the law of the state where the person whose conduct
caused the injury was domiciled.
These examples of successful symbiosis or conciliation between
common law and civil law could be multiplied ad infinitum. 46 They
45. See Patrick J. Borchers, Punitive Damages, Forum Shopping, and the
Conflict of Laws, 70 LA. L. REV. 529 (2010); Ronald A. Brand, Punitive Damages
and the Recognition of Judgments, 43 NILR 143 (1996); Benjamin West Janke &
François-Xavier Licari, Enforcing Punitive Damage Awards in France after
Fountaine Pajot, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 775 (2012).
46. For other examples, see Joachim Zekoll, The Louisiana Private-Law System: The Best of Both Worlds, 10 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 1, 13–27 (1995).
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are the vibrant illustration of what the Hon. Jean-Louis Beaudouin
expressed here, at LSU in 2003 during a symposium entitled “Louisiana Bicentenary: A Fusion of Legal Culture 1803–2003:”
Les pays comme la Louisiane et le Québec qui ont eu l’occasion de vivre les deux traditions et donc d’avoir à leur endroit une vision critique, ont eux réussi à assimiler les éléments essentiels de ces deux grandes cultures. C’est pourquoi, à mon avis, ils peuvent servir d’exemple et de modèle
de bijuridisme authentique et concret. 47
Now it’s time to conclude. In 1986, a Louisiana colleague noted:
“… we would hope that the rest of the Union would stop treating
Louisiana civil law as the Cinderella of American law and show a
greater willingness to consider some of the good ideas that emanate
from our civil code.” 48 Today, I have tried to point the serious likelihood that our cherished Cinderella may turn into a Princess; our
host may be the good fairy she was waiting for.

47. Jean-Louis Beaudouin, Systèmes de droit mixte : un modèle pour le 21e
siècle ?, 63 LA. L. REV. 993, 998 (2003).
48. Christopher Osakwe, Introduction—Louisiana Civil Law: The Cinderella
of American Law, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1105, 1117 (1986).
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ABSTRACT
The first codes of Louisiana (1808 and 1825) were written in
French and translated into English. When the Civil Code was revised in 1870, it was written in English only. Recent revisions, all in
English, aim at promoting a civilian vocabulary that differs from
that of the common law. This article discusses the translation of the
Louisiana Civil Code from English to French in the context of the
steep decline and limited revival of the French language usage in
Louisiana. It explores the purpose and the implementation process
of the translation project, detailing every step, and identifying linguistic and legal challenges as well as resources relied on. With the
objective of producing a truly Louisianan translation, translators
used original French sources to discover what the legislator intended the law to mean. The process may then be described as a
retranslation, aiming at reviving the original language. Where texts
have been substantially rewritten, yet still reflecting civil law logic
and style, the translation aims at echoing the spirit of the Code.
However, in the several occasions where the drafters borrowed
common law substance and style, the civilian spirit no longer vivifies the translation, as it is obscured by an overabundance of language.
RÉSUMÉ
Les premiers codes de Louisiane (1808 et 1825) furent rédigés
en français et traduits en anglais. À l'occasion de la révision de
1870, le Code civil fut publié en anglais seulement. Les révisions récentes, bien sûr en anglais, veillent à promouvoir un vocabulaire
civiliste qui se distingue de celui de la common law. Cet article discute le travail de traduction du Code civil de Louisiane de l'anglais
vers le français dans le contexte du profond déclin et d'un réveil
limité de la francophonie en Louisiane. Il explore l’intérêt du projet
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et sa mise en oeuvre, détaillant chaque étape et identifiant les difficultés linguistiques et juridiques, ainsi que les ressources utilisées.
L'objectif étant de produire une traduction authentiquement louisianaise, la traduction remonte aux sources françaises originelles
chaque fois que le texte a peu évolué ou a été reproduit, afin de retrouver la lettre des origines, dans un processus de retraduction.
Lorsque les textes ont été substantiellement réécrits mais restent
dans la logique et la stylistique du système civiliste, la traduction se
veut fidèle à l'esprit des origines. En revanche, lorsque le législateur
emprunte la substance et le style de la common law, comme il le fait
parfois, la lettre surabondante vient tuer l'esprit civiliste qui peine
alors à vitaliser la traduction.
In the loving memory of Ti-Jean Hernandez,
Ami passionné de la francophonieβ
Louisiana’s jurilinguistic history is unique. In 1812, the Territory of Orleans became the 18th state to be admitted in the Union,
changing its name to Louisiana. It consisted in the southern tip of
the huge territory of Louisiana, which had been sold by France to
the United States of America in 1803. A Civil Code had been
adopted, written in French and translated into English: first in the
form of a bilingual Digest of the Civil Laws (1808), and later in the
form of a bilingual Civil Code (1825) after substantial rewriting. The
text was entirely revised in 1870, but was only published in English.
Until very recently, even though the Civil Code has been extensively
revised over the last decades, a French translation of the Civil Code
did not exist. The effort discussed in this article is a true work of
translation, since all new developments were translated from English to French. It is also a work of retranslation, at least in regard to
β

This article is a tribute to the memory of John “Ti-Jean” Hernandez III
(1968-2012), the late President of the Francophone Section of the Louisiana State
Bar Association, who, along with his father John A. Hernandez, Jr., worked with passion and success to the establishment of international relations with bar associations in
Belgium, Canada, France, and Haiti. The author would like to thank Jean-Claude Gémar and Anne Wagner for encouraging him to write this article and Alexandru-Daniel
On, Michael McAuley, and Robert A. Pascal for their help in its realization.
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sections of texts originally written in 1808 or 1825. The current English translation of these parts is simply a by-product of a translation
from French into English.
In the wake of the French codification, Louisiana was the first
region in the world to adopt a civil code, the first of its kind in the
Western hemisphere. This bilingual Code was adopted in a still
largely monolingual territory. Written in French, the Code was translated into English and enacted in both languages to be accessible to
the many English-speaking Americans who migrated to New Orleans after the Louisiana Purchase in 1803. After the Civil War, many
Louisianans were bilingual. Despite this, the government of Louisiana imposed the use of the English language. Consequently, the
Civil Code was revised, and in 1870, was published in English only.
Although the French language lost its prevalence in Louisiana, civil
law was preserved, but in English.
The first part of this article explains the transition from a bilingual code to a monolingual code. This is a paradoxical evolution
since Louisiana was mostly French speaking when the bilingual
Code was introduced and when the Code was completely translated
into English Louisianans were bilingual. The second part questions
whether the project of (re)translation of the Louisiana Civil Code
from English to French coincides with a return to bilingualism.
The Louisiana Civil Code translation project, conducted by the
Center of Civil Law Studies at Louisiana State University (LSU),
will render the Code more accessible to the francophone minority,
who inevitably became bilingual. It is now, in fact, impossible to
participate in the social and economic life in Louisiana without
speaking English. As such, Louisiana’s institutional discourse
mostly favors the promotion of French in its cultural, economic,1
1. The website of the Council for the Development of French in Louisiana
(CODOFIL, <www.codofil.org>, last consulted on June 20, 2016) states the following:
According to the 1990 census, approximately 250,000 Louisianans responded that French was the main spoken language in their homes. The
2000 census showed 198,784 Louisiana francophones over the age of 5, including 4,470 who speak Creole French. The Council for the Development of
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and touristic endeavors. Therefore, the purpose of this project should
not be viewed as an attempt to entice a return to bilingualism. Despite a warm welcome by the French-speaking population of Louisiana, especially members of the Francophone Section of the Louisiana State Bar Association, the translation of the Code into French
will likely have a limited local impact due to the universal use of
English in Louisiana today.
Though not as extensively as Canada, Louisiana contributes significantly to the translation of legal texts. Until now, translation efforts supported by the state moved from French into English: translation of Codes written in French in the 19th century, translation of
French legal literature classics to inform legal thinking in Louisiana.
The current 21st century project discussed in this paper reverses the
tide. This time translation goes from English into French.
Contrary to custom, even if it may be unwise of the author to
comment on his own work at the risk of having it labeled as a manifesto or propaganda, the author will offer a series of reflections,
which may ultimately help critics and commentators. To this end,
he offers a brief survey of the French language and of Louisiana’s
civil law tradition, and positions the project in the context of other
Louisianan translations.
As of today, more than 75 percent of the Louisiana Civil Code
has been revised. Three types of provisions can be identified and all
three will be discussed in the final part of the article. Firstly, some
provisions were not retouched at all or were only slightly revised.
Translators abided by the letter of the law and restored the original
French, refraining as much as possible from retranslating. Secondly,
French in Louisiana was created in 1968 by the Louisiana state legislature. The
scope of the act was to preserve the already existing francophone core in Louisiana. According to Legislative Act No. 409, the Governor of Louisiana is authorized to appoint the president and fifty members of the Council. CODOFIL
is empowered to “do any and all things necessary to encourage the development, utilization, and preservation of French, as found in Louisiana for the
greatest cultural, economic and touristic benefit of the state.
Then, the name of the agency became the Council for the Development of French
in Louisiana.
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many Code articles were rewritten in an effort to facilitate the convergence with the common law of neighboring states while being
loyal to the civil law tradition. Translators were faithful to the spirit
of the law by using clear and concise language. Thirdly, some articles were directly borrowed from the legislation and jurisprudence
of other states. They resemble more to statutes as opposed to articles
of the Civil Code mirroring common law both in form and in substance. When this occurs, the spirit of the civil law tradition is no
longer present in the text and we find it difficult to see how it could
vivify the work of translation.
I. FROM A BILINGUAL CODE IN LARGELY MONOLINGUAL
LOUISIANA TO A MONOLINGUAL CODE IN BILINGUAL LOUISIANA
Louisiana was only briefly a French colony (A), which did not
prevent French to prosper until the Louisiana Purchase in 1803. Beyond that, the language continued to flourish until the materialization of the two bilingual civil codes promulgated in 1808 and 1825
(B). On the other hand, despite the fact that Louisiana was mostly
bilingual, the 1870 and the 20th century revisions were monolingual
(C).
A. French Louisiana: A Brief History
In 1682, Cavelier de la Salle took possession of Louisiana in the
name of French King Louis XIV. 2 As of 1699, France took political
control of vast territories from the Great Lakes to the Gulf of Mexico
and all the way to the Rocky Mountains. Accordingly, French law
was introduced three centuries ago, when King Louis XIV of France
signed a letter patent on September 14, 1712, providing that all laws
applicable in Paris and its province, including Edicts, Ordinances

2. BERNARD LUGAN, HISTOIRE DE LA LOUISIANE FRANÇAISE 1682–1804
(Perrin 1994); FRANCOIS-XAVIER MARTIN, THE HISTORY OF LOUISIANA (Lyman
& Beardslee 1827; reprint Gretna: Pelican 2000).
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and Customs, were applicable to Louisiana. 3 New Orleans was
founded in 1718 and became the most important seaport of the Western Hemisphere. At the end of the Seven Year’s War, France ceded
Louisiana to Spain (Treaty of Fontainebleau, 1762). Consequently,
in 1769, Spanish law officially replaced French law. Years later, in
1800, Napoleon Bonaparte repossessed Louisiana during twenty
days without re-establishing French law and then ceded Louisiana to
the United States (Louisiana Purchase, 1803).
Immediately after the Louisiana Purchase, civil law was maintained insofar as it was compatible with the Constitution of the
United States (Act of Congress of 1804). The Territory of Orleans,
later to become the State of Louisiana (1812), was separated from
other sold territories with at its head Governor Clairborne, and a legislative council of thirteen members appointed by the President of
the United States. In 1806, James Brown and Louis Moreau-Lislet,
two prominent jurists who mastered the French and Spanish languages, were mandated to write a civil code. Within less than two
years, they produced a code, which was renamed Digest when voted
into law. 4
B. The Codification of 1808 and 1825: The First Bilingual Codes
The Digest of the Civil Laws Now in Force in the Territory of
Orleans was enacted on March 31st, 1808, and published in a bilingual edition with the English text on the left page and the French
text on the right one. 5 Although the text was written in French and

3. Olivier Moréteau, Louisiana 1812–2012: 200 Years of Statehood and 300
Years of French Law Influence, 59 LA. B. J. 325 (2012) [hereinafter Louisiana
1812–2012].
4. VERNON VALENTINE PALMER, THE LOUISIANA CIVILIAN EXPERIENCE,
CRITIQUES OF CODIFICATION IN A MIXED JURISDICTION 10–15 (Carolina Academic Press 2005) [hereinafter THE LOUISIANA CIVILIAN EXPERIENCE]; Moréteau, Louisiana 1812–2012, 325 supra note 3.
5. The Digest is available online, on the LSU Law Center website
<http://www.law.lsu.edu/clo/digest-online/>, last consulted on June 20, 2016. The French
original text and the English translation can be separately or jointly seen on the same
screen. The two versions have been typed from the first edition of 1808, printed in
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was hurriedly translated into English, the act placed both versions
on equal footing, most probably in order to reassure the new immigrants. Although it was organized as a code, the text is called digest
because it did not substitute the pre-existing law. Spanish law, which
was still in effect before the Purchase, therefore remained in force.
In fact, the law only abrogated Spanish texts that contradicted the
Digest. As a consequence, whenever a more detailed explanation
could be derived from Spanish compilations or Roman law, judges
used these historical sources for interpretation, unless they were convinced that there was a contradiction between the Digest and the
previous texts. 6 This gave rise to complex court debates. As such, it
inevitably defeated the purpose of the Digest, which was to clarify
the law and end the need to resort to foreign languages (including
Latin) in Louisiana legal practice. 7
This discussion illustrates the Spanish origin of the Digest 8 and
explains the state of confusion in Louisiana during the years following the first codification. Contrary to what had been done in France,
the Louisiana legislature did not intend to break with the past, which
is the reason why earlier law was not systematically repealed. To
remedy the confusion, the Civil Code of 1825 abrogated all laws,
which were in place when Louisiana was ceded to the United States
(art. 3521), “in every case, for which it has been especially provided
in this Code.”
The texts of 1808 and 1825 are comparatively similar, and the
structure is comparable to the one used in the French Civil Code.
The framework of the French Code was adopted because it mirrored
New Orleans by Bradford & Anderson. The formulation and the orthography of the period were strictly followed, only the obvious typing errors have been eliminated. This
project, conducted by the Civil Law Center at LSU, marked the commemoration of
the bicentenary of the Louisianan codification of laws, in 2008.
6. Cottin v. Cottin, 5 Martin (o.s.) 93 (La. 1817).
7. Act of March 31, 1808, No. 120, 1808 La. Acts 126.
8. Though the text received significant French influence, not only in form
but also in substance: see JOHN W. CAIRNS, CODIFICATION, TRANSPLANTS AND
HISTORY: LAW REFORM IN LOUISIANA (1808) AND QUEBEC (1866) (Talbot Publishing 2015), and book review by Olivier Moréteau, 4 COMPARATIVE LEGAL
HISTORY 94 (2016).
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the Institutes of Gaius and, hence, the civilian tradition. When drafting the Code, the substance of articles was borrowed or reused each
time the French Code or its project offered a similar solution to that
of Spanish law, 9 causing the Louisiana Code to be described as “a
Spanish girl in French dress.” 10 For example, remnants of Spanish
law were used when Spanish and French law differed such as in cases
involving issues of alimony, marital portion, and matrimonial regimes. Careful historical analysis proves, however, that the drafters
at times opted for the French solution when more suitable than the
Spanish one, for instance when deciding to end the patria potestas
once the child reached the age of majority. 11 The use of Spanish law
during the Digest period points to its historical continuity, whilst the
Louisiana Code can largely be described as the first codification of
Spanish law. 12 Spanish sources were quoted so often that they had
to be translated into English. 13
This contributed to the creolization of Louisianan culture. The
codification of Spanish laws in French and in English was enacted
for a predominantly French-speaking population, which also spoke
Spanish, English, and Creole.
C. The 1870 and the 20th Century Revisions: The End of Bilingualism
Following the abolition of slavery, the Civil Code of 1825 was
substantially modified. The revision was entrusted to John Ray, who

9. Robert A. Pascal, Sources of the Digest of 1808: A Reply to Professor
Batiza, 46 TUL. L. REV. 603, 606 (1972); Thomas J. Semmes, History of the Laws
of Louisiana and of the Civil Law, 5 J. CIV. L. STUD. 313 (2012).
10. Robert A. Pascal, Of the Civil Code and Us, 59 LA. L. REV. 301, 303
(1998) [hereinafter Civil Code and Us].
11. CAIRNS, supra note 8, at 204–217.
12. Olivier Moréteau & Agustin Parise, Recodification in Louisiana and
Latin America, 83 TUL. L. REV. 1103, 1104 (2009) [hereinafter Recodification].
13. LOUIS MOREAU-LISLET & HENRY CARLETON, A TRANSLATION OF THE
TITLES ON PROMISES AND OBLIGATIONS, SALE AND PURCHASE, AND EXCHANGE;
FROM THE SPANISH OF LAS SIETE PARTIDAS (Roche 1818); RICHARD KILBOURNE,
A HISTORY OF THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE 100–108 (Baton Rouge: Center of
Civil Law Studies 1987, reprinted Claitor 2008).
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had good knowledge of the Code, the legislation, and the case law. 14
Subsequent legislation was integrated into the Code without changing its framework. The quality of English was also improved. In fact,
the mistakes, which were numerous in the translation of 1825, were
for the most part corrected. As a result, the English version was of
better quality and encompassed strengths of three generations of
civil law practice in English. From a jurilinguistic perspective, this
would be interesting to study. However, the improvements of the
English version were made at the expense of the French version,
which was ultimately abandoned.
How do we explain the abandonment of the French language
when Louisiana was still widely French speaking? Of course, the
question caught the attention of many jurists, but it is one of cultural
and historical nature. Jurists note that the legislature would have
drawn conclusions from the “[f]ading of the French language and
legal culture.” 15 After the American Civil War, the use of English
almost became universal in the political, legal, and administrative
realms. Since there was an important decline in the citation of
French and Spanish sources, some advocated for the outright abandonment of the civilian tradition. They suggested using the Civil
Code as a mere statute, which is a legislative act to be interpreted
against the backdrop of common law. 16
As a general rule, English supremacy was imposed upon a population, which was still widely French speaking. Similarly to the situation in France, where secular and compulsory public education
eradicated the practice of regional languages, the schooling of young
Louisianans became compulsory in 1916 and was strictly in English.
As such, the climate was unfavorable to the emergence of linguistic

14. JOHN RAY, THE CIVIL CODE OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA: REVISED,
ARRANGED AND AMENDED (Office of the Louisiana Intelligencer 1869).
15. Athanassios N. Yiannopoulos, The Civil Codes of Louisiana in
LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE xlix–lxx, lix (A.N. Yiannopoulos ed., 2015).
16. Id.
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rights, a concept unknown at the time. 17 This decline particularly impacted the Cajun community. Many families gave up the practice of
French hoping for an easier integration for their children into American society.
In fact, the evolution of Louisiana’s constitutions mirrors this decline. The original Constitution of 1812, written in English and
French, made it compulsory for all laws to be promulgated in English (art. 6 (15)) without imposing a French translation. This resulted
in the unexpected decline and fall of the French language. 18 Additionally, the Constitution of 1845 imposed bilingualism for the writing of the laws and the Constitution (art. 132). The Constitution of
1852 also imposed English (art. 100), while authorizing the use of
French during legislative debates (art. 101). The provisions in favor
of the French language disappeared with the Constitution of 1864.
Furthermore, at the end of the Civil War, the Constitution of 1868
through article 109 imposed the use of English for the writing of
laws and for judicial and legislative debates. As such, it was legally
forbidden to impose the use of any language other than English in
judicial proceedings. This provision was in force when the Civil
Code of 1870 was promulgated.
The ban of the French language was lifted by the Constitution of
1879. According to article 154, in certain cities, the enactment of
laws in French and their use for judicial announcements were permitted, though not imposed. Also, article 226 required that:
The general exercises in the public schools shall be conducted in the English language and the elementary branches
taught therein; provided that these elementary branches may
be also taught in the French language in those parishes in the
State or localities in said parishes where the French language
predominates, if no additional expense is incurred hereby.

17. The Universal Declaration of Linguistic Rights was only written in 1966 and
it is impossible to find an equivalent to article 16 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms in the state of Louisiana.
18. PALMER, THE LOUISIANA CIVILIAN EXPERIENCE, 16–18, supra note 4.
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This was again required in the constitutions of 1898 (art. 251)
and 1913 (art. 248). Theodore Roosevelt’s battle cry “one nation,
one people, one language” became reality in Louisiana. The Constitution of 1921 no longer referred to French, but imposed the use of
English (art. 12(12)).
It was not until the current Constitution that we witnessed a
timid official recognition of linguistic rights. The Constitution of
1974 makes it clear that “the right of the people to preserve, foster,
and promote their respective historical, cultural, and linguistical origins is recognized” (art. 12 (4)). The Council for the Development
of French in Louisiana (CODOFIL) had meantime been created in
1968 to promote the teaching of French as a second language and in
immersion programs. 19
As for legislative work, it is still exclusively produced in English, whether it is at the debating level, or at the ratification of the
law. The revision of the Civil Code started in the 1970s and continued for several decades. It was prepared by the Louisiana Law Institute, which was created in 1938 with the specific purpose of promoting and encouraging “ . . . the clarification and simplification of
the law of Louisiana and its better adaptation to present social
needs.” 20 The choice was made to revise the Code title after title
instead of undertaking a mere linguistic revision and updating it.
The Louisiana State Law Institute also did not want to carry out a
structural revision, which would have amounted to a recodification.
More than 70 percent of the Code had been revised by 2008 21 and
the work is soon coming to an end. Over the years, the revision mobilized dozens of reporters and hundreds of members of the Louisiana State Law Institute, professors, judges, and lawyers who worked
19. 1968 La. Acts No. 409.
20. Law No. 166 July 2, 1938; William E. Crawford, The Louisiana State
Law Institute — History and Progress, 45 LA. LAW REV. 1077 (1985); William E
Crawford & Cordell H. Haymon, Louisiana State Law Institute Recognizes 70–
Year Milestone: Origin, History and Accomplishments, 56 LA. B. JOURNAL 85
(2008).
21. Moréteau & Parise, Recodification, supra note 12, at 1118.
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in committees. Once finished and approved by the Council of the
Institute, each draft is subject to a discussion and to a vote of the
legislative assemblies.
It is often the case that when judges interpret contemporary provisions, which origins can be dated back to the Code of 1825 or to
the Digest of 1808, they typically favor the French version. Indeed,
they are no longer bound by the law of March 31st, 1808, which put
the two linguistic versions on an equal footing. In a landmark decision,22 a federal judge insisted on the necessity to approach the text
as a code and not as a statute. 23 He cited historical sources and precedents of the Louisiana Supreme Court, which before and after the
Civil Code of 1870, stated that the French text should always prevail.24
II. THE 21ST CENTURY TRANSLATION: A RETURN TO
BILINGUALISM?
Though French appeared to be a dying language in Louisiana, a
revival of the language is occurring in the Bayou State (A). Most
notably, Louisiana contributes to the creation of a singular jurilinguistic heritage, while developing an English vocabulary of civil law
that remains truly French in form and substance (B).
A. A French Renaissance in Louisiana
While Acadians and Quebeckers successfully fought for the defense and promotion of the French language and culture, Louisiana
let it decline to a rich folklore. The creation of the Council for the
Development of French in Louisiana (CODOFIL) in 1968, however,
marked a cultural awakening. In fact, this linguistic identity was recognized in the Constitution of 1974. Today, the teaching of the
22. Shelp v. National Surety Corp., 333 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1964).
23. Olivier Moréteau & Didier Lamèthe, L’interprétation des textes juridiques rédigés dans plus d'une langue, REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT
COMPARÉ 327, 341–42 (2006).
24. Phelps v. Reinach, 38 La. Ann. 547 (1886).
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French language and the development of immersion programs are
encouraged.
Many Cajuns and Creoles contributed to the return of French.
For example, Zachary Richard revives the language through songs.
Also, the International Festival of Louisiana, and the Acadian and
Creole Festival turn Lafayette into an important city for Francophone music. Additionally, Barry Jean Ancelet, who is known for
his work on oral literature in French-speaking Louisiana, writes
about the connections between language and culture. 25 At LSU, the
Center for French and Francophone Studies develops interdisciplinary opportunities for learning in connection with official organizational representatives of the French-speaking world. I modestly contribute by teaching a class in French since 2010 (Introduction to
French Law) at the LSU Law Center, which is also open to postgraduate students of the Department of French Studies. Amanda
Lafleur, the coordinator for Cajun Studies at LSU, has contributed
to the French Lexicography Database 26 created under the aegis of the
Agence universitaire de la Francophonie (AUF). Dictionaries have
also been published, including the outstanding Dictionary of Louisiana French. 27
Some law-related words can be found in the dictionary published
in 2009. For example, one can find the verb “avocasser” (to plead a
case), and the expressions “ça prend pas un avocat” (it is obvious;
this does not require a lawyer) or “t’es pas proche un avocat” (you
are not as smart as you think you are). Louisiana’s French word for
courthouse is “maison de cour,” which is an interesting literal translation of the term. As for the word “code,” it cannot be found in the
Dictionary of Louisiana French. In fact, the closest term to “code”
25. Barry Jean Ancelet & Amanda Lafleur, La revitalisation endogène du
cadien en Louisiane in LE FRANÇAIS EN AMÉRIQUE DU NORD 411–437 (Albert
Valdman, Julie Auger, Deborah Piston-Hatlen eds., Presses Universitaires de
l’Université Laval 2005).
26. <http://www.tlfq.ulaval.ca/bdlp>, last consulted on June 21, 2016.
27. ALBERT VALDMAN & KEVIN J. ROTTET, DICTIONARY OF LOUISIANA
FRENCH, AS SPOKEN IN CAJUN, CREOLE, AND AMERICAN INDIAN COMMUNITIES
(University Press of Mississippi 2009).
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(found in the 1993 Dictionary of Cajun Language by Daigle, meaning “book of laws”, moral code, and system of secret writing) is “codache” (foolish), an expression that may be used by those who have
a “beau parlement” (an elegant oral style) in order to designate those
who waste their time in “parlementages” (idle gossip).
B. The Development of the Jurilinguistic Heritage in Louisiana
When it comes to scholarly language and with an interesting
connection to Quebec, great creativity should be noticed. The Louisiana Civil Law Dictionary, which was recently published by two
young local authors, 28 demonstrates it well. This English dictionary
of 88 pages is first and foremost intended for students and gives a
faithful image of the civil law in English. When possible, definitions
were borrowed from articles of the Louisiana Civil Code or it referred directly to relevant articles.
The dictionary first defines the three following terms: absolute
simulation (with a cross-reference to simulation), abuse of right, and
accession. The latter puts emphasis on the fruits and the products
but unfortunately without citing the general definition of article 482.
When looking at the word act, one finds act of administration, act
of disposition, act under private signature, act translative of title,
authentic act, conservatory act, juridical act, material act, and preparatory acts. All of these acts, with the exception of the material
act, follow the civilian tradition, and clearly demonstrate Louisiana’s civil law roots.
The Louisianan term act under private signature offers an example of the literal translation of a French legal term (“acte sous
seing privé”). Quebec, on the other hand, translates the same notion
into private writing. The Civil Code of Louisiana also uses the expression partnership in commendam (art. 2836), which is closer to
the French “société en commandite” than the universally used term
28. GREGORY W. ROME & STEPHAN KINSELLA, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
DICTIONARY (Quid Pro 2011).
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of limited partnership, most notably found in the Civil Code of Quebec (art. 2236). Finally, enrichment without cause (art. 2298) is
translated word-for-word from French. The Civil Code of Quebec,
however, uses the term “enrichissement injustifié” (art. 1493–1496),
which translates into unjust enrichment in English. Quebec legislators did this even though it was possible to translate the term to unjustified enrichment. In Quebec, legal terminology of civil law in
English is similar to the international standards adopted by comparatists. Louisiana, on the other hand, made a point to keep the terminology close to the French one, even if it risked appearing more exotic to an American audience, which in any case rarely consult comparative law literature. Quebec lawmakers also did not go so far as
to use the universally admitted concept of tort in comparative law.
They translate the term “responsabilité civile” into civil liability (art.
1457), whereas Louisiana remains faithful to the “délits et quasidélits” of the Napoleonic Code, translated by offenses and quasi offenses (art. 2315). Delict and quasi delict is, nevertheless, more
faithful to the Roman origin (the Digest of 1808 translated “Des
Quasi-Délits” into Of Quasi Crimes or Offenses).
All these examples confirm that, in Louisiana, legal texts are traditionally translated from French into English with the civil codes
of France and Louisiana remaining the main terminological referents.
III. WHO TRANSLATES WHAT IN LOUISIANA?
Translations of the codes and of French civilian literary classics
(A) attest to Louisiana’s tradition of translating from French into
English. In fact, at least from the Louisianan point of view (B), the
translation and retranslation of the Civil Code from English into
French are innovative exercises.
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A. English Translations of Civilian Literary Classics
Few jurists outside of Louisiana are aware of the work of translation undertaken by the Louisiana State Law Institute and continued by the LSU Center of Civil Law Studies:
Thanks to Louisiana, several great classics of French civilian literature are available in English. The Louisiana State Law Institute had translated works of Gény, the Planiol Treatise on
Civil Law and the Aubry and Rau Treatise, in order to remedy
the locally limited doctrinal production. Alain Levasseur has
more recently translated Atias, Favoreu, and Halpérin. The Association Capitant also contributes to such work with its new journal and a translation project of the Vocabulaire juridique Cornu
with the assistance of Louisianan civil law jurists.29
Since the writing of local 30 and comparative doctrine is now
more prolific, 31 this translation effort is not as active. Nonetheless,
this does not mean that French doctrine is no longer being translated
in Louisiana. The material used for teaching many civil law courses
in Baton Rouge or New Orleans include numerous translated texts.
They are most often translated from French, but also from other languages: this includes doctrinal writing, court decisions, and legislation. In this effort to make continental systems (and most notably
French law) more accessible to Louisianan students, the LSU Center
of Civil Law Studies intends on adding this gray literature to the
Civil Law Online database, 32 once the French translation of the Louisiana Civil Code is completed.
29. Olivier Moréteau, La traduction de l’œuvre de François Gény : méthode
de traduction et sources doctrinales in LA PENSÉE DE FRANÇOIS GÉNY 69, 71–72
(Olivier Cachard, François-Xavier Licari, François Lormant, eds., Dalloz 2013).
See also Alexandru-Daniel On, Making French Doctrine Accessible to the English-Speaking World: The Louisiana Translation Series. 5 J. CIV. L. STUD. 81–95
(2012); GÉRARD CORNU, DICTIONARY OF THE CIVIL CODE (LexisNexis 2014) was
published in the meantime.
30. Phillip Gragg, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise Series, 5 J. CIV. L. STUD.
301, (2012); Susan Gualtier, Louisiana Civil Code Précis Series, 5 J. CIV. L.
STUD. 305 (2012).
31. VERNON VALENTINE PALMER & ELSPETH CHRISTIE REID, MIXED
JURISDICTIONS COMPARED: PRIVATE LAW IN LOUISIANA AND SCOTLAND (Edinburgh University Press 2009).
32. <http://www.law.lsu.edu/clo/>, last consulted on June 21, 2016.
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B. The French (Re)translation of the Louisiana Civil Code
After a few words on the value of this translation project (1), the
approach will be discussed and its empirical nature will be highlighted (2). The current translation effort receives international support (3), and the results have already been disclosed to the public,
even though it still is an ongoing work (4).
1. The Value of the Project
Since the revision of 1870, the French version of the Louisiana
Civil Code is no longer available to the francophone population of
Louisiana. Even though French-speaking Louisianans only represent 5 or 10 percent of the populace, it seemed natural to give them
back their code in its language of origin. Some have noted that the
Civil Code is, above all, written for the people. In fact, its purpose
is to inform us of our rights and duties. The Code is also meant to
help us understand these rights, at least regarding simple issues,
without resorting to expensive legal advice. 33 In fact, there is a Francophone Section in the Louisiana State Bar Association, and some
cases are pleaded in French in a few courts in South Louisiana, such
as in the Cajun country. The French translation is a contribution,
although modest, to the linguistic rights of the French minority.
It will benefit the French-speaking world far beyond the Mississippi River Basin and it might make it easier for law reform in other
mixed legal systems in and around Africa (Cameroon, Mauritius,
Seychelles), Asia (Cambodia, Vietnam), the South Pacific (Vanuatu), and elsewhere. It might make business relationships between
Louisiana and French-speaking countries easier. It might also be

33. Olivier Moréteau, De revolutionibus, The Place of the Civil Code in Louisiana and in the Legal Universe in LE DROIT CIVIL ET SES CODES: PARCOURS À
TRAVERS LES AMÉRIQUES 1–34 (Jimena Andino Dorato, Jean-Frédérick Ménard,
Lionel Smith eds., Thémis, Montreal 2011), 5 J. CIV. L. STUD. 31–66 (2012) [hereinafter De revolutionibus]; see also A Summary Reflection on the Future of Civil
Codes in Europe in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HELMUT KOZIOL 1449–1459 (Peter Apathy
et alii Eds., Jan Sramek Verlag 2010); Pascal, Civil Code and Us, supra note 10.
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used as a model, at least to some extent (for instance in contract law)
in regions working to facilitate the dialogue between civil law and
common law, as is the case in the European Union. Furthermore, it
will draw attention to the many linguistic problems and their resolutions. Also, just as the English version of the Civil Code of Quebec, it will likely contribute to the development of civil law in English.
A Spanish version of the Louisiana Code will likely follow, and
Louisiana may one day have a trilingual code, just like Quebec.34
Although it was the predecessor of the Spanish Civil Code, the Louisiana Civil Code has never been fully translated in this language
despite the heavy influence of the Code of 1825 on the codification
movement in Latin America. 35 In this age of recodification, the
Spanish version will perhaps bring this influence back to life. 36
2. An Empirical and Documented Approach
The translation work began in 2009, when the project director
translated the Preliminary Title and the beginning of Book I (Of Persons). Professors David Gruning (Loyola, New Orleans) and JeanClaude Gémar (Montreal) revised the Preliminary Title. During a
six-month visit to the Center of Civil Law Studies, Professor Michel
Séjean (then a doctorate candidate at Paris 2) began the translation
of Book II, Title 4, on contracts and conventional obligations.
In 2010, an agreement was reached with the Université de
Nantes, which among other things allowed the annual hosting of two
or three interns, who were enrolled in the Master of Trilingual Legal
Studies, for three months at LSU. A first group of interns stayed in
Baton Rouge from April to June 2011. Anne-Marguerite Barbier du

34. Jimena Andino Dorato, A Jurilinguistic Study of the Trilingual Civil Code
of Québec, 4 J. CIV. L. STUD. 591 (2011).
35. Agustin Parise, The Place of the Louisiana Civil Code in the Hispanic
Civil Codifications: Inclusion in the Comments to the Spanish Civil Code Project
of 1851, 68 LA. LAW REV. 823 (2008).
36. Moréteau & Parise, Recodification, supra note 12.
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Doré, Laurie Chalaux, and Charlotte Henry worked on the translation of Book I and Titles III, IV, VII, and XII of Book III. Dr. Ivan
Tchotourian (then in Nantes, now at Université Laval in Quebec)
translated titles relating to mandate and suretyship (Book III, Titles
XV and XVI), when he visited the LSU Center of Civil Law Studies
for a few months in the fall of 2011. A second group of interns, Anne
Perocheau and Anne-Sophie Roinsard, worked at LSU from April
to June 2012 on the translation of Book I, as well as Titles IV, V,
and VII of Book III. They also worked on the translation of the civil
law words (from English to French) for the Dictionary of the Civil
Code by Gérard Cornu. Alexandru-Daniel On (research assistant at
LSU) and Professor Anne Tercinet (EM Lyon Business School) cooperated in this part of the work, during a research visit at LSU in
June 2012.
In Spring 2013, Laura Castaing and Jean-Pierre Hufen continued
the work, and in Spring 2014, Oriane Defoix, Giorgia Fabris and Mélissa Richard also worked on the project, followed in Spring 2015 by
Sarah Charlat, Delphine Drouard, and Sara Vono, and in spring 2016
by Lucie Talet. The titles relating to successions and donations (Titles I and II), were translated in 2015 and 2016, as well as real securities and privileges (Titles XX to XXII-A), translated in spring 2016
by Lucie Talet. Books I and II were completed in 2015. From January
to June 2014, Dr. Matthias Martin (Université de Lorraine) revised
almost 850 articles on the occasion of a postdoctoral visit, to which
he added a few hundred more from 2012 to 2016. Significant work
was accomplished by the CCLS Research Associates, AlexandruDaniel On (2012–2014), Gaëlle Forget (2014), and Jason MaisonMarcheux (2015–2016) regarding revision and publication. By the
end of June 2016, the translation was completed and, after another
revision, it was made entirely available online in July 2016.
This project features a combination of individual efforts and
teamwork. While one intern translated one chapter, another intern
translated another chapter generally on another subject. They also
cross-checked each other’s work, and kept track of changes and
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comments in the electronic document through the “track change”
command of the Word program. They were provided with dictionaries and the most frequently used dictionaries were the following:
Black’s Law Dictionary, 37 Vocabulaire juridique Cornu and Dictionary of the Civil Code (after 2014), Dictionnaire juridique
Dahl, 38 Robert, Harrap’s and Oxford English Dictionary. Also, a
translation software (Wordfast) has been used since 2013 to facilitate the data collection and their use. This software created a translation memory, which was essential considering the fact that there
were many translators working on the project and at different periods of time. The translation memory was enriched by the work done
from the beginning and additional records were created in 2013, to
include the bilingual Digest of 1808 and the bilingual Civil Code of
Quebec, hereby made available to the translators. The civil codes of
France and Quebec, as well as all necessary doctrinal sources, were
obviously available and widely used together with the Compiled
Editions of the Civil Codes of Louisiana.
During weekly or biweekly meetings chaired by the project director or his research associate, and attended by short-term visitors
and translators, the texts to be revised were projected on a screen
with the proposed changes. The translations were discussed, corrections were made, and in the event further research proved to be necessary, the final approval was postponed until the next meeting. The
linguistic choices were carefully documented, and were recorded in
the translation memory. Other specialists were occasionally consulted, especially in regard to technical issues or procedural rules. In
the spring of 2016, the sequence of translation meetings was intensified, with three or four meetings per week, to which Christabelle
Lefebvre (Université de Montréal) and Sara Vono (LSU LL.M.) also
participated.
37. BRYAN A. GARNER, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed., West 2009)
[hereinafter BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY].
38. HENRY SAINT DAHL, DAHL’S LAW DICTIONARY, DICTIONNAIRE
JURIDIQUE DAHL (Hein, Dalloz 1995).
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The most widely used document for the translation and during
meetings is the Compilation of the Civil Codes of Louisiana. It consists of two large volumes prepared between 1938 and 1940 under
the supervision of Joseph Dainow. The compilation was published
by the state of Louisiana (Louisiana Legal Archives 1940), 39 and
was recently published online on the LSU website. 40 The overall
work and Books I and II of the Code (accounting for 25 percent of
the total volume) were carried out by Professor Emeritus Robert A.
Pascal, who was then assistant of Professor Dainow. 41 The compiled
edition was established pursuant to an act of the state legislature of
Louisiana (Act of 1938, No. 165), and was published by the Louisiana State Law Institute (created by the Act of 1938, No. 166) as
volume 3 of the Louisiana Legal Archives. For each article of the
Civil Code of 1870, the Compiled Edition shows the corresponding
(or original) provision found in the 1825 Code and the 1808 Digest.
The compilation puts a parallel with the original articles of the
French Civil Code of 1804, and the Government Project of 1800,
which are reproduced as much as necessary in French but also in
English. The compilation is certainly of value to any person wanting
to study the evolution and the origins of Louisiana law, but it also
offers an English civil law translation (as opposed to a common law
translation) of the French Civil Code.
The importance of the compilation’s translation work should not
be exaggerated as it reuses, for the most part, the official translations
of 1808 and 1825. This is because many articles of the Louisiana
civil codes directly come from the Code of 1804 and the Project of
1800. Dainow thought that it was better to not retain the translations

39. COMPILED EDITION OF THE CIVIL CODES OF LOUISIANA, LOUISIANA
LEGAL ARCHIVES vol. 3 (State of Louisiana 1940), hereafter COMPILED EDITION.
40. <http://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/la_civilcode/>, last visited June 21,
2016.
41. Robert A. Pascal, Recollections of a Life Studying and Teaching Law in
ROBERT ANTHONY PASCAL: A PRIEST OF RIGHT ORDER 25, 31 (O. Moréteau ed.,
Baton Rouge: Center of Civil Law Studies 2010) [hereinafter Recollections].
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of the Napoleonic Code, which were available at that time. 42 They
were nevertheless cited in an abbreviated manner when they were
occasionally used. All three are the work of common law jurists and
use common law terminology. 43 The translation of the French Code
was made “in terms familiar to Louisiana lawyers.” 44 The Projet du
gouvernement of 1800 was partly reproduced upon the express request of Robert A. Pascal. At the same time that he envisioned the
method to complete and present the compilation, 45 Pascal was successful in convincing Joseph Dainow of the actual influence of the
Projet, especially on the writing of the preliminary titles of the texts
of 1808 and 1825. Since no English translation of this text existed, it
was written in the same spirit as the translation of the Code of 1804,
until the end of Book II, which was most likely written by Robert A.
Pascal. Professor Pascal does not recall having translated it, 46 which
can easily be explained by the fact that the Code and the Projet were
quoted in the compilation each time they had inspired the drafters of
the 1808 and 1825 codes, who very often recopied them word for
word. 47
This valuable document of more than 2,000 pages is now available online through the Center of Civil Law Studies website for the
benefit of historians, jurists, and jurilinguists. 48 It is a much needed
connector between the online publication of the Digest of 1808 and
the bilingual version of the present Code.

42. Translations of the French Civil Code: The Code Napoleon or French Civil
Code, translated into English by a Barrister of the Inner Temple, London, 1827; The
French Civil Code, translated into English by Blackwood Wright, London, 1908; The
French Civil Code, translated into English by Cachard, revised edition, Paris, 1930.
43. COMPILED EDITION, supra note 39, Explanatory Note by Dainow, at xviii.
44. Id. Foreword at xiii.
45. Pascal, Recollections 31, supra note 41.
46. Interview of Robert A. Pascal by O. Moréteau, November 6, 2012 (on file
with the author).
47. COMPILED EDITION, supra note 39, Explanatory Note at xix.
48. Supra note 40.

246

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 9

3. A Sustained Effort in a Context of Financial Crisis
The translation of the Code of Louisiana, performed under the
leadership of the Center of Civil Law Studies, has caught the attention of the French-speaking world. The Organisation internationale
de la francophonie proposed a funding plan in 2008, as the bilingual
Digest of 1808 was made available online on the occasion of the
commemoration of the Bicentennial of codification in Louisiana,
and the Journées louisianaises of the Association Henri Capitant.
Shortly after the Bicentennial, the United States entered into a
recession, and in the context of crisis, the Center for French and Francophone Studies offered seed money for the translation project of
the current Civil Code. Although symbolic in nature, the Center’s
financial support was helpful to the realization of the project. Whilst
surviving with minimal staff, the Center of Civil Law Studies was,
indeed, selected for a French-American grant (Partner University
Fund 49), which provided support from 2012 through 2015, and in
fact until the completion of the project in 2016, as part of a joint
program with Université de Nantes (Training Multilingual Jurists).
The Partner University Grant funded student and faculty mobility,
two international conferences (Baton Rouge, April 2014, 50 and
Nantes, January 2015 51) and the publication of a Bilingual Louisiana
Civil Code in book format, due at the beginning of 2017. 52
The enthusiastic support of the French Embassy to the United
States and of the General Consulate of France in New Orleans (particularly by Consul Generals Olivier Brochenin, Jean-Claude
Brunet, and Grégor Trumel) energized the team throughout the process. The project was proudly honored by the director receiving the
49. A project of the FACE Foundation, Supporting French-American Cultural Exchange in Education and in the Arts, a collaboration with the Cultural
Services of the French Embassy to the United States.
50. Papers are published in the two issues of volume 9 of the Journal of Civil
Law Studies (2016).
51. Papers to be published by Giuffrè Editore, forthcoming 2017.
52. Under contract with Société de législation comparée in the Droit privé
comparé et européen book series, edited by Professor Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson. The book will be published with an introduction by O. Moréteau.
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John Ashby Hernandez III Memorial Francophone Leadership
Award, from the Louisiana State Bar Association, on June 5, 2014,
and being promoted Officier des palmes académiques by the French
Prime Minister on January 1, 2016.
4. A Work in Progress
The project presented is a work in progress and no aspect is final
even at the time of full publication in July 2016. The results are released on the Louisiana Civil Code Online page, 53 with yearly updates keeping pace with code reform and revision. Large excerpts
have been published in the Journal of Civil Law Studies, published
by Center of Civil Law Studies, 54 and the whole Civil Code will
appear in a bilingual volume in 2017. 55
The leader of this project who is neither a linguist nor a translator
advocates his work with humility. With the objective of learning,
improving, and perfecting this work, which he wants to be as much
collective and participative as possible, he welcomes comments and
criticism, and will work at improving the translation.
IV. FIRST THOUGHTS OF THE (RE)TRANSLATOR
The translation of the Louisiana Civil Code aims to bring back to
life the original French as it was written in the Digest of 1808 and
the Code of 1825. The objective is to produce an authentic Louisianan translation comparable to the English translation of the Civil
Code of Quebec, which is authentic to its French Quebecker roots.56
53. <http://www.law.lsu.edu/clo/louisiana-civil-code-online/>, last visited October 20, 2016.
54. Olivier Moréteau, The Louisiana Civil Code Translation Project: An Introduction, 5 J. CIV. L. STUD. 97 (2012); Preliminary Title, Book III, Titles III, IV
and V, 5 J. CIV. L. STUD. 105 (2012); Book III, Titles XV and XVI, 6 J. CIV. L.
STUD. 653 (2013); Book III, Titles VII and VIII, 7 J. CIV. L. STUD. 195 (2014);
Book III, Title VI, 8 J. CIV. L. STUD. 209 (2015); Book II, 8 J. CIV. L. STUD. 493
(2015).
55. Supra note 52.
56. It produces a Montreal sound, as explained orally by Justice Nicholas
Kasirer during the International Symposium of the Bicentennial of the Louisiana
Civil Code at the Tulane University Law School, New Orleans, November 19–
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Translators attempted to remain faithful to the letter of the law whenever they reproduced texts of 1808 and 1825 (A). Also, when the text
was rewritten in the successive revisions, it was important to remain
faithful to the spirit of the law (B). By contrast, when the text of the
Code is altered by the addition of provisions written in style of a
statute rather than that of a code, the wording kills the spirit of the
law, which then hardly vivifies the translation work (C).
A. Reproduced or Slightly Modified Texts: The Letter of the Law
Staying faithful to the original language used in the Code and its
sources is a priority in this project, given the fact that the French version of the Civil Code, whenever traceable, is recognized by the
courts as authoritative, whenever the English may contradict the
French. 57 This, however, sometimes leads the translators to use words
that are not part of contemporary French. For example, in article
2520, we used the French “défaut” (instead of “vice”), which was
taken from the text of 1825 (Art. 2520, paragraph 2). In Book I,
however, article 252 of the 1825 Civil Code was retranslated differently, with a translator’s note explaining the choice: “Lorsqu’une
femme se trouve enceinte au moment du décès de son mari, on ne
peut nommer de tuteur à l’enfant jusqu’à sa naissance…” (the note
reads: Text unmodified since 1825: “Si une veuve se trouve grosse
au tems [sic] de la mort de son mari…” in the original text).
The translation of the Preliminary Title provides an example of
terminological hesitation. Revised in 1987, article 1 states that “The
sources of law are legislation and custom.” This represents an addition to the text of 1870, which stated “Law is a solemn expression
of legislative will”. Similar wording was transposed to article 2:
“Legislation is a solemn expression of legislative will.”
In order to eliminate the risk of confusion caused by the polysemy of the word law, and following the recommendation of the
22, 2008, and at the 37th John H. Tucker Lecture in Civil Law at the LSU Law
Center, Baton Rouge, April 10, 2014.
57. See discussion supra, Section I in fine.
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Louisiana State Law Institute, the legislator in 1987 kept law whenever it meant “droit” in French, and substituted legislation where the
word law was formerly used to mean “loi.” This is possible in English, since the word legislation refers to (1) “the process of making
or enacting a positive law in written form,” (2) “the law so enacted,”
and (3) “the whole body of enacted laws.” 58 However, meaning (2)
does not exist in French: the five meanings listed in the Vocabulaire
juridique Cornu refer to meanings (1) and (3), but do not include
meaning (2). 59 The project director, then working on his own, initially decided to provide a translation that is different from the original text by literally translating the word legislation and departing
from the source-text that reads: “La Loi [sic] est une déclaration solemnelle [sic] de la volonté législative.” 60 Upon first revision by Professor David Gruning whose mother tongue is English, the translation was upheld. Called at a later stage, Professor Jean-Claude Gémar noticed the anglicism and called for correction. Even though the
English word had been modified during the last revision, there was
no reason to depart from the original texts.
In the attempt to give the Code its original Louisianan sound, the
translation of the Code therefore requires a perfect handling of the
lexicographical and historical tools. Deviations in translation should
be avoided. For example, in article 7, the translator used the word
“sauvegarde” instead of “maintien”: “Les personnes ne peuvent par
leurs actes juridiques déroger aux lois relatives à la sauvegarde de
l’ordre public.” Article 11 of the Code of 1825, which is the original
text, forbade any dispensation “aux lois qui sont faites pour le maintien

58. B. A. GARNER, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at Legislation, supra note 37.
59. GÉRARD CORNU, VOCABULAIRE JURIDIQUE at Legislation (8th ed., PUF
2007).
60. Digest of 1808 and article 1 of the Civil Code of 1825 reproducing article
6 of Title I of the Preliminary Book of the Government Project, 1800: “Among
all peoples, law is a solemn expression of legislative authority, upon a subject of
interior regulation and common interest,” text which was not incorporated in the
French Code of 1804.
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de l’ordre public [et des mœurs].”61 The translator should not forget
Boileau’s saying: “Cent fois sur le métier remettez votre ouvrage”
If at first you do not succeed, try, try, try again . . .
With the intent of respecting the original text, non-official titles
given to the articles in more recent 20th century editions of the Civil
Code were not translated. Although these titles are sometimes obvious (example: art. 1 – Sources of law; article 8 – Repeal of laws),
they are sometimes inappropriate or inelegant (example: art. 27 –
General legal capacity; art. 31 – Existence of a person at time of
accrual of right). Above all, the titles and the comments written by
the Louisiana State Law Institute make it more difficult to read the
Code. As such, it should not be a surprise that we chose to not translate the comments as well. 62 Moreover, the titles are sometimes incorrect. The title of article 1498 reveals an embarrassing ignorance
of a civil law principle. The article precludes the donor inter vivos
from divesting of his property and compels him to keep enough for
his own subsistence. If he does not do so, the donation is null for the
whole. The title was reworded when it was revised in 1996 and the
title strangely reads “Nullity of donation inter vivos of entire patrimony.” 63 Aubry and Rau would likely turn over in their graves, if
they heard such phrasing. 64 The Center of Civil Law Studies chose
to publish the Civil Code without any titles of articles or any comments 65 similarly to the 1947 Code, which was produced under the

61. Good morals (“bonnes mœurs”) were whisked away at the occasion of
the revision of 1987.
62. These comments are meant to instruct the legislators as to the extent of
the legislative changes proposed in the draft prepared by the Louisiana State Law
Institute. They are printed in annotated editions of the Code published by West
and LexisNexis, but strictly speaking they have no legislative force.
63. In a 1932 edition (Dart 1932: 463), article 1497 (seat of such a rule) was
titled: Donations inter vivos — Restriction on amount, formulation that was legally correct.
64. Nicholas Kasirer, Translating Part of France’s Legal Heritage: Aubry
and Rau on the Patrimoine, 38 REVUE GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT 453 (2008).
65. Pascal, Civil Code and Us, supra note 10, at 306–307.
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leadership of Canadian Joseph Dainow, who was the first director
of the Center of Civil Law Studies at LSU. 66
B. The Rewritten Texts: The Spirit of the Original Texts
The revision process of the Civil Code, which began in the
1970s, generated a great number of new provisions. The reform of
the law of obligations as adopted by the legislature in 1984 67 is a
good example of the successful convergence between civil and common law. The drafters remained faithful to civil law taxonomy, conceptual grammar, as well as underlying principles. They further endeavored to preserve as much as possible the original meaning of
the Civil Code by favoring clarity over concision. The revised Titles
III and IV of Book IV are good examples of articles that truly embody the spirit of the original texts.
Translators tried to remain faithful to this spirit and did not shy
away from making the translated text shorter, guided by French legislative stylistics. For example, article 1786 states the following:
“When an obligation binds more than one obligor to one obligee, or
binds one obligor to more than one obligee, or binds more than one
obligor to more than one obligee, the obligation may be several,
joint, or solidary.” Here is our French translation: “Lorsqu’elle lie
plusieurs débiteurs à un créancier, un débiteur à plusieurs créanciers,
ou plusieurs débiteurs à plusieurs créanciers, l’obligation est séparée, conjointe ou solidaire.” The word obligation is not repeated,
may be becomes is (“est”) 68 and more than one becomes “plusieurs.”
The expression several obligations, which does not exist in the

66. CIVIL CODE OF LOUISIANA REVISION OF 1870 WITH AMENDMENTS TO
1947 (Joseph Dainow ed., West 1947).
67. Act 1984, No. 331, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1985, reforming Titles III (Obligations
in general) and IV (Conventional obligations or contracts) of Book III.
68. Article 1825 gives another example. About subrogation, it states: “It may
be conventional or legal” that becomes “elle est conventionnelle ou légale,” since
we do not see what else it could be. It is true that one needs to be a jurist to be in
such position as to judge; our original translation “elle peut être” was more cautious, and deemed to be acceptable.
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French legal vocabulary, 69 is translated into separate obligation
(“obligation séparée”), reusing the French wording of article 2072
of the 1825 Civil Code. 70 When translated from English into French,
the number of words decreased from 39 to 24, but the article remains
the same in substance.
For comparison purposes, here is the English version of article
1821 paragraph 2:
An obligor and a third person may agree to an assumption
by the latter of an obligation of the former. To be enforceable
by the obligee against the third person, the agreement must
be made in writing.
Here is the French version:
Le débiteur et un tiers peuvent convenir de la prise en charge
par ce dernier de l’obligation du premier. Afin que le créancier puisse l’opposer à ce tiers, l’accord doit être passé par
écrit.
The article is shorter by two words in French. Also, assumption
is translated into “prise en charge” instead of “délégation.” A translator’s note explains the choice: “in addition to the assumption of the
obligor which is a real delegation (see art. 1886), the Louisiana Civil
Code also considers the assumption following an agreement between the obligee and a third person consenting to assume the obligation of the original obligor (art.1823).” The next sentence: “The
obligee's consent to the agreement does not effect a release of the
obligor” translates into “Le consentement du créancier ne libère pas
le débiteur,” which is a more incisive sentence. The French translation eliminates the redundant word “agreement” and shortens does
not effect a release (five words) into “ne libère pas” (three words).

69. The French Civil Code only distinguishes between joint obligation and
solidary obligation.
70. The Louisianan solution is reused in the French translation of the Principles of European tort law: PRINCIPES DU DROIT EUROPÉEN DE LA
RESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE : TEXTES ET COMMENTAIRES 196 (O. Moréteau ed., M.
Séjean trans., Société de législation comparée 2011).
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The translation of Title III offers a few examples of language
clarification. The first example focuses on the French idea of “opposabilité,” which is difficult to translate into English. In article
1859, is not valid against is translated into “n’est pas opposable.”
Translators preferred this expression to “est inopposable” because it
emphasized the negative construction of the sentence and the rule it
contains. Another example concerns the translation of false-friend
words execution and the verb to execute. In the Code, 71 they are
translated into “passation” and “passer” (art. 1833 and 1836): “An
authentic act is a writing executed before a notary public” is translated into “L’acte authentique est un écrit passé par devant un notaire
public” (art. 1833 A).
As a general rule, as in the aforementioned provision, the indefinite article at the beginning of the sentence is replaced with the definite article in French. This can be illustrated by comparing the English and French versions of article 1906: “A contract is an agreement
by two or more parties whereby obligations are created, modified, or
extinguished.”; “Le contrat est un accord entre deux ou plusieurs
parties qui crée, modifie, ou met fin à des obligations.”
Also, the singular is sometimes preferred to the plural as shown
by article 1918: “All persons have capacity to contract . . . .” which
is translated to “Toute personne a la capacité de contracter . . . .” On
a similar note, if is mostly translated into “lorsque.” The French term
“si” was only used when translating if when it came in second position or introduced a sub-hypothesis (art. 1767, 1773, 1774, 1782,
1804, 1805).
The Civil Code of Quebec served as a reference, when it came
to the translation of notions inspired by common law, such as “prépondérance de la preuve” (preponderance of the evidence) (art.
1957) or “preuves circonstancielles” (circumstantial evidence) (art.
2840 of the Civil Code of Quebec).
71. These words are ubiquitous in the Civil Code and are not to be understood
as meaning performance and to perform, which translate into “exécution” and to
“executer.”
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Article 1967 illustrates a famous example of a common law transplant into the Louisiana Civil Code. The article introduces the concept of detrimental reliance or promissory estoppel (without explicitly using these words) right after the definition of “cause:”
Cause is the reason why a party obligates himself.
A party may be obligated by a promise when he knew or
should have known that the promise would induce the other
party to rely on it to his detriment and the other party was
reasonable in so relying. Recovery may be limited to the expenses incurred or the damages suffered as a result of the promisee’s reliance on the promise. Reliance on a gratuitous
promise made without required formalities is not reasonable.
In French, it is translated as follows:
La cause est la raison pour laquelle une partie s’oblige.
Une partie peut s’obliger par une promesse lorsqu’elle savait ou
aurait dû savoir que la promesse conduirait l’autre partie à se fier
à celle-ci à ses dépens et que cette autre partie s'y est fiée
raisonnablement. Le recouvrement peut être limité aux dépenses engagées ou aux dommages subis du fait de la confiance
que le bénéficiaire de la promesse avait placée en celle-ci. La
confiance en une promesse gratuite faite sans les formalités requises n’est pas raisonnable.
Four additional words are used in the French version. In regard
to the common law, the French text hardly manages to stay concise.
This is because promisee was translated to “bénéficaire de la
promesse . . . .”
C. The Distorted Texts: When the Letter Kills the Spirit
Several provisions of Title V of Book III (Obligations Arising
Without Agreement) combine ideas inspired from both civil law and
common law. With slight adjustments, the general provision on enrichment without cause could be nicely incorporated into the French
Civil Code:
Article 2298. A person who has been enriched without cause
at the expense of another person is bound to compensate that
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person. The term "without cause" is used in this context to
exclude cases in which the enrichment results from a valid
juridical act or the law. The remedy declared here is subsidiary and shall not be available if the law provides another
remedy for the impoverishment or declares a contrary rule.
The amount of compensation due is measured by the extent
to which one has been enriched or the other has been impoverished, whichever is less.
The extent of the enrichment or impoverishment is measured
as of the time the suit is brought or, according to the circumstances, as of the time the judgment is rendered. 72
The outlook changes when we turn to Chapter 3 (Of Offenses
and Quasi Offenses), and particularly article 2315, which starts in
the most promising way by using the well-known general clause of
article 1382 of the Napoleonic Code. A new paragraph was however
added, loaded with common law detail, at odds with the generality
and simplicity of the French model:
Art. 2315. A. Every act whatever of man that causes damage
to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair
it.
B. Damages may include loss of consortium, service, and society, and shall be recoverable by the same respective categories of persons who would have had a cause of action for
wrongful death of an injured person. Damages do not include
costs for future medical treatment, services, surveillance, or
procedures of any kind unless such treatment, services, surveillance, or procedures are directly related to a manifest
physical or mental injury or disease. Damages shall include

72. Art. 2298 :
Une personne qui a été enrichie sans cause au détriment d’une autre est
tenue de compenser cette dernière. L’expression “sans cause” est utilisée
dans ce contexte pour exclure les cas dans lesquels l’enrichissement résulte d’un acte juridique valable ou de la loi. Le recours envisagé ici est
subsidiaire et n’est pas ouvert lorsque la loi prévoit un autre recours pour
l’appauvrissement ou une disposition contraire.
Le montant de la compensation est calculé compte tenu de l’enrichissement de l’un ou de l’appauvrissement de l’autre, le plus petit des deux
étant retenu.
L’étendue de l’enrichissement ou de l’appauvrissement est calculée au
moment où le procès est intenté ou, selon les circonstances, au moment
où le jugement est rendu.
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any sales taxes paid by the owner on the repair or replacement of the property damaged.
In the following article, things get even more complex:
Art. 2315.1. A. If a person who has been injured by an offense or quasi offense dies, the right to recover all damages
for injury to that person, his property or otherwise, caused
by the offense or quasi offense, shall survive for a period of
one year from the death of the deceased in favor of:
(1) The surviving spouse and child or children of the deceased, or either the spouse or the child or children.
(2) The surviving father and mother of the deceased, or either of them if he left no spouse or child surviving.
(3) The surviving brothers and sisters of the deceased, or any
of them, if he left no spouse, child, or parent surviving.
(4) The surviving grandfathers and grandmothers of the deceased, or any of them, if he left no spouse, child, parent, or
sibling surviving.
…
D. As used in this Article, the words "child", "brother", "sister", "father", "mother", "grandfather", and "grandmother"
include a child, brother, sister, father, mother, grandfather,
and grandmother by adoption, respectively.
E. For purposes of this Article, a father or mother who has
abandoned the deceased during his minority is deemed not
to have survived him.
This article and subsequent provisions of the Louisiana Civil
Code resemble more to common law statute than civil law clauses.
Note that the phrasings of the articles include detailed definitions,
and the wording is often redundant (i.e., section D). In fact, this type
of language is usually not included in a code and it is more common
in a statute. The number of words shows this: 298 words in French
versus 269 in English. The repetition of the words “dommages et
intérêts” in the same article triples the word damages. Subsequent
articles keep up listing siblings and relatives. The worst is yet to
come such as in article 2322.1, which is which is only partly reproduced here:
Art. 2322.1. A. The screening, procurement, processing,
distribution, transfusion, or medical use of human blood and
blood components of any kind and the transplantation or
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medical use of any human organ, human tissue, or approved
animal tissue by physicians, dentists, hospitals, hospital
blood banks, and nonprofit community blood banks is declared to be, for all purposes whatsoever, the rendition of a
medical service by each and every physician, dentist, hospital, hospital blood bank, and nonprofit community blood
bank participating therein, and shall not be construed to be
and is declared not to be a sale. Strict liability and warranties
of any kind without negligence shall not be applicable to the
aforementioned who provide these medical services.
Such provisions would be more welcomed in Volume 9 of the
Revised Statutes, which is an annex of the Civil Code. Unfortunately, many provisions distort other parts of the Code. The lengthy
provision in article 2844, defining the liability of partners in commendam, is a telling example. Feared by the members of our team,
these rules pose many challenges: nothing should be missing in the
catalog; every word should be properly translated and repeated as
often as necessary since the aim is to translate and not to rewrite the
law. Unless we want to inspire ourselves of the French Social Security Code or the French General Tax Code instead of the Louisiana
Civil Code, it is sometimes difficult to find a French construction
and sound.
***
To conclude on a more optimistic note, the author of the present
article asked to be appointed as a member of the Louisiana State
Law Institute’s committee in charge of semantics. The committee is
responsible for style and semantics review of drafts proposed by
other committees before they are sent to the Institute Council for
final approval, and then to the legislature for adoption. Its mission
is to identify lexical contradictions and propose more appropriate
wording. The author believes that his in-depth knowledge of the
Code, largely earned though the translation work, will help him notice questionable word choices and constructions, and that he will be
able to suggest better and more convincing choices. The French
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(re)translation may on this point contribute to the improvement of
the English version, through a cross-fertilization, leading to a better
knowledge of the boundaries existing between the language and the
law.73 The translation project is now complete, but no call has yet
been received from the Louisiana State Law Institute.

73. See in this volume Alexandru-Daniel On, Revision and Translation: The
Louisiana Experience, 9 J. CIV. L. STUD. (2016). See also Olivier Moréteau, Les
frontières de la langue et du droit : vers une méthodologie de la traduction juridique, 61 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ 695 (2009).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The history of revision of the civil law in Louisiana can be described as a story of the resilience and survival of the Louisiana Civil
Code. The laws most adaptable to changing circumstances survive
the vicissitudes of time, and around the world, civil codes have
proven to be amongst the most resilient types of legislative acts. The
French Civil Code has survived for more than 200 years even though
France has gone through a succession of some 13 constitutions in
the meantime. 1 The liberal Romanian Civil Code of 1865 survived
∗ Ph.D. Candidate, Maastricht University; Associate Member of the Center of Civil Law Studies; Member of the Ius Commune Research School; Former
Research Associate, Louisiana State University (2013-2014); LL.M. in Comparative Law (Louisiana State University, 2013); LL.M. in Private Law (Babes-Bolyai University, 2011); LL.B (Babes-Bolyai University, 2010). Research for this
paper has been conducted for the most part while the author was still working for
the Louisiana State University as a Research Associate, but some parts have been
corrected and some gaps filled by the author since then. Many thanks are owed
for valuable comments and discussions to Professor Olivier Moréteau, Professor
William E. Crawford, Professor Alain A. Levasseur and Professor Emeritus Robert A. Pascal, to Jason Maison-Marcheux for the help in the research of this paper,
and to Sara Vono and Christabelle Lefebvre for editing.
1. Olivier Moréteau, The Future of Civil Codes in France and Louisiana, 2
J. CIV. L. STUD. 39, 44 (2009); Olivier Moréteau, Codes as Straight-Jackets, Safeguards, and Alibis: The experience of the French Civil Code, 20 N.C.J. INT’L. &
COM. REG. 273 (1995).
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through 50 years of communism, becoming a true testament to the
resilience and adaptability of civil codes. 2 Other civil codes, like the
German Civil Code and the Swiss Civil Code have been around as
well for more than a century. 3
There are several factors that contribute to the resilience of
codes. The way a code is built, as a systematic and comprehensive
body of rules, with a high level of generality is one. The civilian
methods, maxims and techniques of interpretation, coupled with the
ingenuity of judges in filling gaps in the code, are another. Perhaps
most importantly, civil codes are generally remarkable intellectual
achievements that command respect, even reverence, and can become cultural symbols. 4
The Louisiana Civil Code is itself a symbol of Louisianan culture. Its own survival depended just as much on the way it was built
and interpreted as on the respect it attracted from the legal profession. Yet, due to its specific environment, the Louisiana Civil Code
has been employing two other weapons to ensure its survival, perhaps to a greater degree than other codes from around the world.
These tools are revision and translation.

2. The Romanian Civil Code of 1865 was a code that for the most part was
a literal translation of the French Code Civil, and, as a consequence, embodied
throughout the liberal philosophy of the Napoleonic Code. The communist regime
systematically amputated parts of the code through special legislation, especially
in regard to private ownership and family law. Notwithstanding, the code survived
and was abrogated only in 2011. Large part of it was applicable throughout the
years of communism, and during the transition period, after the fall of the
Ceauşescu regime, until 2011when the New Romanian Civil Code came into
force.
3. The German Civil Code entered into force in 1900, and the Swiss Civil
Code in 1912.
4. Again, the French Civil Code is a wonderful example, because it is a code
that transcends its practical value as a tool for solving legal disputes; it is also an
embodiment of the ideas and philosophy of the French Revolution, and a mark of
French, and even European legal culture. See Jean-François Niort, Le Code civil
dans la mêlée politique et sociale, RTD CIV. 2005.257; Basil Markesinis, Deux
cents ans dans la vie d'un code célèbre, RTD CIV. 2004.45; Jean Carbonnier, Le
Code Napoléon en tant que phénomène sociologique, RRJ 1981.327.
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Other civil codes are not foreign to these techniques, of course.
Following the Second World War, the French Civil Code was revised multiple times: family law and filiation, matrimonial regimes,
the law of successions, the law of prescription, personality rights,
products liability, and the general law of obligations, are all examples of areas of the law affected by the multiple revisions of the
French Civil Code. As to translation, the Swiss Civil Code, which is
a multilingual code, is a good example of the importance of translation. However, the originality and the interweaving of the local
translation and revision processes make Louisiana special.
On the one hand, the translation of the Civil Code of Louisiana
from French into English ensured its survival at the end of the 19th
century and at the beginning of the 20th, when the French language
became the language of a minority of the population, 5 la francophonie was on the decline, 6 and the training of Louisiana jurists
in the civil law was rather the exception than the rule. 7 On the other
hand, the enactment of the Civil Code of 1870 and then the ongoing
revision have been essential factors in maintaining the Code alive,
but in order to explain this thought, a digression into Louisiana’s
legal history is needed.
This paper looks at the interplay between the revision process
and translation processes in the context of the current re-translation
effort led by the Center of Civil Law Studies 8—the Civil Code
Translation Project. Beginning with a short historical account of the
various revision efforts of the Louisiana Civil Code (Part II), and
continuing with a presentation of the translation process within the
Civil Code Translation Project (Part III), this contribution then looks

5. See Olivier Moréteau, The Louisiana Civil Code Translation Project: An
Introduction, 5 J. CIV. L. STUD. 97, 98 (2012).
6. Athanassios N. Yiannopoulos, The Civil Codes of Louisiana in
LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE XLVII, at LVII (West 2012) [hereinafter The Civil Codes
of Louisiana].
7. Id.
8. Hereinafter CCLS.
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at a few examples of interplay between the two processes: translation of the revised text and revisions of the translation (Part IV). The
Conclusion (part V) highlights the importance of the dialogue between actors involved in revision and translation, as translators
would benefit much from knowing the intentions behind revision
efforts—translation implying, among other things, interpretation—
and, for future revision efforts, insights from the Civil Code Translation Project can help in consolidating civil law terminology in
English, eliminating inconsistencies, and improving the style of the
Code.
II. A SHORT HISTORY OF LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE REVISION
From the perspective of a civilian, the history of revision in Louisiana begins with the Civil Code of 1825. The “Code” of 1808 was
not a code at all, but a digest of the laws in force in Louisiana prior
to its adoption. 9 That being said, when one looks at the substance of
the Code of 1825, one would have to admit that it is in large part
identical in substance to the Digest of 1808. 10 There were a number
of additions, deletions, and modifications made, 11 and when the substance of the rules does not change much, and the text is revisited
and modified, one could call such a modification a first revision.
However, the fact that the nature of the text changed, from a digest
to a code, makes the use of the term revision highly inappropriate.
The Code of 1825 is not a revision of the digest. The Digest died
when the Code was born.
However, there might be a nuance to be brought to this argument. When exactly did the Digest cease to apply? There seems to
9. DIGEST OF THE CIVIL LAWS NOW IN FORCE IN THE TERRITORY OF
ORLEANS (1808), available online at http://digestof1808.law.lsu.edu/. The Digest
is also available in print: DIGEST OF THE CIVIL LAWS NOW IN FORCE IN THE
TERRITORY OF ORLEANS, BICENTENNIAL EDITION (Claitor’s Publishing Division
2008). See also the interpretation given by the Supreme Court of Louisiana in
Cottin v. Cottin, 5 Mart. (O.S.) 93 (La. 1817).
10. Thomas J. Semmes, History of the Laws of Louisiana and of the Civil
Law, 5 J. CIV. L. STUD. 313, 325 (2012).
11. Yiannopoulos, The Civil Codes of Louisiana, supra note 6, at LIV.
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be a question mark over the moment when the Digest was abrogated,
and when the Louisiana Civil Code was born. With the enactment
of the Civil Code, in 1825, article 3521 was inserted to read:
From and after the promulgation of this Code, the Spanish,
Roman and French laws, which were in force in this State,
when Louisiana was ceded to the United States, and the acts
of the Legislative Council, of the Legislature of the Territory
of Orleans, and of the Legislature of the State of Louisiana,
be and are hereby repealed in every case, for which it has
been especially provided in this Code, and that they shall not
be invoked as laws, even under the pretence that their provisions are not contrary or repugnant to those of this Code. 12
Regarding this Code article, an interesting issue was brought before the Louisiana Supreme Court in 1828, in Cole’s Widow v. His
Executors. 13 In this case, the Court found that article 2370 of the
1825 Code, 14 which was invoked by one of the parties, did not “especially provide” a rule for that case. 15 Therefore, the Court decided
to apply a rule found in the Fuero Real, a Spanish law that in the
eyes of the Court survived the repeal of 1825. 16 This way of interpreting article 3521 of the Code of 1825 led to the Great Repeal of
1828, when “all the civil laws which were in force before the promulgation of the civil code” were abrogated. 17
12. CIVIL CODE OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA WITH THE STATUTORY
AMENDMENTS, FROM 1825 TO 1853, INCLUSIVE; AND REFERENCES TO THE
DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA TO THE SIXTH VOLUME OF
ANNUAL REPORTS 458 (Compiled and edited by Thomas Gibbes Morgan, Bloomfield & Steel, 1861), available online at https://ia600301.us.archive.org
/27/items/civilcodeofstate00loui/civilcodeofstate00loui.pdf [hereinafter CIVIL
CODE OF 1825].
13. 7 Mart. (n.s.) 41 (La. 1828).
14. Article 2370 of the Civil Code of 1825 read thus: “A marriage contracted
out of this State, between persons who afterwards come here to live, is also subjected to the community of acquets, with respect to such property as is acquired
after their arrival.” CIVIL CODE OF 1825, supra note 12, at 319.
15. Cole’s Widow, 7 Mart. (n.s.) 41 (La. 1828) (the court was trying to establish the portion of the community of acquets the widow was entitled to).
16. Id.
17. La. Acts 1828, No. 83, 25. See also RICHARD H. KILBOURNE, JR., A
HISTORY OF THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE; THE FORMATIVE YEARS, 1803-1839, at
158-164 (The Paul M. Hebert Publications Institute 1987, repr. Claitor’s Publishing Division 2008).
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Professor Vernon Palmer has argued that the judiciary in Cole’s
Widow construed the Code of 1825 as a digest, and a true code came
into being only in 1828. 18 His assertion is based on the idea that a
code must entail the repeal of all former law in order to really be
properly construed as a code. 19 A great repeal, like the one in 1828
in Louisiana, or earlier in 1804 in France, would be needed in order
for a code to exist. If this thesis about the sweeping abrogation prerequisite for the code is taken as true, then Louisiana arguably never
really had a code, even after the Great Repeal. 20
The case of Reynolds v. Swain, decided in 1839, 21 shows that
even the Great Repeal did not abrogate all laws, lato sensu. With
Francois-Xavier Martin as chief justice on the bench, the Louisiana
Supreme Court emphatically declared in this case:
The repeal spoken of in the code, and the act of 1828, cannot
extend beyond the laws which the legislature itself has enacted . . . . It cannot be extended to those unwritten laws
which do not derive their authority from the positive institution of any people, as the revealed law, the natural law, the
law of nations, the laws of peace and war, and those laws
which are founded in those relations of justice that existed in
the nature of things, antecedent to any positive precept. 22
Should Cole’s Widow and Reynolds be read as examples of the
judiciary opposing codification? Most certainly not. A better way of

18. Vernon V. Palmer, The Death of a Code—The Birth of a Digest, 63 TUL.
L. REV. 221, 247-48 (1988-1989).
19. Id. at 224, 248.
20. The distinction between codification and revision is at best murky in Louisianan legal history, particularly when it comes to the transition from the Digest
of 1808 to the Code of 1825. Olivier Moréteau and Agustín Parise have used a
wonderful metaphor to describe this: “Nothing is simple and clear-cut in Louisiana, where trees mirror themselves in the swamps. What appears to be a tree may
be the reflection of a tree in the water, and you are never sure where the roots are.”
Olivier Moréteau & Agustín Parise, Recodification in Louisiana and Latin America, 83 TUL. L. REV. 1103, 1115 (2009).
21. Reynolds v. Swain, 13 La. 193 (La. 1839).
22. Id. at 198.
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reading these cases would reveal a judiciary resisting to positivism, 23 not codification. Professor Emeritus Robert A. Pascal is also
of this view. 24 For him, “Reynolds v. Swain shows, above all else,
the reluctance of the Supreme Court of that time to renounce the
possibility of appealing to the wisdom of the ages.” 25
Moving on to the year 1870, a new layer of complexity is added
to the history of codification in Louisiana. Again, one can rightfully
wonder whether the enactment of the Code of 1870 brought about a
new code, or a mere revision of the Code of 1825. In substance, the
Code of 1870 was in large part the Code of 1825. 26 The changes that
were made concerned the elimination of the provisions on slavery,
the incorporation of amendments already made since 1825, and the
integration of acts related to civil code matters passed since 1825. 27
The law enacting the Code of 1870 did not explicitly abrogate the
code of 1825. 28 Also, the text of the Code was adopted by the legislature under the title “The Revised Civil Code of the State of Louisiana.” 29 The use of the term “revised” in the title might be indicative of an intent to bring about a mere revision, and not to abrogate
23. Olivier Moréteau, De Revolutionibus: The Place of the Civil Code in
Louisiana and in the Legal Universe, in LE DROIT CIVIL ET SES CODES: PARCOURS
À TRAVERS LES AMÉRIQUES 1, 11 (Jimena Andino Dorato, Jean-Frédérick Ménard
& Lionel Smith eds., Thémis 2011); also published in 5 J. CIV. L. STUD. 31, 4041 (2012).
24. The author of this note had the great pleasure of discussing Reynolds v.
Swain the week before the Conference “The Louisiana Civil Code Translation
Project: Enhancing Visibility and Promoting the Civil Law in English” with Professor Emeritus Robert A. Pascal (April 7, 2014), and hopes to not do a disservice
to Professor Pascal by quoting his words from memory.
25. Discussion with Robert A. Pascal (April 7, 2014).
26. See John H. Tucker, Source Books of Louisiana Law, 1 LA. LEGAL
ARCHIVES, at XXIV (1937):
[The] Code of 1870 [was] substantially the Code of 1825 with these
changes: 1. Elimination of all articles relating to slavery; 2. Incorporation
of all acts amendatory to the Code, passed since 1825; 3. The integration
of acts passed since 1825 dealing with matters regulated by the Code,
but not specifically amending it.
27. Athanassios N. Yiannopoulos, The civil codes of Louisiana, 1 CIVIL LAW
COMMENTARIES 1, 14 (2008).
28. La. Acts No. 97 (1870). For details regarding the 1870 revision see A.N.
Yiannopoulos, Two Critical Years in The Life of the Louisiana Civil Code: 1870
and 1913, 53 LA. L. REV. 5 (1992).
29. La. Acts No. 97 (1870).
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the Code of 1825. However, the Code of 1870 was a code written
exclusively in the English language, and the Code was “amended
and re-enacted” 30 as a whole. Therefore, an argument could be made
that the Code of 1870 implicitly abrogated the Code of 1825.
In passing, it is also worth mentioning another date. In 1908, the
Louisiana Legislature appointed a commission with the purpose of
revising the Civil Code of 1870, but the revised text proposed by
this commission in 1910 was rejected by the legislature at the insistence of the Louisiana Bar. However, no tears have been shed for this
failed revision. Professor Yiannopoulos described the Revised Civil
Code of the State of Louisiana of 1910 as “an assault and an insult
against the civilian tradition of the State.” 31
Finally, the last episode of the revision saga began in 1948 and
is not over until this day. In 1948, the Louisiana Legislature gave
instructions to the Louisiana State Law Institute 32 to “prepare comprehensive projects for the revision of the Civil Code of Louisiana
. . . .” In 1954, the Institute informed the legislature that a preliminary report had been made by the two reporters and that the project
was temporarily set aside. 33 Then, in 1962, the Institute reported the
creation of a Civil Law Section, which would plan and direct the
revision. 34
Before beginning any work on the revision, the Louisiana State
Law Institute had to make a fundamental choice. According to the

30. Id.
31. Athanassios N. Yiannopoulos, Requiem for a civil code: A
Commemorative Essay, 78 TUL. L. REV. 379, 395 (2003) [hereinafter Requiem for
a civil code].
32. For more information about the Louisiana State Law Institute and its mission see http://www.lsli.org/. See also William E. Crawford & Cordell H. Haymon, Louisiana State Law Institute Recognizes 70-Year Milestone: Origin, History and Accomplishments, 56 LA. B.J. 85, 85 (2008); William E. Crawford, The
Louisiana State Law Institute—History and Progress, 45 LA. L. REV. 1078
(1985); André Tunc, Le Louisiana State Law Institute, 5 REVUE INTERNATIONALE
DE DROIT COMPARÉ 718-722 (1953).
33. Fred Zengel, Civil Code Revision in Louisiana, 54 TUL. L. REV. 942, 946
(1980).
34. Id.
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late Professor Saúl Litvinoff, the choice was between: 1) a superficial revision, that would involve the purification of linguistic aspects, and the elimination of obsolete provisions; 2) a structural revision, which would start with a careful evaluation and analysis of
the foundations of each institution, of the jurisprudence, and of the
wording of the articles; and 3) a series of partial revisions. 35 As we
all know today, the Louisiana State Law Institute opted for the third
option.
Work on the revision of the Civil Code began only in 1968, 36
and the first revision made to the Code came only in 1976 (personal
servitudes). 37 Based on the Institute’s Biennial Report of 1962, the
Civil Law Section began its mandate with the initial plan to make “a
careful evaluation of [Louisiana’s] fundamental law in the light of
its history, its philosophy, and its jurisprudential development,”38
and that the result of this would be “an overall re-examination of
basic principles in light of today’s social and economic requirements
which will be productive of great benefit in and of themselves . . . in
supplying the necessary background against which the Revision of
the Civil Code can be undertaken.” 39 Such a study was never produced by the Institute. Moreover, the revision of the Code began
with no guidelines as to the general philosophy of the end product,
or in regard to the Code’s organization, structure, or fundamental
policies. 40
35. Saúl Litvinoff, Codificación en Louisiana, in 2 LA CODIFICACIÓN: RAÍCES
127, 135 (El Derecho 2004); Moréteau & Parise, supra note 20,
at 1117-18.
36. Zengel, supra note 33, at 945.
37. However, one should not think that the Louisiana State Law Institute was
inactive in the interim. From 1938 to 1968 the Institute had a great number of
accomplishments: The Compiled Editions of the Civil Codes, the Compilation of
Statutes on Civil Law Subjects, The Model Non-Profit Corporation Statute, the
Criminal Code, the creation of the Revised Statutes and continuous statutory revision, The Trust Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure, The Code of Civil procedure, the Civil Law Translations. See Louisiana State Law Institute, ThirtyEighth Biennial Report, at 19 (2014).
38. Louisiana State Law Institute, Twelfth Biennial Report, at 7 (1962).
39. Id. at 8.
40. See Zengel, supra note 33, at 947.
Y PROSPECTIVAS
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A piece-meal revision began with the titles being taken relatively at random for revision. Normally, the revision title by title
would also have implied a careful study of the structure of the Code
and of the legal institutions that form the basis of the articles, and a
coordination effort that would have ensured linguistic and conceptual consistency. 41 This was not the case in the revision process. The
revision work was divided between different reporters, with different advisory committees formed by lawyers, judges, and law professors (more than 20 of the total number of committees of the Louisiana State Law Institute having been created for the purpose of revising and updating areas of the Civil Code). The reporter generally
makes the initial study of the articles to be revised, and then proposes recommendations as to what should be revised and how it
should be revised to the advisory committee. The materials approved by the advisory committee are then sent to the Council of the
Louisiana State Law Institute, a body that usually meets once every
month (except during the summer months) and has final say as to
the substance of the articles proposed for enactment to the Legislature. After a decision is taken on the substance of the articles, two
other committees then come into play. A semantics committee reviews the proposals after their approval by the council, usually verifying for grammatical and typographical errors and attempting to
insure consistency of the terminology that is employed. However,
the semantics committee is limited in its power to revise the language of the Code, because it cannot touch the substance of the text
approved by the Council.
There is also a coordination committee, charged with the task of
insuring a “logical and cohesive final product.” 42 The task of the
coordination committee is particularly difficult due to the revision
41. Christopher Osakwe, Cogitations on the Civil Law Tradition in Louisiana: Civil Code Revision and Beyond, 52 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 179, 217 (1983): “to
attempt to revise a Civil Code without a masterplan is analogous to setting out on
a long distance journey without a road map.”
42. Twentieth Biennial Report of the Louisiana State Law Institute, at 14
(1978).
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process itself. The significant number of reporters, who have different backgrounds, different credentials, education, experience, and
philosophies, and the one title at a time sequence in the revision,
make the coordination of the revision process a challenging mission.
It should not then be all that surprising that the revision has led
to substantive or terminological inconsistency. One such example of
substantive inconsistency can be seen in the coordination between
the law of obligations and the law of property. 43 There is no logical
reason why article 2021 of the Louisiana Civil Code echoes the
French rule “en fait de meubles, la possession vaut titre,” 44 thus
making the bona fide purchaser of movable property the owner of
the purchased thing from the moment he acquires possession, 45
while article 3490 requires possession for a term of three years for
the same effect. 46 An easy way out of this inconsistency would be
to force the reconciliation of these articles by way of interpretation.
Article 2021 deals only with situations where the transferor becomes
non-owner through the retroactive effect of dissolution, and hence
this article might be seen as an exception to the general rule of article
3490. However, it is simply incoherent and unjust to protect third
parties differently in the two hypotheses: the fact that the transferor
is a non-owner due to dissolution or some other reason (like nullity,
or because he is simply a precarious possessor) should not make any
difference when the third party transferee acquires the thing in good
faith. The most likely explanation for this inconsistency is that different reporters worked on the revision of the two titles where these
43. For a more detailed critique of the inconsistencies between the law of
obligation and the law of property in the Louisiana Civil Code, see Yiannopoulos,
Requiem for a civil code, supra note 31, at 402-06.
44. See Art. 2276 FRENCH CIVIL CODE.
45. Art. 2021 LA. CIV. CODE: “Dissolution of a contract does not impair the
rights acquired through an onerous contract by a third party in good faith. If the
contract involves immovable property, the principles of recordation apply to a
third person acquiring an interest in the property whether by onerous or gratuitous
title.”
46. Art. 3490 LA. CIV. CODE: “One who has possessed a movable as owner,
in good faith, under an act sufficient to transfer ownership, and without interruption for three years, acquires ownership by prescription.”
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rules can be found. A future revision will have to correct this inconsistency, and de lege ferenda, it is article 3490 that should be modified by eliminating the three-year acquisitive prescription period.
Not only would this lead to a more just system, but without the prescriptive period rule of article 3490, it would also be more efficient
from an economic standpoint, having the advantage of creating more
security in markets where movable property is traded. 47
On a more general level, there might be a solution to all, or most
of, the consistency problems that sprang from the revision process. 48
After the last remaining parts of the Code will be revised (the “remaining parts” being the parts that have not been revised yet), the
Institute, perhaps through its Coordination Committee, could make
a sweeping revision of the entire Code, to correct the logical and
terminological inconsistencies and errors still present. There are
very few titles left to be revised at this point, and after the entire
Code is revised, one can only hope that a “revision of the revision”
will be organized, that will hopefully bring more logic and coherence in the Louisiana Civil Code.
III. THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE TRANSLATION PROJECT
Undoubtedly, the revision left its mark on the object of translation for the Louisiana Civil Code Translation Project—the language
of the Code. But on top of that, the study of the revision process in
Louisiana is of great significance in assessing the importance of the
project, its goals, its policies, and its methodology.

47. For more details on the foundation and effects of the rule laid down in
article 2276 of the French Civil Code, see Jamel Djoudi, Revendication, No. 80112, in ENCYCLOPÉDIE DALLOZ: RÉPERTOIRE DE DROIT CIVIL (2015).
48. We should draw inspiration from the optimistic attitude of Colonel John
H. Tucker, who wrote (before the first revised title was enacted) that problems of
cohesion and symmetry could be resolved in a very short time after the completion
of the revision. John H. Tucker, Jr., Tradition and Technique of Codification in
the Modern World: The Louisiana Experience, 25 LA. L. REV. 698, 718 (1965).
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The Louisiana Civil Code Translation Project 49 began with the
purpose of translating the Louisiana Civil Code in force. The CCLS
understands the code in force to be the consolidated Civil Code, with
all the revisions that have been made to it. 50
49. For more information on the Louisiana Civil Code Translation Project,
see Moréteau, supra note 5, at 100-103.
50. This also coincides with the Code as it is published by the Louisiana State
Legislature (https://legis.la.gov/legis/Laws_Toc.aspx?folder=67&level=Parent),
by the CCLS (http://lcco.law.lsu.edu/), by West [LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE, 2015
ed. (Athanassios N. Yiannopoulos ed., West)] and LexisNexis [LOUISIANA CIVIL
CODE WITH ANCILLARIES, 2015 ed. (LexisNexis)]. However, an academic debate
sparked by an article published in 1988 by Professor Vernon Palmer in the Tulane
Law Review (Palmer, supra note 18), might need to be revisited, as it might cast
doubt over some of the choices made for the Louisiana Civil Code Translation
Process. Professor Palmer observed that during the revision of the code there have
been very few express repeals of the prior law, and that most of the time, when
the legislature approves a revision proposal made by the LSLI, it only “amends
and re-enacts” a particular title of the Code selected for revision. His main argument is that according to articles 22 and 23 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870,
the substance of which is now in article 8 of the Civil Code, the Legislature never
abrogated, explicitly or implicitly, the provisions of the Code of 1870 which are
“not contrary to or irreconcilable” with the Revision. They are still in force, and
are binding for judges alongside the articles of the Revision.
What Professor Palmer didn’t anticipate in his article is that his argument
could extend, perhaps with more force, to the enactment of the Civil Code of 1870.
The Legislature of 1870 did not repeal expressly any provision of the Civil Code
of 1825, and only “amended and re-enacted” the code. If Professor Palmer’s core
argument is correct, it means that there are at least three layers of civil code provisions still in force. Moreover, it means that the civil code of Louisiana is still
bilingual, because the Code of 1825 was enacted both in French and in English,
and both linguistic versions were considered binding. The impact of adjusting to
this theory for the current translation of the code into French would be devastating. Applied to the Civil Code Translation Project, Professor Palmer’s theory indicates that the CCLS ought to adjust its methodology in order to truly translate
the Code in force. If one were to adjust methodologically to Professor Palmer’s
idea of what the Louisiana Civil Code is at this moment, what should be translated
are the revisions of 1870 and the multiple revised titles from 1976 until this day.
This should be followed (or preceded) by consolidation work, aimed at verifying
which articles of the revision are different in substance and irreconcilable on a
substantive level with the former rules of the code of 1825 and 1870.
Responding to Professor Palmer’s article is beyond the scope of this paper,
and a footnote is not sufficient or appropriate for this purpose. The interpretation
of article 8 of the Louisiana Civil Code invites a discussion that ought to go deep
into issues regarding the nature of codification, the distinction between a norm
and its formal support, and the sources of law in Louisiana. Suffice it to say that
Professor Palmer’s views are just one side of this argument. See, for the opposite
view, Julio C. Cueto Rua, The Civil Code of Louisiana is Alive and Well, 64 TUL.
L. REV. 147 (1989-1990); Yiannopoulos, Requiem for a civil code, supra note 31;
But, see Vernon V. Palmer, Revision of the Code or Regression to a Digest? A
Rejoinder to Professor Cueto-Rua, 64 TUL. L. REV. 177 (1989-1990).
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The translation project advanced by way of partial translations
made every year and was fully completed and published online in
July 2016. 51 Every year, the parts of the Code that have been translated and revised are posted online on the CCLS website. 52
The online format is ideal for such a project, which has been
published in multiple stages, and which has been evolving and maturing, the translation itself being open to constant revision. Some
revisions of the translation were needed as a consequence of the revision of the Code; particularly in 2010 and 2012 with the occasion
of two legislative bills enacting changes to the Louisiana Civil Code
at the proposal of the Louisiana State Law Institute. 53 Such partial
revisions are easy to implement because of the medium for publication. Online publication provides not only the flexibility to continuously revise the text and keep up with the revision effort, but also
allows for this to be done at a low cost and with great accessibility
for the general public.
The CCLS has been revising the translation with great care, and
inconsistencies and errors have been corrected as soon as they were
discovered. Notwithstanding, translation work is always perfectible… For this purpose, the CCLS has been publishing parts of the

51. When the author of this note left Louisiana in 2014, the Preliminary Title
and Book IV were fully translated, as well as large parts of Books I, II and III. In
the meantime, the CCLS has made more progress in the translation, with the help
of four new interns from the Master Program in Trilingual Legal Studies at the
Université de Nantes (France)—Sara Charlat, Delphine Drouard, and Sara Vono
and Lucie Talet—as well as Jason Maison- Marcheux (CCLS Research Associate)
and Christabelle Lefebvre (law graduate from Université de Montréal). Dr. Matthias Martin (Université de Lorraine) also contributed extensively to the translation and the revision during and after his visit to the CCLS in 2014. It was initially
projected that the translation will be completed by the end of the year 2016, but
the project was finalized in July 2016. See The Russell Long Chair and CCLS
Newsletter, No. 36 (May 2016); The Russell Long Chair and CCLS Newsletter,
No. 33 (September 2015).
52. http://lcco.law.lsu.edu/?uid=1&ver=enfr#1.
53. In particular, articles 1848, 1849, 2028 and 2444 of the Louisiana Civil
Code.
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translation in the Journal of Civil Law Studies, with the hope of attracting attention to the translation project and receiving feedback
from legal scholars who have an interest in the subject. 54
As to policy questions, it is the policy of the CCLS to translate
only the language of the Code, without the titles of the individual
articles, without the comments produced by the Louisiana State Law
Institute with the occasion of the revision, and without the exposé
des motifs that occasionally accompanied the revision. 55
For the most part, the translation is made directly from the current English version of the Code into French. However, when Civil
Code articles have remained unchanged in substance from the 1825
version of the Code and the wording has not changed or has changed
only in part, the original French version of the 1825 Code has been
restored. 56 It was decided, however, that it was acceptable not to
revert back to the original French version of the texts from 1825 in
exceptional circumstances, like when the language used in the 1825
Code was considered outdated, for instance.
The translation process evolved over time, and has been improved in order to minimize the risk of errors and inconsistencies in
the translation. The author of this note has been on board for the
translation process only starting with the summer of 2012, so this
paper will only speak of the translation process since then. In 2012,
the translation was organized in three stages. Anne Perocheau and
Anne-Sophie Roinsard (interns at the Center of Civil Law Studies,
coming from the Université de Nantes) prepared each week a chapter or a series of articles in a Word document. They were responsible
for the initial translation of each and every article from the selected
54. See Olivier Moréteau, Le Code civil de Louisiane en français : traduction
et retraduction, 28 INT’L. J. SEMIOT. L. 155, 168-69 (following the online publication of the translation of the Preliminary Title of the Louisiana Civil Code, Professor Jean-Claude Gémar contacted the Project Director of the Louisiana Civil
Code Translation Project and offered assistance by revising and improving upon
the translation of some of the articles in the Preliminary title) [hereinafter Le Code
civil de Louisiane en français].
55. Moréteau, Le Code civil de Louisiane en français, supra note 54, at 169.
56. Id. at 168.

274

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 9

chapter. Then, the two interns would check and make reciprocal suggestions on each other’s work. The changes and suggestions were
marked with track-changes or comment boxes in Word. Once, and
sometimes twice a week, the two interns met with the Project Director (Professor Olivier Moréteau) in order finalize the translation.
Professor Anne Tercinet, from the EM Lyon Business School, and
the author of this note were also present for most of the translation
meetings held in 2012. Important translation decisions and the most
complicated translation issues were discussed during these meetings. And, the final stage of the process has been that of revision:
revision of the translation. For this part of the process, Professor
Moréteau took the lead, and the author of this note often assisted, as
well as Dr. Matthias Martin and Jason Maison-Marcheux in the final
years. This stage of the process was about reading through the articles in French with great attention, in order to verify the consistency
of the language used, and identify and correct any errors.
In 2013, the translation process was, for the most part, identical.
One big change, however, was triggered by the acquisition of a
translation software. 57 The interns from 2013, Laura Castaing and
Jean-Pierre Huffen, have been translating directly into the translation software, instead of classic parallel Word documents. They established a database within the translation software containing the
bilingual Digest of 1808, the bilingual Civil Code of Quebec, and
previous translations made within the Louisiana Civil Code Translation Project. The translation software allows to search for words
in one language and to display the translation of those words from
all the sources within the database. This feature has been extremely
useful in verifying the terminological consistency of the translation.
The one downside of the software is the lack of a track-changes feature, but the team adapted to this by creating more comment boxes
where alternatives for translation were proposed and suggestions
were made, or where certain problems were highlighted.
57. The translation software used by the CCLS since 2013 is Wordfast Pro 3.
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IV. REVISION OF THE TRANSLATION AND TRANSLATION OF THE
REVISION
Reflecting upon the revision of the law in Louisiana and understanding the dynamic of the text of the Civil Code has been a prerequisite for improving the detection and correction of errors in the
translation process. In the following pages, one example has been
chosen from the Louisiana Civil Code Translation Project wherein
the initial translation was revised after careful research and fruitful
discussions in translation meetings. This first example highlights
mainly the importance of studying, interpreting, and understanding
the source text, in light of its history of translation and revision.
Then, a second example is offered that brings to light the advantages
of also studying the translation. Reading the text of the Code in
French is an enlightening experience for bilingual and multilingual
jurists. Looking back at the translation of Title III of Book III regarding Obligations in General and Title IV of the same book regarding Conventional Obligations, 58 the French version of the articles (the text in its target language) can either camouflage imperfections of the English text, or can act like a red flag for some of the
terminological choices made during the revision of these titles (or
even prior to that, during the original translation of the Code of 1825
from French into English). It is hoped that the valuable lessons
learned from these two examples will prove useful to other translators and perhaps also for actors involved in future revisions of the
Louisiana Civil Code.
The first example is one of a difficult translation choice, where
both possible choices can highlight issues either in the English
source text or in the French translation. The translation dilemma had
to do with how the term “dissolution” is used in the Louisiana Civil
Code, and how it ought to be translated in French. The term is used
multiple times in the Code, and six different legal concepts emerge
58. Both titles have been completely revised by Acts 1984, No. 331, §1, and
Acts 1989, No. 137, §16 under the direction of the late Professor Litvinoff, who
acted as the reporter for these titles of the Code.
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from the use of this one term: (1) The most common usage of dissolution in the Code is as a remedy for non-performance of a contractual obligation. This is the sense in which it is used in Chapter 9,
Title 4, of Book III, of the Code, 59 as well as for various specific
contracts: sale, 60 lease, 61 compromise, 62 or donation. 63 (2) Then, the
term is also used to describe the fate of contracts that cannot be performed for reasons that are independent from the behavior of any of
the parties, as in cases of fortuitous events and force majeure, or
when a resolutory condition is fulfilled (or, conversely, when a suspensive condition is not fulfilled). 64 (3) The third usage of the term
is for situations when a marriage comes to an end—the dissolution
of a marriage. 65 (4) The fourth usage of the term refers to situations
when juridical persons are dissolved—the dissolution of juridical
persons. (5) In article 774 a bizarre use of the term dissolution can
be found, referring to the “dissolution of a right,” 66 arguably meaning the situation when a right is lost retroactively due to the dissolution of a juridical act that operated as its title. (6) Finally, in articles
1978 67 and 1983 68 of the Code, the term dissolution is used as a synonym for termination by mutual agreement (mutuus dissensus).
Because of this diversity of meaning, the translation choices that
needed to be made have not been easy. The French language, and
more specifically French legal language, proves to be, lexically,
59. Arts. 2013-2021 LA. CIV. CODE.
60. Arts. 2467 (2), 2485, 2498, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, and 2615 LA. CIV.
CODE.
61. Arts. 2686, 2693, 2704, 2715 (2), 2719 LA. CIV. CODE.
62. Arts. 3081 and 3083 LA. CIV. CODE.
63. Arts. 1563, 1564, 1565, and 1566 LA. CIV. CODE.
64. Arts. 1556, 1562, 1876 (1), 1877 and 1878 LA. CIV. CODE.
65. Arts. 246 and 3526 LA. CIV. CODE.
66. Art. 774 LA. CIV. CODE: “A predial servitude is extinguished by the dissolution of the right of the person who established it” (emphasis added).
67. Art. 1978 LA. CIV. CODE: “A contracting party may stipulate a benefit for
a third person called a third party beneficiary. Once the third party has manifested
his intention to avail himself of the benefit, the parties may not dissolve the contract by mutual consent without the beneficiary's agreement” (emphasis added).
68. Art. 1983 LA. CIV. CODE: “Contracts have the effect of law for the parties
and may be dissolved only through the consent of the parties or on grounds provided by law. Contracts must be performed in good faith” (emphasis added).
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much richer in expressing the various meanings of the word dissolution presented above. A French jurist would generally use the term
résolution in order to convey the same meaning as dissolution in the
first sense. 69 However, there is a distinction that is made in the
French language between situations when the dissolution produces
retroactive effects (ex tunc), and when it produces effects only for
the future (ex nunc). The French term résolution applies in the former case, while in the latter the term résiliation is preferred. For the
second meaning of the word dissolution, the French language uses a
more specific term than the French dissolution, and that is caducité.
Translating the third and the fourth meaning of dissolution is much
easier, because the French jurist would use the French word dissolution to convey the same meaning. 70 The French term dissolution
would probably also be an acceptable translation of dissolution in
the sixth sense, while for the fifth, whatever choice is made for the
first meaning will have to be applied mutatis mutandis.
The difficulty of choosing a translation in French for the English
word dissolution, as it is used in the Louisiana Civil Code, is due to
a conflict between two important goals of the Louisiana Civil Code
Translation Project: terminological consistency and conceptual precision. In order to achieve terminological consistency, the word dissolution would have to be translated identically throughout the
Code. The obvious choice would be the French term dissolution.
However, the fact that there are more precise terms for the first and
second meaning of the English word dissolution would require a divergent approach in order to achieve better conceptual precision.
Accordingly, the word résolution was used when translating dissolution in articles 2013-2021, as well as articles 2467 (2), 2485, 2498,
2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, and 2615 (dissolution of sale agreements),
articles 3081 and 3083 (dissolution of a compromise agreements),
and articles 1563, 1564, 1565, and 1566 (dissolution of donations)
69. See Art. 1184 FRENCH CIVIL CODE;
70. GÉRARD CORNU, VOCABULAIRE JURIDIQUE 356, dissolution (10th ed.,
PUF 2014).
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of the Louisiana Civil Code; the word résiliation was used in the
translation of dissolution in articles 2686, 2693 (2), 2715, 2719 (dissolution of lease contracts); finally, the word caducité should be
used for translating dissolution in articles 1556, 1562, 1876 (1),
1877 and 1878 of the Louisiana Civil Code.
After some hesitation, 71 the translation that was chosen for dissolution within the first meaning was résolution 72 (and résiliation
for the articles dealing with lease contracts). Two powerful arguments justify this breach of consistency in the text. First, a Frenchspeaking jurist would fairly easily recognize the term résolution in
the context of remedies for contractual non-performance, and would
immediately think of the various legal consequences that are attached to this concept in French law. The French word dissolution
in this context would seem odd, and might create the impression that
the Louisianan dissolution is different in nature from the French résolution, and that is not the case. Secondly, in researching the Civil
Code of 1825, one can come across article 2219, which contains the
term dissolution, within its first meaning (as a remedy for contractual non-performance). The French version of the Civil Code of
1825, which is the original version of the Code, used the French term
résolution. As mentioned earlier, whenever it is possible, the original French flavor of the Code of 1825 has been brought back to life
and into the Louisiana Civil Code Translation Project. It must also
be said that, in this case, going back to the old text substantially enriches the translation, bringing with it more conceptual precision and
accessibility. The old French term is in many ways more modern
and more precise than the post-revision English source term.
Much subtler is the problem of translation raised by articles
1556, 1562, 1876 (1), 1877 and 1878. The French term dissolution
in that context would not necessarily seem out of place. Also, there
is nothing in the language of the Code of 1825 to lend assistance for
71. Louisiana Civil Code – Code civil de Louisiane: Preliminary Title; Book
III, Titles 3, 4 and 5, 5 J. CIV. L. STUD. 105, 170-73 (2012).
72. http://lcco.law.lsu.edu/?uid=79&ver=enfr#79.
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this matter, at least as far as the research of this author has shown.
The term caducité is simply more precise. That is why, in the end,
the choice is between the more conservative use of dissolution, and
a more activist translation, using the word caducité in the target text.
This author would be in favor of the second option, 73 because it
would red-flag the English term dissolution and would hopefully invite, perhaps with the occasion of a future revision of the Code, a
discussion regarding the terminology employed in the Louisiana
Civil Code. The vocabulary of the civil law in English can still be
improved, so why not create the English word “caducity,” 74 and substitute the word “dissolution” with “caducity” in articles 1556, 1562,
1876 (1), 1877 and 1878? The reason why this terminological
change has added value has to do with the legal effects that differ in
cases of caducity (caducité) as opposed to cases of dissolution (résolution): (1) caducity operates only for the future; 75 (2) also, it operates ex lege, whereas dissolution, as a rule, is a judicial remedy;
and (3) either party to a contract can invoke caducity, whereas only
the obligee can ask for dissolution when the other party, the obligor,
fails to perform. 76
Replacing dissolution with caducity is much easier than replacing the word “dissolution” with “resolution” and “resiliation” (terms
that are being used, for instance, in the English version of the Civil
Code of Quebec). 77 Although “resolution” would be more precise
73. At the moment when this article was written articles 1556 and 1562, have
not been translated and published on the Louisiana Civil Code online platform
yet, and in articles 1876 (1), 1877, and 1878 the term used in the target language
was dissolution.
74. The word “caducity” was proposed by Professor Randy Trahan, and adding it to the legal vocabulary in Louisiana was discussed during one of the sessions
of the conference where this paper was presented: The Louisiana Civil Code
Translation Project: Enhancing Visibility and Promoting the Civil Law in English
(April 10-11, 2014).
75. ALAIN A. LEVASSEUR ET AL., LOUISIANA LAW OF OBLIGATIONS. A
METHODOLOGICAL & COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE. CASES, TEXTS AND
MATERIALS 512 (Carolina Academic Press 2013). It is noteworthy that the authors
of this book expressly use the term “caducity” in English. Id.
76. See art. 2013 LA. CIV. CODE.
77. See e.g. art. 1590 CIVIL CODE OF QUEBEC.
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and would better reflect the original French term résolution, as used
in the Code of 1825, the English “dissolution” has been used by
courts and lawyers in Louisiana for too much time and too often to
even contemplate changing it for “resolution.” 78
Moving on to the second example, the same interplay between
translation and revision can be seen from a rather different angle:
the learning process between actors involved in translation and those
involved in revision is a two-way street, and the Louisiana Civil
Code Translation Project can guide and inform future Civil Code
revision plans in Louisiana and elsewhere. Although the translation
project is admittedly not the work of professional translators, 79
every person that has contributed to the translation project has been
trained in the law, and many contributors are recognized scholars of
comparative and civil law. 80 The translation often hides nuanced
clues and small hints that a problem is hidden in the English text of
the Code. The translation of the title to Chapter 12, of Title 4, Book
III and of article 2036 of the Louisiana Civil Code provides a very
good illustration. The term “revocatory action” from the title to
Chapter 12 81 has been translated “action paulienne,” instead of “action révocatoire,” although the latter term is perhaps closer etymologically to its English counterpart. Both terms would more or less
accurately translate the legal concept in question, and the Code of
1825 used the term révocatoire in article 1966. 82 As stated above,
78. See e.g. Waseco Chemical & Supply Co. v. Bayou State Oil Corp., 371
So. 2d 305 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1979); Mennella v. Kurt E. Schon E.A.I., Ltd., 979
F.2d 357 (5 Cir. 1992); See also James J. Hautot, Contract Dissolution, 45 LA. L.
REV. 783 (1984-1985).
79. Moréteau, supra note 5, at 103.
80. Besides the Project Director, Professor Olivier Moréteau, who is an internationally recognized civil and comparative law scholar, Professor David Gruning, Professor Emeritus Jean-Claude Gémar, Professor Michel Séjean, Professor
Ivan Tchotourian, Professor Anne Tercinet, and Dr. Matthias Martin are but a few
names of civilians and comparatists of great caliber that have either translated
parts of the code, or contributed to the final version of the text of the translation.
See Moréteau, supra note 5, at 100-01.
81. And from the immediately following Section 1.
82. LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, COMPILED EDITION OF THE CIVIL
CODES OF LOUISIANA 1090 (1940), available online at http://digitalcommons.law
.lsu.edu/la_civilcode/.
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the Louisiana Civil Code Translation Project generally attempts to
revive the old French terminology employed by the Code of 1825.
So, why make an exception here?
The reason “action paulienne” was preferred in the target text
has to do with a very subtle expression of activism on the part of the
translation team. The more unusual term for the translation is used
here to signal a need to reform the Civil Code articles regulating the
revocatory action in Louisiana. Perhaps the English terminology
used in the Louisiana Civil Code for this action ought to be modernized. In Quebec, the English text of sub-section 3, of Section III,
Chapter VI, Title 1, Book V uses the term “Paulian action,” for the
French equivalent “action en inopposabilité.” The same terminology is not foreign to Louisiana lawyers either, and the term “Paulian
action” is mentioned in the revision comments to article 2036. 83
The main problem that the translation is trying to signal is not a
purely terminological one. There is a very good reason why the English term “revocatory” or the French “révocatoire” was not used in
the Civil Code of Quebec. 84 The Civil Code articles dealing with the
Paulian action in Quebec have been drafted so as to reflect a modern
remedy offered also under French law 85: the creditor can disregard
the contract concluded by his debtor “in fraud of his rights”; 86 in
other words the juridical act attached is not opposable to the creditor.
Article 2036 of the Louisiana Civil Code, although in many ways
more modern than its French or Québécois equivalent, offers a very
strange remedy: nullity. The 1984 revision of the law of obligations
eliminated any mention of the obligor’s fraud in concluding the attacked act and replaced it with an objective test: if the obligor causes
or increases his insolvency with his act that would be sufficient to
83. Art. 2036, comment c), in 1 LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE 470 (West 2012).
84. The term “action révocatoire” was also heavily criticized in French doctrine. See FRANÇOIS TERRÉ ET AL., DROIT CIVIL. LES OBLIGATIONS 1147-48 (10th
ed., Dalloz 2009).
85. For a detailed presentation regarding the effects of Paulian actions under
French law see Pierre-Yves Gautier & François Pasqualini, Action paulienne, nos.
87-102, in ENCYCLOPÉDIE DALLOZ : RÉPERTOIRE DE DROIT CIVIL (2015).
86. Art. 1631 CIVIL CODE OF QUEBEC.
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obtain his remedy. 87 This is indeed a welcome reform of the Paulian
action. However, with an objective test, the sought out remedy can
only be a result of the effects of the attacked juridical act, and not of
any intrinsic defect it might have had at the moment of its conclusion. 88 This makes it very hard, if not impossible, to justify the sanction of nullity in such a case. But the problem is not only one of
theoretical inconsistency. Nullity is also a very impractical and
harsh remedy that disregards the rights of third parties that might
have acquired property from the obligor. An objective test for the
Paulian action implies that there might be situations when the third
party that contracts with the obligor is in good faith. There is no
reason to deprive said third party of any contractual remedies the
law might offer (like, for instance, the warranty against eviction, in
case of sale contracts 89). In fact, there is no reason to deprive even
the third party in bad faith from making use of any contractual remedies that might be available to him against the obligor with whom
he colluded to defraud the obligee. 90 If the sanction of nullity would
be replaced with a declaration that the attacked act produces no third
party effects toward the obligee (is inopposable to the obligee) all
of these issues would be avoided, and the Louisiana Civil Code
could boast to have a more modern approach to the Paulian action
than even France or Quebec. Even de lege lata, at least one author,
Professor Alain Levasseur, suggested to ignore the faulty language
of the Code, and that courts ought to, in cases where the Paulian
action is successful, declare that the act attacked through said action
cannot be “opposed” to the obligee who brought the action. 91

87. Art. 2036, comment b), in 1 LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE 470 (West 2012).
88. Nullity sanctions precisely such defects of a juridical act that existed at
the moment of its conclusion. See art. 2029 LA. CIV. CODE; LEVASSEUR ET AL.,
supra note 75, at 512.
89. Arts. 2500-2517 LA. CIV. CODE.
90. In cases of sales contracts, even a buyer that knew that the seller is not or
might not be the owner of the thing being sold may benefit from the warranty
against eviction, but to a limited degree (he can recover only the price he has
paid). See arts. 2502 and 2503 LA. CIV. CODE.
91. LEVASSEUR ET AL., supra note 75, at 356.
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In addition, the author of this note would also suggest removing
the following syntagma from article 2036: “or the result of the failure to act of the obligor.” According to the 1984 revision comment
e):
The expression “. . . the result of a failure to act of the obligor” contemplates situations in which an obligor becomes
insolvent, or his insolvency increases, because of his failure
to act, as when the obligor fails to defend himself in a law
suit, and the resulting judgment creates or increases his insolvency. 92
To this author’s knowledge there is no jurisprudence applying
the rule contemplated in this comment, and one can only hope no
Louisiana court will ever apply it. In cases where the obligor becomes insolvent, or his insolvency increases, due to a failure to act
and enforce his rights, the solution is offered by the oblique action
(article 2044 of the Louisiana Civil Code 93). The oblique action will
not operate once there has been a final judgment (no longer subject
to appeal). Interpreting article 2036 in the manner envisaged by
comment e) after a final judgment is rendered would go against the
principle of res judicata. Moreover, in an adversarial system, the
winning party in the trial against the obligor that becomes insolvent
or increases his insolvency should not be deprived of the possibility
of enforcing a judgment obtained due to the other party’s inactivity.
V. CONCLUSION
The most important lesson that comes out of the examples selected and discussed above is that the study of revision of the law
and of legal translations in Louisiana opens new doors for translators
and lawmakers alike, and a dialogue between the actors involved in
revision and translation can only be mutually beneficial. Translators
would benefit much from knowing the intentions behind revision
92. Art. 2036, Comment e), in 1 LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE 470 (West 2012).
93. Art. 2044 (1) LA. CIV. CODE: “If an obligor causes or increases his insolvency by failing to exercise a right, the obligee may exercise it himself, unless the
right is strictly personal to the obligor.”
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efforts—translation implying, among other things, interpretation—
and, for future revision efforts, insights from Civil Code Translation
Project can help in consolidating civil law terminology in English,
eliminating inconsistencies, and improving the style of the Code.
The Louisiana State Law Institute is now mainly focused on revision of the law (although it ought to be remembered that the Institute has been involved in great legal translation projects in the
past 94), while the Center of Civil Law Studies focuses very much on
translation through the Louisiana Civil Code Translation Project.95
Both institutions exist for the purpose of promoting the study of the
civil law in Louisiana and beyond, and have been guarding the temple of the civil law tradition throughout their existence. Located at
the first and last floor of the Louisiana State University Paul M.
Hebert Law Center, the two guardians ought to collaborate as much
as possible, if they are to succeed in their common mission. While
working for the Center of Civil Law Studies on the Louisiana Civil
Code Translation Project, this author has found the doors of the Louisiana State Law Institute always open, its staff friendly and helpful,
94. See MARCEL PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (La. St. L. Inst. trans., West,
1958, 3 v); FRANÇOIS GÉNY, METHOD OF INTERPRETATION AND SOURCES OF
PRIVATE POSITIVE LAW (La. St. L. Inst. trans., West 1963); CHARLES AUBRY &
CHARLES RAU, 1 OBLIGATIONS (La. St. L. Inst. trans., West, 1965); AUBRY &
RAU, 2 PROPERTY (La. St. L. Inst. trans., West 1966); AUBRY & RAU, 3
TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSIONS & GRATUITOUS DISPOSITIONS (La. St. L. Inst.
trans., West 1969); AUBRY & RAU, 4 INTESTATE SUCCESSIONS (La. St. L. Inst.
trans., West 1971); AUBRY & RAU, 5 PRESCRIPTION (La. St. L. Inst. trans., West
1972); GABRIEL BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, ALBERT-ANATOLE TISSIER & JEAN
CARBONNIER, 5 PRESCRIPTION (La. St. L. Inst. trans., West 1972).
95. Before the Louisiana Civil Code Translation Project, the CCLS also sponsored a number of translations of French legal doctrine into English: RENÉ DAVID,
FRENCH LAW. ITS STRUCTURE, SOURCES, AND METHODOLOGY (Michael Kindred
trans., Louisiana State University Press 1972); MICHEL ALTER, FRENCH LAW OF
BUSINESS CONTRACTS: PRINCIPLES (Alain A. Levasseur trans., Louisiana State
University Paul M. Herbert Publications Institute 1986); BERNARD CHANTEBOUT,
THE FRENCH CONSTITUTION (David Gruning trans., LSU Law Center 1998);
CHRISTIAN ATIAS, THE FRENCH CIVIL LAW: AN INSIDER'S VIEW (Alain A. Levasseur & Bachir Mihoubi trans., Louisiana State University Paul M. Hebert Publications Institute 1987); JEAN-LOUIS HALPÉRIN, THE CIVIL CODE (David W.
Gruning trans., Paul M. Hebert Law Center Publications 2000); LOUIS FAVOREU,
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS (Alain A. Levasseur & Roger K. Ward trans., LSU
Law Center 2001); CHRISTIAN ATIAS, FRENCH CIVIL LAW (Alain A. Levasseur
trans., LSU Law Center 2002).
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and has spent many hours discussing with the director of the Institute, Professor William E. Crawford, before researching minutes
and biennial reports for various issues related to the translation of
the Louisiana Civil Code. Undoubtedly, the Center of Civil Law
Studies would also be as open and willing to help out the Louisiana
State Law Institute in its mission, and through the Louisiana Civil
Code Translation Project it is already doing so.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Nineteenth-century codification endeavors excel in illustrating
the transfer of legal ideas across jurisdictions, even across continents. That transfer required the elaboration of translations to fully
achieve its potential. These would ultimately enable the effective
reception of legal ideas in jurisdictions that did not share the same
vernacular means of communication. Codification necessarily benefited from translations and, accordingly, did not encounter a deceleration process. Translations provided craftsmen with tools that
helped them work with materials that resulted from codification endeavors undertaken in languages they did not master.
Numerous jurisdictions enacted civil codes during the nineteenth century. Some of the resulting civil codes showed resemblances with previous codes, while others demonstrated significant
degrees of originality. In any event, drafters of civil codes did not
work in isolation. Their law libraries turned into fundamental tools
when drafting, and served as means to connect drafters with the
works of other colleagues in near and distant jurisdictions. The efforts to achieve complete and useful law libraries motivated the publication of volumes that presented concordances between the differ-
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ent civil codes. One of those works of concordances, the Concordance entre les Codes civils étrangers et le Code Napoléon 1 (French
Concordance) of 1840, in French, and by Fortuné Anthoine de SaintJoseph, facilitated to a great extent the activities of drafters of civil
codes. It provided a panorama of universal legislation, and it therefore enjoyed a remarkable success, while copies were quickly made
available worldwide.
The French Concordance included a chart comparing the text of
the Code Napoléon with that of eight other codes. One of those eight
privileged places was occupied by the Louisiana Civil Code of
1825, 2 gaining paramount visibility amongst drafters that benefited
from the work of concordance. The French Concordance was popular in Spain and Latin America; and it is known that in the Iberian
Peninsula, during the early 1840s, copies were highly regarded.3
Therefore, a Spanish translation of the first edition of the French
Concordance was for the first time published in 1843. 4 Fermín Verlanga Huerta and Juan Muñiz Miranda were the authors of the translation, and they followed the format of the original by using a comparative chart. That work of concordances, both in its French and
Spanish versions, soon reached Latin America. The volume that was
translated into Spanish and transferred to the Americas indeed included the text of the Louisiana Civil Code, making it most probably
the first Spanish translation of that North-American text.
This paper will focus on the Spanish translation of the Louisiana
Civil Code. The paper is divided into four parts and includes two
appendices. Firstly, the paper will address the emergence of works
1. See generally FORTUNÉ ANTHOINE DE SAINT-JOSEPH, CONCORDANCE
ENTRE LES CODES CIVILS ÉTRANGERS ET LE CODE NAPOLÉON (1840).
2. The other texts were those of Austria (Autrichien), Bavaria (Bavarois),
Sardinia (Sarde), Netherlands (Hollandais), Prussia (Prussien), Vaud (canton de
Vaud), and the Two Sicilies (Deux-Siciles). Id.
3. FERMIN VERLANGA HUERTA & JUAN MUÑIZ MIRANDA, CONCORDANCIA
ENTRE EL CÓDIGO CIVIL FRANCÉS, Y LOS CÓDIGOS CIVILES ESTRANGEROS iv (2d ed.
1847).
4. FERMIN VERLANGA HUERTA & JUAN MUÑIZ MIRANDA, CONCORDANCIA
ENTRE EL CÓDIGO CIVIL FRANCÉS, Y LOS CÓDIGOS CIVILES ESTRANGEROS (1843).
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of legislative concordances during the nineteenth-century. The main
focus will be on the French Concordance of 1840. Secondly, the paper will attend the Spanish translation of that 1840 French opus.
Background information on the translators and their work will be
likewise provided. Thirdly, the paper will provide an analysis of the
references to the Louisiana text in the Spanish translation. The degree in which the text was translated will be assessed. Finally, the
paper will look at the reception and impact of the Spanish translation, both in Europe and the Americas. The first appendix places the
various Louisiana articles in one of the categories implemented by
Saint-Joseph, while the second appendix offers extracts from various nineteenth-century works of legislative concordances. The paper will therefore reflect that translations of legal materials served
as a means to further develop the circulation of ideas and the resulting codification movement that took force during the nineteenth
century.
II. NINETEENTH-CENTURY LEGISLATIVE CONCORDANCES 5
Studies on comparative legislation motivated an interest in other
codification works and gained momentum towards the middle of the
nineteenth century. Those comparative works were essential tools
for the drafters of civil codes around the world. 6 In Europe, yet even
more in the Americas, it was very expensive to hold a private law
library that would fully cover comparative legislation. 7 Important

5. See generally Agustín Parise, Importing Manufactures from the Low
Countries: The Use of the Dutch Civil Code (1838) in the Drafting of the Argentine Civil Code (1871) in RECHTSGESCHIEDENIS OP NIEUWE WEGEN 331 (Dave
De ruysscher et al. eds. 2015).
6. See generally Rolf Knütel, Influences of the Louisiana Civil Code in Latin
America, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1445 (1996).
7. For information about libraries in Río de la Plata, see José María Castán
Vázquez, Los Libros Jurídicos Españoles consultados por Vélez Sarsfield in
ESTUDIOS EN HOMENAJE AL DR. GUILLERMO A. BORDA 73, 74 (1984). See also
VÍCTOR TAU ANZOÁTEGUI, LA CODIFICACIÓN EN LA ARGENTINA (1810-1870):
MENTALIDAD SOCIAL E IDEAS JURÍDICAS 275-281 (1977) (indicating that there
was more access to French literature).
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libraries were therefore few, and were mainly in the hands of the
Church or universities. 8 In Argentina, for example, law libraries of
significant size did exist during the nineteenth century, 9 though it
was more common for practitioners to have smaller personal libraries. 10 That scenario, together with other reasons, motivated the development of works of legislative concordances, where authors
would draw parallels and differences amongst the different legislations. Furthermore, these comparative volumes would reduce the
number of books needed.
The nineteenth century welcomed works of concordances
amongst different civil codes, being drafted in Europe and the
Americas. Those works were handy tools for codifiers when drafting
civil codes. They were also useful for lawyers, judges, and law professors in their daily activities. Amongst the works of concordances,
it is possible to mention the French Concordance of 1840, in French
and by Fortuné Anthoine de Saint-Joseph; the work entitled The
Civil Law of Spain and Mexico (1851), 11 in English and by Gustavus
Schmidt; the Concordancias, Motivos y Comentarios del Código
Civil Español (1852), 12 in Spanish and by Florencio García Goyena;

For information about libraries in Louisiana, see David Combe, The Louisiana
Lawyer’s Roman-Law Library: Recollections of an Antiquarian Bibliophile, 70
TUL. L. REV. 2003 (1996).
8. José María Castán Vázquez, Vélez Sársfield, Jurista Bibliófilo, in 4
HOMENAJE A DALMACIO VÉLEZ SÁRSFIELD 519, 523 (2000).
9. Id. at 523; and José Torre Revello, Bibliotecas en el Buenos Aires antiguo
desde 1729 hasta la inauguración de la Biblioteca Pública en 1812, 59 REVISTA
DE HISTORIA DE AMÉRICA 1, 47-63 (1965).
10. See generally CARLOS LUQUE COLOMBRES, LIBROS DE DERECHO EN
BIBLIOTECAS PARTICULARES CORDOBESAS 1573-1810 (1945); GUILLERMO
FURLONG, BIBLIOTECAS ARGENTINAS DURANTE LA DOMINACIÓN HISPÁNICA
(1944); and Atilio Cornejo, Bibliotecas privadas de Salta en la época colonial,
4:16 BOLETÍN DEL INSTITUTO DE SAN FELIPE Y SANTIAGO DE ESTUDIOS
HISTÓRICOS DE SALTA 67 (1946).
11. GUSTAVUS SCHMIDT, THE CIVIL LAW OF SPAIN AND MEXICO (1851).
12. FLORENCIO GARCÍA GOYENA, 1-4 CONCORDANCIAS, MOTIVOS Y
COMENTARIOS DEL CÓDIGO CIVIL ESPAÑOL (1852).
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and the Jurisprudencia Civil Vigente Española y Estranjera
(1861), 13 in Spanish and by Juan Antonio Seoane.
A. Schmidt and Seoane
The works of Schmidt and Seoane had relevance in the Americas. For example, the book of Schmidt was one of the first works of
its kind accessible to English readers. For that reason, courts and
scholars referred to it early and for many years, beyond the legal
community of the U.S. 14 The book also had influence in Europe,
since Schmidt’s brother transmitted copies of the book to newspapers and law journals in Sweden. 15 Schmidt furthermore sent copies
of his book to his brother, to distribute them to scholars around Europe, 16 and one of the addressees was Friedrich Carl von Savigny in
Berlin. 17
Schmidt was a pioneer in the studies of comparative legislation
in the U.S. and was based in Louisiana. His book 18 aimed to provide
a common ground for civil law jurisdictions in America, indicating
at times the concordance or divergence amongst various Spanish legal texts, 19 and occasionally adding references to Louisiana. 20 It

13. JUAN ANTONIO SEOANE, JURISPRUDENCIA CIVIL VIGENTE ESPAÑOLA Y
ESTRANJERA, SEGÚN LAS SENTENCIAS DEL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO DESDE EL
ESTABLECIMIENTO DE SU JURISPRUDENCIA EN 1838 HASTA LA FECHA (1861).
14. Agustín Parise, Gustavus Schmidt, The Civil Law of Spain and Mexico, 2
J. CIV. L. STUD. 183, 186-191 (2009).
15. Kjell Å. Modéer, Carl und Gustavus Schmidt als Zeitschriftenherausgerber. Zwei schwedische Juristenbruder als Pioniere juristischer Zeitschriften im
19. Jahrhundert in JURISTISCHE ZEITSCHRIFTEN IN EUROPA 55, 64 (Michael Stolleis & Thomas Simon eds. 2006).
16. Kjell A. Modéer, Transatlantic Intercultural Legal Communication in the
19th Century: K.J.A. Mittermaier and the Schmidt Brothers, Carland Gustavus, 8
J. Civ. L. Stud. 409, 410 (2015).
17. Id. at 418.
18. See an extract of that book in VII.B.3 of this paper.
19. See, for example, the reference to the Fuero Real and the Siete Partidas
in the note to article 998. SCHMIDT, supra note 11, at 211.
20. See the note on “Mystic Will” in Louisiana. Id. at 215.
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should be noticed that Schmidt even created a short-lived law journal that was a forerunner for those disciplinary studies in the US. 21
The book 22 of Seoane, published in Madrid (Spain), circulated
widely throughout the Americas, reaching, for example, Río de la
Plata. 23 The book proved useful for the study of foreign doctrines
and legal solutions, by providing the elucidations followed by other
legal systems, even by those foreign to the Romanist tradition. 24 For
example, when looking at other legal systems, Seoane classified his
study in five main divisions: civil (civilismo), Slav (eslavismo), Germanic (germanismo), Oriental (orientalismo), and Roman (romanismo). 25 For example, when addressing the main aspects of ownership, Seoane dealt with the topic in China, India, and in territories
that followed Mahomed’s postulates, 26 stating clearly that his study
was, therefore, not limited to the Western world.
B. García Goyena
The book 27 of García Goyena resulted from the codification efforts undertaken by the Spanish administration. A draft of a civil
code for Spain (Spanish Project) was completed in May 1851. 28 The
work had been led by García Goyena, had 1,992 articles, 29 and was
21. The title of that periodical was Louisiana Law Journal. For more information on that periodical see Agustín Parise, Las bibliotecas jurídicas como herramientas fundamentales del Derecho Comparado: El caso de Schmidt en la Luisiana del siglo XIX, 15 REVISTA DE DERECHO COMPARADO 195, 212-217 (2009).
22. See an extract of that book in VII.B.5 of this paper.
23. See generally Marcelo Urbano Salerno, La legislación comparada del señor Seoane, fuente del código civil argentino, 20 REVISTA DEL INSTITUTO DE
HISTORIA DEL DERECHO “RICARDO LEVENE” 311 (1969). See also TAU
ANZOÁTEGUI, supra note 7, at 276.
24. TAU ANZOÁTEGUI, supra note 7, at 275.
25. SEOANE, supra note 13, at ix.
26. Id. at 169-170.
27. See an extract of that book in VII.B.4 of this paper.
28. JOSÉ MARÍA ANTEQUERA, HISTORIA DE LA LEGISLACIÓN ESPAÑOLA
DESDE LOS TIEMPOS MÁS REMOTOS HASTA NUESTROS DIAS 488 (4th ed. 1895).
29. 4 GARCÍA GOYENA, supra note 12, at 341. The Spanish Project contained
a Preliminary Title “Of laws [legislative acts] and their effects, and of the general
rules for their application” (De las leyes y sus efectos, y de las reglas generales
para su aplicación). The Preliminary Title was followed by three books: Book I
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said to follow the model of the Code Napoléon. 30 Although the
Spanish Project never reached the status of law, it was a cornerstone
for the civil code of Spain of 1889. 31 The Spanish concordance, one
of the most important Spanish-language scholarly legal productions
of the nineteenth century, followed the Spanish Project. In 1852,
García Goyena found a basis for its publication in the discussions
and debates that took place during the drafting of the Spanish Project. 32
The aim of the Spanish concordance was to include the legalhistorical background for each proposed article. 33 It guided the readers through the text of the Spanish Project, which was completely
transcribed and scholarly analysis followed each article. The work
was presented in four volumes. 34 García Goyena made references to
several civil codes and legislation, and the Louisiana Civil Code was
amongst the most frequently cited texts. 35 García Goyena worked

“Of persons” (De las personas), Book II “Of the division of things and of ownership” (De la división de los bienes y de la propiedad), and Book III “Of the modes
of acquiring ownership” (De los modos de adquirir la propiedad). Each book was
divided into titles, chapters, sections, and where relevant, paragraphs.
30. ALFONSO GARCÍA-GALLO, 1 MANUAL DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO
ESPAÑOL § 261 (7th rev. ed. 1977).
31. See generally Regina Gaya Sicilia, La influencia del Código Civil de Luisiana en la codificación civil española, 63:2 ANUARIO DE DERECHO CIVIL 719
(2010).
32. FELIPE SÁNCHEZ ROMÁN, 1 ESTUDIOS DE DERECHO CIVIL 529 (2nd ed.
1899).
33. 1 GARCÍA GOYENA, supra note 12, at 5.
34. The first three included appendices that further developed scholarly elaborations, while the fourth included both an alphabetical index of the topics covered throughout the four volumes (GARCÍA GOYENA, supra note 12, at 361-479)
and an outline of the Spanish Project (Id. at 345-358).
35. The most frequent references were made to the Louisiana Civil Code; the
civil codes of Austria, Bavaria, Holland, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, Prussia, Sardinia, Vaud, and Württemberg; the Code Napoléon; the proceedings of the
Council of Trent; the Corpus iuris civilis; the Fuero Juzgo; the Fuero Real; the
Institutes of Gaius; the Siete Partidas; the Novísima Recopilación; the project of
a Spanish civil code of 1821, the Recopilación, and the Spanish Constitution of
1837. See Agustín Parise, The Place of the Louisiana Civil Code in the Hispanic
Civil Codifications: Inclusion in the Comments to the Spanish Civil Code Project
of 1851, 68 LA. L. REV. 823, 842 (2008).
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with the French Concordance when drafting his Spanish text and this
explains the similarity in sources included in both works. 36
C. Saint-Joseph
The book 37 of Saint-Joseph largely facilitated the activities of
the drafters of civil codes and the activities of those interested in
comparative legislation because it provided a panorama of universal
legislation. 38 It enjoyed a remarkable success, and copies were
quickly made available worldwide. The French Concordance was
available in the new American jurisdictions. Several libraries on
both sides of the Atlantic held copies of that seminal work. The legal
community was well aware of its existence and value. For example,
the renowned South American jurist, Juan Bautista Alberdi, stated
in 1867 that “the work of M. Antonio de Saint-Joseph has gathered
all codes of the world in parallel columns, providing an immediate
comparison, developing steam-engine driven erudition, mechanical
erudition.” 39
The first edition of the French Concordance was published by
Charles Hingray in Paris and by Brockhaus et Avenarius in Leipzig
in 1840. 40 That edition dedicated 126 pages to a chart that included
and helped to compare, whenever possible, the texts of the Code
Napoléon with the texts of the civil codes of Austria, Bavaria, Holland, Louisiana, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, Sardinia, Prussia,
36. For example, the note to article 743 of the Spanish Project in an English
translation read: “In the work entitled ‘Concordance between Foreign Civil Codes
and the Code Napoléon’ [i.e., Concordance] can be read that [...].” GARCÍA
GOYENA, supra note 12, at 166.
37. See an extract of that book in VII.B.2 of this paper.
38. PEDRO LEÓN, EL CÓDIGO DE PRUSIA COMO FUENTE DEL CÓDIGO CIVIL
ARGENTINO 42 (1946).
39. The text in Spanish read: “La obra en que M. Antonio de Saint-Joseph ha
reunido todos los Códigos del mundo en columnas paralelas en que su comparacion se hace por sí misma, ha creado la erudicion á vapor, la erudicion mecánica
por decirlo así [...].” Juan Bautista Alberdi, El Proyecto de Código Civil para la
República Argentina (1868) in 7 OBRAS COMPLETAS DE JUAN BAUTISTA ALBERDI
80, 84 (1887).
40. According to Knütel, there was a second edition of 1842 that incorporated
few changes. Knütel, supra note 6, at 1449.
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and Vaud. 41 In addition, the first edition included, in 146 pages, diverse extracts of the texts of the civil codes of Aargau, Baden, Berne,
Fribourg, Haiti, and Sweden. The first edition further included, in
nineteen pages, a chart with the relevant articles on mortgages from
the civil codes of Fribourg, Geneva, Greece, Saint Gallen, Sweden,
and Württemberg. It should be noticed that the first edition had a
historical introduction on every code it included, which in Saint-Joseph’s words, was a fundamental reading for a better understanding
and interpretation of the legal texts. 42
A second edition of the French Concordance was published in
1856 and included many additions. 43 Arthur de Saint-Joseph, son of
the author of the first edition, was able to expand the work from one
to four volumes. Volume I included an introduction, 44 an historical
account on European codification, 45 and a preliminary note on the
legal texts it included. 46 In addition, a chart included and helped to
compare the texts of the Code Napoléon with those of six other contemporary legal texts. 47 Volumes III 48 and IV 49 also included references to a variety of codes, yet without the use of comparative charts
and through autonomous transcriptions. Volume II followed the
41. SAINT-JOSEPH (DE), supra note 1; and Parise, supra note 35, at 825.
42. The text in French read: “[...] cet historique des codes étrangers était un
avant-propos indispensable pour préparer à leur intelligence [...].” SAINT-JOSEPH
(DE), supra note 1, at viii.
43. ANTHOINE DE SAINT-JOSEPH, 1-4 CONCORDANCE ENTRE LES CODES
CIVILS ÉTRANGERS ET LE CODE NAPOLÉON OUVRAGE TERMINÉ ET PUBLIÉ PAR M.
A. DE SAINT-JOSEPH (1856).
44. 1 SAINT-JOSEPH (DE), supra note 43, at v-xcviii.
45. Id. at xcix-cxl.
46. Id. at cxli-cxlvii.
47. The chart included the texts from Austria, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, Bavaria, Vaud, and Sardinia; and provisions from, what the author called,
the German common law. Id. at 1-239.
48. The volume included the texts from Norway; Parma, Piacenza, and
Guastalla; Poland; Portugal; Prussia; Russia; Saxony; Saxe-Weimar; Serbia; Sweden; and Switzerland, which was divided in the cantons of Appenzell and Aargau.
3 SAINT-JOSEPH (DE), supra note 43, at 1-580.
49. The volume included the texts from the cantons of Basel, Bern, Fribourg,
Geneva, Glarus, Grisons, Lucerne, Neuchâtel, Saint Gallen, Solothurn, Ticino,
Valais, and Zurich. That volume also included texts from Tuscany, Turkey, Venezuela, and Württemberg. 4 SAINT-JOSEPH (DE), supra note 43, at 1-611.
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same format as the latter two volumes, and included the text of the
Louisiana Civil Code 50 together with that of a variety of legal
texts.51
The 1840 edition is of paramount importance for this paper since
it was translated into Spanish and also offered a place of preeminence to the text of the Louisiana Civil Code. The work in its first
edition was drafted only in French, providing French translations of
texts that were available in, amongst other languages, Dutch, 52 English, 53 and German. 54 As previously mentioned, the Louisiana text
was placed within the comparative chart, frequently occupying the
first column to the right of the Code Napoléon. 55 That privileged
location undoubtedly showcased the Louisiana text to codifiers on
both sides of the Atlantic.
The study of each jurisdiction took the Code Napoléon as a point
of departure. In other words, concordances and differences always
referred to the text of the Code Napoléon. Accordingly, when a text
showed similarities with that of the Code Napoléon, Saint-Joseph
stated in French, within the corresponding slot of the chart, comme
(as), and the transcription was most of the times omitted. For example, the chart indicated that article 1240 of the Louisiana Civil Code
was “as” article 818 of the Code Napoléon, even when a detailed
analysis shows that there are some differences. On that occasion
Saint-Joseph indicated: “1240: comme 818, C.N.” 56 When an article
showed differences with the Code Napoléon, Saint-Joseph provided
a transcription of the Louisiana Civil Code article. Furthermore, if

50. 2 SAINT-JOSEPH (DE), supra note 43, at 459-573.
51. The volume included texts from Baden, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Brunswick, Denmark, Frankfurt am Main, Great Britain, Greece, Haiti, Hamburg, Hanover, Holland, Ionian Islands, Malta and Modena, Roman states, South America,
Spain (with a reference to the Spanish work of García Goyena), and the U.S. Id.
at 1-458, 574-640.
52. e.g., Dutch Civil Code (1838).
53. e.g., Louisiana Civil Code (1825) (bilingual in French and English).
54. e.g., Austrian Civil Code (1811).
55. See, for example, the chart at SAINT-JOSEPH (DE), supra note 1, at 6.
56. Id. at 46.
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an article followed the Code Napoléon, but then departed from it,
Saint-Joseph would indicate “is added” (Il est ajouté). Accordingly,
article 217 of Louisiana reads: “Comme 331, C.N. Il est ajouté: Tout
autre mode de légitimation est aboli” [All other mode of legitimation is abolished].57
The historical introduction to the 1840 edition also referred to
the Louisiana Civil Code. The introduction indicated that the
changes in the Louisiana Civil Code were many when compared to
the Code Napoléon. A first group of changes had resulted from the
particularities of that young state and the need to develop judicial
education. A second group of changes had resulted from a difference
in the procedural systems of France and Louisiana. Finally, a third
group of changes had resulted from the inequality amongst inhabitants and the existence of slavery. 58 Saint-Joseph further stated in the
same introduction that the “Louisiana [Civil] Code is nothing more,
in its origins, than the Projet of the Code Napoléon as it had been
submitted to the Tribuat [i.e., one of the four assemblies]. It was
promulgated in 1808 only with the intercalation of some Spanish
laws.” 59
Drafters of civil codes in the Americas valued and used the
works of concordances, and legal provisions migrated with the assistance of those works. Codification endeavors are many times built
on previous experiences that proved to be successful. It has been

57. Id. at 13.
58. The text in French read:
Les changements qu’on a fait subir a Code Napoléon sont très nombreux,
les uns étaient exigés par la situation particulière de ce jeune Etat, qui
avait son éducation judiciaire à faire; les autres par une procédure essentiellement différente de la procédure française; d’autres enfin par l’inégalité d’état des habitans, car il existe parmi eux un assez grand nombre
d’esclaves, dont le sort devait être réglé.
Id. at viii.
59. The text in French read: “Le Code de la Louisiane n’était autre, dans l’origine, que le projet du Code Napoléon tel qu’il avait été soumis au Tribunat. En
1808 il fut promulgué dans l’État, on y intercala seulement quelques lois espagnoles.” Id.
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said, furthermore, when referring to codification, that choosing correctly is to create, 60 and that drafters use the knowledge that humanity treasured. 61
III. SPANISH TRANSLATION OF THE FRENCH CONCORDANCE
The French Concordance was translated into Spanish soon after
the first edition was released in 1840. That Spanish volume included
part of the text of the Louisiana Civil Code, and offered most probably the first Spanish translation of the North American corpus.
A. Motivation
In Spain many libraries received requests and orders to buy the
French Concordance soon after its publication in 1840. 62 The demand for the French volume was notorious, and motivated the need
to translate the text into Spanish. The Spanish volume was entitled
Concordancia entre el código civil francés y los códigos civiles estrangeros. 63 The title of the work was therefore a translation of that
of the French Concordance, yet it replaced the reference to the
“Code Napoléon” by the “French Civil Code.”
Fermín Verlanga Huerta and Juan Muñiz Miranda, lawyers at
the Madrid Bar, undertook the translation work. Verlanga Huerta
gained further exposure amongst the legal narrative with the publication of a pioneering work on the methodological study of procedural law (procedimentalismo) in the early 1840s. 64 That work was
amongst the first of its kind in Spain. 65 Verlanga Huerta had also
undertaken at the same time other translations from the French into

60. JOSÉ OLEGARIO MACHADO, 1 EXPOSICIÓN Y COMENTARIO DEL CÓDIGO
CIVIL ARGENTINO xvi (1898).
61. ALFREDO COLMO, TÉCNICA LEGISLATIVA DEL CÓDIGO CIVIL ARGENTINO
350 (2d ed. 1961).
62. VERLANGA HUERTA & MUÑIZ MIRANDA, supra note 3, at iv.
63. VERLANGA HUERTA & MUÑIZ MIRANDA, supra note 4.
64. Juan Manuel Alonso Furelos, El procedimentalismo español. Siglos XIX
y XX, 15 REVISTA DE DERECHO UNED 547, 554 (2014).
65. Id. at 561.
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Spanish, such as the translation of the work of André-Marie-JeanJacques Dupin on justice, law, and legislation. 66 Muñiz Miranda
also gained recognition with translation works. He translated from
Latin into Spanish, in 1845, together with Raimundo González Andrés, the history of Roman law by Johann Gottlieb Heineccius. 67
That translation widely circulated throughout the Spanish-speaking
world.
B. Editions
Three editions were made of the Spanish translation of the
French Concordance within a decade. The editions were dated 1843,
1845, and 1852. 68 There was an additional edition, being available
in libraries worldwide and used for this paper, that was dated 1847
and repeating that of 1843, yet with a different front page. 69 A Spanish bibliography indicated in 1883 that there were two editions that
appeared as second editions, dating 1845 and 1847; while there was
an economic edition dating 1852. 70 The 1847 text was referred to in
the cover page as “second edition.” The 1843 edition was published
in installments, upon prior subscription, as the newspaper El
Heraldo of Madrid indicated in its edition of May 27, 1843; 71 while

66. DUPIN, LECCIONES ELEMENTALES SOBRE LA JUSTICIA, EL DERECHO Y LAS
(Fermín Verlanga Huerta trans. 1842).
67. J. G. HEINECIO, HISTORIA DEL DERECHO ROMANO (Juan Muñiz Miranda
& Raimundo González Andrés trans. 1845).
68. Álvarez M. del Peral, Fermín Verlanga Huerta, EL DÍA DE CUENCA
(Cuenca) (April 11, 1928), at 1.
69. Id. See also Carlos Petit, De la Historia a la Memoria: A propósito de
una reciente obra de Historia Universal, 8 CUADERNOS DEL INSTITUTO ANTONIO
DE NEBRIJA DE ESTUDIOS SOBRE LA UNIVERSIDAD 237, 259 (2005).
70. The text in Spanish read: “Hay dos ediciones que aparecen como segundas de 1845 (28 rs.) y 1847 (60 rs.) y otra económica de 1852 (28 rs.).”
BIBLIOGRAFÍA ESPAÑOLA CONTEMPORÁNEA DEL DERECHO Y DE LA POLÍTICA,
1800-1880. PARTE PRIMERA. BIBLIOGRAFÍA ESPAÑOLA 128 (Manuel Torres Campos coord. 1883).
71. Anuncios, EL HERALDO (Madrid) (May 27, 1843), at 4.
LEYES
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the 1852 edition was part of the Biblioteca Universal, a series edited
by Ángel Fernández de los Ríos. 72
Many praised the usefulness of the translation. For example, a
widespread bibliographical bulletin of that time indicated that:
The significance of this work [i.e., the Spanish translation]—
for those who study jurisprudence, especially for those who
subscribed to the Códigos Españoles 73—is noticed simply
by reflecting that it almost encompasses an encyclopedia of
universal comparative legislation of modern civil law, based
on all recent scientific developments. 74
The translators also referred to the French Concordance as a
“panorama of civil legislation of all learned nations of the world.”75
The translators also indicated that their work could be of use for legislators. In those lines they claimed that:
How mandatory is the knowledge of the different legislation
of the world, precisely when they [i.e., Senators and Representatives] are called to shape our own [Spanish legislation]
within the new codes that the scenario demands, and whose
need is so much felt? 76
The translators replicated exactly the form and substance of the
original French volume. They therefore preserved, amongst others,
72. It was meant to be volume 2 of Section 4 of the Biblioteca Universal. See
FERMIN VERLANGA HUERTA & JUAN MUÑIZ MIRANDA, CONCORDANCIA ENTRE
EL CÓDIGO CIVIL FRANCÉS, Y LOS CÓDIGOS CIVILES ESTRANJEROS iii (1852).
73. n.b., the Códigos Españoles was a very widespread multi-volume work
that included the texts of all the seminal and historical codes of Spain.
74. The text in Spanish read:
La importancia de esta obra para cuantos se dedican á la carrera de jurisprudencia, y con especialidad para los suscritores á los Códigos Españoles, se advierte con solo reflexionar que casi encierra una enciclopedia
de legislacion comparada universal de derecho civil moderno, basada
sobre todos los adelantos de la ciencia hechos últimamente.
DIONISIO HIDALGO, 11 BOLETÍN BIBLIOGRAFICO ESPAÑOL Y ESTRANGERO 59
(1850).
75. The text in Spanish read: “[…] un panorama de legislación civil de todas
las naciones cultas del mundo.” VERLANGA HUERTA & MUÑIZ MIRANDA, supra
note 3, at iv.
76. The text in Spanish read: “Respecto á los Sres. Senadores y Diputados,
¿cuán indispensable es el conocimiento de las diferentes legislaciones del mundo,
cuando precisamente son llamados á formar la nuestra en los nuevos códigos que
la situacion reclama, y cuya necesidad tanto se siente?” Id.

302

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 9

the historical introduction, the comparative charts, and the reference
style used by Saint-Joseph. The translators seem to have closely and
“blindly” followed the French text they copied. The Spanish version
did include however the somehow expected translator’s preface 77
and occasional references to Spanish legislation that were incorporated as footnotes to a few articles, as seen in the columns devoted
to the Louisiana Civil Code. For example, a reference to Spanish
legislation was added to a note that preceded article 2604 of Louisiana. 78 That note referred to expropriation and stated that “with regards to Spain, the law of July 17, 1836 also regulates this subject
matter.” 79 That reference to Spanish legislation was not included in
the original French text. 80
C. Product
Very few references are found in the literature regarding the
quality or merits of the Spanish translation of the French Concordance. For example, Abel Cháneton, author of a detailed and authoritative study on the life and work of the Argentine codifier Dalmacio
Vélez Sarsfield, stated that the translation was “discrete” (discreta),
hence avoiding any overstatement on the quality. Cháneton did mention, however, that there were some “outrageous” errata. 81 He mentioned, for example, that Verlanga Huerta and Muñiz Miranda translated Geneva 82 (Genève in French, Ginebra in Spanish) into Genoa 83 (Gênes in French, Génova in Spanish). 84 Not a minor mistake
for those interested in the laws of Switzerland, who were incorrectly

77. Id.
78. Id. at 138.
79. The text in Spanish read: “Respecto a España, la ley de 17 de Julio de
1836 regula tambien esta material.” Id.
80. SAINT-JOSEPH (DE), supra note 1, at 89.
81. ABEL CHÁNETON, 2 HISTORIA DE VÉLEZ SÁRSFIELD 173 (1937).
82. See, for example, the reference to Geneva in SAINT-JOSEPH (DE), supra
note 1, at 127.
83. See, for example, the reference to Genoa in the translation in VERLANGA
HUERTA & MUÑIZ MIRANDA, supra note 3, at 203.
84. CHÁNETON, supra note 81, at 173.
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pointing to the laws of Italy. Another reference, though more recent,
was made in a 1995 PhD dissertation defended at University of Cantabria (Spain) by Margarita Serna Vallejo. That author indicated that
the translation contained serious mistakes and that it was a very “free
translation,” suggesting the use of the original French text when
seeking for authoritative wordings. 85
A preliminary look at the translation shows that several terms of
art are properly translated. There are some non-sense translations of
articles, however. For example, Article 1009 of the Louisiana Civil
Code dealt with the impossibility to accept or reject a succession
subject to condition. The translation referred to “subject of condition” (bajo de condicion) 86 instead of “subject to condition” (bajo
condicion). Some clerical mistakes can also be identified in the form
of the translation, and those mistakes do have an impact. For example, the Spanish translation incorrectly stated that articles 530 and
532 of Louisiana were summarized together, 87 while the original
French read that articles 530 to 532 were summarized together. 88
The Spanish translation therefore excluded article 531 of Louisiana,
not a minor exclusion, since readers had to rely on the French Concordance, as they were most of the time unable to look at the original
texts and correct the existing mistakes. A similar inaccuracy occurred with articles 740 to 744 of Louisiana, 89 which incorrectly referred to articles 740 and 744 90 in the Spanish translation. That mistake whipped out three articles of the North American text.

85. The text in Spanish read: “En relación a esta traducción hay que advertir
que, además de la existencia de errores graves, se trata de una traducción bastante
libre por lo que es preferible utilizar la edición francesa.”
Margarita Serna Vallejo, La publicidad inmobiliaria en el derecho hipotecario histórico español, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Universidad de Cantabria, 1995, at 12.
86. VERLANGA HUERTA & MUÑIZ MIRANDA, supra note 3, at 65.
87. Id. at 45.
88. SAINT-JOSEPH (DE), supra note 1, at 30.
89. Id. at 35.
90. VERLANGA HUERTA & MUÑIZ MIRANDA, supra note 3, at 54.
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Readers—many times—had access to foreign legislative bodies
only by means of the Spanish translation of the French Concordance, since as already mentioned, law libraries that dealt with comparative legislation were rare in some jurisdictions. Furthermore,
some legislators had limited foreign-language skills. Consequently,
more careful editing and revision of the translation of the French
Concordance would have been beneficial. That careful work would
have eliminated some mistakes in the translation itself, but more importantly, it would have prevented mistakes in the work that legislators made when relying—necessarily blindly—on the text of Verlanga Huerta and Muñiz Miranda. It should also be noted that some
codifiers, such as Vélez Sarsfield in Argentina, had foreign-language skills that enabled them to work with the original text of the
French Concordance and to avoid some translation mistakes, 91 yet
that was not the case for all codifiers or legislators in the Americas
and beyond.
IV. ANALYSIS OF REFERENCES TO THE LOUISIANA TEXT
No previous study assessed the degree in which the text of the
Louisiana Civil Code was translated into Spanish as a result of the
work of Verlanga Huerta and Muñiz Miranda. Knowledge on that
degree will bring light on the nineteenth-century availability of the
Louisiana text for Spanish readers—and legislators—that had no
language skills in French or English. Louisiana shared some common elements with other American jurisdictions that had been Spanish possessions, and was hence of special interest for the new republics. 92 The civil code of that U.S. state was therefore of special interest for other American legislators that aimed for provisions that

91. AGUSTÍN PARISE, HISTORIA DE LA CODIFICACIÓN CIVIL DEL ESTADO DE
LUISIANA Y SU INFLUENCIA EN EL CÓDIGO CIVIL ARGENTINO 182, 365, 372
(2013).
92. Id. at 147-151, 363-367, 369-370.
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could amalgamate former Spanish colonial provisions with the benefits offered by the nineteenth-century codification. 93 Louisiana was
likewise of interest for English and French speaking jurisdictions in
America, as reflected by the codification efforts in New York 94 and
Quebec. 95
Saint-Joseph dealt differently with the different articles of the
Louisiana Civil Code. A detailed study of the content of the Spanish
translation of the Louisiana Civil Code offered four possible scenarios:
1. The French Concordance indicated the similarities 96—or,
occasionally, differences 97—of the Louisiana text with that
93. Id. at 369-370.
94. David Dudley Field worked on a project of a civil code for the state of
New York. His 1865 project had notes for two-thirds of its articles, and indicated
references to, amongst others, related court decisions, revised statutes, the Code
Napoléon, and the Louisiana Code. For example, the note to Chapter 2, Title 3,
Part 4, Division 2 of the project read, “The provisions of this chapter, except §
455, are similar to those of the Code Napoleon and the Code of Louisiana.” THE
CIVIL CODE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK: REPORTED COMPLETE BY THE
COMMISSIONERS OF THE CODE 136 (1865). See Agustín Parise, Libraries of Civil
Codes as Mirrors of Normative Transfers from Europe to the Americas: The Experiences of Lorimier in Quebec (1871–1890) and Varela in Argentina (1873–
1875) in ENTANGLEMENTS IN LEGAL HISTORY: CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES 315,
347-348 (Thomas Duve ed. 2014); and Shael Herman, The Fate and the Future of
Codification in America, 40 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY 407, 423
(1996).
95. Quebec deserves special attention due to its mixed-jurisdiction nature
within continental America. That jurisdiction adopted the Civil Code of Lower
Canada on August 1, 1866. Codification was expected as a natural and logical
development in Quebec because of its antecedents and of the success that codification had in France. The Louisiana Civil Code was a source for codifiers in Quebec. The Louisiana text occupied for Quebec a prominent role as formal and linguistic source, rather than as substantive model. See John Richert & Suzanne
Richert, The Impact of the Civil Code of Louisiana upon the Civil Code of Quebec
of 1866, 8 REVUE JURIDIQUE THÉMIS DE L’UNIVERSITÉ DE MONTRÉAL 501, 518
(1973); QUEBEC CIVIL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO QUEBEC PRIVATE LAW 24
(John EC Brierley & Roderick A Macdonald eds. 1993); and John E.C. Brierley,
Reception of English Law in the Canadian Province of Quebec in LA RÉCEPTION
DES SYSTÈMES JURIDIQUES. IMPLANTATION ET DESTIN 103, 116 (Michel Doucet &
Jacques Vanderlinden coord. 1994).
96. The concordance also indicated, occasionally, the additions made by the
Louisiana Civil Code to the text of the Code Napoléon. See, for example, articles
3143-3143 of the Louisiana Civil Code. VERLANGA HUERTA & MUÑIZ MIRANDA,
supra note 3, at. 173.
97. See, for example, articles 3038-3039 of the Louisiana Civil Code.
VERLANGA HUERTA & MUÑIZ MIRANDA, supra note 3, at. 168.
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of the Code Napoléon; 98
2. The French Concordance ignored or was silent with regards to the Louisiana text;
3. The French Concordance transcribed the text of Louisiana
articles individually, with occasional paraphrasing; or
4. The French Concordance summarized jointly the text of
several Louisiana articles, amalgamating them into single articles. 99
All the articles of the Louisiana Civil Code fell within one of
those four possible scenarios. 100 The analyses for this paper attended
the 3522 articles of the Louisiana Civil Code, and indicated that 50%
of those articles were not translated into Spanish. Saint-Joseph, and
therefore the Spanish translation, flagged 41% of the articles as having a text similar (or occasionally different) to that of the Code Napoléon, while 9% of the articles were ignored by the French author.
In addition, 32% of the Louisiana articles were translated individually, with occasional paraphrasing; while 18% of the North American articles were summarized jointly with other articles.
A breakdown into books showed that the percentages there fluctuated. Saint-Joseph indicated more similarity with the Code Napoléon or more novelty in Louisiana depending on the book of the civil
code he attended. Therefore, the degree of transcription (and hence
translation) depended on the area of private law. A more in-depth
breakdown, for example, down into titles, chapters, or sections,
could indicate even more variations. That deeper level of analysis
could help better identify the perceptions the author had about the
originality of the Louisiana Civil Code.

98. Concordance was also indicated with other texts. For example, articles
1654-1655 of the Louisiana Civil Code indicate concordance with the French civil
and procedural codes. SAINT-JOSEPH (DE), supra note 1, at 87.
99. It should also be noticed that occasional concordances and differences
were indicated in the cases where Saint-Joseph transcribed articles individually or
jointly.
100. See a breakdown of all the articles of the Louisiana Civil Code in VII.A
of this paper.
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Three charts assist to better visualize the findings of this paper.
Chart 1 indicates how Saint-Joseph dealt with the articles of the Louisiana Civil Code. It places each article within one of the four scenarios (i.e., Concordance, Transcribed Individually, Transcribed
Jointly, Ignored), while it provides a breakdown of that placing
within the preliminary title and the three books of the Louisiana
Civil Code. Chart 1 further provides the article spam for the different
parts of the North American corpus.
Chart 1.
Article
Spam
Preliminary
1 to 23
Title

Concordance

Transcribed Transcribed
Ignored
Individually
Jointly

3

9

0

11

Book I

24 to 438

163

152

29

71

Book II

439 to 865

177

127

72

51

Book III

866 to 3522 1112

850

522

173

Chart 2 transforms the results of the previous chart into percentages. The corresponding percentages for each part of the Louisiana
Civil Code are provided, together with the number of articles of each
part.
Chart 2.
Number of
Transcribed Transcribed
Concordance
Articles
Individually
Jointly
Preliminary
23
Title

Ignored

13%

39%

0%

48%

Book I

415

39%

37%

7%

17%

Book II

427

41%

30%

17%

12%

Book III

2657

42%

32%

20%

6%

Finally, Chart 3 provides the total percentages for each of the
four possible scenarios. This final chart reflects that Saint-Joseph

308

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 9

transcribed 50% of the Louisiana Civil Code in his work of concordance.
Chart 3.
Concordance

Transcribed Transcribed
Individually
Jointly

Ignored

1455

1138

623

306

Percentages 41%

32%

18%

9%

Articles

The analysis provided a significant finding. The French Concordance—and its Spanish translation—told readers in Spain and
Latin America that approximately 41% of the text of the Louisiana
Civil Code resembled the French text, without even needing to fully
transcribe the Louisiana wording. That was indeed an ambitious
claim that entailed a big responsibility for the French author and for
the Spanish translators, since they were the lenses through which
readers looked at Louisiana.
The analysis also triggered some interesting questions. Why
were some articles transcribed and summarized jointly? Why were
some references to concordances grouped together? Why was the
transcription of some articles neglected without any explanation?
What was the criterion of the French author? It is interesting to consider that it was ultimately up to Saint-Joseph to decide which Louisiana articles he thought were similar to those of the Code Napoléon. He somehow imposed on all readers his impressions about
similarities or differences. Accordingly, Saint-Joseph might have
contributed to the worldwide claim that Louisiana adopted the Code
Napoléon. He might be the one to point at! Readers, when working
with the concordance, either in French or Spanish, would read that
41% of the text of Louisiana was similar to that from France. The
perception that Saint-Joseph had was indeed his own way of reading
the differences or similarities. That perception, nevertheless, was
very influential.
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V. RECEPTION OF THE SPANISH TRANSLATION
The Spanish translation contributed to the dissemination of the
French Concordance, both in the Iberian Peninsula and in the Americas. Legislators at large, and codifiers in particular, were able to
look at the Spanish translation when undertaking the drafting of their
legislative proposals. The multiple editions of the Spanish translation offered proof of the demand for that volume. Furthermore, the
Spanish government soon recognized the importance of the Spanish
translation. A Real Ordenanza of August 1844 acknowledged that
the Spanish translation was useful for the study of legislation. 101 The
following year, a Real Resolución of July 31 declared that the Spanish translation was useful for public teaching. 102
The volume also had an impact in the Americas. Previous studies proved that the French Concordance was widely spread in the
Americas, and drafters of civil codes benefited with its presentation
of different seminal codifications. 103 Drafters such as Vélez
Sarsfield in Argentina and Andrés Bello in Chile had access to the
work of García Goyena and to the French Concordance, and worked
at a time when the Spanish translation circulated in the New
World. 104 In addition, law journals and their subscribers were also
interested in the translation. In Argentina, for example, Miguel Navarro Viola edited a journal entitled El Plata Científico y Literario,
and included parts of the Spanish translation.
The most ambitious project of that Argentine journal was to publish the Spanish Concordance. That Argentine journal was short-

101. Peral, supra note 68, at 1.
102. 35 COLECCIÓN DE LAS LEYES, DECRETOS Y DECLARACIONES DE LAS
CORTES, Y DE LOS REALES DECRETOS, ORDENES, RESOLUCIONES Y REGLAMENTOS
GENERALES EXPEDIDOS POR LOS RESPECTIVOS MINISTERIOS DESDE 1° DE JULIO
HASTA FIN DE DICIEMBRE DE 1845 79 (2d ed. 1846); and TAU ANZOÁTEGUI, supra
note 7, at 286.
103. See generally PARISE, supra note 91.
104. Id. at 147-150, 372.
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lived, however, appearing from 1854 to 1855 and having a fate similar to that of Schmidt in Louisiana. 105 Most of the contributions included in the Argentine journal were drafted by Navarro Viola himself, who wrote about, for example, the judicial branch, 106 death
penalty, 107 nullity of marriage, 108 and criminal law at large. 109 The
journal also published contributions by other authors. 110 Accordingly, the pages of the journal included, amongst others, works by
Federico Pineda on the judicial reform 111 and by Valentín Gómez
and Eduardo Lahitte on the nullity of marriage. 112 Two codifiers also
contributed with the journal: Marcelino Ugarte 113 wrote on the law
10 of the Leyes de Toro; 114 while Eduardo Acevedo, 115 together with
105. See footnote 21 and accompanying text.
106. NÉSTOR TOMÁS AUZA, ESTUDIO E ÍNDICE GENERAL DE EL PLATA
CIENTÍFICO Y LITERARIO 1854-1855 Y ATLÁNTIDA 1911-1913 35 (1968).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 33.
109. Id. at 37.
110. CHÁNETON, supra note 81, at 435.
111. AUZA, supra note 106, at 32.
112. Id. at 33.
113. In 1857, the executive power of Buenos Aires authorized the allotment of
financial resources for the drafting of the civil, criminal, and procedural codes.
Marcelo Gamboa and Mercelino Ugarte were appointed to draft the first of those
codes, and the latter jurist started to draft a project, which due to financial constraints was soon interrupted. The main sources of inspiration for Ugarte were the
project of a civil code for Uruguay of 1852 by Eduardo Acevedo and the work of
concordances by García Goyena. See ABELARDO LEVAGGI, 2 MANUAL DE
HISTORIA DEL DERECHO ARGENTINO (CASTELLANO-INDIANO/NACIONAL) 265
(1987); and RICARDO ZORRAQUÍN BECÚ, MARCELINO UGARTE 1822-1872: UN
JURISTA EN LA ÉPOCA DE LA ORGANIZACIÓN NACIONAL (1954).
114. AUZA, supra note 106, at 32.
115. Eduardo Acevedo completed the drafting of a first project of a civil code
for Uruguay by 1851. That first draft was based mainly on traditional law, and to
a lesser extent, on the French doctrine. Acevedo said that in order to capture in
text the law that Uruguayan courts had been using (i.e., Spanish and Indiano laws)
he found practical the adoption of texts by French authors, such as Domat, Pothier,
Toullier, Merlin, and Troplong. That borrowing was done because of the radical
unity of the European law that found its grounding in Roman law. The draft of
Acevedo was later revised and corrected by the Argentine jurist Tristán Narvaja.
Finally, a codifying commission revised the work of Narvaja and drafted a new
project that was promulgated in 1868 as the Civil Code of Uruguay. See Olivier
Moréteau & Agustín Parise, Recodification in Louisiana and Latin America, 83
TUL. L. REV. 1103, 1146-1147 (2009). See also EDUARDO ACEVEDO & ALBERTO
PALOMEQUE, EDUARDO ACEVEDO: AÑOS 1815-1863, SU OBRA COMO
CODIFICADOR, MINISTRO, LEGISLADOR Y PUBLICISTA 338-345 (1908); ALEJANDRO
GUZMÁN BRITO, LA CODIFICACIÓN CIVIL EN IBEROAMÉRICA: SIGLOS XIX Y XX
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José Roque Pérez, wrote on criminal law. 116 The list of contributors
in the area of legislation, jurisprudence, and economic politics encompassed the significant number of 27 contributors. 117
The Spanish translation was published in installments within the
different issues of the Argentine journal. Accordingly, the historical
introduction was published in two issues, 118 while the comparative
chart was presented throughout five issues, 119 reaching only article
454 of the Code Napoléon and 322 of the Louisiana Civil Code.120
Readers were not clearly informed about who was the author of the
Spanish version of the French Concordance that was published in
the Argentine journal. Navarro Viola later admitted that he had reproduced the work of Verlanga Huerta y Muñiz Miranda. 121 However, due to his initial silence regarding the authorship, some scholars erroneously claimed that the translation work had been undertaken by Navarro Viola. 122
Publishers, by means of books and journals, were therefore able
to disseminate the text of the Spanish translation on both sides of the
Atlantic. That dissemination generated awareness of the existence
of the Spanish translation amongst readers, ultimately exposed the
text of the Louisiana Civil Code to the Spanish legal narrative, and
fostered the circulation of legal ideas.

461-462 (2000); LEVAGGI, supra note 113, at 241-242; and ORESTES ARAÚJO ET
1 CÓDIGO CIVIL ANOTADO xxi-xxiii, xxxvi-xxxviii (1949).
116. AUZA, supra note 106, at 36-37.
117. 1 EL PLATA CIENTÍFICO Y LITERARIO 8 (Miguel Navarro-Viola dir. 1854).
118. Id. at 13-40; and 2 EL PLATA CIENTÍFICO Y LITERARIO 1-25 (Miguel Navarro-Viola dir. 1854).
119. The breakdown of articles was: 1 to 25 appeared in 1 EL PLATA
CIENTÍFICO Y LITERARIO 42-47 (Miguel Navarro-Viola dir. 1854); 26 to 156 appeared in 2 EL PLATA CIENTÍFICO Y LITERARIO 26-39 (Miguel Navarro-Viola dir.
1854); 157 to 280 appeared in 3 EL PLATA CIENTÍFICO Y LITERARIO 2-14 (Miguel
Navarro-Viola dir. 1854); 281 to 379 appeared in 4 EL PLATA CIENTÍFICO Y
LITERARIO 2-15 (Miguel Navarro-Viola dir. 1855); and 380 to 454 appeared in 5
EL PLATA CIENTÍFICO Y LITERARIO 2-15 (Miguel Navarro-Viola dir. 1855).
120. 5 EL PLATA CIENTÍFICO Y LITERARIO 14 (Miguel Navarro-Viola dir.
1855).
121. CHÁNETON, supra note 81, at 173.
122. AUZA, supra note 106, at 17.
AL.,
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VI. CLOSING REMARKS
Translations are tools of trade that play a fundamental role in the
development of legislation. This paper provided an example of the
use of those tools of trade by looking at nineteenth-century codification endeavors. It should be noticed that not all codifiers mastered
foreign languages, and codifiers in the Americas might thus have
encountered barriers in some Dutch, English, French, or German
texts—to mention a few.
This paper first addressed the emergence of works of legislative
concordance during the nineteenth century. Even when the main focus was devoted to the French Concordance of 1840, the paper presented other examples of that type of works to be found in English,
French, and Spanish elaborations. The latter provided readers with
early works on comparative legislation, and as mentioned earlier in
this paper, those elaborations were gestated on both sides of the Atlantic.
The paper then devoted special attention to the Spanish translation of the French Concordance of 1840. The work by Verlanga
Huerta and Muñiz Miranda was attended, together with its reception. The paper also alerted on the few references that were found in
the literature regarding the quality or merits of the Spanish translation; and mentioned some mistakes, omissions, and confusions undertaken by Verlanga Huerta and Muñiz Miranda. The translators
had indeed a big responsibility since some legislators were bound to
rely—necessarily blindly—on their Spanish text.
An analysis of the references to the Louisiana Civil Code within
the Spanish translation followed. No previous study had assessed
the degree in which the text of the Louisiana Civil Code was translated into Spanish in the nineteenth century. The analyses for this
paper indicated that 50% of those articles of Louisiana were not transcribed in the French Concordance and therefore not translated into
Spanish. In that 50%, Saint-Joseph opted to indelicate concordance
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with the Code Napoléon or to ignore the article. The Spanish translation told readers in Spain and Latin America that around 41% of
the text of the Louisiana Civil Code resembled the French text, without even needing to fully transcribe the Louisiana wording. In addition, Saint-Joseph indicated more similarity with the Code Napoléon
or more novelty in Louisiana depending on the book of the civil code
he addressed. Therefore, the degree of transcription depended on the
area of private law.
Finally, the paper looked at the reception and impact of the
Spanish translation, both in Europe and the Americas. The Spanish
translation indeed contributed to the dissemination of the French
Concordance. The multiple editions of the Spanish translation were
proof of the demand for that volume in the Iberian Peninsula and
there the government advocated for the value of the book. The
Americas also welcomed the translation, which was available for
codifiers as a result of its inclusion in law journals, such as the one
of Navarro Viola.
Three final comments must be made when assessing the Spanish
translation of the French Concordance of 1840. Firstly, that in the
French Concordance, nothing is said about the origins of the provisions included in the texts. The historical introduction tried to offer
a context, though the sources of those texts were not studied in detail. The French Concordance limited to indicate a similarity or difference between the Code Napoléon and the different civil codes.
This is not a minor point, since, in the case of Louisiana and other
jurisdictions, the similarities could well be traced to Roman law, as
Robert A. Pascal explained. 123 Secondly, that the French Concordance (and its Spanish translation) reflected the understanding of one

123. In 1972, Robert A. Pascal published an article claiming that French law,
composed after elements from Roman, Romanized Frankish, Burgundian, and
Visigothic origins, habitually resembled the Spanish law that derived from Roman
or Roman-Visigothic origins. He understood that the Code Napoléon provided a
mine of texts written in French. Thus, in Louisiana, the drafters of the Digest of
the Civil Laws of 1808 used French texts that contained or could be modified to
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single man, nothing more, nothing less. That understanding, however, had a significant impact on the codification works and on the
teaching and practice of law. Thirdly, that the Spanish translation
was indeed very early in time and elaborated outside the boundaries
of Louisiana. It took place within three decades after the Louisiana
Civil Code was enacted: at a time when codification was starting for
the rest of the civil law world, reaching its heydays in the mid-nineteenth century.
The Spanish translation—and naturally its French original—
raised the text of the Louisiana Civil Code to a paramount position.
The Louisiana text therefore served as a model for codification efforts in Spain, and stretched from Quebec to Argentina. Translations, such as that of the work of Saint-Joseph, served as means to
further develop the circulation of legal ideas: they were undoubtedly
used as tools of trade.
VII. APPENDICES
A. Breakdown of Louisiana Articles within the Spanish Translation
This appendix includes a chart that offers a breakdown of the
different articles of the Louisiana Civil Code. That breakdown
places each Louisiana article within one of the four possible scenarios followed by Saint-Joseph (i.e., Concordance, Transcribed Individually, Transcribed Jointly, Ignored). Researchers may now attend
individual articles or clusters of articles, assessing the different areas
of the law.
CONCORDANCE
8, 9, 11, 58, 60, 63, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77,
78, 79, 80, 82, 86, 92, 94, 96, 97, 98, 109, 112, 113, 115, 116, 118, 119,
120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 134, 135,
136, 137, 138, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154,
contain in substance the Spanish-Roman law then in force in Louisiana. See Robert A. Pascal, Sources of the Digest of 1808: A Reply to Professor Batiza, 46 TUL.
L. REV. 603, 605-606 (1972).
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203, 204, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219,
221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 229, 231, 233, 234, 235, 237, 238, 240, 241,
242, 243, 244, 245, 247, 248, 249, 250, 253, 267, 268, 270, 271, 272,
273, 275, 276, 288, 294, 297, 299, 301, 303, 304, 306, 308, 313, 314,
316, 317, 318, 320, 322, 323, 324, 326, 327, 333, 345, 346, 347, 348,
350, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 367, 369, 370, 372, 373, 376, 379, 380,
381, 382, 383, 386, 389, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 401, 402,
403, 405, 407, 408, 444, 445, 449, 452, 454, 455, 456, 458, 459, 460,
463, 464, 465, 466, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 476, 477, 483, 489, 490,
491, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505,
506, 507, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520,
521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 540, 542, 543,
545, 546, 547, 548, 550, 551, 553, 556, 557, 559, 564, 565, 566, 571,
572, 573, 574, 575, 579, 580, 581, 582, 585, 586, 587, 589, 607, 608,
609, 610, 612, 614, 616, 618, 619, 623, 624, 626, 627, 634, 636, 637,
639, 640, 641, 643, 644, 645, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662,
666, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 684, 685, 686,
687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 694, 695, 696, 704, 705, 706, 707, 709,
716, 723, 724, 725, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 771,
772, 773, 774, 779, 780, 781, 786, 787, 792, 797, 798, 802, 803, 866,
881, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 898,
899, 900, 902, 904, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 914, 915, 916, 923, 924,
925, 927, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 941, 942,
947, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 967, 970, 971, 981, 982, 983, 984,
985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998,
999, 1001, 1003, 1014, 1015, 1022, 1023, 1024, 1025, 1045, 1047,
1054, 1063, 1088, 1089, 1090, 1215, 1216, 1235, 1238, 1240, 1245,
1246, 1250, 1251, 1252, 1258, 1259, 1267, 1286, 1287, 1288, 1289,
1290, 1291, 1292, 1294, 1297, 1298, 1299, 1301, 1306, 1307, 1309,
1312, 1315, 1317, 1320, 1321, 1322, 1323, 1324, 1325, 1328, 1329,
1330, 1331, 1334, 1335, 1336, 1337, 1338, 1342, 1344, 1345, 1346,
1359, 1363, 1364, 1374, 1375, 1376, 1377, 1379, 1382, 1383, 1384,
1385, 1386, 1387, 1388, 1395, 1399, 1400, 1406, 1421, 1422, 1423,
1424, 1425, 1426, 1429, 1430, 1435, 1436, 1437, 1438, 1439, 1440,
1441, 1442, 1446, 1447, 1448, 1452, 1453, 1454, 1455, 1456, 1457,
1461, 1463, 1466, 1467, 1469, 1475, 1476, 1477, 1478, 1483, 1486,
1487, 1488, 1489, 1491, 1492, 1494, 1496, 1497, 1498, 1499, 1502,
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1503,
1518,
1537,
1551,
1572,
1600,
1625,
1653,
1673,
1694,
1719,
1732,
1744,
1785,
1868,
1887,
1902,
1947,
2018,
2036,
2064,
2088,
2099,
2111,
2129,
2152,
2163,
2189,
2202,
2213,
2224,
2239,
2264,
2277,
2295,
2310,
2333,
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1504,
1519,
1541,
1555,
1577,
1601,
1626,
1654,
1674,
1696,
1720,
1733,
1745,
1787,
1869,
1888,
1922,
1948,
2019,
2037,
2065,
2089,
2100,
2112,
2130,
2153,
2164,
2190,
2203,
2214,
2225,
2240,
2265,
2278,
2296,
2317,
2334,

1505,
1521,
1542,
1556,
1579,
1602,
1629,
1655,
1675,
1699,
1721,
1734,
1758,
1844,
1875,
1889,
1928,
1949,
2020,
2038,
2066,
2090,
2101,
2113,
2132,
2154,
2166,
2191,
2204,
2215,
2226,
2241,
2266,
2279,
2297,
2318,
2337,

1506,
1522,
1543,
1557,
1581,
1603,
1630,
1656,
1684,
1700,
1722,
1735,
1761,
1845,
1876,
1890,
1929,
1950,
2026,
2039,
2067,
2091,
2102,
2119,
2134,
2155,
2167,
2192,
2205,
2216,
2227,
2244,
2267,
2280,
2298,
2319,
2338,

1507,
1523,
1544,
1558,
1584,
1604,
1631,
1657,
1686,
1701,
1723,
1736,
1763,
1846,
1877,
1891,
1930,
1952,
2027,
2040,
2068,
2092,
2104,
2120,
2135,
2156,
2170,
2193,
2206,
2217,
2228,
2245,
2268,
2281,
2299,
2320,
2339,

1508,
1526,
1545,
1559,
1593,
1605,
1632,
1658,
1687,
1703,
1724,
1737,
1765,
1847,
1878,
1892,
1934,
1954,
2028,
2041,
2069,
2093,
2105,
2121,
2136,
2157,
2171,
2194,
2207,
2218,
2229,
2246,
2269,
2288,
2302,
2322,
2340,

1509,
1527,
1546,
1560,
1595,
1606,
1633,
1659,
1688,
1704,
1727,
1738,
1766,
1848,
1879,
1893,
1938,
1956,
2029,
2046,
2083,
2094,
2106,
2122,
2143,
2158,
2172,
2195,
2208,
2219,
2230,
2251,
2270,
2289,
2305,
2323,
2341,

1514,
1529,
1547,
1561,
1596,
1607,
1634,
1660,
1690,
1705,
1728,
1739,
1770,
1849,
1880,
1895,
1939,
1957,
2032,
2047,
2084,
2095,
2107,
2123,
2145,
2159,
2185,
2196,
2209,
2220,
2232,
2252,
2271,
2290,
2306,
2324,
2342,

1515,
1532,
1548,
1564,
1597,
1618,
1635,
1664,
1691,
1706,
1729,
1741,
1771,
1864,
1881,
1897,
1940,
1965,
2033,
2048,
2085,
2096,
2108,
2124,
2146,
2160,
2186,
2199,
2210,
2221,
2233,
2253,
2272,
2291,
2307,
2325,
2344,
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1516,
1535,
1549,
1565,
1598,
1619,
1651,
1665,
1692,
1717,
1730,
1742,
1772,
1866,
1883,
1898,
1945,
2016,
2034,
2062,
2086,
2097,
2109,
2125,
2149,
2161,
2187,
2200,
2211,
2222,
2235,
2254,
2274,
2292,
2308,
2326,
2345,

1517,
1536,
1550,
1566,
1599,
1624,
1652,
1666,
1693,
1718,
1731,
1743,
1775,
1867,
1884,
1901,
1946,
2017,
2035,
2063,
2087,
2098,
2110,
2126,
2151,
2162,
2188,
2201,
2212,
2223,
2236,
2263,
2276,
2294,
2309,
2332,
2346,
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2347,
2381,
2399,
2423,
2438,
2460,
2472,
2485,
2531,
2549,
2566,
2618,
2637,
2671,
2689,
2707,
2725,
2738,
2786,
2833,
2848,
2864,
2875,
2886,
2900,
2914,
2925,
2942,
2961,
2976,
2996,
3008,
3021,
3032,
3046,
3129,
3146,
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2348, 2349, 2350, 2352, 2353, 2356, 2358, 2365, 2366, 2373,
2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2394, 2395, 2397, 2398,
2402, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2414, 2420, 2421, 2422,
2427, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437,
2439, 2440, 2441, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2457, 2459,
2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470,
2473, 2474, 2475, 2477, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484,
2486, 2487, 2491, 2492, 2494, 2496, 2497, 2515, 2523, 2528,
2535, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548,
2550, 2551, 2552, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2565,
2567, 2568, 2571, 2578, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617,
2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634,
2643, 2644, 2645, 2653, 2662, 2663, 2665, 2667, 2668, 2670,
2673, 2674, 2676, 2677, 2680, 2681, 2685, 2686, 2687, 2688
2690, 2691, 2692, 2694, 2696, 2698, 2699, 2700, 2702, 2706,
2708, 2709, 2710, 2711, 2713, 2715, 2716, 2717, 2722, 2723,
2727, 2728, 2729, 2730, 2731, 2732, 2733, 2734, 2736, 2737,
2739, 2742, 2764, 2765, 2767, 2768, 2769, 2772, 2780, 2785,
2802, 2804, 2823, 2824, 2825, 2827, 2829, 2830, 2831, 2832,
2834, 2835, 2836, 2837, 2838, 2839, 2840, 2841, 2842, 2847,
2849, 2853, 2855, 2856, 2857, 2858, 2859, 2861, 2862, 2863,
2865, 2866, 2867, 2868, 2869, 2870, 2871, 2872, 2873, 2874,
2876, 2877, 2878, 2879, 2880, 2881, 2882, 2883, 2884, 2885,
2887, 2888, 2891, 2892, 2893, 2894, 2896, 2897, 2898, 2899,
2901, 2902, 2903, 2904, 2906, 2907, 2908, 2909, 2910, 2911,
2915, 2916, 2917, 2918, 2919, 2920, 2921, 2922, 2923, 2924,
2926, 2927, 2929, 2930, 2931, 2935, 2936, 2938, 2939, 2941,
2943, 2944, 2949, 2951, 2952, 2953, 2954, 2957, 2958, 2960,
2963, 2964, 2965, 2966, 2967, 2970, 2971, 2972, 2973, 2974,
2977, 2978, 2979, 2981, 2983, 2990, 2991, 2993, 2994, 2995,
2997, 2998, 2999, 3000, 3001, 3002, 3003, 3005, 3006, 3007,
3009, 3011, 3012, , 3013, 3014, 3015, 3016, 3017, 3018, 3019,
3022, 3023, 3024, 3025, 3026, 3027, 3028, 3029, 3030, 3031,
3033, 3034, 3035, 3036, 3038, 3039, 3040, 3041, 3044, 3045,
3047, 3048, 3049, 3050, 3100, 3101, 3102, 3124, 3125, 3127,
3131, 3132, 3133, 3134, 3135, 3136, 3138, 3143, 3144, 3145,
3147, 3148, 3149, 3150, 3151, 3152, 3153, 3154, 3155, 3156,
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3157, 3158, 3218, 3242, 3249, 3250, 3253, 3254,
3269, 3273, 3276, 3277, 3278, 3288, 3289, 3293,
3301, 3304, 3305, 3306, 3307, 3308, 3310, 3313,
3335, 3336, 3337, 3357, 3362, 3363, 3364, 3366,
3371, 3372, 3373, 3389, 3404, 3409, 3420, 3423,
3427, 3429, 3430, 3442, 3443, 3447, 3448, 3453,
3457, 3458, 3459, 3460, 3461, 3462, 3473, 3474,
3480, 3482, 3483, 3484, 3486, 3487, 3488, 3489,
3500, 3504, 3509, 3514, 3517, 3518, and 3520.

3256,
3297,
3321,
3367,
3424,
3454,
3476,
3491,

[Vol. 9
3267,
3299,
3330,
3369,
3425,
3455,
3477,
3492,

3268,
3300,
3333,
3370,
3426,
3456,
3479,
3493,

TRANSCRIBED INDIVIDUALLY
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 12, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34,
35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59, 61, 62, 64,
81, 83, 90, 91, 93, 95, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108,
110, 111, 114, 117, 125, 133, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 205, 206, 207,
220, 226, 227, 228, 230, 232, 236, 239, 246, 251, 252, 254, 255, 256,
257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 269, 274, 277, 278,
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B. Extracts of Nineteenth-Century Works of Legislative Concordances
This appendix includes five extracts from nineteenth-century
works of legislative concordances that were addressed in this paper.
The first extract [1], belongs to the Spanish translation of the French
Concordance undertaken by Fermín Verlanga Huerta and Juan
Muñiz Miranda. Readers should notice that the corresponding page
of the French Concordance [2] is also accompanied in this appendix,
aiming to show that the translators clearly followed the form of presenting the content. Three other extracts follow, and are taken from:
[3] The Civil Law of Spain and Mexico (1851), in English and by
Gustavus Schmidt; [4] the Concordancias, Motivos y Comentarios
del Código Civil Español (1852), in Spanish and by Florencio García Goyena; and [5] the Jurisprudencia Civil Vigente Española y
Estranjera (1861), in Spanish and by Juan Antonio Seoane. All five
extracts illustrate on the way those seminal works were presented to
readers and how they addressed the different areas of law. Above
all, these extracts illustrate how authors highlighted concordances.
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ABSTRACT
This paper provides an overview of the duty of loyalty in Québec
private law. It dispels uncertainty regarding the duty’s nature and
then analyzes the duty of loyalty in the Civil Code of Québec. In doing so, this paper takes into account the mixed origins of the duty by
establishing certain parallels with the common law. Ultimately, this
paper suggests that the duty of loyalty arises when a legal actor has
the power to act within the legal sphere of another.
I. INTRODUCTION
The duty of loyalty in Québec private law was shaped decades
ago by the influence of common law fiduciary duties. 1 These duties
revolve around a central fiduciary duty of loyalty, 2 which is fundamentally a duty of selflessness 3 or in other words, “a duty to look
after another’s interests.” 4 Since the Civil Code of Québec (CCQ)
1. The influence of the common law in this regard was most notable in the
corporate law area. See concerning the historical intertwinement of Québec’s duty
of loyalty with the common law fiduciary duties, Madeleine Cantin Cumyn, Les
personnes morales dans le droit privé du Québec 31 LES CAHIERS DE DROIT 1021
(1990); Yves Caron, De l’action réciproque du droit civil et du common law dans
le droit des compagnies de la Province de Québec, 1 STUDIES IN CANADIAN
COMPANY LAW – ÉTUDES SUR LE DROIT CANADIEN DES COMPAGNIES, 102 (Jacob
S. Ziegel ed., Butterworths 1967); Paul Martel, Harmonization of the Canada Business Corporations Act with Québec Civil Law – Revision proposal, 42 REVUE
JURIDIQUE THÉMIS 147 (2007).
2. See Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew, Millet L.J., (1998) Ch 1,
(1996) 4 All ER 698 [cited to All ER] at 18; Lac Minerals Ltd v International
Corona Resources Ltd, La Forest J., (1989) 2 SCR 574, 61 DLR (4th) 14 [Lac
Minerals cited to SCR] at 646; Lionel Smith, Fiduciary Relationships: Ensuring
the Loyal Exercise of Judgement on Behalf of Another, 130 LAW Q. REV. 608
(2014) (“[a]lthough they may disagree about many things in relation to fiduciary
obligations, courts and commentators agree that the law of fiduciary obligations
is about ensuring loyalty” at 609).
3. See Lionel Smith, Can We Be Obliged to Be Selfless?, PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 141 (Andrew S. Gold, Paul B. Miller eds., Oxford University Press 2014).
4. Andrew Burrows, We Do This At Common Law But That In Equity, 22
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 8 (2002). See also Daniel Clarry, The Irreducible Core
of the Trust, 101, n. 475 (2011) (unpublished LL.M. Thesis, McGill University
Institute of Comparative Law); Paul B. Miller, Justifying Fiduciary Duties, 58
MCGILL L.J. 969, 980, 1020 (2013).
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came into effect in 1994, it has contained a duty of loyalty that is
similar to the common law fiduciary duty of loyalty from which it
derives, though is still distinctively civilian.
The Civil Code of Québec expressly imposes a duty of loyalty
upon certain legal actors: the director of a legal person (such as a
business corporation), the administrator of the property of another,
the employee and the mandatary. 5 More specifically, the Code requires that the director acts “in the interest of the legal person,” 6 that
the administrator of the property of another acts “in the best interest
of the beneficiary or of the object pursued,” 7 and that the mandatary
acts “in the best interests of the mandator.” 8 The codal article that
imposes a duty of loyalty on the employee, does not use this exact
wording, 9 but case law has established that the employee must act
in the best interests of his employer. 10
Surprisingly, despite its codification more than twenty years
ago, the duty of loyalty in Québec has rarely been studied in its own
right. 11 Professor Cantin Cumyn is one of the only authors to have
done so, and this paper owes much to her writings.

5. Articles 322, 1309, 2138 and 2088 CCQ, respectively. Interestingly,
while the word loyauté appears in the French version of articles 322, 1309, 2088
and 2138 CCQ, the word “loyalty” only appears in the English version art. 322
CCQ. Loyauté is translated as “faithfully” in articles 1309, 2088 and 2138 CCQ.
6. Art. 322, § 2 CCQ: “[the director] shall also act with honesty and loyalty
in the interest of the legal person.”
7. Art. 1309, § 2 CCQ: “[the administrator] shall also act honestly and faithfully in the best interest of the beneficiary or of the object pursued.”
8. Art. 2138, § 2 CCQ: “[the mandatary] shall also act honestly and faithfully in the best interests of the mandator, and avoid placing himself in a position
that puts his own interest in conflict with that of his mandator.”
9. Art. 2088, § 1 CCQ provides that “[t]he employee is bound not only to
perform his work with prudence and diligence, but also to act faithfully and honestly and not use any confidential information he obtains in the performance or in
the course of his work.”
10. See e.g. Concentrés scientifiques Bélisle inc c Lyrco Nutrition inc, 2007
QCCA 676 at para 39 [Concentrés scientifiques Bélisle]; Jenner c Helicopter Association of Canada (HAC), 2012 QCCS 3177 at para 147 [Jenner]; Lanctôt c
Romifal inc (Nova PB inc), 2010 QCCS 4755 [Lanctôt]; Pro-quai inc c Tanguay,
2005 QCCA 1217 at para 36 [Pro-quai].
11. Instead, loyalty is frequently subsumed under the general duty of good
faith (see § 1.2).
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The aim of this paper is to draw a portrait of the duty of loyalty
in Québec. In doing so, it takes into account the specificity of Québec private law. Although predominantly civilian, it bears the imprint of both the civil and common law. 12 Therefore, parallels to the
common law are occasionally made, as it remains a valuable source
of inspiration and of comparison.
This paper first elucidates the nature of the duty of loyalty in
Québec (Part I). Namely, it explains how the duty is connected to
the exercise of legal powers. Then, loyalty is analyzed within the
context of the Civil Code (Part II). Ultimately, this paper suggests
that loyalty is a duty that arises when a legal actor has the power to
act within the legal sphere of another. 13
This definition of loyalty is interesting from a civilian as well as
a comparative standpoint. First, from a civilian standpoint, the notion of legal sphere covers the whole scope of exercise of legal powers. Indeed, as it will be explained, legal powers may be exercised
with respect to matters relating to the property of another or relating
to the very person of another, referred to as patrimonial and extrapatrimonial rights, respectively. However, unlike the patrimony, a classical but rather narrow conceptualization of the legal sphere, which
belongs exclusively to a person, the notion of a legal sphere is flexible. It may encompass patrimonial and extrapatrimonial rights regardless of the distinction between them—a distinction which,
moreover, could be criticized as artificial.

12. Regarding the specificity of Québec private law, see Daniel Jutras, Cartographie de la mixité : La common law et la complétude du droit civil au Québec,
88 CAN. BAR REV. 247 (2009); Sylvio Normand, La culture juridique et l’acculturation du droit : le Québec 1 – Special Issue 1, Legal Culture and Legal Transplants, ISAIDAT L. REV., article 23 (2011), available at http://isaidat.di.unito
.it/index.php/isaidat.
13. Professor Cantin Cumyn has evoked the idea of a sphère juridique or a
“juridical sphere,” which served as inspiration for this article. See MADELEINE
CANTIN CUMYN & MICHELLE CUMYN, L’ADMINISTRATION DU BIEN D’AUTRUI,
TRAITÉ DE DROIT CIVIL 96 (2d ed. Yvon Blais 2014); Madeleine Cantin Cumyn,
The Legal Power, 17 EUROPEAN REVIEW OF PRIVATE LAW 345, 345 (2009).
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Second, from a comparative standpoint, the notion of a legal
sphere 14 is interesting because the ideas of legal power 15 and of patrimony16 are not known to the common law. Free of any civilian
connotation, the notion of a legal sphere is compatible with the common law, which readily recognizes that fiduciaries may deal with
matters relating to property as well as to the physical or moral welfare of a person. 17 The focus of this paper, however, is to provide an
understanding of loyalty in Québec private law.
II. NATURE OF THE DUTY OF LOYALTY
A. Inaccurate Bases of the Duty of Loyalty
In order to understand loyalty, it is necessary to grasp its basis.
The duty of loyalty is often believed to rest upon the confidence in
another or upon good faith. However, neither constitutes the true
basis of the duty of loyalty. This section explains why this is so,
thereby laying the groundwork for the analysis of the duty of loyalty
that will follow.
1. Trust
Loyalty has long been—and still is—associated with the confidence one places in another [i.e., “trust”]. To begin with, the term
fiduciary as in “fiduciary duty” derives from the Latin fiducia,
which means “trust.” Moreover, within the Canadian common law,

14. In a common law setting, Professor Lionel Smith talks about a “sphere of
fiduciary management,” which he describes as a “sphere of activity,” and which
should not be mistaken with the legal sphere described in this paper, which is the
representation of a person or of a legal entity (Smith, supra note 3, at 158).
15. As it is understood in civil law, that is in contrast with a subjective right—
a concept that is foreign to the common law. See Geoffrey Samuel,“Le Droit Subjectif” and English Law, 46 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 264 (1987).
16. See Alexandra Popovici, Trusting Patrimonies in TRUST AND
PATRIMONIES 200 (Remus Valsan ed., Edinburgh University Press 2015).
17. Regarding the possibility that fiduciaries deal with matters relating to the
physical or psychological integrity of a person, see e.g. Paul B Miller, A Theory
of Fiduciary Liability 56 MCGILL L.J. 235, 276 (2011); Norberg v Wynrib, [1992]
2 SCR 226, 92 DLR (4th) 449.
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key cases have identified trust as an indicium of fiduciary relationships. 18
In Québec private law as well, trust is regularly emphasized as a
foundational aspect of the four relationships to which the Civil Code
of Québec attaches a duty of loyalty. 19 For instance, the Supreme
Court of Canada has affirmed that the mandate “is imbued with the
concept of trust.” 20 Trust also influences the appointment of a director of a legal person, 21 and the selection of an administrator of the
property of another such as the liquidator of a succession or a trustee. 22 Finally, trust has been described as the foundation of employment contracts. 23
18. See especially Canson Enterprises Ltd v Boughton & Co, [1991] 3 SCR
534, 85 DLR (4th) 129; Hodgkinson v Simms, [1994] 3 SCR 377, 117 DLR (4th)
[cited to SCR]; Lac Minerals Ltd. v International Corona Resources Ltd., [1989]
2 SCR 574, 61 DLR (4th) 14, La Forest J., dissenting [Lac Minerals cited to SCR].
19. See e.g. Jean-Guy Belley, L'obligation de loyauté dans les services financiers 3 BULLETIN DE DROIT ÉCONOMIQUE 11 (2012); PIERRE-GABRIEL JOBIN &
NATHALIE VÉZINA, JEAN-LOUIS BAUDOUIN ET PIERRE-GABRIEL JOBIN : LES
OBLIGATIONS, 266, para 161 (7th ed. Yvon Blais 2013); Ginette Leclerc, La bonne
foi dans l’exécution des contrats 37 MCGILL L.J. 1070, 1076 (1992); DIDIER
LLUELLES & BENOÎT MOORE, DROIT DES OBLIGATIONS, 1121 para 1980 at 1120,
para 1979 (2d ed., É ditions Thémis 2012); Mario Naccarato & Raymonde Crête,
La confiance : de la réalité à la juridicité in RESPONSIBILITY, FRATERNITY AND
SUSTAINABILITY IN LAW – IN MEMORY OF THE HONOURABLE CHARLES DOHERTY
GONTHIER 647, 659 (Michel Morin et al. eds., LexisNexis Canada 2012) [Naccarato & Crête, Réalité à juridicité].
20. Laflamme v Prudential-Bache Commodities Canada Ltd, 2000 SCC 26,
[2000] 1 SCR 638 at para 28.
21. Very few requirements regarding the nomination of directors are provided by the CCQ and corporate laws, even where very large business corporations are concerned. This allows shareholders to elect a person they deem fit for
the office of director—a person whom they trust. See RAYMONDE CRÊTE &
STÉPHANE ROUSSEAU, DROIT DES SOCIÉTÉS PAR ACTIONS, 340, para 741 (3d ed.,
Éditions Thémis 2011). However, although shareholders elect directors, it should
be noted that the beneficiary of the directors’ duty of loyalty is the legal person
(the business corporation)—not the shareholders. See Peoples Dep’t Stores Inc
(Trustee of) v Wise, 2004 SCC 68, [2004] 3 SCR 461 at para 43.
22. CANTIN CUMYN & CUMYN, supra note 13 (“trust is, certainly, a significant element in the administration of the property of others, namely it generally
inspires the choice of the administrator” at 283, para 299 [translated by author]).
See also Brassard c Brassard, 2009 QCCA 898 at para 106. Trust also has to do
with, inter alia, the prohibition made to the administrator of the property of another to delegate the exercise of a discretionary power (art. 1337, para 1 CCQ).
23. Louise Dubé & Gilles Trudeau, Les manquements du salarié à son obligation d’honnêteté et de loyauté en jurisprudence arbitrale in ÉTUDES EN DROIT
DU TRAVAIL À LA MÉMOIRE DE CLAUDE D’AOUST 51 (Gilles Trudeau, Guylaine
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However, justifying the duty of loyalty on the sole basis of trust
appears problematic. First, providing a clear definition of an openended concept such as trust might prove challenging. 24 Second, although the law can bestow a duty of loyalty upon parties who are in
a relationship, one party may not trust the other. Hence, trust cannot
be the basis of the duty of loyalty—at least not in these cases.
In response to this last argument, however, one could invoke the
interesting distinction drawn by Professor Jean-Guy Belley between
“traditional” trust—the subjective trust a person has in another due
to their relationship of familiarity and intimacy—and “modern”
trust—a rather impersonal trust, required, namely, for institutional
purposes. 25 Trust, if not in its personal, subjective form, would at
least be present in its institutional form in those cases where the law
deems it necessary. 26
Nevertheless, identifying trust as the basis of the duty of loyalty
is inadequate for a fundamental reason: it relies on an element external to private law, rather than explaining private law in its own
terms. 27 Trust is more of a social fact than a juridical notion with
concrete legal implications. 28 It cannot, in and of itself, generate an
obligation or a legal duty. Therefore, while a considerable degree of
Vallée, Diane Veilleux, eds., Yvon Blais 1995) (“l’employé qui trahit cette confiance ébranle les bases mêmes de la relation d’emploi” at 57). See also Bank of
Montreal v Kuet Leong Ng, [1989] 2 SCR 429 [Kuet Leong cited to SCR].
24. In common law, Professor Paul B. Miller rejects the idea of defining fiduciary relationships on the basis of trust (Miller, supra note 4, at 995-999).
Amongst other things, he points out that:
[T]he meaning of trust is contested. Trust may be defined as any of a
number of states of mind, forms of conduct, or both (e.g., a demonstrated
attitude or emotion). In any event, there is no agreement about what trust
comprises . . . . So long as it lacks clear meaning, trust cannot justify
fiduciary duties (id. at 997-998 [footnotes omitted]).
25. Belley, supra note 19, at 15-16.
26. Id. at 15. See also, by Jean-Guy Belley, Théories et pratiques du contrat
relationnel : les obligations de collaboration et d’harmonisation normative in
CONFÉRENCE MEREDITH LECTURES 1998-1999, LA PERTINENCE RENOUVELÉE DU
DROIT DES OBLIGATIONS: BACK TO BASICS/THE CONTINUED RELEVANCE OF THE
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS : RETOUR AUX SOURCES 137 (Yvon Blais 2000).
27. See, in common law, ERNEST WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (Oxford University Press 2012).
28. For an opposite view, see Naccarato & Crête, supra note 19, at 659.
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trust is usually involved in the employment contract, the mandate,
the administration of a legal person, and the administration of the
property of others, it does not follow that trust is the defining element that gives rise to a duty of loyalty.
2. Good Faith
In Québec, it is frequently assumed that the duty of loyalty expressly entrenched in the Civil Code finds its source in the general
duty of good faith that pervades the latter. 29
Good faith is a social standard of conduct that regulates the exercise of civil rights in contractual as well as extracontractual settings. 30 At a minimum, it requires one to act honestly and reasonably31 and to avoid injuring others, 32 but it may also impose positive
duties in certain contractual settings. For instance, the duty of cooperation requires that the parties to a contract actively facilitate the
fulfillment of their common goals as long as this does not unduly
interfere with the pursuit of a party’s own legitimate interests. 33
29. Good faith, being a cardinal and multivalent notion in civil law, is entrenched under various forms in the Civil Code of Québec. According to articles
6, 7 and 1375 CCQ, good faith prohibits the abusive exercise of one’s rights, but
it also governs the conduct of parties at the time of the creation, the performance
and the extinction of an obligation, whether the latter is contractual or extracontractual.
Regarding good faith’s multivalence, see Brigitte Lefebvre, La bonne foi :
notion protéiforme, 26 REVUE DE DROIT DE L'UNIVERSITÉ DE SHERBROOKE 321 at
353 (1996); Didier Lluelles, La bonne foi dans l’exécution des contrats et la problématique des sanctions 83:1 CAN. BAR REV. 181, 188 (2004); JEAN PINEAU ET
AL., THÉORIE DES OBLIGATIONS (4th ed., Éditions Thémis 2001) (“la bonne foi est
un concept-phare du droit civil contemporain, aux contours d’autant plus flous
que son domaine est étendu. Il n’est donc pas aisé de la définir d’une façon précise, encore moins d’en expliquer sommairement toutes les subtilités” at 34-35,
para 17.1 [footnote omitted]).
30. PRIVATE LAW DICTIONARY AND BILINGUAL LEXICONS - OBLIGATIONS
(2d ed., Yvon Blais, 2003), sub verbo “good faith”, def 1 [Private Law Dictionary
- Obligations].
31. See Bank of Montreal v Bail Ltée, [1992] 2 SCR 554, 93 DLR (4th) 490
[Bail]; Houle v Canadian National Bank, [1990] 3 SCR 122, 74 DLR (4th) 577.
32. Art. 7 CCQ.
33. For instance, in a franchise contract, the duty of cooperation requires that
the franchiser provides technical and commercial assistance to his franchisees:
Provigo Distribution Inc. c Supermarché ARG Inc, [1998] RJQ 47, 1997 CanLII
10209 (CA) [Provigo cited to CanLII] at 30-33. See also CHRISTINE LEBRUN, LE

2016]

QUÉBEC

337

The duty of loyalty is often seen as a particular type of duty of
good faith in the performance of contracts 34—a duty of good faith
that imposes high standards, much like the duty of cooperation. 35
This is symptomatic of a misunderstanding of the duty of loyalty.
As will be explained, loyalty and good faith are in fact two distinct
duties that impose different requirements for their respective legal
prerogatives.
It should also be noted that there is, in civil law terminology, a
frequent but risky association between “loyalty” and “good faith.”
In Québec, the term “loyalty” is sometimes used to designate the
general duty of good faith that applies in contractual and extracontractual settings, as well as the particular duty of good faith that applies in specific contractual settings. 36 This terminological conflation of loyalty with good faith certainly contributes to the conceptual
confusion. 37
The merging of the duty of loyalty with the duty of good faith is
simply inaccurate. Interpreted in light of the legal power theory that
will be introduced in the next section of this paper, the duty of loyalty is a duty to further interests other than that of the party upon

DEVOIR DE COOPÉRATION DURANT L’EXÉCUTION DU CONTRAT

14, para 34
(LexisNexis Canada 2013).
34. See PRIVATE LAW DICTIONARY - OBLIGATIONS, supra note 30, sub verbo
“good faith”, def 1, obs 4° (“The Civil Code establishes duties of loyalty and honesty in different sectors of the law that are in fact illustrations of the general principle of good faith applied to specific situations (e.g. arts. 322, 1309, 2138
C.C.Q.”); BRIGITTE LEFEBVRE, LA BONNE FOI DANS LA FORMATION DU CONTRAT
136 (Yvon Blais, 1998); MAURICE TANCELIN, DES OBLIGATIONS EN DROIT MIXTE
DU QUÉ BEC 342, para 491 (7th ed., Wilson & Lafleur 2009).
35. MARIE ANNIK GRÉGOIRE, LE RÔLE DE LA BONNE FOI DANS LA FORMATION
ET L’ÉLABORATION DU CONTRAT, 23-24 (Yvon Blais 2003); VINCENT KARIM,
Vol.1, LES OBLIGATIONS 101-102 (3d ed., Wilson & Lafleur 2009).
36. PRIVATE LAW DICTIONARY - OBLIGATIONS, supra note 30 (defines good
faith as “[l]oyalty and honesty in the exercise of civil rights”) (sub verbo “good
faith”, def 1 [emphasis added]).
37. See e.g. id., sub verbo “obligation of loyalty”, obs 1° (“[t]he obligation of
loyalty may be express (arts. 322, 1309, 2088, 2138 C.C.Q.) or implied (arts. 6,
7, 1375, 1434 C.C.Q.)”); LEFEBVRE, supra note 34, at 136 (“[a]insi, lorsqu’on
utilise le terme « loyauté » dans le Code, ce n’est pas pour faire opposition entre
cette notion et celle de bonne foi, mais c’est plutôt pour rendre l’idée des exigences particulières que la bonne foi requiert dans ces types de contrats”).
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whom the duty is imposed. Good faith, on the other hand, establishes
an honest and reasonable standard of behaviour, but it is not a duty
to look after a co-party’s interests. 38 In other words, while loyalty is
a duty of selflessness, 39 good faith never imposes such a duty.
In this regard, it is of interest to highlight some of the Supreme
Court of Canada’s teachings in a relatively recent case heard on appeal from the Alberta Court of Appeal, Bhasin v. Hrynew. 40 Albeit
rendered in a common law setting, this judgment is relevant in Québec private law for two important reasons. First, the Court gave the
common law duty of good faith in the performance of contracts a
scope comparable to that of the civil law. Second, the duty of loyalty
in Québec is closely connected to the common law. This means that
the distinction the Court drew between good faith in the performance of contracts and loyalty is bound to have some relevance in
Québec civil law. Moreover, the Supreme Court of Canada is, after
all, the country’s highest judicial organ, which has impacted the
Québec civil law. 41
In this judgment, the Court overcame the common law traditional reluctance 42 to recognize a notion as extensive as the civilian
good faith in the performance of contracts, while distinguishing it
from loyalty.
Bhasin v. Hrynew opposed a retail dealer, Bhasin, and a company who marketed education savings plans. Bhasin argued that the
38. GRÉGOIRE, supra note 35, at 14-17.
39. Madeleine Cantin Cumyn, Les actes juridiques accomplis dans l’exercice
de pouvoirs in MÉLANGES JEAN-LOUIS BAUDOUIN 243 (Benoît Moore ed., Yvon
Blais 2012) [Cantin Cumyn, L’exercice de pouvoirs] (“[l]e pouvoir, intrinsèquement circonscrit par la finalité en vue de laquelle il est conféré, n’est jamais destiné à servir l’intérêt de celui qui est autorisé à l’exercer” at 246). Concerning the
idea of selflessness in common law fiduciary relationships, see Smith, supra note
3; Smith, , supra note 2, at 608 (“fiduciaries [are] people who are required to
exercise their judgement in an unselfish way”).
40. 2014 SCC 71.
41. Regarding the Supreme Court of Canada’s influence on Québec civil law,
see especially H. Patrick Glenn, La Cour suprême du Canada et la tradition du
droit civil, 80 CAN. BAR REV. 151 (2001); Pierre-Gabriel Jobin, La Cour suprême
et la réforme du Code civil, 79 CAN. BAR REV. 27 (2000).
42. See GEOFFREY SAMUEL, UNDERSTANDING CONTRACTUAL AND
TORTIOUS OBLIGATIONS 32 (Law Matters Publishing 2005).
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company had displayed dishonest behaviour in exercising the nonrenewal provision contained in the dealership agreement. Namely,
the company had resorted to this provision in order to force the
merging of Bhasin’s business with that of another retail dealer,
Hrynew. As a result, Bhasin lost the value of his business, to the
profit of Hrynew.
The Supreme Court affirmed the existence of a common law
duty of honest performance of contracts. The Court ruled that the
duty of honest performance, which is derived from good faith, is a
“general organizing principle of the common law of contract” 43 and
is immanent in any contractual undertaking. It was cautious in its
scope, stating that the duty did not amount to a fiduciary duty of
loyalty. 44 The Court held that the duty of good faith in the performance of contracts requires that a party “[has] appropriate regard to
the legitimate contractual interests of the contracting partner,” 45 but
that it “does not engage duties of loyalty to the other contracting
party or a duty to put the interests of the other contracting party
first.” 46 The Court, thus, emphasized that good faith has “strong conceptual differences from the much higher obligations of a fiduciary.” 47
The Court also explained that the duty of good faith in contractual performance is not contrary to the philosophy that underpins the
law of contracts, “which generally places great weight on the freedom of contracting parties to pursue their individual self-interest.”48
Indeed, in commerce, parties may intentionally cause loss to one another, and this, as such, is not prohibited by the duty of good faith.49
Requiring that a party performs a contract honestly does not mean
that this party cannot pursue her self-interest in doing so. The Court
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Bhasin v Hrynew, supra note 40, at para 33.
Id. at paras 60, 65, 73, 85.
Id. at para 65.
Id.
Id.
Id. at para 70.
Id.
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stated that the duty of good faith in contractual performance simply
is “a reassurance that if the contract does not work out, [both parties]
will have a fair opportunity to protect their interests.” 50
Likewise, in civil law, good faith in the performance of contracts
is not a duty of devotion to the party. Indeed, good faith never requires that a party selflessly furthers the interests of another, even
under the duty of cooperation, its most constraining form. 51
The reason for this is simple. In civil law, good faith governs the
conduct of a person whenever she acts as a titulary of subjective
rights, that is whenever a person acts for herself, on her own behalf
and in her own interests. Good faith, as a mechanism that regulates
the exercise of subjective rights, is thus compatible with the idea of
selfishness, at least to a certain extent. Conversely, as will be shown
further on, the duty of loyalty is precisely a duty of selflessness. This
is due to the fact that loyalty regulates legal powers, which in essence must be exercised in an interest other than that of their holder.
In brief, loyalty is not merely a duty of good faith of greater intensity; it is a duty of a different nature. Good faith and loyalty regulate the exercise of distinct legal prerogatives: subjective rights
(selfish legal prerogatives) and legal powers (selfless ones). 52 The
fact that subjective right constitutes a strong paradigm in civil law—
the civil law naturally envisions legal actors as titularies of subjective rights, not as holders of legal powers—may explain that loyalty
50. Id. at para 86.
51. MARIE ANNIK GRÉGOIRE, LIBERTÉ, RESPONSABILITÉ ET UTILITÉ : LA
BONNE FOI COMME INSTRUMENT DE JUSTICE 187 (Yvon Blais 2010). See also Bail,
supra note 31; Banque Royale du Canada c Dompierre, 2003 CanLII 3102 (Sup
Ct); Caisse populaire Desjardins St-Jean-Baptiste-de-LaSalle c 164375 Canada
inc., 1999 CanLII 13775 (CA); Provigo, supra note 33, at 25-26; 2328-4938 Québec inc c Naturiste JMB inc, [2000] RJQ 2607, 2000 CanLII 19202 (Sup Ct) [cited
at CanLII] (at paras 134-137, concerning the refusal of Québec courts to incorporate the common law “fiduciary obligation” and the demanding requirements it
entails in a franchise contract).
52. Subjective right has been described as an “egoistic prerogative (prérogative égoïste),” whereas legal power has been described as an “altruistic prerogative (prérogative altruiste).” Cantin Cumyn, The Legal Power, supra note 13, at
355, referring to MICHEL STORCK, ESSAI SUR LE MÉCANISME DE LA
REPRÉSENTATION DANS LES ACTES JURIDIQUES 176 (Librairie générale de droit et
de jurisprudence 1982).

2016]

QUÉBEC

341

is frequently assimilated to good faith. However, as will be discussed next, legal power is key to understanding the duty of loyalty
in Québec.
B. Legal Power as the Basis of the Duty of Loyalty
Although legal power is a civilian construct, it emerged in Québec in response to the influence of the common law. In fact, when
the Civil Code of Québec introduced a new version of the trust—a
civilian adaptation of the common law trust—a new legal regime
was created to govern the conduct of the trustee: the administration
of the property of others. 53 This regime, which has been described
as an “extremely detailed codification of the common law fiduciary
relationship,” 54 applies to various legal relationships besides that of
trustee-beneficiary. The notion of legal power, as articulated by Professor Madeleine Cantin Cumyn, arose out of the regime of the administration of the property of others. As will be explained, legal
power is now a cornerstone in the analysis of the duty of loyalty.
1. Emergence of Legal Power in Québec
In Québec, the emergence of legal power is tied to the history of
the trust. 55 In 1888, the trust was first formally introduced in the
Civil Code of Lower Canada (CCLC). 56 Although distinct from the

53. See CANTIN CUMYN & CUMYN, supra note 13. From a structural perspective, the fact that the title concerning the administration of the property of others
follows the trust in the CCQ’s Book Four on property indicates that the drafters
intended the former to complement the latter.
54. [translated by author, footnotes omitted]: Yves Rossier, Étude comparée
de certains aspects patrimoniaux de la fiducie, 34 MCGILL L.J. 817, at 906 (1989).
55. For a history of the Québec trust, see Popovici, supra note 16, at 201-205.
56. A chapter concerning the trust (articles 981a to 981n) was added to the
CCLC in 1888, a chapter which reproduced the contents of the Act Respecting
Trusts, SQ 1879, c 29. However, even before, the trust had been implicitly incorporated in Québec private law through articles 869 and 964 CCLC, which concerned testamentary gifts subject to a charge and substitution. See Madeleine Cantin Cumyn, L’origine de la fiducie québécoise in MÉ LANGES PRESENTED BY
MCGILL COLLEAGUES TO PAUL-ANDRÉ CRÉ PEAU 199 at 200 (Yvon Blais 1997)
[Cantin Cumyn, L’origine de la fiducie].
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common law trust in multiple ways, it was nonetheless directly inspired by the latter. 57 The trust of the Civil Code of Lower Canada,
however, had given rise to conceptual difficulties regarding the nature of the trustee’s prerogative over the trust, which had been described as a sui generis ownership right by the Supreme Court of
Canada. 58
For some Québec jurists, it was difficult to conceive that the
trustee could hold a title over trust property without benefiting from
it. This sui generis ownership right was therefore described as a
“partial derivative” of the common law “notion of dual titles.” 59
The Civil Code of Québec resolved this issue by introducing a
new version of the trust. 60 Under this version, the trustee is no more
than a manager. Indeed, one provision specifically states that the
trustee has no real right in the trust patrimony. 61
More specifically, under the Civil Code of Québec, the trustee is
an administrator of the property of another. 62 Like the common law
regime of fiduciary relationships, which extends the application of
the trustees’ fiduciary duties to other legal actors in relationships
that parallel the trustee-beneficiary relationship, the Civil Code of

57. Sylvio Normand & Jacques Gosselin, La fiducie du Code civil : un sujet
d’affrontement dans la communauté juridique québécoise, 31 LES CAHIERS DE
DROIT 681 at 688 (1990). See also Cantin Cumyn, L’origine de la fiducie, supra
note 56.
58. Royal Trust Co v Tucker, [1982] 1 SCR 250.
59. John E.C. Brierley, The New Québec Law of Trusts: The Adaptation of
Common Law Thought to Civil Law Concepts in DROIT QUÉBÉCOIS ET DROIT
FRANÇAIS : COMMUNAUTÉ, AUTONOMIE, CONCORDANCE 383, 392 (H. Patrick
Glenn ed., Yvon Blais 1993).
60. Art. 1261-1262 CCQ. This trust constitutes an autonomous patrimony,
which is managed by a trustee for the benefit of the beneficiaries of the trust.
61. Art. 1261 CCQ provides that: “The trust patrimony, consisting of the
property transferred in trust, constitutes a patrimony by appropriation, autonomous and distinct from that of the settlor, trustee or beneficiary and in which none
of them has any real right.”
62. Art. 1278 CCQ.
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Québec’s regime regarding the administration of the property of others governs the conduct of various legal actors. 63 In fact, it was conceived as a general regime and provides the suppletive law 64 for
when a person manages property that is not their own. Indeed, the
“previously existing rules governing the various institutions involving the management of the property of others, particularly tutorship,
curatorship, liquidation of a succession, trust, mandate, and the administration of legal persons [were] identified . . . [to be] sufficiently
broad to qualify as part of a general law of administration.” 65
Professor Cantin Cumyn, who first articulated the notion of legal
power in Québec, built her theory on the framework provided by the

63. Michelle Cumyn, L’encadrement des conflits d’intérêts par le droit commun québécois in LES CONFLITS D’INTÉRÊTS, 49, 51 (Dalloz 2013) [Cumyn, Les
conflits d’intérêts]. The Code mentions that the following legal actors are also
administrators of the property of others: the tutor (art. 208, 286 CCQ) and the
curator (art. 262, 282 CCQ) of the property of a person, the liquidator of a legal
person (art. 360 CCQ), the State where successors have renounced the succession
or where no successor is known or claims the succession (art. 701 CCQ), the liquidator of a succession (art. 802 CCQ), the manager of undivided property (art.
1029 CCQ), the manager of the syndicate of co-owners (art. 1085 CCQ), the trustee (art. 1278 CCQ), the manager of the business of another (art. 1484 CCQ), the
general partners in a limited partnership (art. 2238 CCQ), the liquidator of an undeclared partnership (art. 2266 CCQ), the creditor of a surrendered property (art.
2768 CCQ), the creditor who has taken possession of a property (articles 2773,
2775 CCQ). See Madeleine Cantin Cumyn, L’administration des biens d’autrui
dans le Code civil du Québec, 3 REVISTA CATALANA DE DRET PRIVET 17 at 24,
para 11 (2004).
64. Art. 1299 CCQ provides that:
Any person who is charged with the administration of property or a patrimony that is not his own assumes the office of administrator of the
property of others. The rules of this Title apply to every administration
unless another form of administration applies under the law or the constituting act, or due to circumstances” [emphasis added].
65. Cantin Cumyn, The Legal Power, supra note 13, at 353. See CANTIN
CUMYN & CUMYN, supra note 13, at 49, para 57. Despite the Civil Code Revision
Office’s desire that the administration of the property of others be a suppletive
regime, a régime de droit commun, the Minister of Justice, when commenting on
the CCQ’s title on the Administration of the property of others, seems to have
narrowed its scope as he did not mention that it could be resorted to as a suppletive
regime: see QUÉBEC, CIVIL CODE REVISION OFFICE, VOL.2 REPORT ON THE
QUÉBEC CIVIL CODE: COMMENTARIES, T.1, 372-74 (Éditeur officiel du Québec
1978); 1 COMMENTAIRES DU MINISTRE DE LA JUSTICE : LE CODE CIVIL DU QUÉBEC
774ff (Publications du Québec, 1993) cited in CANTIN CUMYN & CUMYN, supra
note 13, at 49-51.
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regime of the administration of the property of others. As she explains, the trustee, just like other legal actors that are “charged with
the administration of property or a patrimony that is not [their]
own,” 66 clearly has no subjective right over the patrimony he administers; instead, he holds legal powers. 67
2. Description of Legal Power
Following Professor Cantin Cumyn’s theory of legal power, this
notion must be interpreted in contrast with that of subjective rights. 68
While there is no universally accepted definition of subjective
right, 69 it is generally seen as a legal prerogative attached to a subject
of rights (a natural or legal person), which this person exercises, on
her own behalf and interest, over another person or a thing. 70 Subjective rights are found within a person’s patrimony, or the economic representation of a person. 71

66. Art. 1309 CCQ.
67. CANTIN CUMYN & CUMYN, supra note 13 (“s’agissant ‘d’administrer un
bien ou un patrimoine qui n’est pas le sien’, il est exclu que les prérogatives en
cause correspondent à l’exercice des droits propres de l’administrateur” at 75,
para 89). See also Cantin Cumyn, L’exercice de pouvoirs, supra note 39, at 248
(“[l]’immixtion dans les affaires d’une autre personne est une situation exceptionnelle dont la légalité repose sur l’existence de pouvoirs régulièrement conférés”).
68. Cantin Cumyn, The Legal Power, supra note 13, at 352; CANTIN CUMYN
& CUMYN, supra note 13, at 80.
69. JACQUES GHESTIN & GILLES GOUBEAUX, TRAITÉ DE DROIT CIVIL.
INTRODUCTION GÉNÉRALE 126 (4th ed., Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence 1994); HENRI LÉON JEAN MAZEAUD & FRANÇOIS CHABAS, LEÇONS DE
DROIT CIVIL. INTRODUCTION À L’ÉTUDE DU DROIT 253 (12th ed., Montchrestien
2000).
70. See PRIVATE LAW DICTIONARY AND BILINGUAL LEXICONS – PROPERTY
(Yvon Blais 2012) sub verbo “right” [Private Law Dictionary - Property]. Professors Brierley & Macdonald described subjective rights as “the ‘legal rights’ or
the prerogatives of individuals or groups of individuals that the law recognizes in
relation to others or to things” in QUEBEC CIVIL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO
QUEBEC PRIVATE LAW 155, para 125 (John E.C. Brierley & Roderick A. Macdonald eds., Emond Montgomery 1993).
71. Indeed, a person acquires subjective rights and incurs obligations through
her patrimony.
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Under the subjective right paradigm, civil law considers that a
legal actor is either exercising his own rights or unlawfully interfering with those of another. 72 Thus, the civil law proceeds upon the
idea that a person acquires rights and incurs obligations for herself,
through her own patrimony.
However, this is not the case where holders of legal powers such
as administrators of the property of others are concerned. For instance, when a curator 73 enters into a contract with a third party on
behalf of a protected person, the curator himself does not acquire a
right against the third party. Rather, this right forms part of the protected person’s patrimony.
Legal power, therefore, is a rather peculiar notion as its exercise
amounts to the lawful interference in the patrimony of another. In
fact, legal power is more than a lawful interference; it is the power
to act within the patrimony of another. When a holder of legal powers exercises his prerogatives, he neither acts on his own behalf, nor
in his personal interests. Indeed, legal power having a substitutive
dimension will be discussed further.
It should also be noted that although the notion of legal power
in Québec emerged from the regime of the administration of the
property of others, legal power may also be exercised upon a person.
In civil law terms, legal power may affect patrimonial as well as
extrapatrimonial rights. 74 Therefore, Professor Cantin Cumyn has
72. This is the idea expressed, although in different terms, by Catherine
Valcke, The Unhappy Marriage of Corrective and Distributive Justice in the New
Civil Code of Quebec, 46 U. TORONTO L.J. 539 at 573 (1996): “[e]very human
action is either a legitimate exercise of one’s freedom . . . or else an illegitimate
interference with someone else’s freedom” [footnote omitted].
73. The curator is an administrator of the property of another (art. 282 CCQ).
According to art. 281 CCQ, “[t]he court institutes curatorship to a person of full
age if it is established that the incapacity of that person to care for himself and to
administer his property is total and permanent and that he needs to be represented
in the exercise of his civil rights.”
74. See PRIVATE LAW DICTIONARY – PROPERTY, supra note 70, sub verbo
“extrapatrimonial right”:
Right that, because of its close association with the person who enjoys
it, is not part of his or her patrimony . . . . Because they are imagined as
the antithesis of property or patrimonial rights, extrapatrimonial rights
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argued that the regime of the administration of the property of others
could apply, by analogy, when an administrator exercises his powers
with regard to the person of another. 75
The notions of legal power and subjective right can be illustrated
by resorting to the idea of a legal sphere. Where a person acts as a
titulary of subjective rights, she is acting within her own legal
sphere—a sphere within which she is the only sovereign. 76 Holders
of legal powers, however, act within a legal sphere that is not their
own. Where a legal actor acts within the legal sphere of another, he
does not act on his own behalf nor in his personal interests.
The fact that legal powers are exercised in an interest other than
that of their holder implies that the latter cannot exercise these legal
prerogatives for whatever end he wishes to pursue, unlike the titulary of subjective rights. 77 Legal power has therefore been described
as a “prerogative constrained by a purpose.” 78 The potential purposes of the powers are numerous, but they may be grouped into two
categories: the representation of a person and the accomplishment
of another goal. Whereas legal powers of the first type are known as
powers of representation, the powers of the second type are known
as autonomous powers. 79

are often defined as rights that are not susceptible of pecuniary evaluation.
75. Madeleine Cantin Cumyn, De l’administration des biens à la protection
de la personne d’autrui in OBLIGATIONS ET RECOURS CONTRE UN CURATEUR,
TUTEUR OU MANDATAIRE DÉFAILLANT 205 (Yvon Blais 2008) [Cantin Cumyn, De
l’administration]; Cantin Cumyn, The Legal Power, supra note 13, at 359-60.
76. The civilian notion of patrimony is a way to conceptualize this legal
sphere that belongs exclusively to a person. Art. 2, para 1 CCQ states that “[e]very
person is the holder of a patrimony”. The legal sphere with which we are concerned, however, encompasses both patrimonial and extrapatrimonial rights.
77. The exercise of subjective rights is nonetheless subject to certain constraints, such as the duty of good faith, discussed above.
78. Cantin Cumyn, The Legal Power, supra note 13, at 355, referring to the
notion of prérogative finalisée put forth by EMMANUEL GAILLARD, LE POUVOIR
EN DROIT PRIVÉ paras 235-239 (Economica 1985). Such a description of legal
power may be contrasted with a “right as an unbounded prerogative [prérogative
laissée au libre arbitre].” Id.
79. Cantin Cumyn, The Legal Power, supra note 13, at 356.
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3. Loyalty Interpreted in Light of Legal Power
The duty of loyalty requires that the holder of legal powers exercises his powers in absolute accordance with the purpose for
which they were granted to him.80 The protection and the promotion
of the interests of the beneficiary (or beneficiaries) of the duty of
loyalty are subordinated to the holder’s (of legal powers) compliance with the aim of the powers with which he is vested.
A holder of legal powers who uses his powers to further a purpose other than that for which they were granted to him necessarily
breaches his duty of loyalty. This implies that the holder of legal
powers cannot exercise these prerogatives to pursue his own interests. 81 Indeed, as was mentioned above, legal power is necessarily
exercised in an other-regarding purpose.
The meaning of the duty of loyalty is grasped more easily when
distinguished from another notion, the duty to act with prudence and
diligence in the exercise of legal powers. 82
First, while the duty of loyalty is specific and exclusive to legal
power, the duty to act with prudence and diligence can also regulate
the exercise of subjective rights. 83 However, the standard of the reasonable person placed in the same circumstances—the reference in
determining whether one has displayed a prudent and diligent conduct—is necessarily higher for the holder of legal powers than for

80. Id. at 360-61.
81. Conflicts of interests will be discussed in the second part of this paper,
section 3.2.1.
82. Concerning the distinction between loyalty and prudence and diligence,
see Cantin Cumyn, The Legal Power, supra note 13, at 362-63; Caroline Pratte,
Essai sur le rapport entre la société par actions et ses dirigeants dans le cadre du
Code civil du Québec, 39 MCGILL L.J. 1, 48-49 (1994).
Note that the director of a legal person, the administrator of a property of another,
the employee and the mandatary are subject to a duty of prudence and diligence
under the CCQ (articles 322, para 1; 1309, para 1; 2088, para 1 and 2138, para 1).
83. For instance, according to art. 2100, para 1 CCQ, the provider of services—a titulary of subjective rights—is bound to act with prudence and diligence.

348

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 9

the titulary of subjective rights. 84 Indeed, unlike subjective rights,
legal powers must in essence be exercised in an interest other than
that of their holder. 85
Second and more importantly, unlike the duty of loyalty, the
duty of prudence and diligence is not concerned with the purpose of
the powers. Rather, it has to do with the way the holder of legal
powers exercises the prerogatives with which he is vested, rather
than the goal he pursues. 86 The duty of prudence and diligence requires that the legal powers be exercised with care and in a timely
manner, following the standard of the reasonable person placed in
the same circumstances. This implies that the holder of legal power
must always take active steps to protect and promote the interests of
the beneficiary. 87 However, it may happen that a holder of legal
powers does not act in time to protect the interests of the beneficiary
and, thus, acts negligently. Yet, this does not mean that the holder
of legal powers would thereby seek to further another purpose than
that for which he was granted powers. 88 It is therefore possible to be
in breach of the duty of prudence and diligence without being disloyal.
Returning to the duty of loyalty, as mentioned above, it is intrinsically linked to the purpose of the powers. More specifically, Professor Cantin Cumyn explains that a legal actor vested with powers
of representation must exercise his powers in accordance with the
84. Cantin Cumyn, The Legal Power, supra note 13, at 363. See also Cantin
Cumyn, De l’administration, supra note 75, at 213; CANTIN CUMYN & CUMYN,
supra note 13, at 251-52, para 273.
85. For this reason, it has been argued that the “reasonable person” may not
be the appropriate standard to determine whether a holder of legal powers had a
prudent and diligent conduct. While the “reasonable person” evokes the idea of a
rational and prudent person, it does not necessarily evoke the idea of a person who
acts (and therefore cares) for another. See ALEXANDRA POPOVICI, Le bon père de
famille in LES COULEURS DU DROIT 125, 134-38 (Bras Miranda et al eds., Éditions
Thémis 2010).
86. Pratte, supra note 82, at 49 (“l’obligation de diligence et de prudence vise
la mise en œuvre du pouvoir, alors que la loyauté garantit le respect de la finalité
du pouvoir”).
87. Cantin Cumyn, The Legal Power, supra note 13, at 363.
88. See Pratte, supra note 82, at 48 (referring at fn. 272 to Gaillard, supra
note 78, at para 150).
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purpose of these powers and in the best interest of the person represented, whereas a legal actor vested with autonomous powers must
primarily exercise his powers in the furtherance of the goal for
which he was granted powers. 89 Article 1309 CCQ, which sets out
the duty of loyalty of the administrator of the property of another,
encapsulates the nuance: “[the administrator] shall also act honestly
and faithfully in the best interest of the beneficiary or of the object
pursued.”
In the context of the exercise of autonomous powers, the meaning of loyalty may appear more nebulous. Indeed, autonomous powers may be granted for almost any purpose other than for the representation of a person 90 and this purpose may be rather open-ended—
such as in the administration of a trust patrimony or the liquidation
of a succession. Moreover, it is generally harder to identify the beneficiary in the context of the exercise of autonomous powers than it
is with powers of representation, and the beneficiary (or beneficiaries) is generally more remote. There may even be no beneficiary, for
instance in a trust. 91 However, in certain circumstances, the trust itself could be seen as a beneficiary. 92

89. In Professor Cantin Cumyn’s words: “[t]he person to whom powers of
representation have been attributed must necessarily act in the name and the exclusive interest of the person represented. The person to whom autonomous powers have been attributed exercises them to achieve the goal for which the powers
were granted in the first place” (supra note 13, at 360).
90. Professor Cantin Cumyn writes that “the potential purposes of an autonomous power are many and variable”, whereas “the purpose of a power to represent another is unique and invariable.” (Cantin Cumyn, The Legal Power, supra
note 13, at 360).
91. Unlike the common law, Québec civil law admits the possibility that there
be no trust beneficiaries: see Frédéric Zenati-Castaing, L'affectation québécoise,
un malentendu porteur d'avenir. Réflexions de synthèse, 48 REVUE JURIDIQUE
THÉMIS 623, 636 (2014).
92. See Cantin Cumyn, The Legal Power, supra note 13, at 362 (“the trust
itself should also be considered a beneficiary of the administration, despite the
fact that it is not a person”). Professor Cantin Cumyn also considers that the trust,
a patrimony by appropriation (art. 1261 CCQ), is a subject of rights, alongside the
person (natural or legal): Madeleine Cantin Cumyn, La fiducie, un nouveau sujet
de droit ? in MÉLANGES ERNEST CAPARROS 129 (Jacques Beaulnes et al. eds.,
Wilson & Lafleur 2002).
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The liquidation of a succession constitutes another illustration of
the remoteness (and multiplicity) of beneficiaries in the context of
the exercise of autonomous powers, 93 as the de cujus, whose will
must be respected, is deceased. It is also possible that there are future
heirs who have yet to be born.
Therefore, as regards autonomous powers, loyalty is best described as a duty to further the purpose for which one was granted
powers, rather than as a duty to act in the best interests of a beneficiary. Nonetheless, where autonomous powers are exercised, there
are persons who benefit from the fulfillment of the powers’ purpose.
In other words, the holder of legal powers who exercises autonomous powers is still acting in the legal sphere of others (e.g., whether
it is the trust, the beneficiaries of a trust or the beneficiaries of the
liquidation of a succession). Generally, such beneficiaries are just
more remote than the beneficiary of a power of representation.
The main requirements that stem from the duty of loyalty will
be discussed in the second part of this paper. 94 For the moment,
however, it is worth underlining that the administration of the property of others constitutes the Civil Code of Québec’s most elaborate
regime in this respect. 95 In addition to the requirements imposed
upon the four legal actors under a duty of loyalty, the administrator
of the property of another is under a duty to account and inform.96
More specifically, the administrator must “allow the beneficiary to
examine the books and vouchers relating to the administration”97

93. For a discussion relating to the identity of the beneficiaries in the liquidation of a succession, see Jacques Beaulnes, Regards croisés sur la saisine du liquidateur successoral in LA LIQUIDATION DES SUCCESSIONS 1 at 38, para 65 (Yvon
Blais 2009).
94. Section 3.2. These requirements are the duty to avoid conflicts of interests, to act with impartiality and not to mingle the property administered.
95. Cumyn, Les conflits d’intérêts, supra note 63, at 57-58.
96. See CANTIN CUMYN & CUMYN, supra note 13, at 297-302, paras 316-321,
375-391, 397-414.
97. Art. 1354 CCQ.
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and provide annual accounts that are sufficiently detailed. 98 The administrator must also provide a final account upon termination of his
position. 99
Professor Michelle Cumyn notes that these requirements are imposed specifically on the administrator of the property of another
because the administrator is rarely under the direct supervision of
the beneficiary of the duty of loyalty. 100 Indeed, as explained above,
the beneficiary in the context of the exercise of autonomous powers
is generally remote and may even be non-existent. Moreover, in
cases where the administrator of the property of another is vested
with powers of representation, the represented is either absent or affected by incapacity. 101 This implies that the beneficiary is unable
to effectively supervise the administrator. In such cases, the intervention of a third party, whom the Civil Code refers to as “interested
person,” 102 is often necessary to ensure that the powers are exercised
with loyalty, that is, in conformity with their purpose. 103 The duty
to account and inform thus facilitates surveillance of the administrator by interested persons, who may thereby take action more rapidly
if the administrator breaches his duty of loyalty.
Now that the way in which the duty of loyalty was integrated
into Québec civil law through the theory of legal power has been
explained, it is interesting to return to the common law, from which
the duty originates. As will be shown, a common law understanding
of the nature of loyalty can be surprisingly similar to a civilian one.

98. Articles 1351 and 1352, para 2 CCQ.
99. Art. 1363, para 1 CCQ.
100. Cumyn, Les conflits d’intérêts, supra note 63, at 57-58.
101. Id. at 58 (Professor Cumyn mentions the protection mandate, the management of the business of another, and the curatorship to the property of another).
102. Many provisions of the Civil Code found within the regime of the administration of the property of others allow an “interested person” to take action where
there is no existent beneficiary or where the beneficiary is unable to act: art. 1324,
para 1; 1330, para 2; 1333, para 2; 1352, para 2; 1360, para 2; 1363, para 2 CCQ.
103. This scheme, where a third party must step in to protect the interests of
another, departs from the typical structure of private law: Alexandra Popovici,
Êtres et avoirs. De l’existence de droits sans sujet en droit civil actuel (2015)
(unpublished doctoral thesis, Université Laval).
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4. A Common Law Perspective
A common law theory of fiduciary duties was recently formulated by Professor Paul B. Miller. 104 The parallel between Miller’s
account of fiduciary power and the theory of legal power described
above is striking. In both legal traditions, the legal actors under a
duty of loyalty do not exercise their prerogatives for themselves, on
their own behalf. This stands out as the determining element underlying loyalty. For present purposes, only a glimpse of Miller’s theory is presented.
Miller puts forth the idea that persons in everyday life exercise
means “by which [they] act purposively through law.” 105 For instance, he mentions that a person may “[enter into a] contract, . . .
inherit, . . . establish a trust [or] establish possessory interests in
property.” 106 Those means derive from what Miller calls “capacities” of a person, “capacities that are constitutive of [every person’s]
legal personality.” According to Miller, fiduciary duties arise when
one person exercises the legal capacities (or the means) of another. 107 In exercising the means of another person, fiduciaries act
as the person’s extension. 108 Miller justifies the fiduciary duty of
loyalty precisely on the basis of this substitutive 109 aspect of fiduciary powers; “[g]iven that fiduciary power is a means of the beneficiary, the interaction between fiduciary and beneficiary must be presumptively conducted for the sole advantage of the beneficiary.” 110
Finally, according to Miller, the means that fiduciaries exercise
affect what he calls the “practical interests” of the beneficiary. 111 He
104. Miller, supra note 4.
105. Id. at 1019.
106. Id. at 1019.
107. Id. at 1017: “[f]iduciary powers are legal capacities derived from the legal
personality of other persons, natural or corporate” and at 1021: “[f]iduciary power
is properly understood as a means belonging rightfully to the beneficiary.”
108. Id. at 1020.
109. Id. at 1019 (“[f]iduciary power is substitutive”) and at 1017 (“[i]n wielding [the fiduciary powers], the fiduciary stands in substitution for [the beneficiary]
within the ambit of the power”).
110. Id. at 1020.
111. Id. at 1015.
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explains that these practical interests relate to matters of right, personality, and welfare, which he describes as follows:
Matters of personality include aspects of the personality of
corporate or natural persons who lack legal capacity, including the determination of their ends. Matters of welfare include decisions bearing on the physical and psychological
integrity and well-being of natural persons. Matters of right
include decisions bearing upon the interests of corporate and
natural persons relative to their legal rights, duties, powers,
and liabilities, including those in relation to contract and
property. 112
Numerous parallels with the civil law can be drawn. The practical interests that may be affected by the exercise of fiduciary powers, as identified by Miller, are encompassed in the notions of patrimonial and extrapatrimonial rights in the civil law. In other words,
it can be said that the practical interests described by Miller are constitutive of the beneficiary’s legal sphere.
The notions of capacity and legal personality, fundamental to
Miller’s analysis, are also reminiscent of core concepts in the civil
law. Moreover, under Miller’s theory and in civil law, powers may
be understood in relation to legal capacity.
In Québec, one of the first articles in the Civil Code states that
persons possess juridical personality and have enjoyment of their
rights. The capacity to exercise civil rights 113 is a corollary to the
capacity to enjoy such rights, both of which are attributes of a subject of rights. In certain cases, however, the exercise of rights may
be delegated to another, either as a result of a contractual agreement

112. Id. at 1014.
113. Art. 4 CCQ provides that: “Every person is fully able to exercise his civil
rights. In certain cases, the law provides for representation or assistance.”
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or a statutory provision. 114 For instance, minors are, to a certain extent, incapable of exercising their rights. 115 The tutor, therefore, exercises his powers on behalf of the minor to palliate the latter’s incapacity. Thus, although power and capacity should not be conflated
in civil law, capacity cannot be dissociated from a subject of rights
because they are closely connected. Indeed, in civil law, the capacity
of a person to exercise his rights may be substituted with legal powers. 116
This brief overview reveals important commonalities between
civilian and common law understandings of the basis of loyalty. Under a civil law theory of legal powers as well as under Miller’s theory, the prerogatives exercised by a legal actor subject to a duty of
loyalty have a substitutive dimension. Under both accounts, loyalty
is tied to the fact that these prerogatives, whether we call them “legal
powers” or “means,” are not exercised on one’s own behalf, but for
an other-regarding purpose. Additionally, the interests that are susceptible of being affected by the exercise of these prerogatives are
comparable in civil and common law.
C. Conclusion
This first part aimed to invalidate the bases that are often erroneously attributed to loyalty in Québec and to the present true basis
of loyalty in civil law: legal power. Under a theory of legal powers,
loyalty is a duty to act selflessly in the sole furtherance of the purpose of the powers granted to a legal actor. Parallels were drawn
between the civilian notion of legal power and a common law understanding of fiduciary power, parallels which shed light on the fact

114. See art. 4 (2) CCQ above. See also CANTIN CUMYN & CUMYN, supra note
13, at 69-70, paras 73-76.
115. Art. 153, 155 CCQ. Likewise, legal persons are incapable of exercising
their rights on their own. Therefore, they act through their organs, which are composed of holders of legal powers such as directors (art. 311 CCQ). See CANTIN
CUMYN & CUMYN, supra note 13, at 69, para 72.
116. Id. at 70, para 76.
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that the prerogatives held by the legal actor under a duty of loyalty
are invariably exercised for an other-regarding purpose.
A simple way to conceptualize the juridical situation of a legal
actor under a duty of loyalty is through the idea of a legal sphere.
This legal sphere represents a person or a legal entity (such as a trust)
on the legal scene.
Traditionally, in civil law, a person is represented through her
patrimony. 117 However, under a duty of loyalty, when legal actors
exercise their legal powers with regard to matters relating to the person as well as to property, the idea of a legal sphere is more adequate. 118 Thus, in civil law, this legal sphere may be seen as encompassing both patrimonial and extrapatrimonial rights. In common
law, it encompasses the set of interests that may be affected by the
exercise of fiduciary power.
In Québec private law, a legal actor who acts within the legal
sphere of another exercises legal powers and is therefore held to a
duty of loyalty. Where powers of representation are exercised, the
legal sphere within which the holder of legal powers exercises his
prerogatives is that of the person represented. Because the holder of
legal powers acts in the legal sphere of another, the holder of legal
powers must embrace the other’s interests. As for autonomous powers, since they may be granted for a wide range of purposes and exercised in a variety of situations, the identification of the legal sphere
within which the powers are exercised will depend on the context.

117. Art. 2, para 1 CCQ states that “[e]very person is the holder of a patrimony.” The Paul-André Crépeau Centre for Private and Comparative Law defines
the patrimony as follows: “Universality of property and debts of which a person
is titulary or that is appropriated to a purpose recognized by law” (PRIVATE LAW
DICTIONARY – PROPERTY, supra note 70, sub verbo “patrimony”). The patrimony
was famously described as an “emanation of legal personality” by CHARLES
AUBRY & CHARLES-FRÉDÉRIC RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS 231 (Nicholas Kasirer trans., 4th ed. Marchai et Billard 1873); Nicholas Kasirer, Translating Part of France’s Legal Heritage: Aubry and Rau on the Patrimoine, 38 REVUE
GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT 379, 473 (2008).
118. Note however that originally, the concept of patrimony also encompassed
“innate” rights, which are now known as extrapatrimonial rights. Id. at 472.
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This understanding of loyalty is illustrated more concretely in
the next part of this paper. The juridical situation of legal actors subject to the duty of loyalty under the Civil Code of Québec, as well as
the ramifications of this duty in the Civil Code, will be examined.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE DUTY OF LOYALTY
In order to get a better picture of loyalty in Québec private law,
is it necessary to examine the landscape of the duty of loyalty in the
Civil Code of Québec. This part of the paper first discusses the juridical situation of the legal actors upon whom a duty of loyalty is
expressly imposed. Then, it highlights the core requirements of the
duty of loyalty. Lastly, it analyzes the restitution of profits, an interesting mechanism that enforces the duty of loyalty.
A. The Juridical Situation of the Legal Actors Under a Duty of
Loyalty
Under the Civil Code of Québec, the four categories of legal actors that are subject to a duty of loyalty involve holders of legal powers—legal actors who act within the legal sphere of another.
The juridical situation of the administrator of the property of another, having been discussed previously, will not be re-examined.
As for the mandatary and the director of a legal person, the fact that
they act within the legal sphere of another is easily conceivable.
Therefore, their situation will be analyzed only briefly. The largest
part of this section will thus be devoted to the employee, whose legal
situation is ambiguous in Québec private law.
1. The Mandatary and the Director of a Legal Person
In Québec, the mandate has always been associated with the idea
of acting for another. Under the Civil Code of Lower Canada, this

2016]

QUÉBEC

357

situation where a person acted for another was usually envisioned
through the paradigm of the mandate. 119
With the entry into force of the Civil Code of Québec, this paradigm shifted from the mandate to the administration of the property
of others. 120 While the mandatary under the previous code could accomplish many acts of administration—much like the actual administrator of the property of another—the mandatary can only perform
acts of representation under the Civil Code of Québec. 121
Typically, in a mandate, the mandator is substituted for the mandatary in the accomplishment of a juridical act, and the rights and
obligations that arise from this juridical act instantly form part of the
mandator’s legal sphere. 122 The Civil Code of Québec also provides
that the mandatary may perform juridical acts that concern the person of the mandator, and more specifically acts that relate to his protection or moral well-being. 123 For instance, the protection mandate

119. CANTIN CUMYN & CUMYN, supra note 13, at 31, para 36.
120. Id. at 47-48, para 56. Note, however, that for Professor Adrian Popovici,
the mandate was not completely superseded by the administration of the property
of others in this respect (ADRIAN POPOVICI, LA COULEUR DU MANDAT 344 (Éditions Thémis 1995) (“le mandat n’est plus seul; il a un rival ou un adjuvant, l’administration du bien d’autrui”).
121. Contrast art. 2130, para 1 CCQ:
Mandate is a contract by which a person, the mandator, confers upon
another person, the mandatary, the power to represent him in the performance of a juridical act with a third person, and the mandatary, by his
acceptance, binds himself to exercise the power. [emphasis added]
with art. 1701, para 1 CCLC: “Mandate is a contract by which a person, called the
mandator, commits a lawful business to the management of another, called the
mandatary, who by his acceptance obliges himself to perform it.” [emphasis added]
122. POPOVICI, LA COULEUR DU MANDAT, supra note 120, at 18 (“[l]e pouvoir
de représentation explique l’effet essentiel du mandat : le mandant est lié par contrat avec le tiers, de telle sorte que naissent directement dans son patrimoine des
droits et obligations du contrat conclu avec le tiers, avec les recours réciproques
directs contractuels résultant de ce contrat” [footnote omitted, emphasis in the
original]).
123. Art. 2131 CCQ provides that:
The object of the mandate may also be the performance of acts intended
to ensure the personal protection of the mandator, the administration, in
whole or in part, of his patrimony as well as his moral and material wellbeing, should he become incapable of taking care of himself or administering his property.
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requires that the mandator receives all the care required by his state
of health. 124
The Civil Code of Québec establishes a connection between the
mandate and the administration of legal persons such as business
corporations. Indeed, art. 321 CCQ assimilates the director of a legal
person to a mandatary. 125 However, it should be noted that unlike
the mandatary, the director can exercise autonomous powers,
namely when he administers the legal person as a member of the
board of directors. 126 In this case, the powers vested in the directors
are autonomous powers as they are to be used to see to the proper
operation of the business corporation. No representation is involved. 127
That said, regardless of the type of legal power exercised, the
director clearly acts within the legal sphere of another. He is the
means through which the legal person “comes to life.” The legal
person is legally incapable of exercising its own rights and therefore
acts through its organs, such as the board of directors. 128

See also Claude Fabien, Le nouveau droit du mandat in 2 LA RÉFORME DU CODE
CIVIL – OBLIGATIONS, CONTRATS NOMMÉS, TEXTES RÉUNIS PAR LE BARREAU DU
QUÉBEC ET LA CHAMBRE DES NOTAIRES DU QUÉBEC 881 at 889 (Presses de l’Université Laval 1993).
124. MICHEL BEAUCHAMP & CINDY GILBERT, TUTELLE, CURATELLE ET
MANDAT DE PROTECTION 345 (Yvon Blais 2014). However, according to Professor Michelle Cumyn, these mandates may be assimilated to instances of administration of the property of another due to the inability of the represented to supervise adequately the representative (Cumyn, Les conflits d’intérêts, supra note 63,
at 57-58).
125. Art. 321 CCQ:
A director is considered to be the mandatary of the legal person. He shall,
in the performance of his duties, conform to the obligations imposed on
him by law, the constituting act or the by-laws and he shall act within the
limits of the powers conferred on him.
126. Art. 311 CCQ: “Legal persons act through their organs, such as the board
of directors and the general meeting of the members.”
127. Cantin Cumyn, The Legal Power, supra note 13, at 358; Pratte, supra
note 82, at 41. However, individually, a director can of course be granted the
power to represent the legal person when he enters into a contract with a third
party, on behalf of the legal person (see id.).
128. Art. 311 CCQ. See Marcel Lizée, De la capacité organique et des responsabilités délictuelle et pénale des personnes morales, 41 MCGILL L.J. 131
(1995).
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2. The Employee
The juridical situation of the employee, on the other hand, is far
more equivocal. In fact, the employee is erroneously perceived as a
titulary of subjective rights—that is as acting in his own legal
sphere.
The conceptual difficulty when an employee is concerned has to
do with the fact that the employment contract is generally seen under
the perspective of the financial benefits it brings to the employee.
Therefore, the employee is perceived as acting in his own interests,
as a titulary of subjective rights. This is unsurprising as it is indeed
difficult to conceptualize that a person is under a duty to act selflessly when she is remunerated for her services.
However, the employee is not the only legal actor subject to a
duty of loyalty who is remunerated. The director, the mandatary, and
the administrators of the property of another are often paid. Lawyers
who accept the mandate 129 to represent clients and trustees are also
usually remunerated. 130 Yet, jurists recognize more willingly that
these legal actors exercise legal powers in the performance of their
functions. This may be due to the fact that the mandate and the administration of the property of another, unlike the employment contract, have a long history of gratuitousness. In this regard, it is interesting to briefly highlight certain historical elements.
The mandate and the administration of the property of another,
as they now exist in Québec civil law, originate from the Roman
mandatum. 131 Under the classical period of Roman law, the Roman
mandatum was performed gratuitously for a friend. 132 A monetary
counterpart for the accomplishment of the mandate would be given
129. More precisely, the contract between a lawyer and his client is of a hybrid
nature. It is both a mandate and a contract for services. See Bérocan inc c Masson,
[1999] RJQ 195 (Sup Ct).
130. Art. 1300 CCQ provides that as a general rule, the administrator of the
property of others is remunerated.
131. CANTIN CUMYN & CUMYN, supra note 13, at 11, para 9.
132. Id. at 12, para 9; JEAN GAUDEMET, DROIT PRIVÉ ROMAIN 272-73 (2d ed.,
Montchrestien 2000).
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only for the mandates performed for certain “honorable” 133 professions. However, this financial counterpart was not considered to be
a salary, but rather a token of gratitude for the service rendered. 134
Although the importance of the mandate’s gratuitous nature diminished throughout the ages, under the Civil Code of Lower Canada, the mandate, which then encompassed some forms of administration of the property of another, 135 was still presumed to be gratuitous. 136 Offices like that of trustee and liquidator of a succession
were also presumed to be gratuitous. 137 The mandate and the administration of the property of others have only recently been detached
from the idea of gratuitousness, and only to a certain extent. 138
However, in regard to the employee, the emphasis placed on the
benefits gained from the employment contract obscures the fact that
he is in reality acting in his employer’s legal sphere. The fact that
the employee’s duty of loyalty is sometimes described as a point of
equilibrium between his personal interests and that of his employer
shows the ambivalence of the jurists when it comes to determining
the nature of the employee’s status. 139 In other words, is the employee a titulary of subjective rights or a holder of legal powers? In

133. Id. at 273.
134. Id. REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN
FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVILIAN TRADITION 413-420 (2d ed., Clarendon Press
1996).
135. The mandate under the Civil Code of Lower Canada did not only encompass instances of representation arising out of a contractual agreement as it does
under the Civil Code of Québec; it encompassed all acts of management. Compare
art. 2130 CCQ with 1710 CCLC.
136. Art. 1702 CCLC.
137. See articles 981g and 910 (2) CCLC. See also CANTIN CUMYN & CUMYN,
supra note 13, at 171, para 179.
138. See art. 1300 CCQ (concerning the administration of the property of others) and 2133 CCQ (concerning the mandate). However, following art. 2133
CCQ, the mandate between two natural persons is still presumed to be gratuitous.
139. See e.g. Louise Dubé & Gilles Trudeau, supra note 23, at 54 (“[o]n voit
à quel point l’obligation d’honnêteté et de loyauté intervient à un point de tension
entre les intérêts légitimes, mais divergents, des parties à la relation de travail”);
MORIN ET AL., LE DROIT DE L'EMPLOI AU QUÉ BEC 247 (4th ed., Wilson & Lafleur
2010) (“[l]es parties pourront délimiter l’équilibre que devra respecter le salarié
entre ses intérêts et ceux de l’employeur”).
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the performance of his functions, does he act within his own legal
sphere or that of his employer?
Certainly, when a person decides to enter into an employment
contract, she is acting as a titulary of subjective rights as she is exercising her right to work 140 and is certainly driven by her own personal interests, including the desire to earn a salary. The same is true
of the lawyer who accepts a mandate or the trustee who accepts the
office of trustee. The remuneration offered might have influenced
their undertaking. Nonetheless, in the course of their functions, these
legal actors exercise legal powers and act within the legal sphere of
another.
Likewise, the employee certainly acts within the legal sphere of
another when he performs tasks in the course of his employment
contract. Indeed, the employee has the power to alter the patrimonial
situation of his employer. He may, for instance, conclude contracts
on behalf of his employer. Even the employee who does not perform
juridical acts on behalf of his employer can modify the latter’s patrimonial situation. Namely, because the employee acts within the
legal sphere of his employer, the Civil Code of Québec provides that
the employer is liable for the injuries caused by his employee. 141 In
fact, under the Civil Code, it is in the very nature of the contract of
employment for the employee to act “according to the instructions

140. Id. at 234.
141. Art. 1463 CCQ: “The principal is bound to make reparation for injury
caused by the fault of his agents and servants in the performance of their duties;
nevertheless, he retains his remedies against them.” Originally, art. 1054 CCLC,
from which art. 1463 CCQ derives, was inspired by the master-servant relationship. By holding the master responsible for the acts of his servants, it was expected
that the master would choose his servants wisely. In other words, liability was
imposed upon the master because the actions performed by his servants were a
direct consequence of his choice of servants. Thus, art. 1054 CCLC considered
that some persons, such as servants or employees, were mere executors. The same
premise probably underlies art. 1463 CCQ. On the history of art. 1054 CCLC, see
JEAN-LOUIS BAUDOUIN ET AL., 1 LA RESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE: PRINCIPES
GÉNÉRAUX 809, para 814 (8th ed., Yvon Blais 2014).
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and under the direction or control of another person, the employer.” 142 The employee truly is, to borrow Professor Miller’s
words, acting as an “extension” of his employer.
Thus, the Civil Code of Québec imposes a duty of loyalty upon
all employees, indistinctively, although the intensity of this duty
may vary. 143 Regardless of the functions he performs, the employee
does not act within his own legal sphere, but rather within that of his
employer. Employees therefore exercise legal powers; their interests
are subsumed under that of their employer. As a matter of fact, Québec case law recognizes that employees must act in the best interests
of their employer. 144
In short, the key is to distinguish the circumstances in which a
person acts within her own legal sphere from those where she acts
within the legal sphere of another. Loyalty is not a point of balance
between two sets of interests. Rather, there are discrete spheres: in
one, the person acts as a titulary of subjective rights and is under no
duty of loyalty. In the other, the person vested with legal powers is
subject to a duty of loyalty because she acts in the legal sphere of
another.
It must also be emphasized that the situation in which a legal
actor acts within the legal sphere of another does not amount to a
mere interference with this sphere, “from the outside;” the substitutive dimension of legal power discussed previously must be kept in
mind.
For instance, although the contractor and the provider of services
may affect the legal sphere of another, they do not alter this legal

142. Art. 2085 CCQ.
143. The intensity of the obligation essentially is a doctrinal and jurisprudential construct pertaining to the defences available to a defendant, which are fewer
and narrower in scope as the obligation grows in intensity. On the intensity of the
obligation, see PAUL-ANDRÉ CRÉPEAU, L’INTENSITÉ DE L’OBLIGATION
JURIDIQUE, (Yvon Blais 1989).
144. See e.g. Concentrés scientifiques Bélisle, supra note 10, at para 39; Jenner, supra note 10, at para 147; Lanctôt, supra note 10; Pro-quai, supra note 10,
at para 36.
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sphere from within. 145 Indeed, they are not exercising a legal prerogative on behalf of or for the benefit of another under the course
of their functions. They accomplish the tasks in their own name, albeit upon request of their client. To borrow Miller’s words again,
they do no act as “extensions” of the titulary of the legal sphere that
they alter when performing their functions. 146 Therefore, their interest is not completely absorbed into that of the client. This explains
why, unlike the four legal actors upon whom the Civil Code of Québec explicitly imposes a duty of loyalty, other legal actors such as
the contractor and the provider of services are not subject to a duty
of loyalty under Québec private law.
Now that it is established that all four legal actors under a duty
of loyalty act within the legal sphere of another, we will explain the
obligations that flow from the duty of loyalty. These requirements
are ways through which the Civil Code ensures that a legal actor
who acts within another’s legal sphere pursues the sole purpose of
his powers in a selfless manner.
B. Facets of Loyalty
As explained previously, the duty of loyalty requires that the legal actors under this duty act in an other-regarding purpose, more
specifically in the best interest of the person they represent (or of a
goal). This duty has various facets entrenched in the Civil Code of
145. Art. 2098 CCQ describes the contract of enterprise or for services as follows:
A contract of enterprise or for services is a contract by which a person,
the contractor or the provider of services, as the case may be, undertakes
to another person, the client, to carry out physical or intellectual work or
to supply a service, for a price which the client binds himself to pay to
him.
146. See BAUDOUIN ET AL., supra note 141, at 834, para I-867:
L’entrepreneur exécute le travail à ses risques, de la manière dont il l’entend et, en général, avec ses propres instruments. L’article 2099 C.c. précise, en effet, qu’il conserve le libre choix des moyens d’exécution et
qu’aucun lien de subordination n’est créé par la convention . . . . L’entrepreneur reste maître de l’exécution du travail, même si le cocontractant, en raison de son intérêt au succès de l’entreprise, conserve un droit
de surveillance générale.
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Québec. They indicate how legal actors, who are in the atypical juridical situation where they act within the legal sphere of another,
must behave in order to abide by their duty of loyalty. The main
facets, as identified by Professors Cantin Cumyn and Cumyn, are
the prohibition against conflicts of interests, the obligation to act
with impartiality when there is more than one beneficiary, and the
obligation not to mingle the property administered with one’s
own. 147 The facets of the duty of loyalty will be analyzed along those
same lines.
1. Conflicts of Interests
The four legal actors upon whom the Civil Code of Québec imposes a duty of loyalty must not place themselves in a situation of
conflict of interests. Simply put, a situation of conflict of interests is
one in which the legal actor subject to a duty of loyalty could be
tempted to prioritize his personal interest or that of a third party over
that of the beneficiary. 148
Given that legal powers are, in essence, prerogatives that must
be exercised in the interest of a represented or in the furtherance of
a purpose, 149 holders of legal powers must not act in their personal
interest 150 or in any interest that is not related to the accomplishment
of the purpose for which they were granted powers. 151 Put another
way, when acting in the legal sphere of another, a legal actor must
embrace the sole interests of that other. Therefore, a holder of legal
147. Professors Cantin Cumyn & Cumyn also mention the duty to render accounts, which has already been discussed above in section 2.3 (supra note 13, at
284, para 301).
148. FRANCE HÉBERT, L’OBLIGATION DE LOYAUTÉ DU SALARIÉ 50 (Wilson &
Lafleur 1995). Regarding the notion of conflict of interests in Québec private law,
see also Cumyn, Les conflits d’intérêts, supra note 63.
149. Cantin Cumyn, The Legal Power, supra note 13, at 360-61.
150. Even when the holder of legal powers himself is a beneficiary of the administration—for instance where the trustee is also a beneficiary of the trust or
where the liquidator of a succession is also an heir—he must not favour his own
interests over that of the other beneficiaries (art. 1310, para 2 CCQ). See CANTIN
CUMYN & CUMYN, supra note 13, at 285, para 303.
151. Cantin Cumyn, The Legal Power, supra note 13, at 361.
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powers may not favour any other interest, including his own. Thus,
the rule against conflicts of interests incontestably is the most fundamental facet of loyalty. 152
The prohibition against conflicts of interests is explicitly codified where the director, 153 the mandatary, 154 and the administrator
of the property of another are concerned. 155 The employee’s duty of
loyalty is established in art. 2088 CCQ, 156 but the Civil Code of Québec says little concerning its facets. Nonetheless, the literature and
case law recognize the employee’s duty to avoid conflicts of interests. 157
Not only are conflicts of interests prohibited, but the legal actors
under a duty of loyalty must also declare any interest that could potentially lead to a situation of conflict of interests. 158 The potential
source of conflict of interest being disclosed simplifies the beneficiary’s surveillance of the legal actor subject to a duty of loyalty.

152. Likewise, in common law, Miller states that “[the duty of loyalty] has
minimum core content consisting of the conflict rules” (Miller, supra note 4, at
978).
153. Art. 324, para 1 CCQ: “A director shall avoid placing himself in any situation where his personal interest would be in conflict with his obligations as a
director.”
154. Art. 2138, para 2 CCQ: “[The mandatary] shall avoid placing himself in
a position where his personal interest is in conflict with that of his mandator.”
155. Art. 1310, para 1 CCQ: “No administrator may exercise his powers in his
own interest or that of a third person or place himself in a position where his
personal interest is in conflict with his obligations as administrator.”
156. Art. 2088, para 1 CCQ: “[T]he employee is bound . . . to act faithfully
and honestly and not to use any confidential information he obtains in the performance or in the course of his work.”
157. HÉBERT, supra note 148, at 50 (“[l]’obligation de loyauté défend à l’employé de se placer en situation de conflit d’intérêts, c’est-à-dire dans une situation
qui lui permettrait de faire primer ses intérêts ou ceux d’une tierce partie au détriment des intérêts de son employeur”); MORIN ET AL., supra note 139, at 358. See
also Hasanie c Kaufel Group Ltd, 2002 CanLII 8334 (Sup Ct); Labrecque c Montréal (Ville de), 2009 QCCRT 0283 (available on CanLII); Pierro c Allstate Insurance Company, 2005 QCCA 1165 (available on CanLII).
158. Art. 324, para 2 and 1311 CCQ. The rule is not entrenched in the Civil
Code of Québec where the employee and the mandatary are concerned, but it is
recognized by courts and commentators: see MORIN ET AL., supra note 139, at 358
(concerning the employee); Risi c Fologex Ltée, JE 96-1767 (Sup Ct); 91453 Canada inc c Duquette, JE 91-598 (Sup Ct) (concerning the mandatary).
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The other ramifications of the rule prohibiting conflicts of interests vary depending upon the legal regime. However, they can be
grouped into two major categories: rules prohibiting self-dealing activities and rules prohibiting personal usage of the property or information under the control of the legal actor subject to the duty of
loyalty. Naturally, profits deriving from such personal usage are also
prohibited. 159
The second category of rules is a simple manifestation of the
prohibition of conflicts of interests, where the subject matter is property or information. 160 In other words, a legal actor under a duty of
loyalty must not favour his personal interests by using property or
information from the legal sphere of another to his own ends.
As for the category of rules prohibiting self-dealing, it is interesting to point out that while the administrator of the property of
another and the mandatary cannot, in principle, be parties to a contract which involves the property administered 161 or which relates to
an act the mandatary has agreed to perform, 162 the principle is reversed where the director of a legal person is concerned. Paragraph
one of article 325 CCQ provides that “[the] director may, even in
carrying on his duties, acquire, directly or indirectly, rights in the
property under his administration or enter into contracts with the legal person.” 163 As the late Yves Caron pointed out, this rule, which
may not be conceivable in other settings, is justified by the reality in
which legal persons, such as business corporations, operate—that is,

159. Articles 323, 1314 and 2146, para 1 CCQ. As for the employee, art. 2088,
para 1 CCQ provides that he must not “use any confidential information he obtains
in the performance or in the course of his work.” Otherwise, the legal actors must
return the profits obtained. This will be discussed in section III-C.
160. In common law, this is known as the no-profit rule. Lionel Smith, The
Motive, Not the Deed in RATIONALIZING PROPERTY, EQUITY AND TRUSTS: ESSAYS
IN HONOUR OF EDWARD BURN 53 (Joshua Getzler ed., LexisNexis 2003) (“[t]he
‘no-profit’ rule requires the fiduciary to avoid making any profit out of the fiduciary relationship, except where expressly authorized by the constitutive act (such
as the deed of trust), or by the court” at 55).
161. Art. 1312, para 1 CCQ.
162. Art. 2147 CCQ.
163. Art. 325, para 1 CCQ.
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typically a competitive environment dominated by the idea of
profit. 164 Moreover, given that directors are often also shareholders,
Caron has argued that it would be counterproductive to prohibit directors from having any interest in the legal person. 165
That being said, it must be emphasized that article 325 CCQ is
not inconsistent with the duty of loyalty. On the contrary, the director’s lawful conclusion of contracts with the legal person and his
acquisition of rights in the property under his administration are conditional to his divulgation of the acquisition or contract. 166 Otherwise, the act may be annulled and the profit remitted to the legal
person. 167
2. Impartiality
A legal actor may be vested with the power to act in a plurality
of legal spheres, concurrently, if there is more than one beneficiary—for instance if a legal actor acts as a mandatary on behalf of
various individuals. In these cases, the duty of loyalty requires that
the legal actor act with impartiality toward each of the beneficiaries.
Professor Cantin Cumyn explains that this rule is similar to, and is
in fact inspired by, the common law even-hand rule, which requires
the fiduciary to act in the best interests of all of the beneficiaries.168

164. “L’abus de pouvoir en droit commercial québécois” (1978) 19 C de D 7
at 12-13:
[M]algré le devoir de loyauté, il n’est pas possible—ni même souhaitable
—d’interdire à l’administrateur tout conflit d’intérêts avec la corporation. Comment prohiber ces conflits dans un système capitaliste où l’esprit de l’entrepreneur doit nécessairement s’associer avec l’idée de profit
et où l’administrateur est souvent un actionnaire (important) de la corporation ?
165. Id.
166. Art. 325, para 2 CCQ.
167. Art. 326 CCQ.
168. CANTIN CUMYN & CUMYN, supra note 13, at 289, n. 966, referring to
WATERS’ LAW OF TRUSTS IN CANADA 1023-1027 (Mark Gillen & Lionel D.
Smith eds., 4th ed. Carswell 2012).
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In the Civil Code of Québec, this rule is entrenched where the
administrator of the property of another and the mandatary are concerned. 169 The duty to act impartially flows from the fact that each
of the beneficiaries is entitled to the loyalty of the administrator or
mandatary. 170 Therefore, no beneficiary must be prioritized over another. This rule does not set aside the duty to act in the best interest
of the beneficiary (of the duty of loyalty). Rather, through the duty
to act impartially, the interests of the beneficiaries with conflicting
or potentially conflicting interests are safeguarded.
3. Mingling of Property
Another facet of the duty of loyalty specifically concerns the legal actors whose function it is to manage property that is not their
own, such as directors of a legal person, trustees, and, more generally, any administrator of the property of another. 171 This facet of
loyalty requires that a separation be kept at all times between the
property administered and the administrator’s 172 own property. In
other words, a clear distinction between the content of the holder of
legal powers’ and the beneficiary’s respective legal spheres must be
maintained.
According to Professor Cantin Cumyn, the rule against the mingling of property requires that the holder of legal powers take appropriate measures to let third parties know that he is not the owner
of the property. 173 Namely, this facet of loyalty allows the personal
169. Articles 1317 CCQ and 2143, para 1 CCQ.
170. CANTIN CUMYN & CUMYN, supra note 13, at 289, para 307.
171. Art. 323 CCQ states that the director of a legal person may not “mingle
the property of the legal person with his own property”. Likewise, art. 1313 CCQ
mentions that the administrator of the property of another may not “mingle the
administered property with his own property.”
172. The term “administrator” is used here to designate all legal actors who
manage property, and not simply the administrator of the property of others.
173. Professors Cantin Cumyn & Cumyn mention that these measures may
include the opening of a distinct bank account for the sums of money administered
by the holder of legal powers. With respect to immovable property, the name of
the person who manages a given property in her quality of administrator should
be registered in the Land register of Québec (CANTIN CUMYN & CUMYN, supra
note 13, at 292-97, paras 311-15).
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creditors of the holder of legal powers to know that the property they
manage is not their own, meaning they cannot be paid upon it. 174
The rule against the mingling of property is also a way for the
beneficiary and interested parties to keep track of the property administered. An illicit transfer of property from the beneficiary’s legal sphere to that of another (including, of course, the administrator’s own) would indeed be contrary to the duty of loyalty.
The obligation not to mingle the property administered, along
with the prohibition against conflicts of interests, and the obligation
to act with impartiality, presented above, constitute core aspects of
the duty of loyalty entrenched in the Civil Code of Québec. The next
and last part of this paper examines restitution of profits, which can
be seen as yet another requirement that flows from the duty of loyalty, or as a sanction for disloyalty. As will be shown, restitution of
profits corroborates the understanding of loyalty set forth in this paper.
C. Restitution of Profits
In common law, disgorgement of unauthorized profits, through
the constructive trust mechanism, is a classic fiduciary remedy. 175
As a matter of fact, in certain countries, the success or failure of
the transplant of the common law fiduciary duty of loyalty has been

174. Holders of legal powers are not in a debtor-creditor relationship of obligation with respect to the third parties with whom they interact when exercising
their powers. Therefore, art. 2644 CCQ, which mentions that “[t]he property of a
debtor is charged with the performance of his obligations and is the common
pledge of his creditors,” is of no application in such situations. See also id. at 293,
para 312.
175. LEONARD I. ROTMAN, FIDUCIARY LAW 717-23 (Thomson Carswell
2005). Concerning the constructive trust, see generally Robert Chambers, Constructive Trusts in Canada, 37 ALTA. L. REV. 173 (1999); MALCOM COPE,
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS (Law Book Co 1992); A.J. OAKLEY, CONSTRUCTIVE
TRUSTS (3d ed., Sweet & Maxwell 1997); Leonard I. Rotman, Deconstructing the
Constructive Trust, 37 ALTA. L. REV. 133 (1999); DONOVAN W.M. WATERS Q.C.,
THE CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST (Tholone Press 1964); GILLEN & SMITH, supra note
168, at 477-564 (chapter 11).
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attributed to the availability of the disgorgement of profits remedy,
which reveals its importance. 176
The constructive trust may be foreign to the civil law, 177 but restitution of profits appears as its functional equivalent in Québec private law. 178 Although this mechanism has yet to be explored, understanding loyalty as a duty that arises where one person acts within
the legal sphere of another helps to understand restitution of profits. 179
1. Description of Restitution of Profits
Under the terms of the Civil Code of Québec, the director of a
legal person, 180 the administrator of the property of another and the
mandatary must return the profits obtained in the performance of

176. Hideki Kanda & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Re-Examining Legal Transplants:
The Director's Fiduciary Duty in Japanese Corporate Law 51 AM. J. COMP. L.
887, 896 (2003); Rebecca Lee, Fiduciary Duty Without Equity: ‘Fiduciary Duties’ of Directors Under the Revised Company Law of the PRC, 47 VA. J. INT’L
L. 897, 908 (2007) (in a corporate law setting). Disgorgement of unauthorized
profits has been described as a “fiduciary remedy” (id. at 908).
177. This may be because “[c]ivilian systems, as a general rule, are more careful to distinguish property and obligation than is the common law” (BRUCE
WELLING, LIONEL SMITH & LEONARD I. ROTMAN, CANADIAN CORPORATE LAW:
CASES, NOTES & MATERIALS (4th ed., LexisNexis Canada 2010) at 396). Another
possible explanation is that the constructive trust requires the exercise of considerable judiciary discretion, whereas the civil law traditionally implements a structured legal framework which confines the tribunals’ discretionary power within
fairly strict parameters (Aline Grenon, La fiducie in ÉLÉMENTS DE COMMON LAW
CANADIENNE: COMPARAISON AVEC LE DROIT CIVIL QUÉBÉCOIS 187 at 235 (Louise
Bélanger-Hardy & Aline Grenon eds., Thomson Carswell 2008)).
178. See Lefebvre c Filion, 2007 QCCS 5912, [2008] RJQ 145. See also Cumyn, Les conflits d’intérêts, supra note 63, at 60-62; Didier Lluelles, La bonne foi
dans l’exécution des contrats et la problématique des sanctions 83 CAN. BAR REV.
181, 211-213 (2004).
179. It must be pointed out, however, that restitution of profits under the Civil
Code of Québec does not uniquely sanction breaches of the duty of loyalty. For
instance, the possessor in bad faith must return profits: art. 931, para 2 CCQ.
180. Art. 326, para 1 CCQ provides that the director of a legal person may be
ordered to return the profit or benefit realized if he is involved in an acquisition
or a contract with the legal person and “fails to give information correctly and
immediately [to the legal person]” regarding this acquisition or contract.
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their functions. 181 Although the Code does not offer anything explicit in regard to the employee, the courts have not been reluctant
to order employees to remit their profits. 182
Restitution of profits is one of the sanctions for the breach of the
duty of loyalty. 183 It is sometimes assimilated to a form of non-compensatory damages, along with punitive damages. 184 The non-compensatory damages sanction “faults” that do not necessarily result in
a loss for the “victim.” 185 Punitive damages, as the name suggests,
aim to punish the wrongdoer. As for restitutionary damages, although they may have an incidental punitive aspect, they aim to return to the victim a profit of which he has been deprived, but which
does not necessarily amount to a loss per se. 186
181. The codal provisions that impose restitution upon the mandatary and the
administrator of the property of another go even further: they require that “all that
[is] received in the performance of [their] duties be returned” (art. 1366, para 1
CCQ and 2184, para 1 CCQ) [emphasis added]. For instance, in Lefebvre c Filion,
supra note 178, the Superior Court of Québec ordered a real estate broker who
acted as a mandatary to hand over to his client a building which he bought for
himself rather than for his client, in breach of his duty of loyalty. In this decision,
the Court drew parallels with a famous common law case heard by the Supreme
Court of Canada, Soulos v Korkontzilas, [1997] 2 SCR 217. Thus, in Québec private law, restitution does not only target profits obtained in violation of a duty of
loyalty, but also immovable property such as buildings.
182. In Kuet Leong, supra note 23, the Supreme Court ruled that an employee
can be bound to return profits, regardless of whether he may be assimilated to a
mandatary (at 436). This decision was rendered under the Civil Code of Lower
Canada, but it remains relevant today. See also, under the Civil Code of Québec,
LNS Systems Inc c Allard, 2001 CanLII 25020 (Sup Ct), rev’d on other grounds
(sub nom Abbas-Turqui c LNS Systems Inc) 2004 CanLII 26082 (CA).
183. Professor Cumyn has identified four categories of sanctions for the breach
of the duty of loyalty in Québec’s jus commune: specific performance, removal
from office, nullity of the act accomplished without powers, and damages. This
last category of sanctions can be divided into compensatory damages and restitution of profits. Cumyn, Les conflits d’intérêts, supra note 63, at 58-62.
184. Geneviève Viney, La condamnation de l’auteur d’une faute lucrative à
restituer le profit illicite qu’il a retiré de cette faute in MÉLANGES JEAN-LOUIS
BAUDOUIN 949 at 952 (Yvon Blais 2012).
185. Id. A parallel may be drawn between the illicit action and the action which
gives rise to restitution of profits. Both generate liability without being constitutive of a fault per se since the “victims” suffer no loss as a result of these actions:
see MARIÈVE LACROIX, L’ILLICÉITÉ. ESSAI THÉORIQUE ET COMPARATIF EN
MATIÈRE DE RESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE EXTRACONTRACTUELLE POUR LE FAIT
PERSONNEL 179 (Yvon Blais 2013).

186. Cumyn, Les conflits d’intérêts, supra note 63, at 60; Viney, supra note
184, at 958. The facts of a Supreme Court of Canada case, Kuet Leong, supra note
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It is interesting to point out, however, that it may be questioned
whether the restitution of profits truly is a form of damages or a
sanction. According to Professors Smith and Berryman,
[i]n both common law and Québec civil law, in situations
where one person is managing the property or affairs of another, in a fiduciary capacity, improper gains must be surrendered, although it is arguable that the law ascribes rights
acquired by the manager to the principal as the correct legal
implementation of the parties’ relationship, rather than as a
remedy for wrongdoing. 187
In other words, rather than a sanction for disloyalty, restitution
could be seen as a mechanism that enforces the duty of loyalty
through the rightful allocation of profits in situations where a legal
actor acts within the legal sphere of another. 188 More specifically,
given that holders of legal powers act within the legal sphere of another, it appears logical that they should not keep for themselves,
but rather return to that other legal sphere whatever they have obtained through the exercise of their prerogatives. Under this perspective, restitution of profits may be seen, first and foremost, as a mere
requirement deriving from the duty of loyalty, independent of any
breach. 189

23, provide an example of such a situation; in Kuet Leong, a bank trader made
significant profits through the unauthorized use of a client’s account and as a result of private arrangements he had made with some of the bank’s clients. Although the bank suffered no loss per se as the transactions were in any case illegal,
the Court nonetheless ordered the trader to remit the profits he had thereby realized.
187. Lionel Smith & Jeff Berryman, Disgorgement of profits in Canada in
DISGORGEMENT OF PROFITS: GAIN-BASED REMEDIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD
281 (Ewoud Hondius & André Janssen eds., Springer 2015) [emphasis added].
188. In common law, although Professor Smith’s “sphere of fiduciary management” is different from the legal sphere described in this paper, he conveys a
similar idea regarding the attribution of profits: “[i]t is not possible, within the
logic of such a relationship, for the fiduciary lawfully to extract wealth from the
sphere of fiduciary management (except as authorized). On the contrary, everything in that sphere is attributed to the beneficiary” (Smith, supra note 3, at 150)
and “as in all fiduciary relationships, the law attributes property and opportunities
arising from the sphere of fiduciary management to the beneficiary” (id. at 158).
189. See Smith & Berryman, supra note 187, at 281, 295.
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To have a better understanding of the relation between restitution of profits and loyalty, we will discuss a case study.
2. Restitution in Relation to Loyalty
Abbas-Turqui c Labelle Marquis Inc., 190 a case heard by the
Québec Court of Appeal, examines the meaning of acting in another’s legal sphere and discusses the difference between restitution
and other sanctions. As will be shown in this case, restitution of
profits was not deemed the appropriate sanction. Nevertheless, this
case is especially instructive as to the relation between the duty of
loyalty and restitution of profits.
In this decision, the Court of Appeal overturned the previous decision of the Superior Court ordering an employee to hand over the
profits he had obtained through the performance of a competitive
activity which, according to the Superior Court, amounted to a
breach of loyalty.
The facts were the following. An employee, named Abbas-Turqui, had concluded a sale on behalf of his own company rather than
for his employer. The sale concerned military equipment similar to
that which the employer sold. Abbas-Turqui had conducted the sale
in breach of a non-competition clause that was part of his employment contract. To arrange the sale, Abbas-Turqui used his employer’s fax, telephone, and computer equipment.
In its judgment, the Court of Appeal first discarded the argument
that there had been misappropriation of a business opportunity. 191
The Court then rightfully held that restitution of profits was not the
appropriate sanction. The Court briefly distinguished the case from
Kuet Leong, 192 a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of Canada
190. 2004 CanLII 26082 (CA) [cited to CanLII].
191. The Court held that the contract had been attributed to Abbas-Turqui’s
company because of his personal contacts—or more specifically, those of his partner. Additionally, according to the Court, there was no proof that the employer
would have obtained this particular contract had Abbas-Turqui’s company not
existed (id. at para 14).
192. Supra note 23.
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that introduced the restitution of profits as a sanction for disloyalty
in Québec, even before the current Civil Code entered into force. 193
In Kuet Leong, a trader employed by a bank reaped substantial
profits through the unauthorized use of a client’s account, and as a
result of private arrangements he had made with some of the bank’s
clients. In doing so, the bank trader was acting in his quality194 of
employee, while using funds made available by the bank and with
the complicity of clients he knew due to his employment contract
with the bank. Ultimately, the trader was ordered to remit to the bank
the profits he had gained through his disloyal transactions.
Contrary to the situation in Kuet Leong, in Abbas-Turqui c Labelle Marquis Inc., the employee had not earned personal profits
while using funds made available by his employer, nor had he made
his profits while acting as a representative of his employer. 195 Therefore, according to the Court of Appeal, Abbas-Turqui could not be
ordered to return his profits on these bases. The Court thus modified
the quantum of damages to match the injury suffered by the employer instead of the profits earned by Abbas-Turqui. 196 In other
words, restitution of profits was replaced by compensatory damages.
This case shows that the mere use of the property of another is
insufficient to consider that a legal actor is acting within the legal

193. For a critical analysis of Kuet Leong, see Cumyn, Les conflits d’intérêts,
supra note 63, at 62; Claude Massé, Chronique de droit civil québécois : session
1988-89, SUPREME CT. L. REV. (2d) 325, 335 (1990).
194. In French, the expression ès qualités indicates that a person is not acting
on her own behalf, but in the exercise of her functions. See Office québécois de la
langue française, Banque de dépannage linguistique, online: BDL <http://bdl
.oqlf.gouv.qc.ca/bdl> sub verbo Ès qualité (“[l]a langue juridique a conservé un
emploi bien vivant de ès dans l’expression ès qualités, qui est suivie ou non d’un
complément. Cette expression qualifie une personne qui agit dans le cadre de ses
fonctions, selon les qualités propres à sa fonction, et non à titre personnel”). See
e.g. art. 1344 CCQ.
195. Abbas-Turqui c Labelle Marquis Inc., supra, note 190, at paras 12-13.
That said, the Court of Appeal still implicitly recognized that the employer is entitled to restitution of profits where the employee reaps profits while using the
funds of the employer or when acting as his representative.
196. The Court held that the loss suffered by the employer corresponded to the
value of the services that Abbas-Turqui had devoted to his own business: id. at
para 16.
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sphere of another. Unlike the situation in Kuet Leong, in which the
profits earned by the trader were attributable to his employment contract with the bank, Abbas-Turqui had not been “acting in a representative capacity for the appellant, carrying on its business.” 197 Indeed, although Abbas-Turqui did use his employer’s fax, telephone
and computer, he did not conduct the sale in his quality of employee,
while acting within the legal sphere of his employer. To use the
words of Professor Miller, whose theory was previously outlined,
the employee was not exercising the “means” of his employer. 198
Rather, Abbas-Turqui was acting in his own legal sphere and
thus could not be in breach of a duty of loyalty in this situation.
However, he remained bound to a non-competition agreement. This
raises another distinction, between the duty of loyalty and the notion
of non-competition.
Abbas-Turqui c Labelle Marquis Inc. shows that it is possible
not to breach a duty of loyalty but to breach a non-competition
agreement. As established above, Abbas-Turqui was not acting
within his employer’s legal sphere when he conducted the contentious sale. He therefore could not have been in breach of a duty of
loyalty. He did, however, conclude a contract in the same area of
activity as his employer, which his employment contract prohibited.
Thereby, he breached his non-competition agreement. 199
Such a situation can be explained as follows. While non-competition relates to the duty of loyalty in that it is often imposed on a
legal actor who must respect the duty of loyalty, non-competition is
nonetheless a distinct concept. Non-competition is imposed on a legal actor who acts within his own legal sphere. In other words, it
regulates the exercise of subjective rights as opposed to legal pow-

197. Kuet Leong, supra note 23, at 436.
198. Miller, supra note 4, at 1020.
199. It should be noted however that, unlike the Superior Court, the Court of
Appeal does not mention the non-competition agreement that was signed between
Abbas-Turqui and his employer. Regarding the non-competition agreement, refer
to the Superior Court’s decision, 2001 CanLII 25020 at para 28.
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ers. Although no duty of loyalty attaches to the exercise of subjective rights, it can be modulated by certain legal 200 or contractual limitations such as non-competition agreements.
Compensatory damages are generally appropriate to sanction the
conduct of a legal actor who acts within his own legal sphere, as a
titulary of subjective rights. Indeed, subjective rights are not exercised on behalf of another and the person who exercises her rights
acts in her own legal sphere, within which she is the only sovereign.
Therefore, a titulary of subjective rights is generally bound to compensate another person only to the extent of her wrongful interference in that other person’s legal sphere. This wrongful interference
is measured in terms of loss or injury. Thus, in general, compensatory damages adequately sanction breaches of duties that are attached to the exercise of subjective rights, such as non-competition
agreements. This explains why compensatory damages, rather than
restitution of profits, were appropriate in Abbas-Turqui c Labelle
Marquis Inc. 201
Conversely, holders of legal powers are not sovereign in the
sphere in which they exercise their powers, which have an otherregarding purpose. Therefore, they may not, in principle, 202 appropriate anything that comes from the legal sphere of another. Restitution of profits is thus especially adapted to their situation.
D. Conclusion
This second part of the article provided an examination of loyalty within the context of the Civil Code of Québec. First, it showed
how each legal actor under a duty of loyalty acts within the legal
sphere of another. Even the employee, who clearly benefits from his

200. Such as good faith.
201. Supra note 190, at para 16.
202. There are exceptions to this principle. See, for instance, art. 325, para 1
CCQ, which allows the director of a legal person to “acquire, directly or indirectly,
rights in the property under his administration”. The director must, however, inform the legal person of the acquisition or contract (art. 325, para 2 CCQ).
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employment contract because of the salary he receives, nevertheless
acts within the legal sphere of his employer.
Second, the various requirements deriving from the duty of loyalty were presented. They aim to ensure that the legal actor under a
duty of loyalty does not exercise the prerogative with which he is
vested in his own interest. Two of these requirements, in particular,
illustrate how the Civil Code deals with the dual personality of legal
actors under a duty of loyalty who are, in the course of their functions, acting in the legal sphere of another (as holders of legal powers) and not in their own (as titularies of subjective rights). More
specifically, these legal actors must avoid conflicts of interests and
maintain a separation between their personal legal sphere and that
within which they exercise their powers.
Finally, this article explored restitution of profits, a mechanism
whose relation to loyalty is best understood when one thinks of loyalty as a duty that arises where a legal actor acts within the legal
sphere of another.
IV. GENERAL CONCLUSION
Various elements such as trust and good faith are often thought
to underlie the duty of loyalty entrenched in the Civil Code of Québec. However, the latter’s only accurate juridical basis under Québec private law is the notion of legal power.
The duty of loyalty is inherent to the exercise of legal powers,
which amounts to the power to act within the legal sphere of another.
Where a legal actor acts within the legal sphere of another—as opposed to his own legal sphere—he does not act on his own behalf
and, therefore, he may not act in his personal interests, but in an
interest other than his own. Therein lies the duty of loyalty.
Loyalty is therefore a duty of selflessness. 203 It is more than a
mere duty to take into account the interests of another. It is a duty to
203. Cantin Cumyn, L’exercice de pouvoirs, supra note 39 (“[l]e pouvoir, intrinsèquement circonscrit par la finalité en vue de laquelle il est conféré, n’est
jamais destiné à servir l’intérêt de celui qui est autorisé à l’exercer” at 246). In
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further the sole purpose for which one was granted legal powers. A
legal actor’s furtherance of the purpose of the powers vested in him
ensures the protection and the promotion of the interests of the beneficiary of the duty of loyalty.
Finally, in an interesting closing of the loop, the theory of loyalty
presented in this paper can also be helpful in order to clarify some
aspects of the law of fiduciary obligations, from which Québec’s
duty of loyalty originates. For instance, there is still a fair amount of
uncertainty surrounding the foundations of the constructive trust, a
classic fiduciary remedy. Open-ended elements such as “good conscience,” 204 deterrence, 205 or the absence of “factors which would
render [its] imposition . . . unjust” 206 have been invoked to justify
the imposition of a constructive trust.
However, the understanding of loyalty set forth in this paper
rests upon a sound legal basis. Following this understanding, the
constructive trust could be seen as a fiduciary mechanism that comes
into play where a person appropriates something originating from
the legal sphere of another, while she is vested with the power to act
within that other’s legal sphere. In such a situation, it stands to reason that such a misappropriated thing be returned, in its entirety, to
the legal sphere from which it stems.

common law, see Smith, Can We Be Obliged to Be Selfless?, supra note 3; Smith,
Fiduciary Relationships, supra note 2 (“fiduciaries [are] people who are required
to exercise their judgement in an unselfish way” at 608).
204. ROTMAN, supra note 175, at 220-221 (“[t]he majority’s imposition of a
constructive trust in Soulos [is] premised on ‘good conscience’ ”; “[t]he wording
of the majority in Soulos clearly indicates that the . . . primary focus is to remove
the property from the agent rather than to award it to his client” at 220-21, discussing Soulos, supra note 181).
205. ROTMAN, supra note 175, at 719-20. See La Forest J’s majority judgment
in Hodgkinson v Simms, supra note 18, at 208-209. For a criticism of deterrence
as a justification for fiduciary remedies in common law, see Smith, supra note 2,
at 627.
206. Soulos, supra note 181, at 241. This is the fourth of four criteria for the
imposition of a constructive trust, as formulated by the Supreme Court of Canada
in Soulos.

BOOK REVIEW
LEONE NIGLIA, THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW:
A CRITIQUE OF CODIFICATION
(Hart Publishing Ltd., Oxford 2015)
Reviewed by Agustín Parise ∗
The path towards a harmonized private law in Europe is being
signposted. Copious literature has developed on the different signposts, and Leone Niglia offers an innovative approach to a number
of these in The Struggle for European Private Law. His approach
focuses on the codification phenomenon. He attends mainly what he
refers to as the “European code-texts,” 1 which consist of the Draft
Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) and its “synthetic version,” 2
the Common European Sales Law (CESL); these can be considered
the two most recent signposts in that path. The CESL, however, was
put on hold in December 2014 when the European Commission presented the Work Programme 2015 and withdrew the CESL, even
when it had attained a favorable first reading before the European
Parliament.
The book offers a critique of the conventional understanding of
codification. Codification finds its origins in Europe, where it developed significantly during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Codification advocated for a new presentation and form of laws
which would replace existing provisions, while grouping different
areas in an organic, systematic, clear, accurate and complete way. 3

∗ Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, Maastricht University (The Netherlands); LLB, LLD, Universidad de Buenos Aires (Argentina); LLM, Louisiana
State University (USA); PhD, Maastricht University.
1. LEONE NIGLIA, THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: A
CRITIQUE OF CODIFICATION 5 (HART PUBLISHING LTD. 2015).
2. Id. at 5.
3. 1 LUIS DIEZ-PICAZO & ANTONIO GULLON, SISTEMA DE DERECHO CIVIL
51 (1982); 1 ARTURO ALESSANDRI RODRIGUEZ & MANUEL SOMARRIVA
UNDURRAGA, CURSO DE DERECHO CIVIL 49 (1945); and Genaro R. Carrio, Judge
Made Law Under a Civil Code, 41 LA. L. REV. 993, 993 (1981).
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In addition, codification suggested the laying out of a plan with terminology and phraseology. 4 Codification continued to evolve
worldwide during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Jurisdictions continued to amend and replace the texts of their codes, adapting them to their particular societies. In Europe, a new challenge
currently goes beyond the adaptation to changes in a particular society; rather, the challenge focuses on adaptation to the changes in
the European Union as a whole. The current exploration of harmonization in Europe aims for a private law that is able to bridge national and regional scopes. 5
In the Prologue, Niglia conveys the idea that the legislature is
regarded as the engine behind modern codification. Codes are considered as the statutes par excellence. However, his book refers to
two main components behind the codification phenomenon: legislation (thesis) and scholars and judges (nomos); in other words, statute
and jurisprudence. Both components shape the codification phenomenon. Niglia, therefore, advocates for an invitation to look at the
“surrounding community of interpreters.” 6 The book attends the interplay of those interpreters, since their role helps explain the success or failure of some of the signposts on the path towards a harmonized private law in Europe. As explained in the Prologue, his
book is divided into four chapters. The first deals with the top-down
perspective of how the proposed European code-texts were shaped
in the context of the European Union legislative process. The remaining three chapters offer a bottom-up perspective from the viewpoint of the different interpreters.
The first chapter, entitled Code, offers an overview of the path
towards a harmonized private law in Europe since the late 1980s.
4. Jean Louis Bergel, Principal Features and Methods of Codification, 48
LA. L. REV. 1073, 1084-85 (1988).
5. Agustín Parise, Civil Law Codification in Latin America: Understanding
First and Second Generation Codes, in TRADITION, CODIFICATION AND
UNIFICATION 183 (J.M. Milo, J.H.A. Lokin, & J.M. Smits eds., Intersentia Ltd.,
2014).
6. NIGLIA, supra note 1, at 3.

2016]

BOOK REVIEW

381

The author naturally focuses on the DCFR and the CESL, due to
their recent stature. However, Niglia notes that such efforts target
unification, rather than solely focusing on harmonization of private
law in Europe. His description of the path extends from the Lando
Principles to the DCFR. In that path he emphasizes that there are
elements of continuity, yet there are also significant elements of discontinuity. In that first chapter, he further attends how the Acquis
Communs of the Lando Principles were fused with the Acquis Communautaire. He searches for examples in a number of directives, initially the Unfair Terms Directive. The European code texts entail,
according to Niglia, a move towards universalization and disciplining interpretation. That universality is somehow similar to the one
irradiating from nineteenth-century codes. Yet, that universalization
is questionable for Niglia, since there is a lack of transparency requirements, and it entails an inherent radicality. Furthermore, that
European code text entails the emergence of an “official” legal
grammar, something that was also present in nineteenth-century
codification. He notes that grammaticalism may help implement
policy choices that would impose from the thesis top-down on to the
nomos. Niglia acknowledges that there are other forces involved,
however, since the nomos interacts with the codes and forms a holistic movement beyond the legislature. Therefore, codification goes
beyond the letter of the law, beyond what the legislature states. Accordingly, there seems to be a need to “investigate the wider private
law world” 7 to fully grasp the extent of codification. Indeed, codification shapes the way jurists study, interpret, and apply the law; 8
but, jurists can also shape codification. Codes exist in environments
that reject or accept them. There are interplays that enrich the life of
each codification effort, and this shows that codification is dynamic,
and it feeds on the interpretations that the different actors make.

7. NIGLIA, supra note 1, at 39.
8. Parise, supra note 5, at 184.
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The second chapter, entitled Jurisprudence, aims to demonstrate
that the codification struggle is between the legislature and nomos.
The struggle goes beyond a European code text and the national
codes, and a fundamental understanding of that struggle helps fully
grasp the extent of the path towards harmonization. Niglia claims
that the efforts towards a European code text aim to impose a disciplinary interpretation on the nomos, and this explains the move from
harmonization to unification that a code would entail. Central to this
chapter is the movement of the nomos away from the nineteenthcentury code ideology, first at a national and then at a European
level, mainly during the first half of the twentieth century. Niglia
considers that the European code text would serve as a tool to terminate the divergent interpretation made by the nomos, hence imposing a disciplining interpretation. This would ultimately jeopardize the jurisprudential diversity in Europe in relation to private law
matters and terminate the contingent points of authority that emerge
from the structures of private law jurisprudence. Niglia then claims
that, during the last half century, private law developed a pluralist
and politicized nature, linked to the interaction, again, of thesis and
nomos. The former plays a role mainly through special legislation
and de-codification; and the latter by the constitutionalization of private law, which tends to derive into a jurisprudential de-codification. After all, nomos offers the required context in which thesis develops. This pluralism also developed beyond national borders, exceeding the domestic level and extending to the European sphere.
This chapter furthermore offers insights, as other parts of the book,
on codification, de-codification, and re-codification. These are three
fundamental concepts used to build and fully comprehend the path
towards a harmonized private law in Europe.
The third chapter, entitled Code vs Jurisprudence, aims to
demonstrate that the European code texts, mainly represented by the
CESL, denote an assault on the pluralistic structure of private law as
reflected by nomos. As hinted before, Niglia emphasizes that the
struggle is not between national codes and a European code text, but
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rather, between the European code text and nomos (domestic and
European). He claims that the codes are no longer as strong as they
used to be (especially when compared with the nineteenth-century),
but rather, these codes affected by de- and re-codification have
given place to nomos (domestic and European), which is now threatened by the European code texts. Niglia illustrates his claim by addressing two main polemics. The first relates to the role and number
of the principles as initially inserted in the Interim Outline Edition
of the DCFR, and the second relates to the critique of the inconsistencies and defects in drafting raised by a number of German scholars, amongst others Horst Eidenmüller and Reinhard Zimmermann,
to that same edition of the DCFR. Continuing with his claim, in that
same chapter, Niglia indicates that the CESL would impose a barrier
to the development and survival of private law nomos, since constitutional synthetization would be obstructed. The living constitutional values on which nomos developed would be threatened, subject to de-constitutionalization and finally, experience re-constitutionalization. The chapter follows with arguments put forward to explain that potential assault (now dormant) of the CESL on the pluralistic structure of private law nomos. Plural re-creations would be
eliminated, according to Niglia, if the European code text would be
implemented, since interpretation, both monistic and grammaticalist, would be circumscribed to the CESL. Nomos would, therefore,
turn to this new European code text, leaving behind the living and
diverse developments experienced in past decades. The question,
thus, revolves around what actors should do when facing the potential shift in a codification that aims to “erase the existing private
law.” 9
The fourth chapter, entitled Jurisprudence vs Jurisprudence, repeats the call of looking at codification also from the perspective of
nomos. Niglia offers a number of historical experiences to demonstrate that the understanding of a code also depends of nomos. The
9. NIGLIA, supra note 1, at 104
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support, acceptance, and rejection of thesis by nomos marks the fate
of each codification endeavor. Amongst the examples offered to
convey this claim, Niglia mentions—of special interest for this journal–the tendency in the legal community of the state of Louisiana to
de-emphasize the Digest of 1808 after its enactment. 10 The constitutionalization of private law offers another argument for the important role of nomos, since codes lost their place in the center of
the solar system due to de-codification. De-codification has an impact on codes, and it has been said that:
the civil law tradition has long been portrayed as a solar system where everything not found in the civil code, which is
the sun or central star, gravitates around it, and is inspired
and interpreted on the basis of the light it sheds on the planets
that revolve around it. De-codification weakens the system,
and multiplies special statutes, revolving loosely like shapeless meteors. 11
Niglia emphasizes that codes, due to the constitutionalization of
private law and de-codification, are no longer placed by nomos at
the center of the solar system. He further states the need to be aware
of the role of nomos in the legislative enterprises in order to fully
comprehend the current understanding of codification. The European code texts are a result of the interaction of the divergent nomos.
Identifying and understanding these nomos helps understand and explain the European code texts. This interaction between thesis and
nomos is, according to Niglia, what ultimately places the current European code texts as clogs in a chain of codification that started more
than 200 years ago. Ultimately, this chapter explores in-depth the
nomos behind the European code texts. This exploration aims to un-

10. For more information about the resistance to the Digest of 1808 in Louisiana, see RICHARD H. KILBOURNE JR., A HISTORY OF THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE
62-63 (reprint of the 1987 edition, 2008); and Agustín Parise, The Place of the
Louisiana Civil Code in the Hispanic Civil Codifications: Inclusion in the Comments to the Spanish Civil Code Project of 1851, 68 LA. L. REV. 823, 833 (2008).
11. Olivier Moréteau & Agustín Parise, Recodification in Louisiana and
Latin America, 83 TUL. L. REV. 1103, 1110 (2009).
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veil a struggle between nomos and nomos, as opposed to solely between nomos and thesis. Codification, as claimed by Niglia, results
from struggles between scholars: struggles in which the decisions of
the sovereign are not absent.
Niglia concludes his argumentation with an Epilogue. There, he
highlights the value of codes as both contingent governmental tools
and epistemic tools that result from the interplay of divergent nomos. In the Epilogue, he also repeats that the current European code
texts are clogs in the codification chain. There, Niglia also provokes
interesting lines of thought by means of two additional questions.
First, should the European code texts recreate strong forms of sovereignty opposing domestic contexts that had developed through
codification? Second, what would be the authority of a European
code text? A final, yet not less important note, is made by Niglia,
emphasizing the risk that a European code text could bring to the
socialization of private law that has taken place since the early twentieth century. Neglecting the nomos and the constitutionalization of
private law could have a negative impact on the collective, considering socialization as an achievement which offered a change in paradigm from the liberal conception.
The book walks readers through the different claims of Niglia,
step-by-step, unveiling his path of argumentation. Chapters are enriched with contemporary examples (e.g., European Union directives, court decisions) and examples extracted from legal history
(e.g., codification in Prussia and France, the Thibaut-Savigny debate). The book offers an innovative approach, while also bringing
to the codification table elements from comparative law, legal history, constitutional law, and private law.
The Struggle for European Private Law succeeds in broadening
the traditional view on codification. The literature in the area tends
to focus on the legislative aspects of codes. Attention to the work of
scholars and judges (nomos) is often not given the necessary attention. Further, the literature tends to overlook how the work of scholars and judges has an impact on the life of codes and the codification
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phenomenon as a whole. The awareness now offered by this book
offers a viewpoint that goes beyond the signposts, and such awareness could be applied to future signposts when pursuing further the
harmonization of private law in Europe. Signposts are to come, and
this work by Niglia should be considered when erecting new signposts. Nomos should not be overlooked. It is an important component in the codification phenomenon, one that should not be neglected. In the words of Niglia, his book aims to contribute to “the
much needed refinement of the private law discourse towards engagement and responsibility.” 12 The mission has been accomplished.

12. NIGLIA, supra note 1, at vii.

